Judgment Rajiv Sharma, J. This regular second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned Addl. District Judge, (FTC) Hamirpur, H.P., dated 19.4.2005, passed in Civil Appeal No.98 of 1999/109 of 2004. 2. “Key facts” necessary for the adjudication of this regular second appeal are that the appellants-plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) instituted a suit for declaration to the effect that they were tenants over the land measuring 43 kanals out of the land comprised in Khata No. 46, Khtoni No. 53, 54, Khasra Nos. 382 min, 382 min plots 2 measuring 111 kanals 12 marlas, situated in Tika Tilla, Mouza Hathol, Tehsil Nadaun, Distt. Hamirpur, H.P., as per jamabandi for the year 1989-90 and in the alternative decree for possession. According to the plaintiffs, one Sh. Nihalu son of Bhajnu grandfather of the plaintiffs was tenant at will on payment of rent under the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents-defendants (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) over the suit land comprised in Khata No. 11 min, Khatoni No. 22, Khasra Nos. 230 min, measuring 57 kanals, 13 marlas, situated in Tika Tilla, Mouza Hathol, Tehsil Nadaun, Distt. Hamirpur, H.P., as per jamabandi for the year 1915-16. The plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of late Nihalu son of Bhajnu. It was further averred that even later on late Sh. Nihalu, grandfather of the plaintiffs was shown as a tenant on payment of rent under the ancestors of defendants, namely, Shankar etc. as per jamabandi for the year 1923-24. The plaintiffs had earlier filed a suit titled as Santu versus Dharmu regarding 14 kanals 13 marlas. According to the plaintiffs, the suit land now remains only 43 kanals 13 marlas. The suit was decided by the learned Sub Judge, Hamirpur on 7.11.1978. The appeal was decided by the learned District Judge, Hamirpur on 5.5.1982 and the Regular Second Appeal preferred against the judgment and decree dated 5.5.1982 was decided alongwith the Cross Objections on 20.8.1992 vide Ext. DA. The suit was decided by the learned Sub Judge, Hamirpur on 7.11.1978. The appeal was decided by the learned District Judge, Hamirpur on 5.5.1982 and the Regular Second Appeal preferred against the judgment and decree dated 5.5.1982 was decided alongwith the Cross Objections on 20.8.1992 vide Ext. DA. The defendants in collusion with the revenue staff got reduced the tenancy land and only 18 kanals 13 marlas of land in suit was shown under the tenancy of ancestors of the plaintiffs though the plaintiffs and their ancestors continued to cultivate the same as tenants on payment of rent and the reduction of area under the tenancy of the plaintiffs and their ancestors from 57 kanals 13 marlas to 18 kanals 13 marlas was illegal, null and void. It is further averred that again in 1951-52, the area under the tenancy of ancestors of plaintiffs was reduced to 14 kanals 13 marlas without any lawful order from any authority. 3. The suit was contested by the defendants. According to them, the suit was barred by principles of res judicata. No replication was filed by the plaintiffs. The following issues were framed on the pleadings of the parties by the learned Sr. Sub Judge, Hamirpur on 5.8.1994: “1. Whether the suit is barred by the principles of res judicata ? OPD. 2. Whether this Court has the jurisdiction to try this suit ? OPP. 3. Relief.” 4. The learned Senior Sub Judge, Hamirpur, dismissed the suit on 16.8.1999. The plaintiffs, feeling aggrieved, preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, Hamirpur, H.P. The learned District Judge, Hamirpur, dismissed the same on 19.4.2005. Hence this Regular Second Appeal. 5. The RSA was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 20.7.2005: “1. Whether the assumptions of the court below that the suit was barred by principles of res-judicata and order 2 rule 2 is sustainable in law when neither the pleadings of the previous suit nor the issues framed therein nor the judgment and decree had been placed on record? 2. Whether in view of admitted tenancy of the plaintiff and their not being ejected in accordance with law and in view of the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act, 1953 and the provisions of the H.P. Land Tenancy Act, the plaintiff/appellant had become owners of the land and the suit was liable to be decreed ?” 6. Mr. Mr. Rajnish K. Lall, Advocate, appearing vice for the appellants, on the basis of the substantial questions of law framed, has vehemently argued that both the Courts below have come to the wrong conclusion that the suit was barred by principles of res-judicata. He then contended that his clients have become owners of the land as per the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act, 1953 and the provisions of the H.P. Land Tenancy Act. On the other hand, Ms. Devyani Sharma, Advocate, for the defendants has supported the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below. 7. Since the substantial questions of law are interconnected, they are being discussed together to avoid repetition of discussion of evidence. 8. I have heard the learned Advocates for the parties and gone through the judgments and records of the case carefully. 9. PW-1 Premu has testified that the land in suit is 43 kanals which they have been cultivating from the time of their ancestors. Their ancestors were tenant at will. The defendants never came in possession of the suit land nor they have ever ejected them from the suit land. Their ancestors used to give half produce to the owners as rent and now they have sown wheat over the same. They have never received any notice for correction of the entries nor their statements were ever recorded and about two years ago, the defendants picked up a quarrel in order to take possession and then only they came to know about the wrong entries. 10. PW-2 Bhagwan Singh and PW-3 Bidhi Chand have corroborated the statement of the plaintiff. The plaintiffs have also proved on record the copy of jamabandi for the year 1989-90 Ext. P-1, copy of jamabandi for the year 1915-16 Ext. P-2, copy of jamabandi for the year 1923-24 Ext. P-3, copy of jamabandi for the year 1939-40 Ext. P-4, copy of jamabandi for the year 1951-52, Ext. P-5, copy of jamabandi for the year 1965-66 Ext. P-6 and copy of rapat rojnamcha dated 30.3.1965 Ext. P-7 in order to show that they have been coming in possession as tenant at will from the time of their ancestors. 11. P-3, copy of jamabandi for the year 1939-40 Ext. P-4, copy of jamabandi for the year 1951-52, Ext. P-5, copy of jamabandi for the year 1965-66 Ext. P-6 and copy of rapat rojnamcha dated 30.3.1965 Ext. P-7 in order to show that they have been coming in possession as tenant at will from the time of their ancestors. 11. DW-1 Dharmu has deposed that they are three brothers, having 111 kanals 12 marlas of land in this Tikka and the land measuring 14 kanals 13 marlas remained under the tenancy of three tenants Santu, Palu and Premu. They filed suit for ejectment of tenants. They became the owners of the land in suit in 1955-56. The three tenants were ejected on 30.3.1965. They took the possession of the land in suit in 1966-67. They were cultivating the suit land. 12. DW-2 Ram Dass deposed that the defendant Dharmu is in the possession of the suit land. The defendants have proved copy of judgment of this High Court dated 20.8.1992 Ext. DA, copy of rapat rojnamcha dated 2.10.1967 Ext. D-1, copy of order of registrar K-1 of Collector, Hamirpur Ext. D-2, copy of application for ejectment Ext. D-3 and Ext. D-4 copy of judgment of the Sub Judge, Hamirpur dated 7.11.1978 Ext. D-5 to prove that the plaintiffs and their ancestors were tenants over the 14 kanals 13 marlas land and not over 57 kanals 13 marlas. 13. The plaintiffs have categorically averred in para 4 & 5 of the plaint that they have earlier filed suit titled as Santu Vrs. Dharmu qua 14 kanals 13 marlas. The litigation has come up to this Court. The learned Sub Judge, Hamirpur, passed the judgment and decree dated 7.11.1978. The appeal preferred before the learned District Judge was decided on 5.5.1982 and thereafter, the RSA was decided by this Court from the judgment and decree dated 5.5.1982 on 20.8.1992. The plaintiffs have also admitted in para 7 of the plaint that later on in 1951-52, the area under the tenancy of ancestors of plaintiffs has been reduced to 14 kanals 13 marlas without any lawful orders. The earlier suit was filed qua 14 kanals 13 marlas. In case they were in possession of 57 kanals 13 marlas, as claimed by them, they would have filed suit qua 57 kanals 13 marlas. The earlier suit was filed qua 14 kanals 13 marlas. In case they were in possession of 57 kanals 13 marlas, as claimed by them, they would have filed suit qua 57 kanals 13 marlas. It is reiterated that the plaintiffs have specifically stated in para 7 that the area was reduced to 14 kanals 13 marlas in 1951-52. This was challenged by them in the suit which has attained finality up to this Court. In view of this, the plaintiffs could not file the suit for remaining land of 43 kanals on the principles of res judicata read with order 2 Rule 2 CPC. The earlier suit bearing No. 205 of 1978 was between the same parties qua the same subject matter of the suit land which found the subject matter of Civil Suit No. 98 of 1993. 14. Their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai (Dead) by LRs and others vrs. Mohd. Hanifa (Dead) by LRs and others., reported in AIR 1976 SC 1569 , have held that before the plea of res judicata can be given effect to, the following conditions must be proved: (1) That the litigating parties must be the same; (2) That the subject matter of the suit also must be identical; (3) That the matter must be finally decided between the parties, and (4) that the suit must be decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction. 8. In the instant case according to the plaintiffs/respondents, the identity of the subject-matter in the present suit is quite different from the one which was adjudicated upon in the suits which formed the basis of the previous litigation. In our opinion the best method to decide the question of res judicata is first to determine the case of the parties as put forward in their respective pleadings of their previous suits, and then to find out as to what had been decided by the judgments which operate as res judicata. Unfortunately however in this case the pleadings of the suits instituted by the parties have not at all been filed and we have to rely upon the facts as mentioned in the judgments themselves. It is well settled that pleadings cannot be proved merely by recitals of the allegations mentioned in the judgment. Unfortunately however in this case the pleadings of the suits instituted by the parties have not at all been filed and we have to rely upon the facts as mentioned in the judgments themselves. It is well settled that pleadings cannot be proved merely by recitals of the allegations mentioned in the judgment. We would also like to note what the High Court has said on the question of res judicata. The High Court found that although the litigation between the parties lasted for a pretty long time it was never decided whether all or any of the suit properties constituted a public trust. Both the parties appear to have taken extreme stands but even despite the fact that the previous judgments contained an incidental finding that the mosque was a public property and so was the burial ground, the effect of these findings was nullified in 1939 when the High Court held that even if the properties in dispute were the exclusive properties of the Labbais, this expression was not meant to indicate that they were their private properties. This, in our opinion, clearly shows that the public charcter of the wakf or of the mosque was never in issue. The High Court on this point found as follows: "We are, therefore, of the view, that the issue as to whether the properties constituted a public trust having been never raised and decided between the parties in any of the prior suits, O.S. No. 9 of 1956 on that question was not barred by res judicata. The finding of the Court below in this regard is affirmed." The Trial Court had also negatived the plea of res judicata taken by the defendants.” 15. In the present case, the litigating parties are the same, the subject matter of the suit was identical and the matter had been finally decided between the parties by the court of competent jurisdiction. The issue involved in the subsequent suit was directly and substantially involved in the earlier suit bearing No. 205 of 1978. The cause of the action was also the same. Mr. Rajnish K. Lall, Advocate, for the plaintiffs could not satisfy the Court as to why the whole claim was not included in the earlier suit bearing No. 205 of 1978. The cause of the action was also the same. Mr. Rajnish K. Lall, Advocate, for the plaintiffs could not satisfy the Court as to why the whole claim was not included in the earlier suit bearing No. 205 of 1978. The plaintiffs were bound to include the whole claim while filing Civil Suit No. 205 of 1978 and in case he has not included the same, it would be deemed to have been relinquished and this afterwards he could not sue in respect of the portion so omitted and relinquished. 16. In the case of Satyadhan Ghosal and others vrs. Smt. Deorajin Debi and another, reported in AIR 1960 SC 941 , their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held that the principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. When a matter, whether on a question of fact or on a question of law, has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. It has been held as follows: “7. The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter whether on a question of fact or on a question of law-has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where s. 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where s. 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct. 8. The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Does this however mean that because at an earlier stage of the litigation a court has decided an interlocutory matter in one way and no appeal has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher court cannot at a later stage of the same litigation consider the matter again ?” 17. Their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M. Nagabhushana vrs. State of Karnataka and others, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 408 , have held that it is a fundamental principle sustaining the rule of law in ensuring finality of litigation. It prevents the approaching of courts for re-agitating same issues which have already been finally decided between the parties. In the absence of such principles great oppression might be caused in pretext of law and there would be no end to litigation. Rich and malicious litigant will succeed in vexing his opponent by repetitive suits and actions resulting in weaker party to relinquish his rights. It has been held as follows: 12. The principles of Res Judicata are of universal application as it is based on two age old principles, namely, 'interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium' which means that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and the other principle is `nemo debet bis vexari, si constat curiae quod sit pro una et eademn cause' meaning thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the Court that it is for one and the same cause. This doctrine of Res Judicata is common to all civilized system of jurisprudence to the extent that a judgment after a proper trial by a Court of competent jurisdiction should be regarded as final and conclusive determination of the questions litigated and should for ever set the controversy at rest. 13. That principle of finality of litigation is based on high principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle great oppression might result under the colour and pretence of law in as much as there will be no end of litigation and a rich and malicious litigant will succeed in infinitely vexing his opponent by repetitive suits and actions. This may compel the weaker party to relinquish his right. The doctrine of Res Judicata has been evolved to prevent such an anarchy. That is why it is perceived that the plea of Res Judicata is not a technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which sustains the Rule of Law in ensuring finality in litigation. This principle seeks to promote honesty and a fair administration of justice and to prevent abuse in the matter of accessing Court for agitating on issues which have become final between the parties. 17. It may be noted in this context that while applying the principles of Res Judicata the Court should not be hampered by any technical rules of interpretation. It has been very categorically opined by Sir Lawrence Jenkins that "the application of the rule by Courts in India should be influenced by no technical considerations of form but by matter of substance within the limits allowed by law". [See Sheoparsan Singh Vs. Rammanandan Prasad Singh, (1916) 1 I.L.R. 43 Cal. 694 at page 706 (P.C.)].” 18. Now, as far as the plea of tenancy under the Punjab Security of land and Tenure Act, 1953 and H.P. Land Tenancy Act is concerned, neither there are pleadings to this effect nor evidence has been led. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 19. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.