JUDGMENT : Aravind Kumar, J. 1. These two appeals have been admitted on 14.07.2014 to consider the following substantial questions of law: "1. Whether the courts below are justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs even though the plaintiffs have failed to prove the relationship of the landlord and tenant? Whether the courts below erred in giving the finding on issue No. 1 especially when the defendant has seriously disputed the relationship? 2. Whether the courts below are justified in decreeing the suit in spite of the fact that the plaintiffs have not produced any piece of evidence to prove that they are the owners of the building in question? 3. Whether the courts below are justified in discarding the clear admission made by PW-1 that the plaintiffs are not the owners of the premises in question? Whether the trial court is justified in rejecting the counterclaim made by the defendant in spite of the fact that the plaintiffs miserably failed to prove the ownership? ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW: i) Whether Courts below were justified in decreeing the suit though schedule described in the plaint does not contain the boundaries? OR Whether plaint schedule is in conformity with Order VII Rule 3 CPC?" 2. Facts in brief which has led to filing of these two appeals are as under: "Plaintiffs instituted a suit for ejectment against defendants contending inter alia that they are the landlords of commercial premises as described in the schedule to the plaint(for short 'Suit Schedule Properties') on a monthly rent of Rs.8,000/- and Rs.3,750/- respectively. It was contended that since suit schedule premises measures 4600 sq. ft. and 2300 sq. ft. respectively and the provisions of Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 would not be applicable, plaintiffs had got issued legal notice terminating tenancy and calling upon the respective defendants to quit, vacate and hand over vacant possession of suit schedule premises which notice was duly served on the defendants and replied admitting entering into lease agreement with the plaintiff but contending that the plaintiffs had misrepresented with regard to the ownership of suit schedule premises and as such they are not entitled to initiate any proceedings against defendants. As such two suits came to be filed by the plaintiffs for directing the defendants to quit and hand over vacant possession of suit schedule premises and also to pay future mesne profits @ Rs.69,000/- and Rs.46,000/- per month from date of suit till date of actual delivery." 3. On service of suit summons defendants in both the suits appeared and filed their written statement and denied the averments made in the plaint except to the extent expressly admitted thereunder. It was also contended that defendants at the time of being inducted as tenants by the landlord, they had paid a sum of Rs.70,000/- as security deposit and same is liable to be refunded to the defendants at the time of vacating the premises. On these grounds they sought for dismissal of the suit. 4. Trial court after formulating the issues for its consideration and on evaluating the evidence tendered by parties decreed the suits in part and directed respective defendants to hand over vacant possession of the plaint schedule premises to the plaintiff within 30 days from the date of Judgment and decree. Defendants were also directed to pay mesne profits @ Rs.8,000/- from March 2010 in O.S.420/2010 and in O.S.421/2010 the defendant was directed to pay mesne profits @ Rs.3,750/- for the month of March 2010 and @ Rs.4,000/- per month from April 2010 till vacating and handing over vacant possession. Being aggrieved by these Judgment and decrees passed by the trial court the unsuccessful defendants filed two separate appeals in R.A.68/2011 and R.A.69/2011. Lower appellate court after securing the records from the trial court and after considering the arguments advanced by respective learned advocates appearing for the parties formulated the points for its consideration and tested the Judgment and decrees passed by courts below to ascertain as to whether it is perverse, capricious, erroneous and against the evidence available on record and held on re-appreciation of evidence that Judgment and decree passed by the trial court does not suffer from any of these vices for being interfered with. Hence, first appellate court by Judgment and decrees dated 26.06.2012 rendered separately dismissed both the appeals by confirming the Judgment and decrees passed by the trial court. Hence, first appellate court by Judgment and decrees dated 26.06.2012 rendered separately dismissed both the appeals by confirming the Judgment and decrees passed by the trial court. Hence, these two second appeals have been filed by respective defendants and as already noticed herein above this court has admitted the appeals for considering the substantial questions of law already extracted hereinabove. 5. I have heard the arguments of Sri. K. Rama Bhat, learned counsel appearing for appellant and Sri. G. Balakrishna Shastry, learned counsel appearing for respondents. Though appeals are listed for orders by consent of learned Advocates appearing for the parties, they are taken up together for final disposal. Parties are referred to as per their rank in the trial court. 6. It is the contention of Sri. Rama Bhat, learned counsel appearing for defendants that there is serious identity crisis of the suit schedule properties and description of the property as described in the plaint schedule does not conform to the provisions of Order VII Rule 3 of C.P.C. As such on this ground alone plaintiff ought to have been non suited. He would also submit that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant and when plaintiffs have failed to produce any agreement entered into between the parties to prove the jural relationship the suit itself was not maintainable. He would elaborate his submissions by contending even the alleged agreement entered into between the parties (though admitted by defendants in their reply notice and written statement) is an unenforceable agreement and a void document and as such no right flows to the plaintiffs to seek ejectment of the defendants from suit schedule properties. He would draw the attention of the court to section 5 of the Specific Relief Act to contend that the suit is not maintainable since such suit for ejectment can be maintained only by a person entitled to seek for possession of specific immovable property by initiating appropriate proceedings in the manner provided by Code of Civil Procedure and in the instant case plaintiffs did not have title to the suit schedule properties and as such they could not maintain a suit for ejectment and seek possession of suit schedule properties from the defendants. He would also contend that plaint schedule described is entirely different from the premises which is in occupation of the defendants and as such plaintiffs are not entitled for the relief sought for. He would submit these aspects which were vital and highlighted could not have been lost sight of by the courts below and material evidence having been tendered by defendants in this regard same has been ignored and as such findings of the courts below are required to be interfered by this court since available material evidence has been erroneously considered and it has also been ignored. As such he prays for answering the substantial questions of law in favour of appellants. In support of his submissions he has relied upon the following Judgments: "1. Unreported Judgment rendered on 14.09.2007 in RFA No. 654/2002 - Mahesh Centre Joint Family Firm represented by Father/Manager v. People Charity Fund represented now by its Present Trustees 2. (2007) 6 SCC 737 - Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan v. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale (Dead) and others 3. (2010) 5 SCC 203 - R. Hanumaiah and anr. v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department and others 4. ILR 2009 Karnataka 60 - Nanjappa v. Nanjappa, since deceased by his LRs. 5. (2009) 8 SCC 231 - H.P. Vedavysachar v. Shivashankara and anr. 6. AIR 1992 Karnataka 160 - Javarasetty v. Smt. Ningamma" 7. Per contra, Sri. G. Balakrishna Shastry, learned counsel appearing for respondents/plaintiffs would support the judgment and decree passed by Courts below and would contend that concurrent finding of facts recorded by Courts below is not required to be interfered by this Court and as such, he prays for Substantial Questions of Law formulated by this Court being answered in favour of respondents/plaintiffs. He would also submit that there is neither erroneous appreciation of evidence or non-appreciation of available evidence for this Court to clutch the jurisdiction under second appeal under Section 100 of CPC to reverse the finding of facts recorded by Courts below and hence, he prays for answering the Substantial Questions of Law in favour of respondents/plaintiffs. 8. He would also contend that issue regarding identity crisis of suit schedule property now raised in second appeal is for the first time and there being no foundation laid before the trial Court and canvassed before appellate Court, this aspect need not be gone into in second appeal. 8. He would also contend that issue regarding identity crisis of suit schedule property now raised in second appeal is for the first time and there being no foundation laid before the trial Court and canvassed before appellate Court, this aspect need not be gone into in second appeal. He would also submit with regard to plea of recording there being no jural relationship is concerned, he would contend that notice terminating tenancy came to be issued on 14.03.2010 as per Ex. P-8 and it was replied on 24.03.2010 as per Ex. P-1 by defendants unequivocally admitting the tenancy or lease agreement entered into between parties and as such, Courts below have taken note of this fact and Section 116 of Evidence Act, 1872 to arrive at a conclusion that defendant - tenant is estopped from raising a plea of there being no title to plaintiffs, which was not disputed at the time of entering into tenancy agreement and as such, he submits that both Courts below have rightly held that tenant is estopped from raising such a plea and on these grounds, he prays for answering the Substantial Questions of Law in favour of respondents/plaintiffs. 9. Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for parties and on perusal of judgment and decree passed by Courts below and records secured from both Courts and also bestowing my careful and anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by respective learned Advocates at the bar, answer to the Substantial Questions of Law formulated hereinabove is indicated herein below. RE: SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW 1 & 2: 10. Trial Court having taken note of plea raised by defendants denying the jural relationship of landlord and tenant, had formulated following issues for its consideration in both the suits: "(i) Whether plaintiff proofs the landlord and tenant relationship between plaintiffs and defendant in both the suits?" 11. While adjudicating the said issue entire material evidence available on record has been taken into consideration to answer the said issue in the affirmative by the trial Court. At the outset, it requires to be noticed that undisputedly building where the suit schedule premises is located was the subject matter of dispute before Debt Recovery Tribunal in O.A. No. 995/1995. While adjudicating the said issue entire material evidence available on record has been taken into consideration to answer the said issue in the affirmative by the trial Court. At the outset, it requires to be noticed that undisputedly building where the suit schedule premises is located was the subject matter of dispute before Debt Recovery Tribunal in O.A. No. 995/1995. On account of borrower having not repaid the amounts due to financial institution namely Bank, entire building came to be sold by way of public auction by the Bank and in the said public auction plaintiffs became successful bidder which undisputedly got culminated in the proceedings before the Hon'ble Apex Court in favour of plaintiffs and by virtue of same, sale certificate has also been issued by Authorized Officer of Bank in favour of plaintiff. 12. Immediately after plaintiffs purchased the suit schedule building in public auction conducted by Bank is said to have approached defendants requesting attorning the tenancy in the year 2007. Defendants who considered the plea of plaintiff have attorned the tenancy and continued to entered into a lease agreement with plaintiffs. At this juncture itself it would be appropriate to extract the admission of defendant in reply notice about they having entered into such agreement with plaintiffs. In reply notice dated 17.03.2010, Ex. P-7 defendants have admitted entering into separate lease agreement with plaintiffs as under: "It is true that my clients have entered into separate lease agreements with your client and as per the lease agreements they have till last month paid the rent without fail." 13. Having raised such a plea in reply notice, on being served with suit summons in the suit, they appeared before trial Court and filed written statement denying the right of plaintiffs to seek for ejectment and reiterating the contentions raised in reply notice it has been averred in both written statements by both defendants to the following effect: "5. It is submitted xxxx this defendant. The plaintiff firm has entered into a lease agreement with the plaintiffs father dated 2007 with this defendant by misrepresentation, fraud and coercion." 14. At this juncture it requires to be noticed that in the event of party to lis were to plead misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default or undue influence, are required to furnish the particulars as contemplated under Order VI Rule 4 CPC. At this juncture it requires to be noticed that in the event of party to lis were to plead misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default or undue influence, are required to furnish the particulars as contemplated under Order VI Rule 4 CPC. These particulars are to be given with a view to narrow down the issue. Undisputedly, such details of fraud, misrepresentation are not forthcoming either from pleading or from evidence tendered by the defendants. As such, said plea has not been eschewed by the Courts below. In fact, defendants do not dispute the fact about entering into lease agreement with plaintiffs after attorning the tenancy and continuously paying rents from 2007 to 2010. 15. Admission of D.W.1 in his cross - examination with regard to this fact has been extracted by First Appellate Court in paragraph 43 and 44, which would clearly indicate that D.W.1 in both suits have admitted that they have entered into lease agreement with plaintiffs and paid rents by cheques till February 2010. However, on account of lis between plaintiff, who was the auction purchaser from Bank and creditor, pending before various forums was sought to be taken advantage by the defendants to contend that there has been misrepresentation on the part of plaintiffs at the time of entering into an agreement of lease with them. It requires to be noticed that defendants are not layman to contend that they had been asked or called upon to sign on the dotted lines or plaintiffs being in any domineering position which perforced the defendants to enter into lease agreement with plaintiffs. Hence, said plea of misrepresentation or fraud pleaded by defendants to contend that lease agreement is tainted, was not accepted by both the Courts and rightly so. That apart, in the instant case, the doctrine of "feeding the estoppel by grant" would be squarely applicable to the facts on hand, inasmuch as, title which was conveyed to the plaintiffs by Authorised Officer of the Bank and said to have been set aside by the Courts ultimately was held in favour of plaintiffs by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 34282-283/2012 dated 19.03.2013 and by virtue of same, sale certificate came to be issued in favour of plaintiffs by financial institution namely Corporation Bank Asset Recovery Management Bank which is duly registered before the jurisdictional Sub Registrar Office. 16. 16. That apart, it requires to be noticed that both the Courts have considered that under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872, tenant is estopped from raising a plea of there being no title in favour of landlord after having accepted his title at the time of entering into lease. At this point itself it would be apt to notice the argument advanced by learned counsel for appellant namely Section 5 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 would enable only such person who is having title to property to file suit for possession in Courts as per the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure as otherwise such person would not be entitle to maintain such suit. 17. In view of finding recorded hereinabove that plaintiff in the instant case was the successful bidder of entire suit schedule property (including suit schedule premises) and his title had been affirmed by the Bank who issued the sale certificate in respect of building in question, which undisputedly was pursuant to auction conducted by Authorised Officer of the Bank, plaintiff was definitely entitle to maintain the suit and seek for possession of suit schedule property from defendants. 18. Under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872, tenant is estopped from denying the title of landlord, who at the time of entering into such lease with eyes wide open, did not dispute the title of landlord and in that view of the matter, finding recorded by Courts below that Section 116 of the Evidence Act is attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case is based on proper appreciation of evidence both oral and documentary and in view of unequivocal admission of defendants that they had entered into lease agreement with plaintiffs, paid rents from 2007 to February 2010 and not disputed the payment of rents through cheques to plaintiffs for three (3) years, cannot be heard to contend that they would be entitled to raise a plea of there being no title with the plaintiffs or their right to institute the suit for recovery of possession that too after period of three (3) years. This conduct of defendants would clearly establish and demonstrate that they intend to protract the proceedings keeping the lis alive and postpone delivery of possession of suit schedule premises to plaintiffs on one ground or the other. This conduct of defendants would clearly establish and demonstrate that they intend to protract the proceedings keeping the lis alive and postpone delivery of possession of suit schedule premises to plaintiffs on one ground or the other. In fact this finding is also fortified by the very plea of defendants themselves raised in paragraph 10 of the written statement which is to the following effect: "10. Without prejudice to the above contention it is submitted that the defendant has paid a sum of Rs. 70,000/- as Security deposit which the plaintiff is liable to return to the defendant and defendant will vacate the premises immediately on receipt of the said amount. Under the above circumstances the defendant prays for dismissal of suit." 19. Above plea in the written statement would indicate that defendants are seeking payment of money from plaintiffs without tendering any proof. In this regard except self serving testimony of defendants there is no other material tendered by defendants to establish the fact that defendants had paid the advance amount to the landlords and defendant agreed to vacate the premises only after its repayment. Their plea would clearly indicate that they intended to vacate the suit schedule premises, but with a precondition and same has not been countenanced by the Courts below on appreciation of evidence. Hence, Substantial Questions of Law 1 and 2 are answered in favour of plaintiffs and against defendants. RE: SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW NO.3 AND ADDL. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW NO.(i): 20. Answer to Substantial Questions of Law 1 and 2 would suffice for answering this question of law. However, to clear any cloud created in this regard it would suffice to note that in paragraph 10 of the cross-examination of P.W.1 dated 18.07.2011 it has been stated as under: Above admission of P.W. 1 does not even remotely suggest plaintiffs having admitted that they are not the owners of suit schedule premises, but on the other hand it would indicate that P. W. 1 has stated that on account of dispute pending before Debt Recovery Tribunal there has been no registration of documents in respect of suit schedule building by the authorised officer of the Bank. At the cost of repetition, it requires to be noticed that plaintiffs were successful bidders before the Authorized Officer of Bank and they participated in the public auction conducted by Bank and declared as successful bidders and they paid the consideration amount to the Bank as per bidding concluded and dispute raised by creditor in this regard namely with regard to auction sale conducted by the Bank pending before Debt Recovery Tribunal, which bidding came to be upheld by the Hon'ble Apex Court in SLP (CVL) No. 34282-83/2012 by judgment dated 19.02.2013 and in pursuance to said order sale certificate came to be executed by Authorized Officer of Bank in favour of plaintiffs and was duly registered in the Office of Senior Sub Registrar, Mangalore City on 23.11.2013, which would clearly indicate that defendants after being satisfied with the claim of plaintiff had entered into lease agreements with them. It is during this interregnum period i.e., from the date of plaintiffs purchasing suit schedule property in the auction conducted by Authorized Officer of the Bank during 2007 and issuance of sale certificate in 2010, plaintiff had persuaded defendants to enter into an agreement of lease and accordingly defendants had entered into such agreements. Knowing fully well that issue relating to ownership of building who was debtor and auction purchaser (plaintiff) was pending before Courts, defendants entered into a lease agreement with plaintiffs in the year 2007 itself by attorning the tenancy and continued to pay rents. In the instant case, at the time of either attorning the tenancy or entering into a lease agreement with the plaintiffs, defendant did not deny the title. As such, tenant would be estopped from questioning the title of landlord under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872. 21. This view is also supported by the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sri. Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and Others reported in AIR 1976 SC 2335 whereunder it has been held that tenant in such a suit is estopped from questioning the title of landlord. It has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under: "It is only the landlord who can terminate the tenancy and institute the suit for eviction. The tenant is such a suit is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. It has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under: "It is only the landlord who can terminate the tenancy and institute the suit for eviction. The tenant is such a suit is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. The tenant cannot deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the commencement of the tenancy. Under the general law, is a suit between landlord and tenant the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant." Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in all force would apply to the facts on hand. Hence, such Substantial Question of Law No. 3 also deserves to be answered in favour of plaintiffs and against defendant. 22. It has been contended by Sri. K. Rama Bhat, learned counsel appearing for appellant that suit itself was not maintainable on account of identity crisis of suit schedule property namely plaintiff in his cross-examination has admitted that lease agreement with which he entered into with defendant in O.S. No. 420/2011 was in respect of Sy. No. 633 though same has been described in plaint schedule as No. 625. Neither of parties have produced the lease deed. The description of property in plaint is described as 20-8-635 (in O.S. No. 420/2011). Legal notice issued by plaintiff to defendant, which came to be marked as Ex. P-8 addressed to defendants would indicate that door number of suit schedule premises as "20-8-635". In reply to said notice defendant along with three others has got issued a reply notice on 24.03.2010 as per Ex. P-1. Defendant is the third addressee in said reply notice. Even in the said reply notice the address of defendants where he is carrying on business is indicated as "Door No. 20-8-635 & 635". It is also not in dispute that this defendant along with three other tenants of suit schedule building had filed a suit in O.S. No. 259/2010 for the relief of perpetual injunction against plaintiff herein from blocking the pathway or ingress and egress to suit schedule premises. Plaint of said suit came to be produced and marked as Ex. P-5 in the present suit in question. A perusal of same would indicate that plaintiff therein i.e., defendant herein is carrying on business in door No. 20-8-635 & 635. Even in the schedule to said plaint it has been indicated as such. Plaint of said suit came to be produced and marked as Ex. P-5 in the present suit in question. A perusal of same would indicate that plaintiff therein i.e., defendant herein is carrying on business in door No. 20-8-635 & 635. Even in the schedule to said plaint it has been indicated as such. Plaintiffs therein (which includes both defendants in the present appeals) have also not described the suit schedule premises with any boundaries obviously because of suit schedule premises being located in the first floor of building and description in plaint schedule by plaintiff is in conformity with Order VII Rule 3 CPC and purpose of describing the property which is the subject matter of lease with exact location is to ensure that decree could be duly executed. A bare reading of Order VII Rule 3 CPC would clearly indicate that where the subject matter of suit is immovable property, plaint which contains the description of property is sufficient to identify it, it would suffice. Non mentioning of boundaries would not be fatal. It does not indicate that description of boundaries being mandatory. However, if there were to be any dispute with regard to identity of property then in all probabilities the contention now raised by the defendants would have been susceptible to acceptance. In view of the undisputed fact that very same defendants had filed suit O.S. No. 259/2010 and as per plaint in the said suit which was marked as Ex. P-5 indicating that defendants herein had themselves continued that they are carrying on the business in the plaint schedule building and they themselves having not indicated any boundaries in their plaint (Ex. P-5), they cannot be heard to contend that present plaintiff in both suits ought to have described the suit schedule property by giving boundaries or on account of such non mentioning of boundaries the suit is liable to be dismissed. For this reason Substantial Question of Law No. 3 and additional question of law No. (i) formulated hereinabove is answered by holding trial Court was justified in decreeing the suit by holding plaintiffs being owner of suit schedule property, rejecting counter claim and plaint being in confirmity with Order VII Rule 3 CPC i.e., against defendants and in favour of plaintiff. 23. For these myriad reasons this Court is of the considered view that present appeals are liable to be dismissed. 23. For these myriad reasons this Court is of the considered view that present appeals are liable to be dismissed. Hence, I proceed to pass the following: "ORDER i. Second appeals are hereby dismissed. ii. Judgment and decree dated 22.09.2011 passed in O.S. No. 420/2010 & O.S. No. 421/2011 as affirmed by First Appellate Court by its judgment and decree dated 26.06.2012 passed in R.A. No. 68/2011 & R.A. No. 69/2011 are hereby affirmed. iii. Taking into consideration that defendants have been carrying on the business from past 15 years, if three (3) months time is granted to them to vacate and handover vacant possession of suit schedule property to plaintiff and same would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, three (3) months time is granted to defendants to vacate and hand over possession subject to filing of affidavit of undertaking within two weeks from today, failing which time granted would not enure to their benefit. iv. Amount in deposit is ordered to be paid to plaintiffs by the registry by issuing cheques, if not already paid. v. No costs."