JUDGMENT 1. - This is a Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the F.I.R. No. 255/2012 dated 6.6.2012 registered at Police Station Kotwali, District-Barmer. The F.I.R. has been registered against the present petitioners for offences under Sections 384, 385 and 500 I.P.C. 2. It is contended that F.I.R. has been registered against the petitioner by Mewa Ram Jain, Local M.L.A., Barmer, who is a powerful politician. The said F.I.R. is misuse of the process of law, which was filed only to exert political influence on police machinery. The complainant himself is involved in number of irregularities and corruption cases and various F.I.Rs. have been registered against him in the past. It is further stated that the said F.I.R. has been filed with mala fide intention. The petitioner No. 1 has filed D.B. Civil Writ (PIL) Petition No. 9730/2011 (Mahaveer Jain v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) before this Court wherein the complainant and his associates are impleaded as respondents. Further, petitioner No. 1 is Editor-cum-Publisher of daily News Paper "Maru Lehar" and he was instrumental in exposing number of corruption cases and in I some of those cases, respondent No. 3 is involved. Thus, out of vengeance and in order to escape from criminal liability and under political vendetta, the present F.I.R. has been lodged by the respondent No. 3. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 , to state that an F.I.R. registered due to mala fide should be quashed. 3. it is further contended that the allegations are false on the face of it. As per the F.I.R., the petitioners had demanded money and threatened that in case the said money was not delivered, he would publish the news item against the complainant. The news item stood already published in the daily news paper "Maru Lehar" on 4.6.2012. Thus, demanding any money after the publication of the said news item, does not arise. Moreover, the said news was carried out by various news papers and not by the news paper of the petitioner alone. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioners raised yet another argument. It was submitted that no offence under Section 384 I.P.C. is made out. For making out an offence under Section 384 I.P.C., it was necessary that property, valuable security etc. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioners raised yet another argument. It was submitted that no offence under Section 384 I.P.C. is made out. For making out an offence under Section 384 I.P.C., it was necessary that property, valuable security etc. should stand delivered to the accused in pursuance to the threat by the accused. In the present case, no valuable security, money etc. was passed on to the accused. 5. Learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, while opposing the same submitted that charge-sheet has already been filed. The Trial Court has taken cognizance of the offence against the petitioners and as such the petitioner is rendered infractuous. Further, the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 20.1.2015 has already dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner c and number of F.I.Rs. are registered against the petitioners for similar offence; f by various individuals. 6. The Trial Court has taken cognizance of the offence against the petitioners and as such the petitioner is rendered infractuous. Further, the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 20.1.2015 has already dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner c and number of F.I.Rs. are registered against the petitioners for similar offence; f by various individuals. 6. For the proper adjudication of the case, it is necessary to reproduce the t wordings of the F.I.R. The F.I.R. reads as under:- " fuosnu gS fd eSokjke tSu fo/kk;d ckMesj dk ;g gS fd egkohj tSu uked i=dkj tks e:ygj ds uke ls lekpkj i= tks/kiqj o ckMesj ls izdkf'kr djrk gS egkohj tSu vius v[kckjksa esa jktuhftKksa o ftykf/kdkfj;ksa ds fo:) vuki'kuki >wBh [kcjsa izdkf'kr djds iSls ,saBrk jgrk gSA blds fo:) /kks[kk/kM+h] ekugkfu] ,uMhih,l ,DV ds rgr eqdnesa pys gSaA orZeku esa dbZ izdj.k yfEcr gSaA egkohj tSu esjs o esjs ifjokj ds ckjs esa >wBh Hkzked [kcjsa Nkirs jgrs gSaA vkSj /kefd;ka nsrk jgrk gS fd iSls nks ojuk rqEgkjh izfr"Bk /kwy esa feyk nwaxkA fd bl ekg bf.M;k VqMs uked if=dk esa ,d [kcj izdkf'kr gqbZ Fkh ftlesa ckMesj esa dkaxzsl usrk dh v'yhy lhMh gksus dk nkok fd;k Fkk ekgohj tSu us bl bafM;k VqMs esa izdkf'kr [kcj dk vk/kkj cukdj vius lkekpkj i= e:ygj esa igys rks ;g Nkik fd ckM+esj ds dkaxzslh usrk dh v'yhy lhMh vkus okyh gS fQj eq>s o esjs HkkbZ ls txnh'k [k=h ,oa gfj'k paMd ds ekQZr 10 yk[k :i;s dh ekax egkohj tSu }kjk dh xbZ ugha rks cnuke dj nwaxk eSaus tc iSls nsus ls badkj fd;k rc egkohj tSu us vius lekpkj i= e:ygj ds izFke ist ij tks fnukad 4-6-2012 dks izdkf'kr fd;k ftlesa egkohj tSu us vkf[kj ckMesj dk dkSu lk usrk gS vkifRr tud lhMh esa\ ds uke ls [kcj Nkih ftlesa Hkzked ,oa f}vFkhZ Hkk"kk esa b'kkjk fd;k x;k fd og vkifRrtud lhMh ckdesj ds fo/kk;d dh gSA ;g fujk/kkj lekpkj gS tks egkohj tSu us 10 yk[k :i;s ugha nsus ij Nkik gS yksxksa dks Cysdesy djuk] /kefd;ka nsuk muls iSlk ,saBuk ,slk O;olk; gS tks fiNys 15 o"kksZa ls dj jgk gSA dksbZ Hkh O;fDr egkohj tSu ds fo:) dk;Zokgh djus ls Mjrk gSa D;ksafd egkohj tSu vius v[kckj esa ml O;fDr ds fo:) ,slh >wBh [kcjsa izdkf'kr djus dh /kedh nsrk gS fd og lekt esa eqag ugha fn[kk lds rc rd ihfM+r O;fDr lPpkbZ is'k djrk gS rc rd ml O;fDr dk izfr"Bk dk lR;kuk'k gks pqdk gksrk gSA vr% fjiksVZ izLrqr dj fuosnu gS fd egkohj tSu] txnh'k [k=h o gjh'k p.Md ds fo:) CySd dj iSls ekaxus ij ekugkuh dkfjr djus ds lEcU/k esa eqdnek ntZ dj dkuwuh dk;Zokgh djkdj nf.Mr djkosaA fnukad 5-6-2012 Hkonh; ,l0Mh0 esokjke tSu fo/kk;d ckMesjA " 7. In the background of these facts, this Court is required to see as to whether the offence under Section 384 is made out or not. 8. The definition of Extortion under Section 383 I.P.C. reads as under: Section 383. Extortion. - Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any properly or valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits "extortion". 9. Punishment for offence under Section 383 I.P.C. is prescribed under Section 384 I.P.C., which reads as under: Section 384. Punishment for extortion. - Whoever commits extortion shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 10. From the perusal of the above, it is evident that to make out a case under Section 384 I.P.C., one of the requirements is that the valuable security as demanded, in whichever form, should stand delivered. In the present case, admittedly, no such amount or valuable security was passed on to the petitioners. This fact has not been disputed. 11. The Apex Court in the case of R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Auntulay & Anr., reported in 1986 Cr.L.R. (SC) 266 , while dealing with Section 383 I.P.C. observed:- "Mr. Rao for the respondent relied upon the definition of 'extortion' in Section 383 in the Indian Penal Code and contended that the ingredients of the offence had not been prima facie established so as to justify framing of a charge for the said offence. Rao for the respondent relied upon the definition of 'extortion' in Section 383 in the Indian Penal Code and contended that the ingredients of the offence had not been prima facie established so as to justify framing of a charge for the said offence. 'Extortion' is thus defined in Section 383, I.P.C. : "Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits extortion." The main ingredients of the offence are : (i) the accused must put any person in fear of injury to that person or any other person; (ii) the putting of a person in such fear must be intentional; (iii) the accused must thereby induce the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security and (iv) such inducement must be done dishonestly. Before a person can be said to put any person to fear of any injury to that person, it must appear that he has held out some threat to do or omit to do what he is legally bound to do in future. If all that a man does is to promise to do a thing which he is not legally bound to do and says that if money is not paid to him he would not do that thing, such act would not amount to an offence of extortion. We agree with this view, which has been indicated in Habibul Razak v. King Emperor, AIR 1924 All 197 . There is no evidence at all in this case that the managements of the sugar co-operatives had been put in any fear and the contributions had been paid in response to threats. Merely because the respondent was Chief Minister at the relevant time and the sugar co-operatives had some of their grievances pending consideration before the Government and pressure was brought about to make the donations promising consideration of such grievances, possibly by way of reciprocity, we do not think the appellant is justified in his contention that the ingredients of the offence of extortion have been made out. The evidence led by the prosecution falls short of the requirements of law in regard to the alleged offence of extortion. We see, therefore, no justification in the claim of Mr. Jethmalani that a charge for the offence of extortion should have been framed. 12. It is well settled proposition of law that power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be exercised for quashing of the F.I.R. only in the rarest of rare cases or in case where no offence is made out even after the F.I.R. is accepted as Gospel Truth. From the above, it is clear that for an offence under Section 384 I.P.C., one of the ingredients that should be satisfied is that the accused must induce the person to deliver property, valuable security or any such thing which can be converted into valuable security. In view of the admitted position that m amount had been delivered in pursuance to the threat or blackmail, this Court, finds that no offence under Section 384 I.P.C. is made out, even if, the allegations in the F.I.R. are accepted as they are. Accordingly, the offence unde1 Section 384 I.P.C. is quashed. 13. Now, the only dispute to be considered is with respect to offences under Sections 385 and 500 I.P.C. which stands on a different footing. 14. After arguing for some time, learned Counsel for the petitioners state that he does not wish to press the petition for quashing of F.I.R. qua Sections 385 and 500 I.P.C. and prays that liberty be granted to the petitioners to raise all the pleas qua the remaining offence before the Trial Court at appropriate time. 15. In view of the above, the present Petition is partly allowed. The offence under Section 384 I.P.C. stands quashed. However, the petition qua other offences is dismissed as not pressed with liberty to the petitioners to raise all the pleas before the Trial Court qua the same at appropriate stage.Petition partly allowed. *******