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2015 DIGILAW 1041 (BOM)

Ganpat Bakaramji Lad v. State of Maharashtra

2015-04-20

A.B.CHAUDHARI, P.N.DESHMUKH

body2015
JUDGMENT : 1. Being aggrieved by the Judgment and Order dated 14th September, 2012, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-2, Amravati, in Sessions Trial No. 135 of 2011, by which the appellant was convicted of the offence punishable under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, and was sentenced to undergo Life Imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default, to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for two months, the present appeal was filed by the appellant. Facts : 2. In brief, the case of the prosecution is that deceased Manisha alias Manorama was married to appellant-accused – Ganpat Lad nine years before the incident. Two daughters and a son were born out of the wedlock. The appellant was ill-treating his wife since after marriage by assaulting her under the influence of liquor and she used to go to the house of her brother – Anil Pohane and used to inform him about the drinking habit of appellant Ganpat and assaulting her on trifle matters. Appellant was given understanding, but to no use. 3. On 21st February, 2011, at about 10.30 to 10.45 a.m., Annapurna Ramesh Bawane, neighbour of the deceased, informed deceased's brother – Anil, that Manisha received burns and she was taken to Govt. Hospital at Warud. Therefore, Anil, accompanied by his parents, uncle Tukaram Pohane and the neighbourer Narayan Waghamare went to Govt. Hospital at Warud by auto rickshaw. They met Manisha who was in a burnt condition. Statement of Manisha was already recorded. Anil asked her as to what happened and she narrated the incident, saying that at about 10.00 a.m., her husband Ganpat went out, returned after ten to fifteen minutes in a drunken state, started abusing her and thereafter he took kerosene, poured it on her person and set her on fire. Her father Named as well as Sushila, her mother, so also Tukaram and Narayan, the neighbours, also asked the same question and she answered accordingly. She was brought to the hospital by the neighbours Annapurna Bawne, Lata Dhanraj Kadu and Kamla Pandurang Shende. On the basis of her Dying Declaration recorded immediately after the incident, an FIR was registered. Thereafter, she was shifted to Irwin Hospital, Amravati where another Dying Declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate. She stated that it was the appellant Ganpat who poured kerosene on her person and set her ablaze. On the basis of her Dying Declaration recorded immediately after the incident, an FIR was registered. Thereafter, she was shifted to Irwin Hospital, Amravati where another Dying Declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate. She stated that it was the appellant Ganpat who poured kerosene on her person and set her ablaze. She died in the hospital and then an offence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, was registered. Investigation was carried out. Charge-sheet was filed. Case was committed to the Sessions Court. 4. Appellant denied the charge. Trial was held. Evidence was heard by the learned Trial Judge. After hearing arguments, Trial Judge convicted the appellant. Hence this appeal. 5. Mr. Rahul Dhande, learned counsel for the appellant [appointed] made the following submissions:- [a] The learned Trial Judge has committed a serious error in convicting the appellant of the offence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, for which he was charged. [b] The case of the prosecution is false and the prosecution failed to prove its case that too beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the benefit of doubt should have been given by the Trial Judge to the accused and not to the prosecution. [c] Referring to the Dying Declaration [Exh.31], he contended that there is interpolation above the stamp “Medical Officer, Rural Hospital, Warud” as to the time of completion of Dying Declaration and that raises a serious doubt about the sanctity of the document of Dying Declaration, particularly because the same was recorded by the Police Officer and no explanation is forthcoming as to why the Executive Magistrate was not called for first Dying Declaration. [d] Perusal of the said Dying Declaration [Exh.31] shows a thumb impression, when, as a matter of fact, the Post-mortem Report shows that burn injuries suffered by deceased were on hands to the extent of hundred per cent as understood in the medical science and, therefore, that lends support to his argument about his suspicion in recording the Dying Declaration. He, therefore, prayed for rejecting the Dying declaration [Exh.31] recorded by the Police Officer. He, therefore, prayed for rejecting the Dying declaration [Exh.31] recorded by the Police Officer. [e] Referring to Dying Declaration [Exh.24] recorded by the Executive Magistrate, he submitted that at the end of the Dying Declaration, it is nowhere mentioned that whatever Dying Declaration was recorded, was read over to the deceased Manisha and that she admitted the same to be correct, apart from the fact that the Dying Declaration appears to have been recorded on a printed proforma which also does not show any mention about reading over of the contents of Dying Declaration to the Declarant and it also shows thumb impression of the left hand, while it it is not indicated on Exh.31 as to of which hand the thumb impression. He relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Abdul Riyaz Abdul Bashir Vs. State of Maharashtra [2012 (3) Bom. C.R. (Cri) 329], and submitted that based on the Apex Court decision in the case of Shaikh Bakshu Vs. State of Maharashtra [(2008) 1 SCC (Cri.) 679], the Division Bench has consistently taken a view that omission to read over the Dying Declaration to the Declarant and the Declarant admitting the same to be correctly written must result into rejection of the Dying Declaration altogether. [f] Referring to the Oral Dying Declarations to various witnesses, including Anil [PW 1], father, mother and neighbour Narayan, he submitted that all these Oral Dying Declarations are required to be rejected for the simple reason that the statements of these witnesses were recorded by the Investigating machinery almost after one-and-half-month, for which there is no explanation, whatsoever. According to him, the burden was on the prosecution to explain the delay in recording the statements and, therefore, the appellant deserves to be acquitted. 6. Per contra, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State supported the impugned Judgments and Order and prayed for dismissal of the appeal. CONSIDERATION : 7. We have heard learned counsel for the rival parties. We have perused the entire record and the evidence that was tendered before Trial Judge. We are aware that the prosecution also relied upon the Oral Dying Declarations made to Anil [PW 1], Sushilabai [PW 2] and Narayan [PW 3]. We have taken into consideration the submissions made by Mr. We have heard learned counsel for the rival parties. We have perused the entire record and the evidence that was tendered before Trial Judge. We are aware that the prosecution also relied upon the Oral Dying Declarations made to Anil [PW 1], Sushilabai [PW 2] and Narayan [PW 3]. We have taken into consideration the submissions made by Mr. Dhande, learned counsel for the Appellant, about the statements under Section 161, Criminal Procedure Code, which were recorded by the Investigating Officer in respect of these three witnesses. We find that the statement of Anil [PW 1] was recorded on 28th March 2011, that of Sushilabai [PW 2] on 28th March, 2011 and Narayan Waghmare, on 28th March, 2011, while the incident had taken place on 21st February, 2011. The statements were, thus, recorded after almost one-month and seven days. There is no explanation tendered by the prosecution for such a delay. We have, therefore, serious doubt as to the veracity of the evidence of these three witnesses – Pws 1,2 and 3 about the Dying Declaration and we would not be justified in jumping to the conclusion of accepting the Oral Dying Declaration given to them for this reason, which is, in our opinion, a substantial reason. 8. The matter, however, does not end there. We find, and rather it is a settled legal position, that the conviction can also be based on even a single Dying Declaration if it is truthful and inspires confidence. We have examined the Dying Declaration [Exh.31] that was recorded by the Police Officer and duly proved by Prakash Boke, ASI [PW 8]. We have perused the Examination-in-Chief and cross-examination of Prakash Boke [PW 8] and we are satisfied that his evidence about recording of the Dying Declaration is consistent and has not at all been shaken in the cross-examination. Perusal of the Dying Declaration [Exh.31] shows that recording of the same commenced at about 11.40 a.m., and was completed by 11.55 a.m., on the same day of the incident, i.e., 21st February, 2011. The incident had taken place at about 10.00 a.m., and victim was immediately admitted to the Rural Hospital, Warud. We, thus, find that the Dying Declaration was recorded hardly within one hour and forty minutes of the incident, leaving no chance for anybody to manipulate. The incident had taken place at about 10.00 a.m., and victim was immediately admitted to the Rural Hospital, Warud. We, thus, find that the Dying Declaration was recorded hardly within one hour and forty minutes of the incident, leaving no chance for anybody to manipulate. On the contrary, evidence goes to show that PW 1 Anil, P W 2 – Sushila and PW 3 – Narayan all reached after the Police Officer had already recorded the Dying Declaration and gone away from the hospital. There is absolutely no suggestion to PW 8 Prakash that why he would record anything wrong. The said Dying Declaration at the end records that the same was read over to her and she admitted the same to be correct. We have, therefore, decided to rely upon the Dying Declaration [Exh.31] which is corroborated by First Information Report immediately registered by the concerned Police Station Officer. We think that this Dying Declaration [Exh.31] does not require any corroboration, since we have carefully examined the said Dying Declaration, so also the evidence of PW 8 Prakash. The submission made by learned counsel for the appellant that there is interpolation in the time under the signature of the Medical Officer in the figures “11.55 a.m.,” is not acceptable to us, because the doctor stated in the cross-examination that he made overwriting for mentioning the time, but then there is nothing brought on record as to any alleged falsity of time or as the case may be. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission. 9. The next question is about the second Dying Declaration that was recorded by the Executive Magistrate. Second Dying Declaration is recorded at Exh.24 by the Executive Magistrate who was examined before the Court as PW 6 – Umesh Panjabrao Khodke. We have perused the Dying Declaration [Exh.24]. The Dying Declaration was recorded on 21st February, 2011 in the evening at about 6.55 p.m., by the Executive Magistrate, Bhatkuli, after obtaining the Fitness Certificate from the doctor. We have perused the Dying Declaration [Exh.24] and we find also upon reading the evidence of PW 6 Umesh Khodke that the same is consistent and has been duly proved by him. Cross-examination of this witness, to our mind, has not caused any damage to his evidence. We have no reason, whatsoever, to reject the second Dying Declaration [Exh.24], since the same inspires confidence and is trustworthy. Cross-examination of this witness, to our mind, has not caused any damage to his evidence. We have no reason, whatsoever, to reject the second Dying Declaration [Exh.24], since the same inspires confidence and is trustworthy. It corroborates the Dying Declaration earlier recorded in the morning, i.e., Exh.31. The submission made by counsel for the appellant that the thumb impression of the declarant could not be obtained because her hands were hundred per cent burnt does not appeal to us. There is no cross-examination on this aspect which sought to be argued and the burn injuries were not hundred per cent, as contended. Hence we reject the said submission. 10. Counsel for the appellant has made a submission that Dying Declaration [Exh.24] is required to be rejected on a solitary ground that there is no endorsement at the end of the Dying Declaration that the same was read over to the Declarant and that she had admitted the same to be correctly recorded either in the printed form or in the handwriting of the PW 6. On the contrary, PW 6 in his evidence before the Court by way of omission stated that he read over the Dying Declaration to her and that she admitted the same to be correctly recorded and that omission was duly brought on record and proved also. Counsel, therefore, contended that the Dying Declaration was not read over to her and that she did not admit the same to be correct will have to be accepted and consequently the Dying Declaration [Exh.24] will have to be rejected in the light of the decision of this Court in the case of Abdul Riyaz Abdul Bashir [cited supra] which is based on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shaikh Bakshu Vs. State of Maharashtra [cited supra]. We have given a careful consideration to this aspect of the matter. We are satisfied that the Dying Declaration [Exh.24] inspires confidence and, therefore, will have to be relied upon as truthful in addition to the first Dying Declaration [Exh.31]. However, in so far as the second Dying Declaration [Exh.24] is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Shivaji Tukaram Patdukhe Vs. State of Maharashtra [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 3220], followed in Abdul Riyaz Abdul Bashir Vs. State of Maharashtra [2012 (3) Bom. However, in so far as the second Dying Declaration [Exh.24] is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Shivaji Tukaram Patdukhe Vs. State of Maharashtra [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 3220], followed in Abdul Riyaz Abdul Bashir Vs. State of Maharashtra [2012 (3) Bom. C.R. (Cri) 329], and on the stated judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shaikh Bakshu & others Vs. State of Maharashtra [(2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 679]. We are unable to agree with the submission made by learned counsel for the appellant based on the aforesaid decisions and would rather respectfully differ with the Division Bench Judgments of this Court, for the following reasons:- [i] In Shivaji Tukaram Patdukhe Vs. State of Maharashtra [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 3220] [cited supra], the facts were that on 29th December, 1999 PW 10 – PSI Sudhakar having received information that deceased Durgabai was admitted to hospital with burn injuries, directed Head Constable Bagul to record her Dying Declaration. Executive Magistrate – PW 7 – Bharat singh Chavan on the next day at about 10.30 a.m., recorded her Dying Declaration, in which she stated that accused Shivaji had in a drunken condition poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire. He admitted in the cross-examination that on Exh.24, there is no endorsement that he had read over the statement to Durgabai after recording it. The Dying Declaration recorded by Head Constable Bagul was, however, suppressed, and was not brought before the Court and, therefore, the Division Bench drew adverse inference against the prosecution. In so far as Exh.24 recorded by PW 7 Bharat singh Chavan is concerned, except for the following reason appearing in para 13 of the Judgment, no other reason was ascribed for not accepting Exh.24 as the foundation for sustaining the conviction. We quote para 13 as follows:- “13. The dying declaration at Exh.24, according to us, can not be relied upon as the statement was never read over to deceased Durgabai and there is no endorsement to that effect. When the declaration was not read over to Durgabai and she had not admitted the contents thereof to be correct, according to us, the dying declaration cannot be made foundation for sustaining the conviction.” [ii] In Shaikh Bakshu & others Vs. When the declaration was not read over to Durgabai and she had not admitted the contents thereof to be correct, according to us, the dying declaration cannot be made foundation for sustaining the conviction.” [ii] In Shaikh Bakshu & others Vs. State of Maharashtra [(2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 679] [cited supra], the facts were that Shaikh Bakshu had married Rubina eight days before the incident of 19th August, 2001 at about 4.00 p.m., when Shaikh Bakshu poured kerosene on her person and set Rubina on fire. PW 1 – Naib Tahsildar Narhari Pandit on the very day, i.e., 19th August, 2001, recorded the statement of Rubina [Exh.26] in the hospital at about 7.10 p.m., but PW 3 Radha kishan, ASI, had already recorded her Dying Declaration [Exh.31] earlier between 6.00 p.m., and 6.10 p.m., and the deceased expired at 8.30 p.m., on the same day. PW 3, however, in his cross-examination, stated that he had received the intimation regarding occurrence at 6.30 p.m., and, therefore, the Supreme Court found as to how the Dying Declaration could be recorded at 6.10 p.m., even before receipt of intimation of occurrence and then Apex Court observed thus in para 13 of its Judgment, which we quote hereunder:- “13. PW 1 in his statement stated that on 19.8.2001, on the basis of a letter requiring him to record dying declaration of the person who was admitted to the hospital, he went to the hospital at 7.00 p.m., met the Medical Officer in the hospital and thereafter he requested the Medical Officer to show the person to him. The letter in question was not produced by him. The trial court came to the conclusion that PW 3, the Medical Officer and the constable reached the Burns Ward at about 7.10 p.m. As noted above, it was the evidence of PW 3 that he had accompanied the Naib Tahsildar, PW 1. Even if it is accepted as noted by the trial court that the Naib Tahsildar has not produced the letter because it may be misplaced but nothing prevented the prosecution to produce the copy of the letter which was purportedly written to the Naib Tahsildar. No effort in that regard has been made. Even if it is accepted as noted by the trial court that the Naib Tahsildar has not produced the letter because it may be misplaced but nothing prevented the prosecution to produce the copy of the letter which was purportedly written to the Naib Tahsildar. No effort in that regard has been made. The trial court and the High Court noted that the condition of the deceased was very poor as was stated by the Medical Officer and the condition was deteriorating since 6.10 p.m. The trial court, however, held the dying declaration to be credible because the Medical Officer was present when the dying declaration was recorded. There was no mention in the dying declaration that it was read over and explained to the deceased. The trial court and the High Court concluded that even though it is not so stated, it has to be presumed that it was read over and explained. The view is clearly unacceptable.” Reading of para 13, thus, shows that the Supreme Court has recorded several reasons about the Dying Declaration recorded by PW 1 as doubtful. Reading of the above emphasized portion shows that the Supreme Court did not agree with the view of the Trial Court and the High Court that even though a mention about reading over of the Dying Declaration to the deceased was not made therein, the view of the Trial Court and High Court that it could be presumed so, was not acceptable. But this does not mean, according to us, that the Supreme Court laid down the proposition that it was mandatory or the requirement of law or essential requirement for a Dying Declaration to be believed, to have an endorsement in the Dying Declaration that the contents thereof were read over and explained to the deceased. In other words, at the cost of repetition, it is neither the ratio decidendi, nor the obiter dicta of the Judgment of the Supreme Court suggestive of any requirement of law that the Dying Declaration cannot be made the foundation for sustaining a conviction, or the same cannot be relied upon if it was not read over to and admitted by the declarant to be correct. [iii] In the case of Abdul Riyaz Vs. State of Mah. [iii] In the case of Abdul Riyaz Vs. State of Mah. [cited supra], the Division Bench of this Court in Para 8 held thus:- “8.............However, Column No. 8 pertains to the fact that the statement as recorded was read over to the deponent and proved to be correct as per the say of the deponent. The said column is left blank. To rule out any remote infirmity, it is necessary that there has to be an endorsement that the contents were read over and admitted to be true and correct. The said column cannot be treated as an empty formality since the deponent is not available for cross-examination. Hence it is a material inherent infirmity in the dying declaration and, therefore, cannot inspire confidence of the Court. It, therefore, appears that the statement was never read over to the deceased and there is no endorsement to that effect. When the declaration was not read over to the deponent and hence not admitted by the deponent to be correct and recorded according to her say, then such a dying declaration cannot be a foundation for sustaining the conviction. Merely because it is mentioned in the printed proforma that the statement is read over to the deponent, it cannot be presumed that the actual exercise of reading over the statement and getting it endorsed to be correct, was actually followed. In fact, the said column is blank and, therefore, the said fact cannot be assumed. The learned Counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (2008) 1 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.) 679 (Shaikh Bakshu and others Vs. State of Maharashtra), wherein it is held by the Apex Court that there was no mention in the dying declaration that it was read over and explained to the deceased. The trial Court and the High Court concluded that even though it is not so stated, it has to be presumed that it was read over and explained. The Apex Court has held that the said view is unacceptable. The learned Counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the judgment reported in 2004 (soft) B.C.I. 289(A.B.) : 2004 ALL M.R. (Cri) 3220 in the case of (Shivaji Tukaram Potdukhe Vs. The Apex Court has held that the said view is unacceptable. The learned Counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the judgment reported in 2004 (soft) B.C.I. 289(A.B.) : 2004 ALL M.R. (Cri) 3220 in the case of (Shivaji Tukaram Potdukhe Vs. State of Maharashtra), wherein it is held that when the declaration was not read over to Durgabai and she had not admitted the contents thereof to be correct, according to us, the dying declaration cannot be made foundation for sustaining the conviction. …..” From perusal of the above para 8, it is clear that the Division Bench held that it was the requirement of law as held in the case of Shivaji Patdukhe by the Division Bench itself and in the light of a decision in the case of Shaikh Bakshu by the Supreme Court that it was obligatory to have a mention in the Dying Declaration that the same was read over and explained to the declarant/deceased; otherwise the same will have to be rejected. 11. In the instant case, we have already held that the Dying Declaration [Exh.24] is trustworthy and is required to be fully relied upon. However, it does not contain any endorsement that the same was read over and explained to the deceased and that she admitted the same to be correct. In the light of the above Division Bench judgments of this Court, we would not be in a position to accept the Dying Declaration [Exh.24]. But, since, as already stated, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench in the aforesaid two decisions for the reasons below stated by us, the question is required to be referred to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Apropos our conclusion to accept the Dying Declaration [Exh.31], the present appeal would result into dismissal thereof. It may be stated that the question proposed by us to be referred may become academic. However, in the light of the following observations of the Apex Court in Para 32 of its judgment in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Apropos our conclusion to accept the Dying Declaration [Exh.31], the present appeal would result into dismissal thereof. It may be stated that the question proposed by us to be referred may become academic. However, in the light of the following observations of the Apex Court in Para 32 of its judgment in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Salil Sabhlok & others [ (2013) 5 SCC 1 ] (at page 29), the reference can still be made which we do:- “it will be clear from paras 6 and 7 of the order dated 13.7.2011 quoted above that the Division Bench of the High Court found that Article 316 of the Constitution, which provides for appointment of the Chairman and other Members of the Public Service Commission by the Governor, does not prescribe any particular procedure and took the view that, having regard to the purpose and nature of appointment, it cannot be assumed that the power of appointment need not be regulated by any procedure. The Division Bench of the High Court was further of the view that the persons to be appointed must have competence and integrity, but how such persons are to be identified and selected must be considered by a Bench of three Judges and accordingly referred the matter to the three Judges. The Division Bench also referred the question to the larger Bench of three Judges as to whether the procedure adopted in the present case for appointing Mr. Harish Dhanda as the Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission was valid and if not, what is the effect of not following the procedure. I do not, therefore, find any merit in the submission of Mr. Rao that the Division Bench of the High Court having found in its order dated 13.7.2011 that the irregularities and illegalities pointed out in the writ petition against Mr. Harish Dhanda are unsustantiated, should not have made an academic reference to the larger Bench of the High Court.” 12. We have further reasons to give for differing with the aforesaid Division Bench Judgments which are as follows:- [a] As held by us, the evidence of PW 6 Umesh Khodke, Executive Magistrate, is trustworthy as to the Dying Declaration given to him by the deceased, which was the second Dying Declaration in point of time. We have further reasons to give for differing with the aforesaid Division Bench Judgments which are as follows:- [a] As held by us, the evidence of PW 6 Umesh Khodke, Executive Magistrate, is trustworthy as to the Dying Declaration given to him by the deceased, which was the second Dying Declaration in point of time. What was stated to him by the declarant about the role of the appellant-accused has also been believed by us. He recorded the Dying Declaration as per her say has also been believed by us. He also stated in his evidence as under:- “2..............I asked some formal questions to the patient so as to ascertain myself regarding the fitness of the patient to give statement. I started recording statement of the patient at 6.55 p.m. I asked the patient's name, address and as to how incident took place. Patient told me that on 21.2.2011 in the morning at about 9 to 10 a.m. her husband came to the house by drinking liquor and abused her, and poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire. The women in neighbour admitted her in the hospital. As per her say I recorded her statement. Thereafter I read over the same to her. She admitted the same to be correctly recorded. I took her left hand thumb impression on statement. Thereafter I signed the same. The dying declaration now shown to me is recorded by me. It bear left hand thumb impression of deceased Manisha and my signature. The contents therein are correct. It is at Ex.24. It would have been 7.10 p.m., by that time. There I again requested medical officer to examine the patient to ascertain about her condition. Doctor had examined her and stated that she is fit and had accordingly issued the certificate.” We have already stated that by way of omission, the said witness stated in his Examination-in-Chief that he had read over the Dying Declaration to her and that she had admitted the same to be correctly recorded and since that is an omission duly proved, we are unable to rely upon the same. The fact, however, remains that in Dying Declaration [Exh.24], it is nowhere endorsed that the same was read over and explained to the deceased and that she admitted the same to be correctly recorded. The fact, however, remains that in Dying Declaration [Exh.24], it is nowhere endorsed that the same was read over and explained to the deceased and that she admitted the same to be correctly recorded. Fact, however, remains that we have believed entire evidence and in the wake of the said fact, we are unable to see any requirement of law anywhere that the last formality of reading over the same and the declarant admitting the same to be correctly recorded should result into rejection of the entire Dying Declaration duly proved by him and duly believed by us as above. As earlier stated, there is no pronouncement of law to the said effect in the case of Shaikh Bakshu and in the absence of any requirement of law, we think, it would be unjust to reject the entire Dying Declaration duly proved and believed, only for the reason that it was not read over and admitted to be correct. [b] The observations made by the Supreme Court [underlined] in para 13 of the Judgment in the case of Sk. Bakshu [cited supra] do not constitute either ratio decedendi or obiter dicta and hence there is no pronouncement of law by the summit court that such a dying declaration should be rejected only because the same was not read over and admitted to be correct. 13. We, therefore, frame the following question for reference to the Larger Bench:- “Whether a Dying Declaration can be rejected merely because the same is not read over to the declarant and the declarant admitting the same to have been correctly recorded?” 14. Harking back to the present case, we have come to the conclusion that there is no merit in this appeal and the same must be dismissed. Hence the following order:- ORDER [a] Criminal Appeal No. 186 of 2013 is dismissed. [b] Registry is directed to place the papers before Hon'ble the Chief Justice in the light of the observations made in this judgment. [c] The fee payable to the learned Adv. Mr. Rahul Dhande [appointed] for the appellant is quantified at Rs.5,000-00 [rupees five thousand only].