Order Per D.N. Patel, J.: 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 930 of 2014 dated 2nd December, 2014, whereby, the petition preferred by this appellant was dismissed and the prayer for getting back wages during the period of suspension was not accepted by this Court and, hence, the original petitioner has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Factual Matrix: ? This appellant (original petitioner) was appointed on the post of Clerk with effect from 21st December, 2004 in the Building Construction Department, State of Jharkhand. ? This appellant (original petitioner) was involved in criminal charge of dowry death of his wife under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, cruelty by husband under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code to be read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. ? This appellant (original petitioner) was arrested on 28th August, 2005 (as jointly submitted by learned counsels for both the sides). ? By virtue of Rule 99 of the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001, he was under deemed suspension. ? Thereafter, investigation was carried out by the competent Investigating Officer. Chargesheet was filed against this appellant and the case was committed to the Sessions Court being Sessions Trial No. 844 of 2005 before 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Hilsa, Nalanda, Bihar. ? This appellant was acquitted by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Hilsa, Nalanda, Bihar vide order dated 5th August, 2008. ? The suspension was revoked from 14th August, 2008. ? The order was passed by the respondents dated 6th November, 2008 under Rule 97 of the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001 for the reinstatement of this appellant with effect from 14th August, 2008, the date on which he joined the services. ? No order was passed for the back wages to be paid to this appellant (original petitioner) for the period of suspension. This appellant was paid subsistence allowance during suspension period. ? ? No order was passed for the back wages to be paid to this appellant (original petitioner) for the period of suspension. This appellant was paid subsistence allowance during suspension period. ? As the salary was not paid for the period of suspension, writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 930 of 2014 was preferred by this appellant, wherein, prayer was made to regularize the services of the appellant for the period from 18th October, 2005 to 13th August, 2008 i.e. the period of suspension on account of pendency of a criminal case and for getting full salary, allowances and subsequent promotion with all consequential benefits along with interest. As the writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 2nd December, 2014, present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner. ? Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that as this appellant has been acquitted by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Hilsa, Nalanda in Sessions Trial No. 844 of 2005 vide order dated 5th August, 2008 and as the suspension of this appellant has been revoked with effect from 14th August, 2008, this appellant is entitled to get salary, allowances and consequential benefits along with interest as per Rule 97 of the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge. ? Learned counsel appearing for the appellant (original petitioner) has relied upon the decision rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, reported in (1984) 2 SCC 433 . On the basis of the aforesaid decision, it is submitted that once suspension is revoked because of acquittal from the criminal charges, levelled against the delinquent, he is entitled to reinstatement with all full back wages. ? It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the decision rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court clearly lays down the ratio that once there is an acquittal and the employee's suspension is revoked, he is entitled to full salary or his reinstatement for the entire period of suspension. The learned Single Judge has not properly appreciated the ratio propounded by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. ? The learned Single Judge has not properly appreciated the ratio propounded by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. ? Learned counsel appearing for the appellant further submitted that suspension has been revoked from 14th August, 2008, whereas, it should have been from the date of acquittal i.e. with effect from 28th July, 2005 i.e. from the date of arrest. ? Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has also relied upon other decisions upon binding effect of the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India and it is, therefore, submitted that the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be quashed and set aside and the prayers made in the writ petition may kindly be allowed. ? Learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition preferred by this appellant. ? This appellant was suspended because of deemed suspension under Rule 99 of the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001 as he was involved in the criminal charges of dowry death of his wife (under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code), cruelty upon his wife (under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code) to be read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and, hence, he was arrested on 28th July, 2005. Thus, there is no fault lies on the part of the employer nor it was a desire of the employer to put this appellant (original petitioner) under suspension, but, he was under suspension by the operation of law. Thereafter, chargesheet was filed and the case was committed to the court of 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Hilsa, Nalanda, Bihar being Sessions Trial No. 844 of 2005. This appellant was acquitted vide order dated 5th August, 2008. By virtue of this acquittal, this appellant joined the services with effect from 14th August, 2008 and the suspension was revoked from the said date. Nonetheless, the fact remains that no fault lies on the part of the employer-respondents and, hence, the respondent is not liable to make the payment of salary for the period of suspension. ? On the contrary, the respondent-State is a sufferer because no work was done by this appellant during the period of suspension. Nonetheless, the fact remains that no fault lies on the part of the employer-respondents and, hence, the respondent is not liable to make the payment of salary for the period of suspension. ? On the contrary, the respondent-State is a sufferer because no work was done by this appellant during the period of suspension. For no fault of the respondents, this appellant was under suspension and, therefore, the respondent cannot be settled with the liability of the payment of salary, otherwise, it will be a punishment to the State for no fault of the State and it will be a premium to the fallacy of this appellant mainly for the reason that though he has not worked for the period of suspension, he will get the full salary and allowances. ? Learned counsel appearing for the respondents further submitted that there are two types of prosecution, one is initiated by the employer-State of Jharkhand and another type of prosecution is initiated at the behest of the private parties against the employee of the State. Whenever any prosecution is initiated by the private parties and if the employee of the State is put under suspension, by the operation of law (Rule 99 of the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001) and if later on there is acquittal of the employee of the State, the State shall not be liable to make the payment of full salary or allowances during the period of suspension. Conversely, if the prosecution is initiated by the employer State of Jharkhand and the employee was put under suspension and if later on there is any acquittal and, therefore, if the suspension is revoked, in such eventuality, the State-employer will be liable to make the payment of full salary and allowances etc. for the period of suspension. In the facts of the present case, criminal prosecution was never initiated by the respondent-employer, but, it was initiated because of private parties. There were allegations of dowry death of his wife and the cruelty upon his wife. As per the medical evidence, there is injury upon the body of the deceased, teeth were broken and there was fracture also and yet there was acquittal. There were allegations of dowry death of his wife and the cruelty upon his wife. As per the medical evidence, there is injury upon the body of the deceased, teeth were broken and there was fracture also and yet there was acquittal. Be as it may, the fact remains that this appellant was prosecuted by the private parties and he was under suspension because of his arrest, by the virtue of operation of law, under Rule 99 of the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001 and this suspension has been revoked because of acquittal. Thus, this appellant was never prosecuted at the behest of the State of Jharkhand, on the contrary, as the appellant has remained absent from the date of his arrest till the date of his acquittal i.e. from July 2005 to August 2008, for several months, the State is a sufferer, for no fault of the State of Jharkhand and in this eventuality, no liability can be settled upon the State for the payment of the back wages, otherwise, it will tantamount to premium of fallacy of this appellant. These aspects of the matter have been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition preferred by this appellant and, hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court. ? Learned counsel appearing for the respondents has also relied upon following decisions: (a) (1996) 11 SCC 603 ; (b) (2004) 1 SCC 121 ; (c) (2005) 8 SCC 747 ; and (d) judgment delivered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 9601-9602 of 2010 (Special Leave Petition (C) No. 8440-8441 of 2009) dated 9th November, 2010. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that if the prosecution is not initiated by the State of Jharkhand upon this appellant and if the appellant has remained under suspension after his arrest, by the virtue of operation of law and if later on because of acquittal if the delinquent is to be reinstated, in such eventuality, the State cannot be made liable for the payment of salary and other allowances during the period of suspension. Learned counsel for the respondents has also relied upon Rule 99 to be read with Rule 97 of the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001 and it is submitted that on the basis of the aforesaid decisions also, rightly it has been held by the learned Single Judge not to give any relief, as prayed for, in the memo of the writ petition and, hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court. Reasons: 3. Arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant: 4. Arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents: 5. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we see no reason to entertain this Letters Patent Appeal mainly for the following facts and reasons: (i) The present appellant (original petitioner) was appointed on the post of Clerk in one of the Department of the State of Jharkhand. The charges were levelled against him by the private parties because of death of his wife. The charges were about dowry death (under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code), cruelty upon his wife (under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code) to be read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code. Thereafter, this appellant was arrested on 28th July, 2005 and by virtue of Rule 99 of the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001, he was suspended. (ii) For the ready reference, Rule 99 of the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001 reads as under: “99. A servant of Government against whom proceedings have been taken either for his arrest for debt or on a criminal charge or who is detained under any law providing for preventive detention should be considered as under suspension for any periods during which he is detained in custody or is undergoing imprisonment, and not allowed to draw any pay and allowances (other than any subsistence grant that may be granted in accordance with principles laid down in Rule 96) for such periods, until the termination of the proceedings taken against him or until he is released from detention and allowed to rejoin his duties as the case may be. An adjustment of his allowances for such period should therefore, be made according to the circumstances of the case, the full amount being given only in the event of the Government servant being acquitted of blame or (if the proceeding taken against him, were for his arrest for debt) of its being proved that the Government servant's liability arose from circumstances beyond his control or detention, being held by any competent authority to be unjustified.” (emphasis supplied) (iii) It further appears from the facts of the case that chargesheet was filed against this appellant and the case was committed to the Sessions Court being Sessions Trial No. 844 of 2005 before 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Hilsa, Nalanda, Bihar. Thereafter, evidences were taken. Medical evidence reveals that there was fracture upon the body of the deceased and the teeth were broken. Nonetheless, there was acquittal order passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Hilsa, Nalanda, Bihar vide order dated 5th August, 2008. Because of this acquittal, this appellant came to resume the services with effect from 14th August, 2008. He was allowed to resume the services with effect from 14th August, 2008 and the suspension was also revoked with effect from 14th August, 2008 vide order dated 6th November, 2008 (Annexure-8 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal). (iv) Even after acquittal order passed by the learned trial court after couple of days, this appellant has gone to resume the services. Hence, the appellant is entitled to salary only after revocation of the suspension i.e. with effect from 14th August, 2008 and not prior that to. (v) In the aforesaid order dated 6th November, 2008, it has been mentioned that the appellant will be paid salary on and from 14th August, 2008 and, therefore, writ petition was preferred by this appellant for getting salary and other allowances during the period of suspension with interest. (vi) It further appears from the facts of the case that this appellant was suspended because of deemed suspension provision under Rule 99 of the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001. The prosecution was never at the behest of the employer, on the contrary from the date of arrest of this appellant i.e. with effect from 28th July, 2005 till the revocation of suspension i.e. till 14th August, 2008 i.e. for approximately 35 months, the respondents could not get the services of this appellant. The prosecution was never at the behest of the employer, on the contrary from the date of arrest of this appellant i.e. with effect from 28th July, 2005 till the revocation of suspension i.e. till 14th August, 2008 i.e. for approximately 35 months, the respondents could not get the services of this appellant. Thus, the respondent-State is a sufferer for no fault of the State of Jharkhand. (vii) For no fault of the State of Jharkhand, even subsistence allowance has been paid by the State. (viii) Now, the question arises of full salary for the suspension period and other allowances along with the salary. This cannot be paid to this appellant because prosecution was never at the behest of the State of Jharkhand-employer. Secondly, the State of Jharkhand is a sufferer because of long absenteeism of approximately 35 months. Thirdly for the reason that no work was done by this appellant for approximately 35 months and, hence, on the basis of the principle of “No Work No Pay”, this appellant cannot get salary for the period of suspension nor any allowances. This appellant cannot get any allowance which are connected with the basic pay of the appellant. If the prosecution has been initiated against any employee of the State by the private parties and if the employee of the State is arrested and if such employee is under deemed suspension, by virtue of Rule 99 of the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001 and if because of acquittal from the criminal charges the suspension is also revoked, in the intervening period of suspension, the State cannot be made liable to make the payment of full salary and payment of allowances attached with the basic salary. Thus, there is vast difference between two types of prosecution, one which is initiated at the behest of the employer and another, which is initiated at the behest of any other private parties, other than employer. (ix) The aforesaid two types of prosecution and the service jurisprudence of suspension and revocation of suspension because of the aforesaid two types of prosecution have been clearly narrated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, reported in (1996) 11 SCC 603 in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 as under: “2. This case does not warrant interference for the reason that, admittedly, the petitioner was charged for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC for his involvement in a crime committed on 1-10-1986. The Sessions Judge had convicted the petitioner under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. On that basis, the respondents had taken action to have him dismissed from service since he was working as a Junior Clerk in the respondent-Electricity Board. The petitioner challenged the validity of the dismissal order by way of a special civil application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Pending disposal, the Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated 14-10-1992 acquitted him of the offence. Consequently, while disposing of the writ petition, the learned Single Judge directed the respondent to reinstate him into the service with continuity of the service, but denied back wages. The petitioner then filed Letters Patent Appeal No. 319 of 1993 which was dismissed by the impugned order dated 26-8-1993. Thus, this special leave petition. 3. The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting interference. 4. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting interference. 4. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.” (emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision, this appellant is not entitled to get the salary and the allowances attached with the salary for the period of suspension because in the facts of the present case also, the prosecution upon this appellant was never initiated by the employer-State of Jharkhand. (x) It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Jaipal Singh, reported in (2004) 1 SCC 121 in paragraph nos. 3, 4 and 5 as under: “3. Heard Mr Raju Ramachandran, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the appellants, who placed strong reliance upon the decision of this Court in 1996 (11) SCC 603 , Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Supdt. Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board wherein this Court, in a case identical to the facts of the present case, has chosen to order only reinstatement but denied back wages on the ground that the Department was in no way concerned with the criminal case and, therefore, cannot be saddled with the liability also for back wages for the period when he was out of service during/after conviction suffered by the respondent in the criminal case. Per contra, Mr Ranbir Singh Yadav, learned counsel for the respondent sought to place reliance upon an order of this Court dismissing the special leave petition filed summarily against the judgment of the very same High Court dated 19-7-2001 in CWP No. 10201 of 2000. The learned counsel for the respondent, by inviting our attention to the judgment of the High Court in that case contended that on the facts the case on hand was also similar to the case considered therein but this Court dismissed the special leave petition when the relief granted for reinstatement and back wages was contested by the authorities before this Court. 4. 4. On a careful consideration of the matter and the materials on record, including the judgment and orders brought to our notice, we are of the view that it is well accepted that an order rejecting a special leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons therefor does not constitute any declaration of law by this Court or constitute a binding precedent. Per contra, the decision relied upon by the appellant is one on merits and for reasons specifically recorded therefor it operates as a binding precedent as well. On going through the same, we are in respectful agreement with the view taken in 1996 (11) SCC 603 (supra). If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the person concerned was at the behest of or by the department itself, perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as a citizen the employee or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and if after initial conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service. Consequently, the reasons given in the decision relied upon, for the appellants are not only convincing but are in consonance with reasonableness as well. Though exception taken to that part of the order directing reinstatement cannot be sustained and the respondent has to be reinstated in service, for the reason that the earlier discharge was on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only, the appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to the respondent for the period he was not in service. The appellants cannot be made liable to pay for the period for which they could not avail of the services of the respondent. The High Court, in our view, committed a grave error, in allowing back wages also, without adverting to all such relevant aspects and considerations. Consequently, the order of the High Court insofar as it directed payment of back wages is liable to be and is hereby set aside. 5. The High Court, in our view, committed a grave error, in allowing back wages also, without adverting to all such relevant aspects and considerations. Consequently, the order of the High Court insofar as it directed payment of back wages is liable to be and is hereby set aside. 5. The respondent will be entitled to back wages from the date of acquittal and except for the purpose of denying the respondent actual payment of back wages, that period also will be counted as period of service, without any break. The reinstatement, if not already done, in terms of the order of the High Court will be done within thirty days from today.” (emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision also, this appellant is not entitled to get the salary and other allowances attached with the salary during the period of suspension. (xi) It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Baldev Singh v. Union of India, reported in (2005) 8 SCC 747 in paragraph nos. 7 and 8 as under: “7. As the factual position noted clearly indicates, the appellant was not in actual service for the period he was in custody. Merely because there has been an acquittal does not automatically entitle him to get salary for the period concerned. This is more so, on the logic of no work no pay. It is to be noted that the appellant was terminated from service because of the conviction. Effect of the same does not get diluted because of subsequent acquittal for the purpose of counting service. The aforesaid position was clearly stated in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore Vs. Supdt. Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board. 8. The position was reiterated in Union of India v. Jaipal Singh. (emphasis supplied) (xii) It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Corp. Mithilesh Kumar @ Mithilesh Singh v. Union of India & Ors., in Civil Appeal Nos. 9601-9602 of 2010 arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 8440-8441 of 2009 dated 9th November, 2010 as under: “..... Ms. Indira Jaisingh, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Union of India has submitted that the impugned judgment of the High Court requires no interference and the legal position as focused by the appellant is no longer res integra. She placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore Vs. Ms. Indira Jaisingh, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Union of India has submitted that the impugned judgment of the High Court requires no interference and the legal position as focused by the appellant is no longer res integra. She placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore Vs. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) & Anr., (1996) 11 SCC p. 603. In this case also the appellant was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. And on that basis he was dismissed from the service. The appellant approached the High Court by filing an appeal against the order of conviction and in that appeal he was acquitted of the offence. The respondent had reinstated the appellant in service but denied the backwages. This Court examined this position and observed that “...Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents had taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties....” Learned Additional Solicitor General has also placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1 SCC p. 121. In this case also the initial conviction was converted into acquittal by the trial court. This Court observed that “....if after initial conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service. Consequently, the reasons given in the decision relied upon, for the appellants are not only convincing but are in consonance with reasonableness as well..” Reliance was also placed on the decision in Baldev Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2005) 8 SCC p. 747. This Court has reiterated the same principle that merely because there has been an acquittal does not automatically entitle the appellant to get the consequential benefits. In view of the consistent legal position, we cannot find any fault with the impugned judgment of the High Court. The appeals, being devoid of any merit are, accordingly, dismissed. This Court has reiterated the same principle that merely because there has been an acquittal does not automatically entitle the appellant to get the consequential benefits. In view of the consistent legal position, we cannot find any fault with the impugned judgment of the High Court. The appeals, being devoid of any merit are, accordingly, dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs.” (emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision, this appellant is not entitled to get the salary for the period of suspension and the allowances attached with the salary because the prosecution was never initiated at the behest of the employer, but, it was initiated at the behest of private parties because of long absenteeism of this appellant of approximately 35 months, on the contrary, the State of Jharkhand is a sufferer and, hence also, the State of Jharkhand cannot be saddled with the liability of payment of salary for the period for which, this appellant has not done any work. (xiii) Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the decision rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, reported in (1984) 2 SCC 433 . Here in this matter, Article 193 of Civil Services Regulation has been referred and the matter was based upon said Article. In that matter, suit was filed and, thereafter, Second Appeal was preferred and 3/4th of salary was paid, which was held as a valid one by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Looking to the facts of that case, full salary was also not paid in the aforesaid reported decision. In the facts of the present case, the State is not a complainant in the criminal matter upon this appellant. The charges of dowry death and cruelty upon wife were levelled against this appellant by private party, as stated hereinabove. This appellant was arrested with effect from 28th July, 2005 and by virtue of operation of law i.e. Rule 99 of the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001 as there was deemed suspension, he remained under suspension till his acquittal and when this appellant came to resume the services i.e. on 14th August, 2008, suspension was revoked. Thus, for 35 long months, the State is a sufferer because no services were rendered by this appellant. These facts make the present case different from the aforesaid reported decision. 6. Thus, for 35 long months, the State is a sufferer because no services were rendered by this appellant. These facts make the present case different from the aforesaid reported decision. 6. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition preferred by this appellant being W.P.(S) No. 930 of 2014 vide order dated 2nd December, 2014. We see no reason to entertain this Letters Patent Appeal. There being no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal and, hence, the same is, hereby, dismissed.