JUDGMENT K.S. Jhaveri, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 4.4.2008 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 10, Vadodara, in Sessions Case No. 187 of 2007, whereby the respondent-original accused was acquitted of the charges under Sections 302 and 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The facts in brief giving rise to the filing of present appeal are as under: 2.1 The victim married with the respondent-accused, however, as the victim was not in a position to conceive child, the respondent-accused used to give mental and physical torture to her and also taunted her for the same. On 23.2.2007, in night hours, an altercation took place between the accused and the victim, thereafter, the accused asked her to bring Rs. 5,000/- from her maternal home. The accused also taunted her for not conceiving the child and threatened that he would marry for the second time. On the very same night, at about 3 O' clock, the accused poured kerosene on the body of the victim and set her on fire. Thereafter, she was taken to Bharuch Welfare Hospital, where she succumbed to the burn injuries on 26.2.2007. Accordingly, the complaint being C.R. No. I-44/2007 came to be registered with Karjan Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 498(A) of IPC. 2.2 Investigation was carried out and the accused came to be arrested. At the end of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the accused before the Magistrate Court. Since the offence was exclusively triable by the Court of sessions, the case was committed to Sessions Court and, ultimately, trial was initiated and charge came to be framed. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 2.3 In order to bring home the charges against the accused persons, prosecution has examined following witnesses. Sr. No. Name Exh. 1. Prabhatbhai Vishabhai Vasava 9 2. Surajben@ Sudiben Vasava 10 3. Shardaben Manubhai Vasava 11 4. Yakubbhai Ali Isha Baqsh 13 5. Valibhai Mohammadbhai 14 6. Sirajbhai Ibrahimbhai Vasava 15 7. Ganpatbhai Vitthalbhai Vasava 16 8. Abbasbhai Momid Tabu 17 9. Saiyadali Mohammadmiya Saiyad 19 10. Idrishkha Kesharkha Pathan 20 11. Pratapbhai Zaverbhai Vasava 22 12. Haziruddin Abbasbhai Tabu 24 13. Bharatbhai Rameshchandra Purohit 25 14. Illiyas Hafiz Ismail, Ex. Magistrate 28 15. Lalitbhai Bhagubhai Patel, P.M.S.O. 31 16. Ankur Natvarlal Vaishnav 36 17. Yasmin Mohammad Rasulkhan 39 18. Ganpatbhai Vitthalbhai Vasava 16 8. Abbasbhai Momid Tabu 17 9. Saiyadali Mohammadmiya Saiyad 19 10. Idrishkha Kesharkha Pathan 20 11. Pratapbhai Zaverbhai Vasava 22 12. Haziruddin Abbasbhai Tabu 24 13. Bharatbhai Rameshchandra Purohit 25 14. Illiyas Hafiz Ismail, Ex. Magistrate 28 15. Lalitbhai Bhagubhai Patel, P.M.S.O. 31 16. Ankur Natvarlal Vaishnav 36 17. Yasmin Mohammad Rasulkhan 39 18. Gulam Mohammad Mushir Shekh 40 19. Kanubhai Visiyabhai Rathva 45 2.4 The prosecution has also relied upon following documents in support of its case Sr. No. Description Exh. 1. Panchnama of place of offence 18 2. Inquest panchnama 21 3. Panchnama of recovery of muddamal from the place of offence 23 4. Arrest panchnama of accused 26 5. Yadi for taking dying declaration 29 6. Dying declaration before Ex. Magistrate 30 7. Yadi for P.M. of body of Laxmiben 32 8. Postmortem 33 9. O/c of inquest panchnama 34 10. Postmortem report 35 11. Case paper of Patel Welfare Hospital 37 12. Opinion of medical officer regarding dying declaration 38 13. Complaint of Laxmiben Purshottambhai Vasava 41 14. Report of lodging complaint 42 15. Report of investigation by P.S.O. 43 16. Vardhi of Hospital 44 17. Vardhi of Hospital regarding death of Laxmiben 46 18. Report of P.S.I. on the basis of Vardhi of Hospital 47 19. Spot analysis report of FSL 48 20. Forwarding letter of dispatching muddamal receipt 49 21. Receipt of FSL receiving muddamal 50 22. Analysis of FSL 51 23. Station Diary entry No.6 52 24. Station Diary entry No.11 53 25. Station Diary entry No.21 54 2.5 Thereafter, after filing of closing purshis by the prosecution, further statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was recorded. The accused denied the case of the prosecution and submitted that a false case is filed against him. 3. At the conclusion of trial and after appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence, the learned Judge vide impugned Judgment, acquitted the respondent. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order of acquittal dated 4.4.2008 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 10, Vadodara, in Sessions Case No. 187 of 2007, the appellant-State has preferred the present appeal before this Court. 4. Ms. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order of acquittal dated 4.4.2008 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 10, Vadodara, in Sessions Case No. 187 of 2007, the appellant-State has preferred the present appeal before this Court. 4. Ms. Nisha Thakor, learned APP appearing for the State has taken us through the oral as well as documentary evidence and contended that the trial Court has committed an error in acquitting the accused inspite of voluminous evidence against him and contended that the trial Court ought not to have acquitted the accused. She submitted that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have appreciated the version of PW-14 viz., Iliyas Hafiz Ismail, Executive Magistrate, who has been examined at Exh. 28. This witness has stated in his evidence that after receiving yadi, he reached the hospital for recording dying declaration of the victim. He stated that after obtaining endorsement regarding fit state of mind of the victim from the doctor, he has recorded the dying declaration of the victim, wherein she has narrated the incident and stated that it is his husband, who poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. She has also submitted that in fact the learned trial Judge has ignored the deposition recorded vide Exh. 28 as referred above. She also submitted that Dr. Lalitbhai Bhagubhai Patel, PW-15, Exh. 31, who performed postmortem of the dead body, has stated that the victim was burnt to the extent of 90 to 95% and he has opined the cause of death is the burn injuries received by the victim. She also submitted that even Dr. Yasmin Mahammad Rasulkhan, PW-17, Exh. 39 has also supported the case of the prosecution. She submitted that the learned trial Judge has committed an error in not believing the version of the deceased in the form of complaint as well as dying declaration, wherein she has stated about the harassment being meted out to her at the behest of the respondent-accused. She submitted that on the date of incident, quarrel had taken place between the accused and the victim and the accused asked the victim to bring Rs. 5,000/-from her parents for the marriage of his younger brother and on the same night, the incident in question has taken place. She submitted that on the date of incident, quarrel had taken place between the accused and the victim and the accused asked the victim to bring Rs. 5,000/-from her parents for the marriage of his younger brother and on the same night, the incident in question has taken place. In the complaint, the victim has stated that her husband has poured kerosene on her and in her dying declaration also she has repeated the same incident. She further submitted that as per the evidence on record, the deceased was in the fit state of mind at the time of recording of dying declaration. She, therefore, submitted that the learned trial Judge has committed an error in not believing the evidence on record and acquitting the accused of the charges levelled against him. She, therefore, prays that this appeal may be allowed by reversing the impugned judgment. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Pratik Barot, learned counsel for the respondent-accused has supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the learned trial Judge has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and acquitted the accused. He also contended that so far as acquittal appeals are concerned, the law is well settled and by taking us through the impugned judgment, he submitted that this Court may not interfere with the impugned judgment and the appeal may be dismissed. 6. We have heard learned APP appearing for the appellant-State as well as learned advocate for the respondent. We have also gone through the oral as well as documentary evidence on record. We have also perused the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2. PW-1, who is the father of the victim has stated in his deposition that the victim has stated that the accused was demanding Rs. 5,000/- from her for the marriage of his younger brother and on the date of the incident, he poured kerosene on the victim and set her on fire. This witness has supported the case of the prosecution. PW-2, Surajben Vasava has also supported the case of the prosecution and deposed that the deceased told that her husband has set her on fire. From the evidence, it is clear that on the date of incident, quarrel had taken place between the accused and the victim and the accused asked the victim to bring Rs. PW-2, Surajben Vasava has also supported the case of the prosecution and deposed that the deceased told that her husband has set her on fire. From the evidence, it is clear that on the date of incident, quarrel had taken place between the accused and the victim and the accused asked the victim to bring Rs. 5,000/- from her parents for the marriage of his younger brother and on the same night, the incident in question has taken place. In the complaint, the victim has stated that her husband has poured kerosene on her and in her dying declaration also she has repeated the same incident. As per the evidence on record, the deceased was in the fit state of mind at the time of recording of dying declaration. Even in the telephone vardhi and the history before the doctor, the alleged incident in question is narrated by the victim. In his evidence, PW-14, Iliyas Hafiz Ismail, Executive Magistrate, Exh. 28, has stated that after receiving yadi, he reached the hospital for recording dying declaration of the victim. He stated that after obtaining endorsement regarding fit state of mind of the victim from the doctor, he has recorded the dying declaration of the victim, wherein she has narrated the incident and stated that it is his husband, who poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. In view of decision of the Apex Court in the case of Vijay alias Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2010) 8 SCC 191 , when the statement of prosecutrix is found to be worthy of credence and reliable, it requires no corroboration and the accused can be convicted solely on the basis of testimony of the prosecutrix. While deciding the aforesaid matter, the Apex Court has observed as under:-- "9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain AIR 1990 SC 658 , this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under:-- "16. A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Court observed as under:-- "16. A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence." 10. In State of U.P. v. Pappu @Yunus & Anr. AIR 2005 SC 1248 , this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under:-- "12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do." 11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1393 , this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation etc. the court is duty bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under:-- "The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix............... The courts must, while evaluating evidence remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case............. Seeking corroboration of her statement before replying upon the same as a rule, in such cases, amounts to adding insult to injury............ Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. ** ** ** ** 21....... The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations." 12. In State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra & Anr. AIR 2002 SC 1963 , this Court held that rape is not mere a physical assault, rather it often distracts the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. 13. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh (1993) 2 SCC 622 , this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 9 , placing reliance on earlier judgment in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1952 SC 54 . 14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that statement of prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix." 7. Even Dr. Lalitbhai Bhagubhai Patel, PW-15, Exh. 31, who performed postmortem of the dead body, has stated that the victim was burnt to the extent of 90 to 95% and he has opined the cause of death is the burn injuries received by the victim. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix." 7. Even Dr. Lalitbhai Bhagubhai Patel, PW-15, Exh. 31, who performed postmortem of the dead body, has stated that the victim was burnt to the extent of 90 to 95% and he has opined the cause of death is the burn injuries received by the victim. Therefore, in view of the fact that the deceased died due to burn injuries and in view of her dying declaration, the accused can be held guilty of the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. However, it has come on record that the incident in question is of 23.2.2007, while the deceased died on 26.2.2007 and the cause of death as stated by the doctor is septicemia. In B.N. Kavatakar and another v. State of Karnataka [1994 Supp (1) SCC 304], the Honourable Apex Court observed as under:-- "9. The next question that comes up for our consideration is what is the nature of the offence that the appellants have committed. The Medical Officer who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased has opined that the death was as a result of septicemia secondary to injuries and peritonitis. As we have indicated above, the deceased died after five days of the occurrence in the hospital. On an overall scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of the case coupled with the opinion of the Medical Officer, we are of the view that the offence would be one punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC. 10. In the result, we set aside the conviction under Section 302read with Section 34 IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed therefore on each of the appellants. Instead we convict them under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC and sentence each of the appellants to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years. With the above modification in the conviction and sentence, the appeal is dismissed." 8. Similarly, in Ganga Dass @ Godha v. State of Haryana [1994 Supp (1) SCC 534], the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para-36 observed as under; "36. We find considerable force in this submission. As stated above the occurrence took place on November 18, 1988 and the deceased died 18 days later on December 5, 1988 due to septicemia and other complications. Similarly, in Ganga Dass @ Godha v. State of Haryana [1994 Supp (1) SCC 534], the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para-36 observed as under; "36. We find considerable force in this submission. As stated above the occurrence took place on November 18, 1988 and the deceased died 18 days later on December 5, 1988 due to septicemia and other complications. The Doctor found only one injury on the head and that was due to single blow inflicted with an iron pipe not with any sharp-edged weapon. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, it is difficult to hold that the appellant intended to cause death nor it can be said that he intended to cause that particular injury. In any event the medical evidence shows that the injured deceased was operated but unfortunately some complications set in and ultimately he died because of cardiac failure etc. Under these circumstances, we set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded thereunder. Instead we convict him under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentence him to undergo six years RI. The sentence of fine of Rs. 2000 along with default clause is confirmed. Accordingly the appeal is partly allowed." 9. In view of the fact that the victim died due to septicemia and in view of above decisions of the Honourable Apex Court, though the accused is found guilty of the offence, he can be convicted for offence under Section 304, Part II of IPC. In view of above discussion, present appeal is required to be allowed, as it is found that the trial Court has committed an error while acquitting the accused and the accused is found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304, Part II of IPC. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 4.4.2008 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 10, Vadodara, in Sessions Case No. 187 of 2007 is reversed and the accused is held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 304, Part (II) of the Indian Penal Code and ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. The accused shall surrender before the jail authorities within a period of ten weeks from today to serve the remaining period of sentence. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. The accused shall surrender before the jail authorities within a period of ten weeks from today to serve the remaining period of sentence. Record and Proceedings, if lying here, be sent back to the concerned trial Court forthwith.