Om Prakash Tiwari v. Judge, Labour Court, Bhilwara
2015-05-13
SANDEEP MEHTA
body2015
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. - Being aggrieved of the award Annexure-9 dated 29.9.2001 passed by the learned Labour Court, Bhilwara in Labour Case No. 9/1995, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the instant writ petition. 2. Facts in brief are that the petitioner was appointed as a vehicle driver in the respondent Central Cooperative Bank Ltd., Bhilwara on 15.11.1978. The petitioner has set up a case that he remained in the employment of the respondent Bank till 14.9.1992, on which date the petitioner was retrenched from service without following the mandatory procedure prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner raised an industrial dispute through All Rajasthan Cooperative Bank Employees Union, Bhilwara. Reconciliation proceedings were held but the same failed upon which the State Government referred the matter for adjudication to the Labour Tribunal, Bhilwara by a notification dated 26.4.1995. The Labour Court framed following issues for decision:- "As to whether the termination of service of the petitioner by the Manager, Central Cooperative Bank, Bhilwara by its order dated 14.9.1992 was just and proper, if not then the relief to which the workman was entitled?" The Tribunal conducted the inquiry and after examining the facts in extensor, reached to a conclusion that retrenchment of the petitioner was just and proper and was carried out after following the due procedure of law. The petitioners claim was rejected by award Annexure-9 dated 29.9.2001. Being aggrieved of the impugned award dated 29.9.2001 whereby the industrial dispute raised by the petitioner was adjudicated against him, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the instant writ petition. 3. Mr. Saluja, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the petitioner's services were terminated without following the mandatory procedure of Section 25F(a) & (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. That apart, the termination of the petitioner's services was also carried out in violation of the provisions of Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that termination of the petitioner on the ground of curtailment of posts on the principle of last come first go was absolutely unjustified. He further contended that as per the document Annexure-1 which is a notice published in the news-paper on 12.9.1992, it is evident that the cheque as envisaged under Section 25F(a)& (b) of the Act of 1947 was not prepared on the same day of the publication in the news paper.
He further contended that as per the document Annexure-1 which is a notice published in the news-paper on 12.9.1992, it is evident that the cheque as envisaged under Section 25F(a)& (b) of the Act of 1947 was not prepared on the same day of the publication in the news paper. The cheque towards the retrenchment compensation was prepared on 14.9.1992 and thus there was no sufficient compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 25F(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act before retrenching the petitioner. He further contended that the retrenchment compensation offered to the petitioner fell short of the monthly salary by 10 paise. Thus, as per him, the termination of the petitioner from service was totally illegal. Learned counsel submitted that as per the case set up by the respondent Bank before the Tribunal, the notice of compensation was served on the petitioner on 14.9.1992 and admittedly the said notice was not accompanied with the cheque of retrenchment compensation. Thus, relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anoop Sharma v. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division, 2010 (3) SCC 497 , learned counsel contended that the mandatory provisions of Section 25F of the I.D. Act were not complied with, while effecting retrenchment and thus the termination of the petitioner has to be quashed and set aside. He further contended that the petitioner, by leading ample evidence proved and established before the Labour Court beyond all manner of doubt that the petitioner's termination on the ground that post of 5th driver was not required by the Bank was absolutely illegal and contrary to facts. He contended that from the evidence of bank officers, it was amply proved that the Bank had hired vehicles and drivers from market for meeting its requirements. He contended vehemently that this aspect of the matter was not appropriately examined by the Labour Court while passing the impugned award. Learned counsel further contended that the termination of the petitioner's service on the ground of abolition of the post tantamounts to reduction in the number of persons employed by the employer. Such reduction is covered by Clause-11 of the Schedule-IV of the Industrial Disputes Act and amounts to change in condition of service. He contended that before effecting such change in conditions of service, the employer is required to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 9A of the Act.
Such reduction is covered by Clause-11 of the Schedule-IV of the Industrial Disputes Act and amounts to change in condition of service. He contended that before effecting such change in conditions of service, the employer is required to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 9A of the Act. As per him the mandatory provisions of Section 9A of the Act not having been complied with by the employer, the petitioner was entitled to reinstatement in service. He, therefore, prayed that the impugned award is totally illegal and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Per contra Mr. Sanjay Mathur, learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently opposed the submissions advanced by the counsel for the petitioner. He submitted that the Bank led ample evidence to prove that there was no requirement of 5th vehicle driver in the Bank and as such the Bank took a decision to terminate the petitioner's service on the principle of last come first go. The decision taken by the Bank was published in the news paper on 12.9.1992 and thereafter on 14.9.1992 the termination order accompanied with retrenchment compensation as per Section 25F was offered to the petitioner through a pay order dated 14.9.1992. However, the petitioner refused to accept the compensation as well as the termination order and escaped on a scooter as is evident from the document Annexure-3. He contended that the specific case set up by the respondent Bank before the Tribunal was that the petitioner was terminated from service on the ground of Bank not being in requirement of 5th driver. He contended that the Bank was running in loss and as four other drivers were already engaged and working prior in point of time to the petitioner, the Bank took a decision to retrench the petitioner. Before doing so, appropriate proceedings were drawn up and simultaneously a pay order towards salary for the notice period as well the retrenchment compensation was prepared and sent at the petitioner's residence along with the letter of termination. However, the petitioner opened the envelope and then escaped without receiving the same.
Before doing so, appropriate proceedings were drawn up and simultaneously a pay order towards salary for the notice period as well the retrenchment compensation was prepared and sent at the petitioner's residence along with the letter of termination. However, the petitioner opened the envelope and then escaped without receiving the same. He further contended that the provisions of Section 9A of the Act do not apply to the case at hand inasmuch as the provision deals with the change of condition in service of a particular employee whereas Rule 11 which was relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner deals with change in the condition of the employee and the employer. He further contends that no illegality is reflected in the action of the respondent in terminating the services of the petitioner and the writ petition should be dismissed. 5. Heard and considered the arguments advanced at the bar. Perused the material available on record.Three points which fall for Court's consideration in view of the arguments advanced by the rival counsels can be enumerated as under: 1. As to whether retrenchment of the petitioner was carried out after complying with the mandatory requirements of Section 25F(a) & (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act" 2. Whether the decision to terminate the petitioner's services on the ground of surplus staff was justified" 3. As to whether the termination of the petitioner's services amounts to a change in the condition of service and as a consequence, whether the action thus taken can be termed to be in violation of the requirements of Section 9A of the I.D.Act. 4. The compensation offered to the petitioner was not in consonance with the salary of the petitioner and was short by 10 paise. 6. Coming to the point no. 1, it is required to be seen as to whether the Bank complied with the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act before retrenching the petitioner. Two requirements have to be complied with before retrenching a workman from service as per Section 25F(a) & (b); first the employee has to be served with an order of termination and on the very same day, he is required to be paid one month's salary for the notice period and the retrenchment compensation as per Section 25(b) of the I.D.Act.
It is not disputed that the termination order was issued on 14.9.1992 and on the very same day a pay order towards the retrenchment compensation and the notice pay for a total amount of Rs. 21240/- was prepared. There is a dispute between the parties as to whether the Peon who took the termination order to the petitioner's house carried the pay order with him or not. It cannot be gainsaid that once the pay order was prepared and ready, there was no ostensible reason for not sending the same to the petitioner. The statement of claim filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal has been annexed as Annexure-5 on the record of the writ petition. The petitioner has no-where averred in the statement that the order of termination sent to his residence was not accompanied with the pay order. On the contrary, the Bank in its reply has specifically asserted that the termination order was sent to the petitioner's residence with a Bank Clerk Mohd. Aslam and Peon Ladu Lal on 14.9.1992 itself. The petitioner refused to accept the same and ran away where after the termination order was published in the news paper. The petitioner has admitted that the news of his termination was published in the news-paper on 15.9.1992 wherein he was informed to approach the Bank's office and receive the pay order. In this background, this Court is of the opinion that the stand taken by the petitioner's counsel that the pay order towards the retrenchment compensation and the salary of notice period were not offered to the petitioner on the very same day when the termination order was sent to him has no legs to stand. The Bank in its reply has specifically pleaded that as the petitioner refused to accept the pay order, the same was sent to his residence through registered post on 19.9.1992. 7. In this background, this Court is of the opinion that the finding recorded by the Tribunal in its impugned order that the Bank made full compliance of the mandatory requirements of Section 25F(a)&(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act before terminating the petitioner from service is based on just and proper appreciation of evidence and does not call for any interference whatsoever. 8.
8. The second challenge made by the petitioner's counsel to the impugned award is based on the assertion that the ground taken by the Bank that termination of the petitioner's service was directed as the services of 5th driver were not required consequently the post was abolished is absolutely false and fabricated. In this regard, he urged that even after terminating the petitioner from service, the Bank continued to engage drivers and vehicles on hire from open market, and therefore, the pretext for terminating the petitioner's services that there was no requirement of the 5th driver in the Bank is absolutely baseless. The fact that the Bank utilised vehicles on hire after petitioner's termination is vaguely pleaded in the statement of claim submitted on behalf of the petitioner. An uncertain averment is made in para no. 1 of the statement of the claim that the Bank was adopting the practice of taking services of additional vehicles on hire as per requirement. It is further pleaded in the statement of claim that the Bank had to procure additional vehicles on hire basis between March to June, 1992. However, the pleadings are tacitly silent as to whether Bank adopted such a practice after June, 1992. Thus, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioner failed to establish beyond all manner of doubt that the Bank utilised the services of hired vehicles or drivers after the petitioner's termination and the assertion made in this regard has no legs to stand whatsoever. If at all the petitioner was interested in establishing that the Bank utilised vehicles on hire after his termination then he had to come out with specific pleadings and evidence in this regard. Upon going through the petitioner's affidavit, it becomes clear that the petitioner has made a vague assertion in the affidavit that the Bank took additional vehicle on hire in the year 1992 for the purpose of increasing its business. However, in the affidavit as well the petitioner has not mentioned that the Bank took any vehicle on hire in the month of September, 1992 or any time thereafter. The petitioner's witness Chandmal Somani also did not give any evidence to the effect that the Bank utilised services of vehicles on hire before or after termination of the services of the petitioner.
The petitioner's witness Chandmal Somani also did not give any evidence to the effect that the Bank utilised services of vehicles on hire before or after termination of the services of the petitioner. In this background, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioner failed to establish beyond all manner of doubt that the respondent Bank had hired vehicles for the purpose of increasing its business either before or after the petitioner's termination. This point was also rightly decided by the Tribunal against the petitioner. 9. Coming to the third argument advanced by the petitioner's counsel that the petitioner's retrenchment is illegal as the same was effected without complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 9A of the Act. Section 9A of the Act reads as below:- "9-A Notice of change.- No employer, who proposes to effect any change in the conditions of service applicable to any workman in respect of any matter specified in the Fourth Schedule, shall effect such change,- (a) without giving to the workmen likely to be affected by such change a notice in the prescribed manner of the nature of the change proposed to be effected; or (b) within twenty-one days of giving such notice: Provided that no notice shall be required for effecting any such change- (a) where the change is effect in pursuance of any [settlement or award]; or (b) where the workmen likely to be affected by the change are persons to whom the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Civil Services Rules, Revised Leave Rules, Civil Service Regulations, Civilians in Defence Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or the Indian Railway Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf by the appropriate Government in the Official Gazette, apply." The provision thus deals with a situation where the employer proposes to effect any change in the conditions of service applicable to any workman in respect of any matter specified in the Fourth Schedule. Clause 11 of the Fourth Schedule reads as below:- "11. Any increases or reduction (other than casual) in the number of persons employed or to be employed in any occupation or process or department or shift, {not occasioned by circumstances over which the employer has no control]." 10.
Clause 11 of the Fourth Schedule reads as below:- "11. Any increases or reduction (other than casual) in the number of persons employed or to be employed in any occupation or process or department or shift, {not occasioned by circumstances over which the employer has no control]." 10. On a perusal of Clause 11 of the Fourth Schedule it is evident that the increase or reduction in the number of persons employed or to be employed in any occupation or process or department or shift, should not be occasioned by circumstances over which the employer has no control. If the employer intends to effect any change in condition of service in normal circumstances and not in circumstances beyond its control then the procedure prescribed in Section 9A has to be complied with. In the case at hand, the Bank has come with a specific plea that the reduction in posts of driver was made because the Bank's business was running into losses. Obviously, the cause of losses in business cannot be perceived to be in the control of the employer. No institution more so a financial institution would deliberately allow a drop in its business if it can be controlled. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that if the facts are viewed in light of the non-obstante clause of Sub-Clause 11 of Schedule IV clearly, Bank's action in reducing the number of the persons employed was occasioned by circumstances over which the Bank had no control, therefore, there was no requirement to comply with the provisions of Section 9A of the Act before removing the petitioner from service. 11. Coming to the last argument advanced by the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was drawing salary of Rs. 2655 and 10 paise per month and that the pay order was prepared by taking his salary to be Rs. 2655/- per month only. The petitioner was required to establish this fact by leading appropriate evidence. Mere bald oral statement cannot be considered sufficient to accept the assertion that the petitioner was drawing salary to the tune of Rs. 2655 and 10 paise. The petitioner should have produced his salary certificate if at all he was desirous of proving this fact before the Tribunal.
The petitioner was required to establish this fact by leading appropriate evidence. Mere bald oral statement cannot be considered sufficient to accept the assertion that the petitioner was drawing salary to the tune of Rs. 2655 and 10 paise. The petitioner should have produced his salary certificate if at all he was desirous of proving this fact before the Tribunal. On going through the statement of claim, it is evident that no plea was taken by the petitioner that the pay order towards retrenchment compensation and salary of one month was short of the actual pay of the petitioner by 10 paise per month. The plea which the petitioner has taken in his affidavit is unacceptable because the evidence which the petitioner has given in this regard is a clear improvement from the pleadings set out in his statement of claim and thus is unacceptable. 12. As a consequence of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned award does not suffer from any illegality or perversity. The action taken by the Bank in terminating the petitioner's services on the ground of non requirement and in pursuance to the decision taken to reduce one post of driver was proceeded with in compliance of mandatory provisions of Section 25F(a)&(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the same is not liable to be interfered with in the writ jurisdiction of this Court.Resultantly, the writ petition being devoid of any merit is dismissed. No order as to costs. Writ Petition dismissed. *******