Judgment :- 1. The plaintiffs are mother and son. Plaintiff No.1 is the daughter-in-law of defendant No.1 and the sister-in-law of defendant No.2. The plaintiffs have sued for administration of the estate of the deceased husband of plaintiff No.1 as also the deceased father-in-law of plaintiff No.1. The father-in-law of plaintiff No.1 is stated to have expired on 12.04.2003. The husband of plaintiff No.1 is stated to have expired on 23.04.2003, a mere 11 days after the death of his father. 2. The suit property is one residential flat. The suit flat admittedly belonged to the father-in-law of plaintiff No.1. The plaintiffs claim 1/3rd share each in the estate of the husband of plaintiff No.1 and 1/3rd of 1/3rd share of the husband of plaintiff No.1 in the estate of the father-in-law of plaintiff No.1. The plaintiffs claim that when the father-in-law expired on 12.04.2003, his wife (defendant No.1), his daughter (defendant No.2) and the husband of plaintiff No.1 were the only heirs. The husband of plaintiff No.1 would obtain 1/3rd of his estate (and accordingly 1/3rd of the suit flat) of his father. He expired 11 days thereafter. The plaintiffs claim that that 1/3rd share would devolve upon plaintiff No.1, plaintiff No.2 and defendant No.1 in equal shares. 3. The plaintiffs have valued the suit flat at Rs.75 lacs. The plaintiffs have valued the share of the husband of plaintiff No.1 at Rs.25 lacs. The plaintiffs have valued their 1/3rd share each in the share of the husband of plaintiff No.1 in the suit flat at Rs.8.33 lacs + 8.33 lacs = 16.66 lacs. 4. The plaintiffs claim compensation for wrongful use of the suit flat by defendant No.1 to the exclusion of the plaintiffs from the date of the death of the father-in-law of plaintiff No.1 i.e. 12.04.2003 till the filing of the suit i.e. for the period of 71 months aggregating to Rs.8.52 lacs @ Rs.12,000/- per month and have valued the claim of plaintiff No.2 at Rs.4.26 lacs. The plaintiffs were required to pay Court fees upon the valuation of the suit property of Rs.16.66 lacs + Rs.4.26 lacs. 5. The plaintiffs have instead paid Court fees upon the claim of plaintiff No.2 upon valuing it at Rs.8.33 lacs + Rs.4.26 lacs = Rs.12.59 lacs. The plaintiffs have paid Court fees of Rs.28845/- upon such valuation. The plaintiffs were required to pay Court fees upon the valuation of the suit property of Rs.16.66 lacs + Rs.4.26 lacs. 5. The plaintiffs have instead paid Court fees upon the claim of plaintiff No.2 upon valuing it at Rs.8.33 lacs + Rs.4.26 lacs = Rs.12.59 lacs. The plaintiffs have paid Court fees of Rs.28845/- upon such valuation. The plaintiffs have not paid any Court fees upon the valuation of the suit property for the share claimed by plaintiff No.1 on the ground that her claim has arisen out of the matrimonial relationship and is accordingly exempted from the payment of Court fees. 6. The objection was raised by the office of the Prothonotary & Senior Master of this Court with regard to the payment of Court fees. The claim of exemption was not allowed. The plaint came to be rejected on 01.07.2009 under Rule 986 of the High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1980 for non removal of the office objection which was for non payment of requisite Court fees. 7. The plaintiffs claimed exemption under the notification of the State Government exempting women from payment of Court fees dated 01.10.1994. That notification came to be amended in the year 2000. Suits such as the above suit were not exempted under the later notification. Only applications by women for maintenance were exempted. Hence plaintiff No.1 was not exempted from payment of Court fees. The objection was rightly raised. The objection has not yet been removed. The suit has been rightly rejected by the Prothonotary and Senior Master of this Court under Rule 986 aforesaid. 8. The plaintiffs accept that the suit was rightly rejected and have applied for setting aside the rejection upon offer of payment of Court fees towards the 1/3rd share of plaintiff No.1 valued at Rs.8.33 lacs. 9. The plaintiffs' claim is from 12.04.2003, which is the date of the death of the father-in-law of plaintiff No.1. From that date the husband of plaintiff No.1 would have been entitled to his 1/3rd share in the estate of his father. He expired on 23.04.2003. The plaintiffs could sue on and from 23.04.2003 to obtain their share in the share of the husband of plaintiff No.1 in the estate of his father. Hence the cause of action accrued to the plaintiffs from 23.04.2003. The suit is filed in 2009. He expired on 23.04.2003. The plaintiffs could sue on and from 23.04.2003 to obtain their share in the share of the husband of plaintiff No.1 in the estate of his father. Hence the cause of action accrued to the plaintiffs from 23.04.2003. The suit is filed in 2009. The claim for compensation for wrongful use of the suit flat by defendant No.1 is made for 71 months from 12.04.2003 till the filing of the suit. The suit has been filed on 03.11.2009. The share of both the plaintiffs had to be determined as on 03.11.2009. The compensation claimed for 71 months was until 03.011.2009. The plaintiffs paid part of the Court fees towards the claim of plaintiff No.2 alone. The plaintiffs have not paid a part of the Court fees towards the claim of plaintiff No.1 for a period of 65 months since the filing of the suit until now. 10. Two separate aspects would have to be seen. One would relate to the bar of limitation. The other would relate to making good the Court fees lost to the State for the period of 65 months. 11. The plaintiffs have claimed that the suit has not been barred by the law of limitation despite the above chronology. The suit has further been delayed of 65 months. Since the suit was not allowed to be registered, the plaintiffs have naturally not served the writ of summons upon the defendants. The defendants have no knowledge of the plaintiffs' claim made 65 months earlier. It would be in this light that the service of the writ of summons, long delayed, would also have to be considered. Interest of justice to the defendants may demand that the service of the writ of summons to be effected in 2015 for a suit filed in 2009 would not be allowed under Rule 87 of the High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1980. The suit would otherwise be also kept for dismissal if the writ of summons was not served in this suit since under Rule 87 if the writ of summons is not served within 6 months from the date of the filing of the plaint, the suit would be placed on board for dismissal unless good cause was shown. This salutary provision is in the interest of the defendants who have no knowledge of the plaintiffs' claim. This salutary provision is in the interest of the defendants who have no knowledge of the plaintiffs' claim. The defendants who have not been served during the entire period of limitation allowed to the plaintiffs would not be allowed to be served upon the suit required to be kept on board for dismissal. This Court has refused to allow the plaintiffs to serve the writ of summons after a lapse of many years of filing of the suit upon such a principle. [See. M/s. Ebrahim Currim & Sons Vs. M/s. City Traders in Notice of Motion No. 4391 of 2009 in Summary Suit No. 2990 of 1998 dated 15.06.2011 and Khandwani Exports Ltd. Vs. Aftab Hussain in Notice of Motion No. 1119 of 2009 in Suit No. 476 of 1998 dated 22.12.2014] 12. If the Suit is allowed to be prosecuted and the order of rejection of the plaint is set aside upon payment of necessary Court fees, the plaintiffs would then have to serve the writ of summons upon the defendants. It would be in a suit which was liable to put on board for dismissal under Rule 87 aforesaid. It would be unjust and inequitable to effect service upon the defendants in this suit at such distance of time. The defendants would have reasonably concluded that the plaintiffs' claim, if any, in the estate of the deceased husband of plaintiff No.1 and the father of plaintiff No.2 has been given up as it is seen to be barred by the law of limitation, the cause of action having accrued to the plaintiffs on 23.04.2003, the date of the death of the husband of plaintiff No.1 when they could sue as his heirs upon succession under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It would do well for this Court to keep in mind such state of circumstances. 13. Even if the plaintiffs were to be allowed to pay the Court fees now which should have admittedly been paid 65 months ago at the time of the filing of the suit, the Court fees towards the claim of plaintiff No.1 would be lost to the State for a period of 65 months. It would be inequitable to allow the plaintiffs to pay Court fees at such distance of time when it is so grossly delayed without making any provisions for the loss caused to the State. It would be inequitable to allow the plaintiffs to pay Court fees at such distance of time when it is so grossly delayed without making any provisions for the loss caused to the State. It is in this light that the law relating to payment of Court fees deserves a look. 14. Under Section 3 of the Bombay Court Fees Act the levy of fees in the High Court on its Original Side is to be collected in the manner appearing after Section 3. The payment is to be made as set out in Section 40 of the Bombay Court Fees Act which runs thus: 40. Stamping documents in inadvertently received. No document which ought to bear a stamp under this Act shall be of any validity, unless and until it is properly stamped. But, if any such document is through mistake or inadvertence received, filed or used in any Court or Office without being properly stamped, the presiding Judge or the head of the office, as the case may be, or, in the case of the High Court, any Judge of such Court, may, if he thinks fit, order that such document be stamped as he may direct; and, on such document being stamped accordingly, the same and every proceeding relative thereto shall be as valid as if it had been properly stamped in the first instance. 15. It has been held in the case of Mohanlal Hochandra Doshi Vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 BOMBAY 224 that the insufficiency of Court fees is curable by making further payment at a subsequent stage and once such payment is made and the defect is cured the document is not invalid. It is observed in para 6 of the Judgment that under Section 40 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 no document which ought to bear a stamp under the Court Fees Act shall be valid unless it is properly stamped. However if it is not properly stamped through mistake or inadvertence and is received, filed or used, the Court may direct such document to be stamped if it thinks fit and upon it being stamped it shall be valid as if it had been properly stamped in the first instance. It is, therefore, held that insufficiency of stamp will not make the document totally defective and the defect is curable by making further payment at a subsequent stage. 16. It is, therefore, held that insufficiency of stamp will not make the document totally defective and the defect is curable by making further payment at a subsequent stage. 16. It will have to be seen when such further payment can be made. All claims filed in this Court are required to be duly checked by officers of Court under the rules of the Court. Objections are raised if the plaints are not properly filed. The payment of Court fees is the most important aspect of such checking. If through inadvertence or mistake sufficient Court fees is not paid and an objection is raised, the plaintiff could make payment and get the objections removed. This would be required to be done within a reasonable time. The reasonable time would be a matter of few days or a month or two because it is only upon inadvertence or mistake that further payment of Court fees is allowed upon seeing that the plaint is insufficiently stamped. Consequently the Judge of this Court has the discretion to allow such plaint bearing insufficient Court fees through mistake or inadvertence to be filed as he may direct. 17. It is trite that discretion has to be judiciously exercised; it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised. Therefore, the exercise of discretion must take into account the effect of such exercise. 18. Allowing the plaintiffs to pay Court fees in this case would mean that the State would lose the Court fees which should have admittedly been paid but has not been paid, not through any mistake or inadvertence in calculation of the Court fees but upon a wholly incorrect premise that plaintiff No.1 was exempted from payment of Court fees when the suit was filed in 2003. 19. It is common knowledge that for every payment not made an interest or a penalty is levied. There is no payment of interest specifically provided for payment of Court fees not paid through mistake or inadvertence or otherwise. That proceeds on a footing that the mistake or inadvertence is brought to light soon after the plaint is lodged and comes up for the scrutiny by the officers of the Court. There is no payment of interest specifically provided for payment of Court fees not paid through mistake or inadvertence or otherwise. That proceeds on a footing that the mistake or inadvertence is brought to light soon after the plaint is lodged and comes up for the scrutiny by the officers of the Court. Hence the payment of further Court fees in a plaint which has been wrongly received, filed or used in this Court without being properly stamped is necessarily to be made soon after the plaint is lodged and the objection is raised and not more than 5 years thereafter. 20. It may be mentioned that this Court did inform the Counsel on behalf of the plaintiffs to pay interest at the reasonable rate of 12% per annum on the amount of Court fees which has remained unpaid for the 1/3rd share claimed by plaintiff No.1 from the date of filing of the suit when such Court fees should have been paid until the date of the payment and which would be subject, of course, to the further discretion of the Court to allow the writ of summons to be served at such distance of time in a suit which, if the Court-fees was paid on time, and not served until now was liable to be placed on board for dismissal for non service of the writ of summons. Counsel on behalf of the plaintiffs upon taking instructions from the plaintiffs refused to pay interest upon the Court-fees payable. 21. The provisions of the CPC are also similar in this regard. Under Section 149 of the CPC the Court has power to make up deficiencies of Court fees. Section 149 runs thus: 149. Power to make up deficiency of Court-fees. Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to Court-fees has not been paid, the Court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such Court-fee; and upon such payment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance. The Court must exercise its discretion to allow a person to pay the remainder of the Court-fees. Upon such payment the objection of the officer of the Court would be removed and the plaint would be registered. The discretion has to be exercised as under Section 40 of the Bombay Court-Fees Act. 22. It has been held in the case of K. C. Skaria Vs. Government of State of Kerala 2006(4) ALL MR (SC) 14 that when the Court fees due on a plaint is not paid wholly or partly by any person instituting the suit, the Court, in its discretion, may allow him to pay the deficit Court fees within the period fixed by it under Section 149 of the CPC. 23. Under Section 151 of the CPC the inherent powers of the Court are saved. Section 151 runs thus: 151. Saving of inherent powers of Court.- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. The inherent powers also must be exercised taking into account the equity and justice for both the parties to the lis and in this case also the State. Hence just as the plaintiffs would be allowed to prosecute their action, the defendants must be allowed to defend the suit. The question of limitation by gross delay in filing the plaint and thereafter serving the writ of summons should be present to the mind of the Court. The revenue loss to the State for the period of time that the plaint remained insufficiently stamped by payment of deficient Court fees must also be kept in mind. 24. Under Order 7 Rule 11(b) of the CPC the plaint is liable to be rejected if the relief is undervalued and on the plaintiff being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court fails to do so. Under Order 7 Rule 11(c) when the relief is properly valued, but the plaint is insufficiently stamped and the plaintiff on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp papers within a time to be fixed by the Court fails to do so also, the plaint is liable to rejected. 25. Under Order 7 Rule 11(c) when the relief is properly valued, but the plaint is insufficiently stamped and the plaintiff on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp papers within a time to be fixed by the Court fails to do so also, the plaint is liable to rejected. 25. The purport of these provisions must be fully considered. In cases where full Court fees is not paid and the officer of the Court raises the objection and calls upon the plaintiff to pay additional Court fees, the plaintiff is expected to pay such Court fees within a reasonable time. This would be a matter of days or a month or two. It cannot be that the Court fees is not paid for as long as 5 years after which it is allowed to be paid by raising the objection. 26. The period of extension granted to the plaintiffs under Order 7 Rule 11(b) & (c) is for a cause on an unexceptional nature that prevented the plaintiff from paying the Court fees. It is not for the plaintiff who erroneously fails to pay it. Hence such an extension would not avail a plaintiff who has erroneously claimed the exemption of Court fees upon being a female litigant under law by way of a notification which did not govern the plaintiff at the time of the filing of the suit. 27. Thus seen, the plaintiffs would not be legally or equitably entitled to have the order of rejection of the suit set aside and to be allowed to pay the Court fees which has remained unpaid for the last 65 months. 28. The case of the plaintiffs in this Chamber Summons is that she had applied for exemption from the payment of Court-fees under the notification dated 01.10.1994. The case of the plaintiffs also is that plaintiff No.1 barely managed to raise the funds to deposit the Court-fees for the claim of plaintiff No.2, her son and she was trying to arrange for the funds for the balance 50% Court-fees. She claims that she could not raise the funds in time. She suffered severe depression. Now she has somehow managed to raise funds. She claims to be allowed to make payment of Court-fees (without interest) thereon due to her mental state. 29. She claims that she could not raise the funds in time. She suffered severe depression. Now she has somehow managed to raise funds. She claims to be allowed to make payment of Court-fees (without interest) thereon due to her mental state. 29. If plaintiff No.1 was unable to raise funds she was required to sue as an indigent person under Order 33 Rule 1 of the CPC. Her pauperism would have been ascertained under Order 33 Rule 1A of the CPC. The plaintiff does not now claim to be indigent and to benefits thereof. Even if she so claimed, her pauperism would have to be inquired into. She cannot be simplicitor allowed to pay additional Court-fees at such a late stage. 30. In view of the exemption claimed by her in the plaint as a legal entitlement and in view of the payment of Court-fees made by her on behalf of plaintiff No.2, her son, her case for payment of Court-fees of being unable to raise funds for her own share or not being in a fit mental state is seen to be false and cannot be accepted. 31. Taking all of the aforesaid facts into account it would be neither just nor proper to allow the plaintiffs to pay additional Court-fees and to have the order of rejection of the plaint set aside. 32. Consequently the Chamber Summons is dismissed.