JUDGMENT : S.R. Brahmbhatt, J. (Common Oral) - On 09.10.2015, these matters were adjourned for dictation on 23.10.2015. But, as 17.10.2015 was declared as working day for Court, and as this Court was assigned the matters as single judge in the first session, therefore, these matters were preponed and listed for dictation on 17.10.2015. In this group of petitions the petitioner is common, respondent no.1 is teacher and respondent no.2 is the Appellate Authority, who passed the impugned orders in various appeals being Appeal No.7 of 2014, Appeal No.8 of 2014, Appeal No.9 of 2014 and Appeal No.10 of 2014 respectively on 21.08.2014, under the payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, preferred by the petitioner, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of the Controlling Authority dated 25.11.2013, wherein the Controlling Authority directed the petitioner, herein, to pay the gratuity amount to the respondents within a period of 30 days from the date of the order along with 10% simple interest from the date of application till the payment is made. Hence, all these petitions were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. Facts in brief leading to filing this group of petitions, as could be gathered from memo and documents, could be described as under : 2.1. The petitioner school is engaged in imparting education to the students studying in Standard I to VIII and is managed by a trust. It has around 23 teaching as well as non teaching staffs. The respondents were appointed as Assistant Teachers and they superannuated on attaining the age of retirement i.e. 58 years. 2.2 The relevant details regarding the respondent teachers about progress of their gratuity cases are as under : Sr. No. Particulars Madhuben M. Gohil Ranjanaben G.K. Shotriya Upendrabhai B. Gundigara Induben D. Nagariya 1. Date of retirement 31/05/2010 31/10/2007 31.05.2001 31/10/1998 2. Period of service (1.6.1971 to 31.5.2010, i.e. 39 years) (16.8.1971 to 31.10.2007 i.e. 36 years (2.7.1962 to 31.5.2001, i.e. 39 years) (22.06.1973 to 31.10.1998 i.e. 25 years) 3. Date of submission of Form 'I' before Employer 06/08/10 27.04.2010 27.08.2010 21.04.2010 4. Date of filing of application before Controlling Authority in Form-'N' 20/08/2010 20.08.2010 09/09/10 20.08.2010 5 . Gratuity Application No. 595 of 2010 596 of 2010 598 of 2010 594 of 2010 6 . Date of order in Gratuity Application 25/11/2013 25.11.2013 25/11/2013 25.11.2013 7 . Date of submission of Form 'I' before Employer 06/08/10 27.04.2010 27.08.2010 21.04.2010 4. Date of filing of application before Controlling Authority in Form-'N' 20/08/2010 20.08.2010 09/09/10 20.08.2010 5 . Gratuity Application No. 595 of 2010 596 of 2010 598 of 2010 594 of 2010 6 . Date of order in Gratuity Application 25/11/2013 25.11.2013 25/11/2013 25.11.2013 7 . Amount ordered to be paid in Gratuity Application Rs.4,37,72 3/-+10% simple interest from 20/08/2010 Rs.3,07,114.5 0 with simple interest @ 10% from 20.08.2010 till the payment is made Rs. 2,06,212.0 5 with simple interest @ 10% from 13.09.2010 till the payment is made Rs.1,01,22 1/- with simple interest @ 10% from 20.08.2010 till the payment is made 8 . Date of filing of Appeal by petitioner against order of Controlling Authority 28/01/2014 28.01.2014 28.01.2014 28.01.2014 9 . Appeal No. 7 of 2014 8 of 2014 9 of 2010 10 of 2014 10 . Date of order in Appeal rejecting appeal 21/08/2014 21.08.2014 21/08/2014 21.08.2014 11 . Petition by challenging order of Appellate Authority by petitioner SCA 14821 of 2014 SCA 14822 of 2014 SCA 14823 of 2014 SCA 14824 of 2014 12 . Date of filing of present petition October- 2014 October-2014 October-2014 October-2014 2.3 The respondents were, after attaining the age of superannuation, submitted application for gratuity in Form-I to the petitioner school stating their date of joining and date of superannuation. They also submitted application being Application No. 595 of 2010, 596 of 2010, 598 of 2010 and 594 of 2010 respectively to the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 claiming their gratuity amounts along with 10% simple interest. 2.4 The petitioner school submitted its written statement before the Controlling Authority and raised preliminary objections about the maintainability of the said applications and non-joinder of necessary party. The petitioner school had submitted another application for amendment of written statement raising contention that the respondent teachers were not an 'Employee' within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act prior to 03.04.1997 and they had not completed 5 years of service as provided under Section 4(1) of the said Act. 2.5 The respondent teachers had submitted their affidavit reiterating their date of joining, date of superannuation and their last drawn wages. 2.5 The respondent teachers had submitted their affidavit reiterating their date of joining, date of superannuation and their last drawn wages. The secretary of the petitioner school had also filed affidavit stating that the respondents were working in the school from 01.06.1971 to 31.05.2010, 16.08.1971 to 31.10.2007, 02.07.1962 to 31.05.2001 and 22.06.1973 to 31.10.1998 respectively and as the respondents were not covered under section 2(e) of the Act prior to 03.04.1997, they were not entitled to gratuity under the said Act. 2.6 Thereafter respondent teachers had submitted their written arguments before the Controlling Authority claiming Rs.4,37,723/-, Rs.3,07,114/-, Rs.2,06,212.15 ps and Rs.1,01,221/- respectively as gratuity amount along with 10% interest and cost of Rs.2,000/-. The petitioner school had also submitted its written arguments stating that in view of judgments of the Supreme Court in case of Ahmedabad Private Primary Teacher Association v. Administrative Officer and others, Management of Goodyear India Ltd. v. K.G. Devessar and judgments of other High Courts, the respondents will not be entitled for gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 prior to 03.04.1997. 2.7 The Controlling Authority on 25.11.2013 ordered the petitioner school to pay Rs.4,37,723/-, Rs.3,07,114.50ps, Rs. 2,06,212.05ps and Rs.1,01,221/- respectively to the respondent teachers as gratuity and 10% simple interest w.e.f. the date of their applications i.e. on 20.08.2010 and 13.09.2010 within 30 days from the date of the order. 2.8 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of the Controlling Authority, the present petitioner preferred Appeal under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 before the Appellate Authority being Gratuity Appeal No.7 of 2014, 8 of 2014, 9 of 2014 and 10 of 2014 respectively. The Appellate Authority vide its order dated 21.08.2014 confirmed the order of the Controlling Authority. Hence, the present petitions. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the order impugned passed by the Appellate Authority is based on inferences not warranted by facts and presumptions and not permitted by law. He submitted that the order impugned is not only improper and illegal but the same is nullity in law as having been passed without jurisdiction and authority in law, and on that ground alone the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. He submitted that the order impugned is not only improper and illegal but the same is nullity in law as having been passed without jurisdiction and authority in law, and on that ground alone the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Controlling Authority as well as Appellate Authority grossly erred in not appreciating the facts that all the teachers had superannuated long back and after the amendment in the Act they filed applications in Form No.'I' without any separate application for condonation of delay. When the delay was required to be condoned and it was not condoned, the authority did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner thereafter contended that both the authorities i.e. Controlling Authority as well as Appellate Authority grossly erred in not appreciating the ratio and clear finding on law decided by the Supreme Court in case of Ahmedabad Private Primary Teacher Association v. Administrative Officer and others, reported in 2004 (1) GLH 301. The counsel emphatically submitted that the teachers as were not falling under the purview of definition of 'employee' under Section 2(e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, prior to the amendment of the said act before 03.04.1997. Therefore, the respondent teachers could not be said to have been entitled for gratuity prior to 03.04.1997. The authorities below failed in appreciating this aspect and, therefore, the order impugned deserve to be quashed and set aside. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further submitted that the various matters on the similar issue have been admitted by this Court being S.C.A. No.11269 of 2014, L.P.A. No. 1202 of 2012, etc. Therefore, he submits that impugned order passed by the appellate authority is ex-facie illegal and untenable and required to be quashed and set aside. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the following authorities : (i) in case of Ahmedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers' Association v. Administrative Officer and Others, reported in 2004 (1) G.L.H. 301; The counsel for the petitioner invited Court's attention to the observation in the said judgment made by the Supreme Court in paragraph no.17 to support his contention that the notification dated 03.04.1997 issued in exercise of power under Section 2(13)(c) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The Gratuity Act is though extended to educational institutions in which ten or more persons were employed or were employed on any day preceding 12 months. The same is only on the strength thereto without there being amendment in the definition of 'employee', was not made applicable so far as, the teaching staff of the school is concerned. The educational institutions' staff members were treated to be covered, but not the teaching staff i.e. teachers because they could not have been equated with the workman and, therefore, the definition, as it then stood, did not include teachers of educational institutions despite there being a notification under which the gratuity act was extended to cover the schools and educational institutions at least from 03.04.1997. The counsel, therefore submitted that, as could be seen from the observations in paragraph nos.22 and 23 of the said judgment, it can well be said that the definition of 'employee' did not cover the teachers in the educational institutions and therefore, they were not to be included under the Payment of Gratuity Act. (ii) The counsel for the petitioner invited Court's attention to the observations made by the Supreme Court in case of Management of Goodyear India Limited v. K.G. Devessar, reported in 1985 (4) SCC 45 to indicate that the relevant part is the applicability of the Act and the employee fulfilling all the conditions mentioned thereunder. In the aforesaid case, it was an argument of the management that if the definition of 'employee' is read into Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, it would show that only those persons who were drawing wages of less than Rs.1,000/- on the date of superannuation, retirement, etc. would be entitled to payment of gratuity provided that such retirement, superannuation, etc. was after the date of coming into force of the Act. While negativing this submission, the Supreme Court observed that the date of coming into force of the Act, has relevance to the date on which gratuity becomes payable on termination of employment and therefore, in order to be eligible to payment of gratuity, the termination of employment whether it be due to superannuation or retirement or resignation or death or disablement, has to be after the date of coming into force of the Act. Once that condition is satisfied, the further question would be only regarding the amount of gratuity payable. Once that condition is satisfied, the further question would be only regarding the amount of gratuity payable. The gratuity would have to be paid to all those persons whose employment came to an end after the coming into force of the Act for that period during which he came within the definition of an employee within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act. Thus the precise observations were pressed into service to indicate that the employee to be eligible and entitle to receive gratuity has to be fulfilling the terms and conditions and should have been within the purview of the definition of Section 2(e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act. (iii) in case of Principal v. Manusukhbhai Arjanbhai Rachhadiya and others, passed by Division Bench of this Court in C.A. No.10954 of 2012 and allied matters on 26.02.2013. The counsel placed reliance upon the order of this Court passed in the said Civil Application for stay, wherein the Court also ordered investment of amount of gratuity, so far as the amount of gratuity prior to the period of 03.04.1997, was concerned. The subsequent amount was permitted to be withdrawn. Relying upon this observation and direction, it was contended on the part of the petitioner that this Court may not decide the matter and await the decision of the Division Bench in the Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No.1202 of 2012 and L.P.A. No.135 of 2013. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in these very matters, as could be seen from the earlier orders passed, it can well be said that on 31.03.2015, to be more precise, the learned single Judge of this Court thought it appropriate to adjourn the matters beyond 25.04.2015, as the Letters Patent Appeals were listed for hearing. The said Letters Patent Appeals have been lastly listed, as could be seen from the status report, on 15.04.2015. Thereafter, those appeals were not listed. (iv) in case of Gangandeep Pratishthan Private Limited v. Mechano, reported in 2002 (1) SCC 475 ; The decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the said case was in respect of the proposition that the High Court ought not to have considered and decided appeal without considering preliminary objection as to delay and maintainability of the appeal. (iv) in case of Gangandeep Pratishthan Private Limited v. Mechano, reported in 2002 (1) SCC 475 ; The decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the said case was in respect of the proposition that the High Court ought not to have considered and decided appeal without considering preliminary objection as to delay and maintainability of the appeal. In the instant case also, it was urged that the authorities below i.e. Controlling Authority as well as Appellate Authority did not have jurisdiction to decide the matter, as no delay condonation applications preferred by the respondents seeking condonation of delay in approaching the authority. (v) in case of Rajkumar Sing v. Best Handling Corporation and others, passed by this Court in S.C.A. No.931 of 2013 on 30.01.2013. The said judgment is relied upon to indicate that the employee, if, is not making out a ground for condoning delay, the gratuity authorities were not justified in rejecting the application, as this Court did not interfere with and dismiss the matter of employee. This order is pressed into service to support the contention that delay condonation application is must before the authority. (vi) in case of Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation v. Deputy Labour Commissioner and Another, reported in 2008-III-LLJ-396(Kar); (vii) in case of M. Devarajulu v. Asst. Commissioner of Labour & Ors., reported in 1995 I LLJ 348; (viii) in case of Dhanda, R.P. v. Regional Manager, UCO Bank, Mumbai, reported in 2007(3)LLJ 106; These decisions are also pressed into service to support the contention in respect of the delay occurred in filing Form 'I' and therefore, the authorities were not justified in passing any order without first passing order of condonation of delay. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner also submitted that the decision rendered by this Court in case of Jain Citizens Education Society-Surendranagar v. Union of India through Secretary, reported in 2012 (3) LLJ 91, would be of no avail to the respondent teachers, inasmuch as, it was merely in respect of the constitutional validity of the amendment and the moot question in respect of whether the teachers, who rendered services prior to 1997 i.e. 03.04.1997, would be eligible to reckon their services as teachers rendered prior to 1997 and, therefore, when this question is precisely raised, the said decision would be of no avail to the respondents. 9. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent teachers submitted that details of all the teachers mentioned herein above and placed on record in a tabular form, would clearly indicate that the teachers had put in major part of their services prior to 1997. The gratuity Act and its amendment and the retrospectivity given to the amendment was subject matter of scrutiny before this Court in case of Jain Citizens Education Society - Surendranagar (supra) and, therefore, now on account of absolutely untenable ground of distinction, the same cannot be said to be not available to avail the benefits enuring therefrom, so far as interpretation is concerned, to all the similarly situated teachers. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent teachers submitted that the petitions are devoid of any merits and therefore the same is required to be rejected at the admission stage itself. He submits that by the impugned orders in the present petitions learned Appellate Authority vide order dated 21.08.2014 in appeals has confirmed the order of the Controlling Authority dated 25.11.2013, by which learned Controlling Authority has considering the joining date as 15.06.1970, 16.08.1971, 02.07.1962 and 22.06.1973 respectively and retirement date as 31.05.2010, 31.10.2007, 31.05.2001 and 31.10.1998 respectively in all 40 years, 36 years, 39 years and 25 years of continuous service determined and directed payment of gratuity of Rs.4,37,723/- Rs.3,07,114.50ps, Rs. 2,06,212.05ps and Rs.1,01,221/- respectively with simple interest at the rate of 10% from the date of their applications i.e. on 20.08.2010 and 13.09.2010 within 30 days to the respondents. He further submits that after the order of the appellate authority dated 21.08.2014, respondents approached the controlling authority on 23.09.2014 for making the payment of gratuity out of the deposited amount while filing the appeal by the petitioner, it came to the knowledge of the respondents that petitioner has only deposited the principal amount without interest. Thus the efforts on part of the petitioner is to deny the statutory rights of getting gratuity to the respondents and therefore present petition is required to be rejected in the interest of justice. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent teachers submits that the finding in the orders impugned is concurrent finding and as per well settled principles of law and it cannot be interfered with. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent teachers submits that the finding in the orders impugned is concurrent finding and as per well settled principles of law and it cannot be interfered with. He submits that after the order of the controlling authority, respondents consistently approached the petitioner for compliance of the order and despite the fact that petitioner has failed in appeal and still non compliance by the petitioner is an act of unfair labour practice and also contempt of courts' order and therefore present petition is required to be rejected. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents further submitted that petitioner has based its case on the ground that respondents cannot be granted gratuity with retrospective effect, prior to 03.04.1997,. He submits that the Division Bench of this Court has finally decided identical and similar plea in case of Jain Citizens Education Society - Surendranagar v. Union of India through Secretary, reported in 2012 (3) LLJ 91, and has held that impugned provisions made to implement the intention of the Government of India to provide the benefit of gratuity to all the employees of the Educational Institutions including the teachers and substituted Section 2(e) and newly inserted Section 13A of the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act, 2009, are neither violative of Article 14 nor violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and holding so petition has been dismissed. He further submits that when the petitioner is aware of about interim order in unreported decisions it appears petitioner has conveniently and intentionally filed above petition ignoring the above referred binding decision and therefore, on this ground also present petition is required to be rejected and controlling authority is required to be directed to recover the balance amount including the interest from the petitioner and disburse it to the respondents. The counsel for the respondent teachers heavily relied upon the said decision submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in paragraph nos.1, 2, 24 and 25, would indicate that the same cannot be brushed aside on so called ground of distinction sought to be made out by the employer in the present case. 13. The counsel for the respondent teachers heavily relied upon the said decision submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in paragraph nos.1, 2, 24 and 25, would indicate that the same cannot be brushed aside on so called ground of distinction sought to be made out by the employer in the present case. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents relied upon the following authorities : (i) in case of Sushilkumar Maloo v. Gujarat Raffia Industries Ltd., reported in (2015) II C.L.R. 550; Relying upon the said decision, the counsel for the respondent teachers urged that the object and reasoning of the gratuity act were considered by the Court for rejecting contention of the employer that the subsequent enhancement in the ceiling limit would restrict the right of employee to receive the gratuity amount to the period when the enhancement become operative. Thus, in the instant case also, it would not be open to the employer to contend that the period of service rendered prior to 1997 would not be nugatory in light of the object and reasoning and the retrospectivity upheld by the Court of the amendment in question. (ii) The counsel for the respondents relied upon the case of Panoli Intermediate (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, reported in 2015 JX (Guj) 158; This decision is pressed into service to indicate that in absence of any challenge to the order of the Controlling Authority dated 25.11.2013, there cannot be any condonation qua delay condonation or lack of delay condonation available in the writ petition on the specious ground that the order of the appellate court would have effect of merging the order of the Controlling Authority. In fact, the ground of delay or any other ground, which were available for assailing the order of Controlling Authority, ought to have been pressed into service along with the prayers in these petitions, else it would not be open to the employer to assail that order. (iii) The respondents' counsel relied upon the decision in case of Gurudeo Ayurved Mahavidyalaya, Gurukunj Ashram, and another v. Madhav and others, reported in 1994-II L.L.N. 551; This case was cited to support the condonation that there cannot be denial to counting the period rendered prior to the date of notification i.e. 03.04.1997. (iii) The respondents' counsel relied upon the decision in case of Gurudeo Ayurved Mahavidyalaya, Gurukunj Ashram, and another v. Madhav and others, reported in 1994-II L.L.N. 551; This case was cited to support the condonation that there cannot be denial to counting the period rendered prior to the date of notification i.e. 03.04.1997. In this case Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court found that the employee at the time of retirements was drawing wages less than limit fixed under the Act. It was considered to be a fit case in which the entire gratuity was ordered to be granted to him. (iv) The counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision in case of Gurunath Vithal Tamse v. National Textile Corporation (N.M.), reported in 2002(1) CLR 809; In this case it was submitted that the order of Controlling Authority as well as Appellate Authority were quashed and set aside, where under the authorities had rejected the claim of gratuity on account of delay, as the delay had occurred when the reference challenging the illegal termination, was pending. (v) The counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision in case of H. Jayrama Shetty v. The Sangli Bank Ltd., reported in (2005) III LLJ 637 Bom., H.C.; In this case learned counsel for the respondents relied upon paragraph nos.9 and 10 submitted that the employer cannot be permitted to dodge his responsibility of paying the gratuity of setting up delay as a ground. (vi) The counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision in case of Mineral Area Development v. State of Bihar And Ors., reported in (1998) II LLJ 54 (Pat); The observation of the Court in the said judgment is relied upon to support the submission that the claim of gratuity cannot be defeated on a technical ground as limitation. (vii) The counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision in case of Madhya Pradesh Madhya Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Co. Ltd., Gwalior v. D.D. Singh, reported in 2015 I CLR 349; 14. The Court has heard learned counsels appearing for the parties. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the counsel for the parties, it would be most appropriate to set out the relevant portion of the notification dated 03.04.1997, which read as under; "Notification No.5-42013/1/95-SS II. Ltd., Gwalior v. D.D. Singh, reported in 2015 I CLR 349; 14. The Court has heard learned counsels appearing for the parties. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the counsel for the parties, it would be most appropriate to set out the relevant portion of the notification dated 03.04.1997, which read as under; "Notification No.5-42013/1/95-SS II. Dated 3rd April, 1997- In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (c) of subsection (3) of Section 1 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (39 of 1972), the Central Government hereby specifies the educational institutions in which ten or more persons are employed or were employed on any day preceding 12 months as a class of establishments to which the said Act shall apply with effect from the date of publication of this notification. Provided that nothing contained in this notification shall affect the operation of the notification of the Ministry of Labour S.O.239 dated 8th January, 1982." 15. Thus, the said notification extended the payment of Gratuity Act to the educational institutions also. Unfortunately, on account of phraseology of the then definition of word 'employee', the teaching staff of the educational institutions were not getting benefit of provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act. This is articulately coming out in the observation of the Supreme Court decision rendered in case of Ahmedabad Private Primary Teacher Association (supra). The following paragraphs would indicate that as to why the teaching staffs and teachers were not treated to be covered by the definition. The Court in fact expressed its anxiety also, as could be seen from the observations made in this judgment for its inability to cover them. The said observations are reproduced herein below in order to appreciate the controversy. "Para 23. The Legislature was alive to various kinds of definitions of word 'employee' contained in various previous labour enactments when the Act was passed in 1972. If it intended to cover in the definition of 'employee' all kinds of employees, it could have as well used such wide language as is contained in Section 2(f) of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 which defines 'employee' to mean 'any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of (an establishment)'.... Non-use of such wide language in the definition of 'employee' in Section 2(e) of the Act 1972 reinforces our conclusion that teachers are clearly not covered in the definition." 16. The definition of 'employee', as it existed then, and as it is reproduced in the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Ahmedabad Private Primary Teacher Association (supra), it is required to be reproduced hereunder also for ready reference; "2(e). 'employee' means any person (other than an apprentice) employed on wages, in any establishment, factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, railway company or shop, to do any skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work, whether the terms of such employment are express or implied, (and whether or not such person is employed in a managerial or administrative capacity, but does not include any such person who holds a post under the Central Government or a State Government and is governed by any other Act or by any rules providing for payment of gratuity)." 17. This definition was interpreted by the Supreme Court in the said case, as could be seen from the observations of the Supreme Court in para nos. 19, 20, 21, 22, which is reproduced herein below : "Para 19. Having thus compared the various definition clauses of word 'employee' in different enactments, with due regard to the different aims and objects of the various labour legislation's, we are of the view that even on plain construction of the words and expression used in definition clause 2(e) of the Act, 'teachers' who are mainly employed for imparting education are not intended to be covered for extending gratuity benefits under the Act. Teachers do not answer description of being employees who are 'skilled', 'semi-skilled' or 'unskilled'. These three words used in association with each other intend to convey that a person who is 'unskilled' is one who is not 'skilled' and a person who is 'semiskilled' may be one who falls between two categories meaning he is neither fully skilled nor unskilled. The Brik's law Dictionary defines these three words as under: “Semi-skilled work. Work that may require some alertness and close alternation, such as inspecting items or machinery for irregularities, or guarding property or people against loss or injury. Skilled work. The Brik's law Dictionary defines these three words as under: “Semi-skilled work. Work that may require some alertness and close alternation, such as inspecting items or machinery for irregularities, or guarding property or people against loss or injury. Skilled work. Work requiring the worker to use judgment, deal with the public, analyse facts and figures, or work with abstract ideas at a high level of complexity. Unskilled work. Work requiring little or no judgment, and involving simple tasks that can be learned quickly on the job.” para 20: In construing the above mentioned three works which are used in association with each other, the rule or construction noscitur a soclls may be appalled. The meaning of each of these words is to be understood by the company it keeps. It is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them. The actual order of these three words in juxtaposition indicates that meaning of one takes colour from the other. The rule is explained differently: 'that meaning of doubtful words may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it'. Para 21. The word 'unskilled' is opposite of the word 'skilled' and the word 'semi-skilled' seems to describe a person who falls between the two categories, i.e. he is not fully skilled and also is not completely unskilled but has some amount of skill for the work for which he is employed. The word 'unskilled' cannot, therefore, be understood dissociated from the work 'skilled' and 'semi-skilled' to read and construe it to include in it all categories of employees irrespective of the nature of employment. If the Legislature intended to cover all categories of employees for extending benefit of gratuity under the Act, specific mention of categories of employment in the definition clause was not necessary at all. Any construction of definition clause which renders it superfluous or otiose has to be avoided. Para 22. The contention advanced that teachers should be treated as included in expression 'unskilled' or 'skilled' cannot, therefore, be accepted. The teachers might have been imparted training for teaching or there may be cases where teachers who are employed in primary schools are untrained. A trained teacher is not described in industrial field or service jurisprudence as a 'skilled employee'. The contention advanced that teachers should be treated as included in expression 'unskilled' or 'skilled' cannot, therefore, be accepted. The teachers might have been imparted training for teaching or there may be cases where teachers who are employed in primary schools are untrained. A trained teacher is not described in industrial field or service jurisprudence as a 'skilled employee'. Such adjective generally is used for employee doing manual or technical work. Similarly, the words 'semi-skilled' and 'unskilled' are not understood in educational establishments as describing nature or job of untrained teachers. We do not attach much importance to the arguments advanced on the question as to whether 'skilled', 'semi-skilled' and 'unskilled' quality the words 'manual', 'supervisory', 'technical' or 'clerical' or the above words qualify the word 'work'. Even if all the words are read distinctively or in any other manner, trained or untrained teachers do not plainly answer any of the descriptions of the nature of various employments given in the definition clause. Trained or untrained teachers are not 'skilled', 'semi-skilled', 'unskilled', 'manual', 'supervisory', 'technical' or 'clerical' employees. They are also not employed in 'managerial' or 'administrative' capacity. Occasionally, even if they do some administrative work as part of their duty with teaching, since their main job is imparting education, they cannot be held employed in 'managerial' or 'administrative' capacity. The teachers are clearly not intended to be covered by the definition of 'employee'. 18. After recording the conclusion, the Supreme Court did observe as under, as could be seen from observations of the Supreme Court in para nos.24 and 25. "Para 24: Our conclusion should not be misunderstood that teachers although engaged in very noble profession of educating our young generation should not be given any gratuity benefit. There are already in several States separate statutes, rules and regulations granting gratuity benefits to teachers in educational institutions which are more or less beneficial than the gratuity benefits provided under the Act. It is for the Legislature to take cognisance of situation of such teachers in various establishments where gratuity benefits are not available and think of a separate legislation for them in this regard. That is the subject-matter solely of the Legislature to consider and decide. Para 25: In conclusion, we find no merit in this appeal. It is, hereby, dismissed but without any order as to costs." 19. That is the subject-matter solely of the Legislature to consider and decide. Para 25: In conclusion, we find no merit in this appeal. It is, hereby, dismissed but without any order as to costs." 19. Thus, the Supreme Court left it to the legislature to take care of the situation, as the Supreme Court had held that the definition existed then, did not cover the teachers which prompted the State in bringing about an amendment in the Gratuity Act itself in form of Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act, 2009. Under the said Act, the definition of 'employee' came to be recast and now it reads as under; "1. Short title and commencement:-(1) This Act may be called the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act, 2009. (2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 3rd April, 1997. 2. Amendment of Section 2- In the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (39 of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act), in Section 2 for Clause (e), the following clause shall be substituted, namely:- '(e) “employee” means any person (other than an apprentice) who is employed for wages, whether the terms of such employment are express or implied, in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of a factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, railway company, shop or other establishment to which this Act applies, but does not include any such person who holds a post under the Central Government or a State Government and is governed by any other Act or by any rules providing for payment of gratuity;' 20. The State was mindful of the fact that on account of unfortunate exclusion of teachers from the purview of Gratuity Act, the definition of 'employee' was required to be made, else the original extension of Payment of Gratuity Act, vide notification dated 03.04.1997, would have cover the teachers. The State and legislature thought it fit to give the said amendment retrospectivity by way of inserting Section 13A, which read as under. "3. Insertion of new Section 13A- After Section 13 of the principal Act, the following section shall be inserted, namely : “13A. The State and legislature thought it fit to give the said amendment retrospectivity by way of inserting Section 13A, which read as under. "3. Insertion of new Section 13A- After Section 13 of the principal Act, the following section shall be inserted, namely : “13A. Validation of payment of gratuity.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court, for the period commencing on and from the 3 April, 1997 and ending on the day on which the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act, 2009, receives the assent of the President, the gratuity shall be payable to an employee in pursuance of the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Labour and Employment vide number S.O.1080, dated the 3 of April, 1997 and the said notification shall be valid and shall be deemed always to have been valid as if the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act, 2009 had been in force at all material times and the gratuity shall be payable accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall extend, or be construed to extend, to affect any person with any punishment or penalty whatsoever by reason of the non-payment by him of the gratuity during the period specified in this section which shall become due in pursuance of the said notification.” 21. Thus, the plain and simple reading of Section 13A of the Gratuity Act shall put at rest all the doubts qua applicability of the Act to the teachers of the educational institutions right from 03.04.1997. The same is to be treated as if it is part of the Gratuity Act from the beginning. The challenge to its retrospectivity has been put at rest by this Court, as could be seen from the observations of this Court in case of Jain Citizens Education Society - Surendranagar (supra). The relevant observations including challenge would come handy in appreciating the controversy. Therefore, they are reproduced herein below; "1. These two writ petitions have been preferred by the petitioners challenging the validity of Section 2(e) and Section 13-A of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, as being unconstitutional and void in the eye of law. The relevant observations including challenge would come handy in appreciating the controversy. Therefore, they are reproduced herein below; "1. These two writ petitions have been preferred by the petitioners challenging the validity of Section 2(e) and Section 13-A of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, as being unconstitutional and void in the eye of law. Further prayer has been made to direct the respondents, their officers, subordinate servants and agents to refrain from taking any steps pursuant to enforcement of the provisions of Section 2(e) and Section 3-A of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 against the petitioners. 2. The main grievance of the petitioners is with regard to the retrospective effect given to the aforesaid provisions from 3rd April 1997. According to the petitioners, the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act, 2009, having received assent from the President on 31st December 2009 as published in the Gazette of India, Extra Part II, Section 1 on 31st December 2009, it cannot be given retrospective effect from 3rd April 1997. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that the retrospective date of 3rd April 1997 has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The provisions being violative of fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioners under Article 19(1)(g) and Article 300A of the Constitution of India, the substitution of Section 2(e) and the insertion of Section 13-A in the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, are bad in law and ultravires the aforesaid provisions. 13. It was in this background that as the Parliament decided to give effect to the intention of the Government of India as made by Notification No. S.O. 1080 dated 3rd April 1997, and thereby, amended the relevant provisions by substitution of Section 2(e) and insertion of Section 13-A by the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act, 2009 as evident from the Statement of Objects and Reasons and quoted hereunder:- "Prefatory Note - Statement of Objects and Reasons. - The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 provides for payment of gratuity to employees engaged in factories, mines, oilfields, plantations, ports, railway companies, shops or other establishment and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. - The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 provides for payment of gratuity to employees engaged in factories, mines, oilfields, plantations, ports, railway companies, shops or other establishment and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the said Act empowers the Central Government to apply the provisions of the said Act by notification in the Official Gazette to such other establishments or class of establishments in which ten or more employees are employed, or were employed, on any day preceding twelve months. Accordingly, the Central Government had extended the provisions of the said Act to the educational institutions employing ten or more persons by notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Labour and Employment vide Number S.O. 1080, dated the 3rd April, 1997. 2. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment in Civil Appeal No.6369 of 2001, dated the 13th January, 2004, in Ahmedabad (P) Primary Teacher's Assn. v. Administrative Officer, (2004) 1 SCC 755 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 306 had felt that if it was extended to cover in the definition of `employee', all kind of employees, it could have as well used such wide language as is contained in clause (f) of Section 2 of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 which defines `employee' to mean any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an establishment. It had been held that non-use of such wide language in the definition of `employee' under clause (e) of Section 2 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 reinforces the conclusion that teachers are clearly not covered in the said definition. 3. Keeping in view the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is proposed to widen the definition of `employee' under the said Act in order to extend the benefit of gratuity to the teachers. Accordingly, the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Bill, 2007 and same was referred to the Standing Committee on Labour which made certain recommendations. After examining those recommendations, it was decided to give effect to the amendment retrospectively with effect from the 3rd April, 1997, the date on which the provisions of the said Act were made applicable to educational institutions. 4. Accordingly, the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Bill, 2007 and same was referred to the Standing Committee on Labour which made certain recommendations. After examining those recommendations, it was decided to give effect to the amendment retrospectively with effect from the 3rd April, 1997, the date on which the provisions of the said Act were made applicable to educational institutions. 4. Accordingly, the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Bill, 2007 was withdrawn and a new Bill, namely the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Bill, 2009 having retrospective effect was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 24th February, 2009. However, due to dissolution of the Fourteenth Lok Sabha, the said Bill lapsed. In view of the above, it is considered necessary to bring the present Bill. 5. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives." In the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, in Section 2 for clause (e), following clause has been substituted:- "(e) "employee" means any person (other than an apprentice) who is employed for wages, whether the terms of such employment are express or implied, in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of a factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, railway company, shop or other establishment to which this Act applies, but does not include any such person who holds a post under the Central Government or a State Government and is governed by any other Act or by any rules providing for payment of gratuity." After Section 13 of the Principal Act, Section 13-A was inserted for validation of payment of gratuity, which reads as under:- "13-A. Validation of payment of gratuity - Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court, for the period commencing on and from the 3rd day of April, 1997 and ending on the day on which the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act, 2009, receives the assent of the President, the gratuity shall be payable to an employee in pursuance of the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Labour and Employment vide Number S.O. 1080, dated the 3rd day of April, 1997 and the said notification shall be valid and shall be deemed always to have been valid as if the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act, 2009 had been in force at all material times and the gratuity shall be payable accordingly. Provided that nothing contained in this section shall extend, or be construed to extend, to affect any person with any punishment or penalty whatsoever by reason of the nonpayment by him of the gratuity during the period specified in this section which shall become due in pursuance of the said notification." 14. Now, in view of the substituted definition of `employee' u/Sec.2(e) any person, who is employed for wages in any kind of work in or in connection with the work of a factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, railway company, shop or other establishment to which the Act applies, except the employees of the Central Government or State Governments, is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The benefit of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 was intended to be extended by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment vide Notification No. S.O. 1080 dated 3rd April 1997 to the employees of the educational institutions, including the teachers, but it could not be given effect to the teachers in view of the decision rendered by this High Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers' Association (supra). However, the intention was validated by the amended Section 2(e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. To ensure validation of payment of gratuity with effect from 3rd April 1997, that is the date the Central Government, Ministry of Labour and Employment issued the Notification contained in S.O. No. 1080 dated 3rd April 1997, Section 13-A was inserted after Section 13 in the Principal Act. 18. The aforesaid decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Shantiben L. Christian (supra) was challenged by the Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers' Association before the Supreme Court reported in Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers' Association (supra). By that time, the Government of India from its Ministry of Labour and Employment issued notification dated 3rd April 1997 in exercise of powers conferred u/Sec.1(3) (c) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, whereby the benefit of payment of gratuity was extended to educational institutions in which ten or more persons are/were employed on any day preceding twelve months. By that time, the Government of India from its Ministry of Labour and Employment issued notification dated 3rd April 1997 in exercise of powers conferred u/Sec.1(3) (c) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, whereby the benefit of payment of gratuity was extended to educational institutions in which ten or more persons are/were employed on any day preceding twelve months. The Supreme Court having noticed the Notification dated 3rd April 1997 and the definition of `employee' as was in vogue under the unamended Section 2(e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, while upheld the decision of the Full Bench of this Court that teachers are not covered within the definition of `employees', but in view of the Notification dated 3rd April 1997, following observations were made:- "25. The Legislature was alive to various kinds of definitions of word 'employee' contained in various previous labour enactments when the Act was passed in 1972. If it intended to cover in the definition of 'employee' all kinds of employees, it could have as well used such wide language as is contained in section 2(1) of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 which defines 'employee to mean 'any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of [an establishment ............ Non-use of such wide language in definition of 'employee' in section 2(e) of the Act of 1972 reinforces our conclusion that teachers are clearly not covered in the definition. "26. Our conclusion should not be misunderstood that teachers although engaged in very noble profession of educating our young generation should not be given any gratuity benefit. There are already in several States separate statutes, rules and regulations granting gratuity benefits to teachers in educational institutions which are more or less beneficial than the gratuity benefits provided under the Act. It is for the Legislature to take cognisance of situation of such teachers in various establishments where gratuity benefits are not available and think of a separate legislation for them in this regard. That is the subject matter solely of the Legislature to consider and decide." 19. It is for the Legislature to take cognisance of situation of such teachers in various establishments where gratuity benefits are not available and think of a separate legislation for them in this regard. That is the subject matter solely of the Legislature to consider and decide." 19. In view of the observations made by the Supreme Court and to implement the intention of Government of India to provide the benefit of gratuity to all the employees of educational institutions, including teachers, the impugned substitution was made in Section 2(e) and Section 13-A was inserted by the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act 47 of 2009). 25. In view of the `Statement of Objects and Reasons' of the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act, 2009, giving effect to the amended Act with effect from 3rd April 1997 having nexus with the Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment Notification contained in S.O. 1080 dated 3rd April 1997, and as the appropriate Legislature can enact the laws in respect of topics both prospectively and retrospectively, and it does not take away any right of the petitioners, we hold that the substituted Section 2(e) and the newly inserted Section 13-A of the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act, 2009 are neither violative of Article 14 nor violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, and in absence of any infirmity, we hold them as good." 22. Thus, in view of decision rendered by the Supreme Court at para no.24 in the Ahmedabad Primary Teachers Association (supra), the consequent legislative amendment and interpretation of para no.13A as well as recasting of definition of 'employee' and observations of this Court cited herein above in case of Jain Citizens Education Society - Surendranagar (supra), should put at rest all the questions and arguments in respect of the applicability of the Act to the teachers with the retrospective effect. 23. The Court, therefore, need not elaborate on this aspect, at this stage, suffice it to say that the decision cited at the Bar in case of Jain Citizens Education Society - Surendranagar (supra), amply takes care of all these aspects. 24. The question, at this stage, arises as to whether the employer is justified in raising a plea of applicability of the Act only from 1997 and the services of the teachers rendered after 1997. 24. The question, at this stage, arises as to whether the employer is justified in raising a plea of applicability of the Act only from 1997 and the services of the teachers rendered after 1997. The answer would be in emphatic 'negative', as the object and reason of extension of the Gratuity Act to the educational institutions way back in 03.04.1997, would clearly indicate that the date of extension, read with the retrospectivity given to the Act, would render all the teachers eligible to receive their gratuity for the period rendered prior to 1997. For this purpose, once the extension has to be read into existence from 1997 and the definition of 'employee' is by legislative amendment said to be in the Act, by virtue of provision of Section 13A, the artificial distinction sought to be created would be of no avail as the same would be leading to an absurd situation and also militate against the avowed principle and objective of giving benefit of Gratuity Act and benefits to the teachers and therefore, the Gratuity Act itself came to be extended with effect from 03.04.1997. Once, the Act become applicable to the teachers, then the provisions will come into operation, which indicate that the educational institutions having teachers fulfilling the conditions laid thereunder, would be entitled to receive gratuity. It would be unfortunate, if the other interpretation is accepted, as it would render nugatory the operation of not only the notification, but also of the amendment by wrongful interpretation of the provision of Section 13A and other provisions of the Gratuity Act. 25. Once the Gratuity Act is made applicable to the educational institutions by virtue of notification dated 03.04.1997 and when on account of operation of Section 13A of the Gratuity Act, the definition of 'employee' stood included in the statute with retrospective effect. There, it can well be said that the teachers, who are retiring on or after 03.04.1997, would be entitled to reckon their past services for receiving gratuity benefit. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner school that the services rendered after 03.04.1997 only is to be reckoned for gratuity purpose, is unfortunate and to say the least lead to absurdity. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner school that the services rendered after 03.04.1997 only is to be reckoned for gratuity purpose, is unfortunate and to say the least lead to absurdity. If, such an interpretation is accepted, then it would amount to say that the gratuity amendment and notification of 03.04.1997, though is made applicable to educational institutions from 03.04.1997 and on account of retrospectivity given to the definition of 'employee' by Section 13A, the teachers who retires only on completion of five years from 03.04.1997, would be entitled to receive gratuity for that five years only and their earlier services will be of no avail. In other words, this absurdity can be described as shifting the enforceability of the Act for the period of five years from 03.04.1997, which can obviously not the purport and purpose of the amendment of Section 13A of the Amendment Act. On the contrary, the unequivocal retrospectivity given to the definition of word 'employee', would make all the teachers who retired on 03.04.1997 to reckon their past services for the purpose of gratuity on account of amendment in the definition of “teachers' as well as the retrospectivity given by Section 13A of the Amendment Act. 26. This leads the Court to consider the question, which is raised, that as the Letters Patent Appeal is pending, this Court should deny hearing and relief to the employee respondents. The answer is emphatic 'No', as in fact the counsel for the respondent teachers was justified in submitting that the Division Bench's judgment rendered in Jain Citizens Education Society - Surendranagar (supra) covers the entire gamut of submission and artificial interpretation sought to be attached to the applicability, cannot be said to be a ground capable of denying any hearing and adjudication, as the counsel for the petitioner has not placed on record any prohibitory orders in Letters Patent Appeal, though the judgment of the learned Single Judge, which was subject matter of Letters Patent Appeal is of course stayed, but if one looks at the judgment there is no discussion on the point, as sought to be canvassed. Therefore, in absence of any articulate contention indicating any point involved in Letters Patent Appeal, the learned counsel for the petitioner would not be justified in seeking adjournment only on that ground. Therefore, in absence of any articulate contention indicating any point involved in Letters Patent Appeal, the learned counsel for the petitioner would not be justified in seeking adjournment only on that ground. These submission was canvassed on behalf of the respondents' counsel and this Court is of the view that the same cannot be brushed aside, as though this Court is mindful of the fact that on earlier occasion these very petitions were adjourned by the learned Single Judge, as the Letters Patent Appeals were listed for hearing. The status of those Letters Patent Appeals indicate that they are still pending and last order has been passed only on 15.04.2015. Thereafter, there is no effective order. A question arises as to whether in absence of any specific adjudicatory orders, the Division Bench's interim order in Letters Patent Appeals can be said to be a ground for denying the adjudication in the applications, which is said to be covered by the judgment of the Division Bench in case of Jain Citizens Education Society - Surendranagar (supra), the answer would be in 'negative'. Inasmuch as, when the Letters Patent Appeal's memos have not been placed on record and by merely referring to those numbers and the interim order of learned Single Judge by adjourning these matters, would not be sufficient for denying the hearing and adjudication of these matters only on that ground without looking to the respondents' age and their claim for gratuity and their service period, they cannot be permitted to languish in the limbo of uncertainty, which would in my view amount of heaping insult to injury and injustice to which this Court cannot be a party. The decisions cited at the bar on behalf of the petitioner school would be of no avail, as the recent decision of this Court in case of Jain Citizens Education Society - Surendranagar (supra) and the statutory provision of Section 13A introduced in the year 2009 indicate that those decisions will be no applicability to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 27. The entire gamut of delay is required to be viewed from the aspects of the amendment and the retrospectivity attached to the amendment by way of insertion of Section 13A in the year 2009. 27. The entire gamut of delay is required to be viewed from the aspects of the amendment and the retrospectivity attached to the amendment by way of insertion of Section 13A in the year 2009. Had this not been intended to be beneficial to the teachers, who rendered their services up to 1997 or thereafter, then nothing prevented legislature from answering the same, but in absence thereof the delay as sought to be made out cannot be said to be in fact a delay etc. denying the benefits and Bombay High Court Judgment in case of Gurunath Vithal Tamse (supra) would come handy to show that the aspect of delay in peculiar situation cannot be permitted to be pleaded so as to deny the benefits which legislature has unequivocally intended to be made admissible to such lot of teachers. Hence, aspect of delay is also of no consequence to the petitioner. 28. As a result thereof, the petitions being bereft of merits, deserves to be rejected and are accordingly rejected. Notice discharged. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Office to place copy of this order in each matter. Petition dismissed.