ORDER 1. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner has questioned legality, validity and propriety of impugned order dated 18.12.2014 passed by the Collector/appellate authority, District Bhind setting aside undated order passed by the Registration Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Ater District Bhind in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under rule 12(5) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Nirvachan Niyam, 1995 (hereinafter referred to Nirvachan Rules,1995). 2. Facts necessary for disposal of this petition are to the effect that respondents’ No.4 to 36 were in the voters’ list issued under rule 10 of the Election Rules,1995 in respect of Gram Panchayat, Jarri, Janpad Panchayat, Ater District Bhind uptill now and acted upon in recently held parliamentary elections. Thereafter, objections were filed for deletion of their names from the voters’ list. The Registration Officer without notice to the aforesaid respondents’ No.4 to 36 and without enquiry, much less, summary enquiry has deleted their names from the voters’ list by an undated order. Thereafter, final voters list was published. Respondents’ No.4 to 36 having come to know about the order passed by the Registration Officer on 3.12.2014 have filed an appeal on 8.12.2014. The order passed by the Registration Officer has been challenged inter alia on the ground that their names appearing in the voters’ list of Gram Panchayat,Jaari, Janpad Panchayat Ater, District Bhind uptill nowand but without any notice and opportunity of hearing, the Registration Officer has deleted their names from the voters’ list. No enquiry was held and the same is contrary to the mandate contained under rule 12(1) of the Nirvachan Rules,1995. Further, the order by which their names were deleted is an undated order. The Registration Officer has not mentioned even the date of receiving the objections and no date was given for appearance. That is the sole basis for deleting their names from the voters’ list. It was, therefore, submitted that the Registration Officer had acted in highhanded manner and in flagrant violation of statutory provisions contained in rule 12 of the Nirvachan Rules,1995. As the order was undated, the same was not in the knowledge of the respondents No.4 to 36. However, no sooner, they acquired knowledge of the order on 3.12.2014, appeal was filed before the Collector, i.e., within 5 days from the date of acquisition of knowledge. As the order was undated, the same was not in the knowledge of the respondents No.4 to 36. However, no sooner, they acquired knowledge of the order on 3.12.2014, appeal was filed before the Collector, i.e., within 5 days from the date of acquisition of knowledge. The aforesaid fact of acquisition of knowledge of the order on 3.12.2014 was explained in the application filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act on 10.12.2014 by the respondents’ No.4 to 36. With the aforesaid submissions, it was submitted that the appeal was filed within limitation and the order passed by the Registration Officer was patently illegal and unsustainable in the eye of law. The petitioner was not party before the Registration Officer, however, filed an application for permission to participate in the appellate proceedings before the appellate authority. The appellate authority has observed that the petitioner has not filed any objection before the Registration Officer for deletion of names of the respondents’ No.4 to 36. There was nothing on record to demonstrate and establish that the petitioner could be said to be party and, therefore, turned down the application of the petitioner to participate in the appellate proceedings. Though, the appellate authority has recorded contentions of the petitioner related to preliminary objection as regards limitation on the ground that the voters’ list was finalized on 24.10.2014 and since the appeal was not filed within the prescribed period under rule 12(5) of Nirvachan Rules,1995, therefore, the appeal was barred by time and no interference was warranted. The appellate authority on perusal of the original record has found that no proceedings whatsoever were initiated by the Registration Officer before deletion of names of respondents’ No.4 to 36 from the voters’ list of Gram Panchayat, Jaari, Janpad Panchayat Ater. Besides, before taking the aforesaid action for deletion of names of respondents’ No.4 to 36 from the voters’ list, they were not even noticed and no opportunity of hearing was afforded. That apart, no enquiry has been conducted before passing the order for deletion of their names. The authority so exercised by the Registration Officer is vitiated by law and fact. The impugned order passed by the Registration Officer was found to be in excess of the authority. That apart, no enquiry has been conducted before passing the order for deletion of their names. The authority so exercised by the Registration Officer is vitiated by law and fact. The impugned order passed by the Registration Officer was found to be in excess of the authority. As the order itself was undated and not preceded by an proceeding as contemplated under rule 12(1) of the Nirvachan Rues,1995, therefore, the period of 5 days has to be reckoned from the date of acquisition of knowledge of the date of the order by the respondents’ No.4 to 36. The explanation offered in that behalf was accepted and the appeal was found to be within limitation. With the aforesaid reasoning, the appellate authority has set aside the order of the Registration Officer and ordered to maintain status quo ante, i.e., to restore the names of respondents No.4 to 36 in the voters’ list of Gram Panchayat, Jaari. It is relevant to mention that consequent upon voters’ list having been updated and finalised, the respondent No.24, Sushil s/o Bal Krishna, respondent No.35,Smt. Aarti w/o Arvind are contesting the elections for the post of Sarpanch. Respondent No.13, Smt.Karuna w/o Arpit are contesting the election for the post of Panch of Ward No.7. 3. Petitioner assails the aforesaid order passed by the Collector on the following premise : (i) the appeal having been filed belatedly, i.e., much after passing of the order by the Registration Officer, the appeal ought to have been dismissed on the ground of limitation as there is no provision for condonation of delay by the appellate authority; and (ii) once the voters’ list was finalized on 24.10.2014, no inclusion of names could have been made by the Collector/appellate authority in view of rule 15 of the Nirvachan Rules,1995. Hence, the Collector has acted in excess of the jurisdiction while setting aside the order of the Registration Officer and ordered that the voters’ list as in existence prior to passing of the order by the Registration Officer shall be maintained. (iii) As names of respondents’ No.4 to 36 appeared in the voters’ list of Nagar Parishad, therefore, Registration Officer was justified deleting their names from the voters’ list of Gram Panchayat, Jaari, and no notice or opportunity of hearing was required to be afforded to respondents’ No.4 to 36 in the obtaining facts and circumstances of the case. (iii) As names of respondents’ No.4 to 36 appeared in the voters’ list of Nagar Parishad, therefore, Registration Officer was justified deleting their names from the voters’ list of Gram Panchayat, Jaari, and no notice or opportunity of hearing was required to be afforded to respondents’ No.4 to 36 in the obtaining facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, the impugned order deserves to be set aside and relied upon the following judgments. (a) 2007(4) SCC 54 , Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India and others, (b) 2013 Legal Eagle (SC) 847, Yazdani International P. Ltd., v. Auroglobal Comtrade P. Ltd., and ors., (c) 2005(1) MPLJ 168, Uttam Chand s/o Kundanlal Khatik v. State Election Commissioner of M.P., and others; (d) 2012(3) MPHT 146, Ravindra Chandoria v. Ramashankar and others; (e) 2008(3) JLJ 293 , Bhuvaneshwar Prasad alias Guddu Dixit v. State of Madhya Pradesh. 4. Per contra, respondents’ No.1 to 3 have submitted that notification for election was issued on 22.12.2014 by the Election Commission under rule 28 of the Nirvachan Rules,1995; the nomination forms for first phase of elections were to be submitted from 22.12.2014 to 29.12.2014 and for the second phase of elections, the nominations were to be submitted from 31.12.2014 to 7.1.2015. The date of polling is fixed as 5.2.2015 for the second phase. The relevant date/period in the instant case is second phase for filing nomination. Hence, it is submitted that as the election process has already started, no interference is warranted in terms of Article 243-O of the Constitution of India. The relevant portion thereof reads as under : “243-O. Bar to interference by Courts in election matters. Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution - a) ...... ..... .... (b) no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any Law made by the Legislature of a State. In support of their contentions, relied upon decisions of the Hon’ble apex Court reported in (1996)3 SCC 416 Boddula Krishnaiah and another v. State Election Commissioner, A.P., and others, (2000)8 SCC 216 Election Commission of India through Secretary v. Ashok Kumar and others, (2001)8 SCC 509 Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha and another. 5. In support of their contentions, relied upon decisions of the Hon’ble apex Court reported in (1996)3 SCC 416 Boddula Krishnaiah and another v. State Election Commissioner, A.P., and others, (2000)8 SCC 216 Election Commission of India through Secretary v. Ashok Kumar and others, (2001)8 SCC 509 Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha and another. 5. The respondents’ No.1 to 3 have further submitted that the Registration Officer was obliged to issue notice and afford opportunity of hearing and thereafter has to hold summary enquiry and only thereafter could have resorted for deletion of names of respondents’ No.4 to 36 from the voters’ list whose names did appear in the voters’ list uptill deletion by the Registration Officer. Admittedly, no notices were issued and no opportunity of hearing was afforded to respondents’ No.4 to 36. As per record, no enquiry, much less, summary enquiry was conducted before deletion of names of respondents’ No.4 to 36, the order so passed by the Registration Officer was in flagrant violation of rule 12(1) of the Nirvachan Rules,1995. Even the order so passed is undated, somuch so, no mention in the record as to on which date the objections were received and the date of appearance of the party was given for deciding the objections. The whole exercise has been conducted in a slip shod manner and in hothaste for no justification whatsoever. Under such circumstances, the entire action is ultra vires to the mandate contained in the Nirvachan Rules,1995 and, therefore, cannot be sustained. The Collector was fully justified having set aside the action and restoring the position as was existing prior to passing of the order by the Registration Officer. It is submitted that as per the scheme of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the Adhiniyam, 1993) under rule 12(1) of the Nirvachan Rules,1995 the Registration Officer after holding such summary inquiry into claims and objections as he thinks fit shall record his decision in writing and shall make available on demand copy of such decision to the objector free of charge forthwith. Therefore, before resorting to deletion of names of the respondents’ No.4 to 36, there is procedural safeguard as submitted above. It is also submitted that there ought to have been decision with due advertance to the objections. Therefore, before resorting to deletion of names of the respondents’ No.4 to 36, there is procedural safeguard as submitted above. It is also submitted that there ought to have been decision with due advertance to the objections. There is nothing on record to suggest that any decision was taken upon enquiry as per rule 12(1) of the Nirvachan Rules,1995 after notice to affected individual and affording opportunity of hearing. 6. It is further submitted that in terms of proviso to rule 12(5) thereof which reads as under : “provided that no amendment shall be carried out in the voters’ list according to the decision of the appellate authority after the last date and time fixed for making nominations in the notice issued under rule 28 and before the completion of election.” the appellate authority has full competence to pass an order for amendment in the voters’ list uptill the last date and time fixed for making nominations. In the instant case, the Collector has passed the order on 18.12.2014, much prior to the last date of making nominations on 7.1.2015. Hence, there is no jurisdictional error while passing the impugned order by the Collector. 7. It is submitted that as the order passed by the Registration Officer was itself undated and there was no notice to the respondents’ No.4 to 36, as such, the aforesaid order passed by the Registration Officer cannot be said to be in the knowledge of respondents’ No.4 to 36. Therefore, the date of acquisition of knowledge shall be the starting point for counting the limitation of 5 days for filing the appeal. As the order, much less; the impugned order was passed behind back of the objector cannot be said to be an order passed under rule 12(1) of the Nirvachan Rules,1995 to construe the period of limitation as contemplated under rule 12(5) of the Nirvachan Rules,1995 for the purpose of filing the appeal. Hence, date on which the respondents’ No.4 to 36 have acquired the knowledge of the order, i.e., 3.12.2014 shall be the starting point of reckoning the period of limitation. Therefore, the appeal filed by the respondents’ No.4 to 36 on 8.12.2014 well within time. 8. Hence, date on which the respondents’ No.4 to 36 have acquired the knowledge of the order, i.e., 3.12.2014 shall be the starting point of reckoning the period of limitation. Therefore, the appeal filed by the respondents’ No.4 to 36 on 8.12.2014 well within time. 8. Counsels for the respondents’ No.1 to 3 have also submitted that there is no express exclusion of nonapplicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act and the same shall apply by force of provisions contained in section 29 of the Limitation Act. In support of the submission, relied upon of the decisions of the Hon’ble apex Court in the cases reported in AIR 1970 SC 1477 , D.P.Mishra v. Narayan Sharma and another, (1996) 5 SCC 342 State of W.B. And others v. Kartick Chandra Das and others, (2000) 8 SCC 649 Tarun Prasad Chatteerjee v. Dinanath Sharma and (2008) 7 SCC 169 Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and others. 9. With the aforesaid submissions, it is submitted that this writ petition is misconceived and the order passed by the appellate authority is legal and proper, therefore, no interference is warranted by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, it is prayed that this writ petition be dismissed. 10. Heard. 11. The following questions emerge for consideration, (i) Whether the Registration Officer while disposing of the claims and objections under rule 12(1) of the Nirvachan Rules,1995 in the course of summary enquiry is obliged to issue notice to such persons who are likely to be affected by his decision ? (ii) What is the nature and scope of summary enquiry and what is the meaning of expression ‘Decision’ ? (iii) As to when the voters’ list can be said to be finalized and not open for correction or amendment by way of addition or deletion of names of voters’ in the voters’ list ? (iv) Whether a person who is not objector before the Registration Officer in the proceedings under rule 12(1) of the Nirvachan Rules,1995 can be allowed to become party to the appellate proceedings under rule 12(5) of the Nirvachan Rules,1995 ? (v) What shall be the meaning attributable to “any person aggrieved” used in rule 12(5) of the Nirvachan Rules, 1995 in the context of the appellate proceedings ? 12. (v) What shall be the meaning attributable to “any person aggrieved” used in rule 12(5) of the Nirvachan Rules, 1995 in the context of the appellate proceedings ? 12. In the instant case, the voters’ list has been restored by setting aside the undated order passed by the Registration Officer under the orders passed by the appellate authority dated 18.12.2014. Thereafter, notification for election was issued by the State Government under rule 28 of the Nirvachan Rules,1995 on 22.12.2014. As per the election schedule, as regards the elections in issue, the nominations were to be submitted from 31.12.2014 to 7.1.2015 and the date of polling fixed is 5.2.2015. As such, the election process has commenced. 13. Law is well settled that once election process has commenced, no interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is warranted as Article 243O of the Constitution of India envisages constitutional bar of interference with the election process except by an election petition, presented to an Election Tribunal as provided under the Adhiniyam, 1993. Besides, the power of the Court granting stay of the election process is no more res integra. The aforesaid principle was reiterated in the case of Lakshmi Charan Sen v. A.K.M.Hassan Uzzaman,(1985)4 SCC 689 in para 30 at page 708-09 which reads as under : “The High Court acted within its jurisdiction in entraining the writ petition and in issuing a rule Nisi upon it, since the petition questioned the vires of the laws of election. But, with respect, it was not justified in passing the interim orders dated February 12, and 19, 1982 and in confirming those orders by its judgment dated February 25, 1982. Firstly, the High Court had no material before it to warrant the passing of those orders. The allegations in the Writ Petition are of a vague and general nature, on the basis of which no relief could be granted. Secondly, though the High Court did not lack the jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition and to issue appropriate directions therein, no High Court in the exercise of its powers under article 226 of the Constitution should pass any orders, interim or otherwise, which has the tendency or effect of postponing an election, which is reasonably imminent and in relation to which its writ jurisdiction is invoked. The imminence of the electoral processes is a factor which must guide and govern the passing of orders in the High Court’s writ jurisdiction. The more imminent such process, the greater ought to be the reluctance of the High Court to do anything, or direct anything to be done, which will postpone that process indefinitely by creating a situation in which, the Government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. India is an oasis of democracy, a fact of contemporary history which demands of the Courts the use of wise statesmanship in the exercise of their extraordinary powers under the Constitution. The High Courts must observe a selfimposed limitation on their power to act under article 226, by refusing to pass order or give directions which will inevitably result in an indefinite postponement of elections to legislative bodies, which are the very essence of the democratic foundation and functioning of our Constitution. That limitation ought to be observed irrespective of the fact whether the preparation and publication of electoral rolls are a part of the process of ‘election’ within the meaning of Article 329(b) of the Constitution.” 14. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that even assuming, that the preparation and publication of electoral rolls are not a part of the process of ‘election’ within the meaning of Article 329(b) of the Constitution of India, the High Court ought not to have passed the impugned interim orders, whereby it not only assumed control over the election process but, as a result of which, the election to the Legislative Assembly stood the risk of being postponed indefinitely. 15. Three Judges Bench in the case of Election Commission of India through Secretary v. Ashok Kumar and others, (2000)8 SCC 216 , the Hon’ble apex Court has addressed upon the issue as regards jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and issue of interim direction after commencement of election process in the context of Article 329 of the Constitution of India. The term “election” as occurring in Article 329 of the Constitution of India has been held to mean and include the entire process from the issue of the notification under section 14 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 to the declaration of result under section 66 of the said Act. 16. True, it is that power of judicial review is part of a basic structure of the Constitution of India; concept no more in issue but the scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the light of the embargo envisaged by Article 329 of the Constitution of India is well addressed by the Hon’ble apex Court in the case of N.P.Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, AIR 1952 SC 64 and reiterated in subsequent judgment in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978)1 SCC 405 . The provision as contained in Article 329 of the Constitution of India was described by the Constitution of India on two principles; (I) the peremptory urgency of prompt engineering of the whole election process without intermediate interruptions by way of legal proceedings challenging the steps and stages in between the commencement and the conclusion; (2) the provision for special jurisdiction which can be invoked by an aggrieved party at the end of the election excludes other form, the right and remedy being creatures of statutes and controlled by the Constitution of India. In Mohinder Singh Gill’s case, the authoritative meaning of Article 329 of the Constitution of India has been further reiterated as follows : (1) Having regard to the important functions which the legislatures have to perform in democratic countries, it has always been recognised to be a matter of first importance that elections should be concluded as early as possible according to time schedule and all controversial matters and all disputes arising out of elections should be postponed till after the elections are over, so that the election proceedings may not be unduly retarded or protracted. (2) In conformity with this principle, the scheme of the election law in this country as well as in England is that no significance should be attached to anything which does not affect the “election”; and if any irregularities are committed while it is in progress and they belong to the category or class which, under the law by which elections are governed, would have the effect of vitiating the “election” and enable the person effected to call it in question, they should be brought so before a special tribunal by means of an election petition being and not be made the subject of a dispute before any Court while the election is in progress.” The same principle was reiterated by the Hon’ble apex Court in the case of Boddula Krishnaiah and another v. State Election Commissioner, A.P., and others, 1996(3) SCC 416 . 17. There is no cavil of doubt that aforesaid principles squarely applies to Panchayat elections as well. For that reason alone, as a matter of fact, no interference is warranted in this writ petition. The remedy of filing an election petition is very much available to a party seeking to challenge the election of the declared/returned candidate whose name has been published, under section 122 of the Adhiniyam, 1993 read with the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats (Election Petitions, Corrupt Practices and Disqualification for Membership) Rules, 1995 on the grounds specified under rule 21 thereunder. 18. However, it is considered apposite to answer the questions involved in this petition. 19. In Nirvachan Rules, 1995 under chapter IV provision as regards List of Voters are made and inter alia for preparation of voters list under rule 9, publication of voters’ list for inviting claims and objections under rule 10, claims and objections by any person to the voters’ list under rule 11, disposal of claims and objections under rule 12, finalization of voters’ list under rule 15 and deletion of entires in voters’ list in certain cases under rule 15A. 20. Rule 12 of Nirvachan Rules, 1995 provides for ‘summary inquiry’. For the purpose of answering the questions formulated, rule 12 is relevant: “12. Disposal of claims and objections. 20. Rule 12 of Nirvachan Rules, 1995 provides for ‘summary inquiry’. For the purpose of answering the questions formulated, rule 12 is relevant: “12. Disposal of claims and objections. (1) The Registration Officer shall, after holding such summary inquiry into the claims or objections as he thinks fit, record his decision in writing and shall make available on demand copy of such decision to the objector free of charge forthwith. (2) No person shall be presented by any legal practitioner in any proceeding under this rule. (3) The Registration Officer shall amend the voters’ list in accordance with his decision. (4) The voters’ list so amended shall subject to decision in appeal, if any, be final and a copy thereof duly signed by the Registration Officer shall be kept in his office and another copy deposited in the office of District Election Officer. (5) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Registration Officer may prefer an appeal to the appellate authority within five days of such decision. Every appeal shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the Commission and presented to the appellate authority accompanied with a copy of the decision of the Registration Officer. The appellate authority, after giving the appellant an opportunity of hearing and making such enquiry as it deems fit, shall pass suitable orders expeditiously and in the event of the appeal succeeding, direct the Registration Officer to amend the voters’ list to give effect to its decision. The decision of the appellate authority shall be final: provided that no amendment shall be carried out in the voters’ list according to the decision of the appellate authority after the last date and time fixed for making nominations in the notice issued under rule 28 and before the completion of election.” 21. As such, under rule 12(1) of the Nirvachan Rules, 1995 the procedure prescribed is to hold a summary inquiry into the claims and objections as the Registration Officer thinks fit and record his decision in writing. As such, under rule 12(1) of the Nirvachan Rules, 1995 the procedure prescribed is to hold a summary inquiry into the claims and objections as the Registration Officer thinks fit and record his decision in writing. In the opinion of this Court, on objections being submitted by any person against the inclusion of the name of a person in the voters’ list, the Registration Officer is obliged to take the objection on record specifying the date and time and thereafter has to issue notice to the person against whom objection is filed and also to call upon him to reply thereto by affording a reasonable opportunity. Though, after submission of the reply, the Registration Officer is not required to hold an elaborate inquiry but nevertheless, he is obliged to apply his mind to the merits of the objections and the reply submitted thereto. Thereafter, he is required to reach a conclusion with reasoning either by rejecting the objection or accepting the objection resulting into deletion of the entry in the voters’ list. Summary inquiry, therefore, does not mean nonreasoned disposal. More so, when the order is appealable, the decision must be a reasoned decision. ‘Summary inquiry’ only means that it should be short and quick and not elaborate but requirements of observance of the principles of natural justice and fair play are not done away with. Likewise, it cannot be based on mere hearsay or unverified facts. [1995 Suppl. Vol.4 SCC 684, Mohan Lal v. Kartar Singh and others is referred to]. Therefore, the order of the Registration Officer passed in slip shod manner and in a hothaste without observance of requirement of law as observed above cannot be justified under the pretext that the said authority only required to hold the summary inquiry. 22. Besides, under rule 12(1) of the Nirvachan Rules, 1995, the Registration Officer after summary inquiry into claims and objections has to record his reasons in writing. “Decision” does not mean a mere conclusion but the conclusions led by reasons. 22. Besides, under rule 12(1) of the Nirvachan Rules, 1995, the Registration Officer after summary inquiry into claims and objections has to record his reasons in writing. “Decision” does not mean a mere conclusion but the conclusions led by reasons. [(1995)1 SCC 761, Sohan Lal v. Satnam Singh and others is referred to wherein in paragraph 10 it is observed as under : “.......Since,the first appeal lay to this Court, the trial Court should have reproduced and discussed at least the essential parts of the evidence of the witness besides recording the submissions made at the bar to enable the appellate Court to know the basis on which the ‘decision’ is based. A ‘decision’ does not merely mean the ‘conclusion’ – it embraces within its fold the reasons which form the basis for arriving at the ‘conclusions’. The judgment of the trial Court contains only the ‘conclusions’ and nothing more. The judgment of the trial Court cannot, therefore, be sustained. The case needs to be remanded to the trial Court for its fresh disposal by writing a fresh judgment in accordance with law. 23. Rule 12(5) of the Nirvachan Rules,1995 provides that ‘any person aggrieved’ by the decision of the Registration Officer may prefer an appeal to the appellate authority within 5 days of such decision. Phrase ‘any person aggrieved’ by the decision of the Registration Officer must receive contextual interpretation and in the opinion of this Court, the ‘person aggrieved’ shall be a person either who was party to the decision making process before the Registration Officer or the person desirous of filing the appeal is adversely effected by the decision of the Registration Officer as the phrase ‘Any person aggrieved’ has to be interpreted in the context of appellate proceedings. 24. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Md. Sharfuddin v. R.P.Singh and others, AIR 1961 SC 1312 while interpreting the words “any person aggrieved” has given contextual meaning in the context of the Act in which the words were used and held in paragraph 6 as under : “6. Learned counsel for the respondents contends that the words “any person aggrieved” in section 25 of the Act are comprehensive enough to include a Custodian and, therefore, a Custodian can prefer an appeal against an order of a Custodian releasing properties under section 7 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondents contends that the words “any person aggrieved” in section 25 of the Act are comprehensive enough to include a Custodian and, therefore, a Custodian can prefer an appeal against an order of a Custodian releasing properties under section 7 of the Act. Realising that an obvious anomaly is implicit in the argument, learned counsel concedes that an appeal can be filed only by a Custodian other than the Custodian who made the order releasing the properties. It is said that the Central Government may, under section 6 of the Act, provide for the distribution of work among the various Custodians, namely, Additional, Deputy and Assistant Custodians, and in such allocation the power to inquire whether a property is an evacuee property or not may be conferred on one Custodian and the power to manage it on another, and that, in that event, the Custodian on whom the power to manage is conferred will be a person aggrieved within the meaning of section 24 of the Act. In our view this argument is not consistent with the scheme of the Act. Though for the purpose of convenience of management or judicial determination of disputes the Act provides different categories of Custodians, all of them fall within the definition of “Custodian” in the Act. The Act further provides a hierarchy of tribunals under the superintendence and control of the CustodianGeneral. It would be anomalous were it to be held that a Custodian could prefer an appeal against the order of a Custodian. The Act does not contemplate one officer preferring appeals against the orders of another officer. If an Assistant Custodian or a Custodian went wrong in the matter of declaring a property to be an evacuee property, the Act provides that the Custodian or the CustodianGeneral, as the case may be, before 1956, and the CustodianGeneral thereafter, may set right the wrong. In the premises the words “any person aggrieved” in section 24 of the Act can only mean a person whose properties have been declared to be evacuee properties by the Custodian, or a person who moved the Custodian to get the properties so declared or any other such aggrieved person. The words “any person aggrieved” in the context of the Act cannot include any Custodian as defined in the Act.” 25. The words “any person aggrieved” in the context of the Act cannot include any Custodian as defined in the Act.” 25. Further, rule 12(5) of the Nirvachan Rule, 1995 provides for an appeal before the appellate authority against the decision by the Registration Officer. Besides, as discussed above the decision must bear the date on which the decision is taken only then the period of limitation can be reckoned as provided for under rule 12(5) of the Nirvachan Rules,1995. More over, as there is no exclusionary provision under this Special Act, as such, the provision of Limitation Act apply in terms of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Thus, the provisions in sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are applicable [1970 JLJ 685= AIR 1970 SC 1477 D.P. Mishra v. Kamal Narayan Sharma, (1996)5 SCC 342 , State of W. B. and others v. Kartick Chandra Das and others and (2008)7 SCC 169 , Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and others are referred to]. 26. Under such circumstances, the question arises as to what shall be the starting point for reckoning the limitation of 5 days for the purpose of filing the appeal before the appellate authority when the decision of the authority (Registration Officer) is undated? Certainly, it shall be the date of knowledge of the order passed and not otherwise by applying the principles underlying section 5 of the Limitation Act. 27. Proviso to rule 12(5) of the Nirvachan Rules, 1995 provides that after the last date and time fixed for nomination in the notice issued under under rule 28 of the Nirvachan Rules,1995 and before completion of elections, no amendment shall be carried out in the voters’ list according to the decision of the appellate authority. Therefore, the voters’ list finalized under rule 15 thereof after disposal of claims and objections under rule 12(1) thereof by the Registration Officer can always be amended by the orders of the appellate authority as the voters’ list so far prepared under rule 12(1) is subject to the decision in the appeal. Therefore, under rule 12(5) of the Nirvachan Rules, 1995 amendment can be carried out in the voters’ list but before the last date of time and place fixed for filing the nomination. 28. Therefore, under rule 12(5) of the Nirvachan Rules, 1995 amendment can be carried out in the voters’ list but before the last date of time and place fixed for filing the nomination. 28. Now adverting to the factual matrix in hand, upon perusal of the record, it appears that no date was mentioned by the Registration Officer while receiving the objections, no notices were issued to the respondents’ No.4 to 36 calling upon them to reply to the aforesaid objections for deletion of their names in the voters’ list and no inquiry whatsoever was held. The decision so taken as a matter of fact is contrary to the provisions of rule 12(1) of the Nirvachan Rules, 1995 and such decision cannot be said to be decision in the legal parlance. Besides, the reason/decision is undated. Hence, the Registration Officer has committed grave illegality by deleting the names of the respondents’ No.4 to 36 from the voters’ list of Gram Panchayat, Jarri, Janpad Panchayat, Ater, District Bhind by orders of the so called decision. 29. Respondents’ No.4 to 36 under such circumstances since had no knowledge of the proceedings of the decision taken by the Registration Officer resulting into deletion of their names from the voters’ list were justified having preferred the appeal upon acquisition of knowledge. In the instant case, the date of knowledge of the aforesaid decision of the Registration Officer is 3.12.2014 and the appeal was filed on 8.12.2014. Hence, the appeal has rightly been found to be within time from the date of knowledge by the appellate authority. Merely because, the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed on 10.12.2014, this by itself shall not render the appeal barred by time as it is settled law that the starting point of limitation is from the date of filing of the appeal. Application for condonation of delay can always be submitted on a later date explaining the sufficiency of cause and the same shall relate back to the date of filing of the appeal. 30. Hence, in the opinion of this Court, the appellate authority has not committed any error of law and fact having entertained the appeal to be well within time. 31. Admittedly, the petitioner was not an objector before the Registration Officer and the application for intervention before the appellate authority was rejected on the aforesaid ground. 32. 30. Hence, in the opinion of this Court, the appellate authority has not committed any error of law and fact having entertained the appeal to be well within time. 31. Admittedly, the petitioner was not an objector before the Registration Officer and the application for intervention before the appellate authority was rejected on the aforesaid ground. 32. The question arises is whether the petitioner could be said to be a person entitled for hearing in the appellate proceedings. As has been held above, ‘aggrieved person’ is a person either a person; party to the decision making process before the Registration Officer or is adversely effected by the decision of the Registration Officer. Petitioner is neither a party to the aforesaid proceedings nor could be said to be aggrieved person of the aforesaid proceedings. The appellate jurisdiction was exercised by the Collector by virtue of rule 12(5) of the Nirvachan Rules, 1995. Hence, his jurisdiction is confined to the mandate contained in rule 12(5) of the Nirvachan Rule, 1995. For want of any provision other than of any person aggrieved by the decision or the order appealed against, the application filed by the petitioner has rightly been rejected by the appellate authority for intervention. 33. The appellate authority has after scrutiny of the record has reached the conclusion that the Registration Officer in fact and in effect acted in utter disregard and gross violation of the provisions contained under rule 12(1) of the Nirvachan Rules, 1995 in the matter of ordering for deletion of the names of respondents’ No.4 to 36 from the voters’ list. For the reasons already mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the appellate authority has not committed any error of law and fact in setting aside the decision of the Registration Officer and restoration of position as regards voters’ list as was existed prior to the decision of the Registration Officer. 34. The allegations made in the petition that the names of respondents’ No.4 to 36 did appear in the voters’ list of Nagar Parishad, Bhind cannot be countenanced. To this, there is specific denial of the allegations with supporting documents. This Court does not deem it fit to hold an enquiry into the allegations and the counterallegations made by the parties as the same are in the realm of disputed questions of fact which cannot be adverted to under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 35. To this, there is specific denial of the allegations with supporting documents. This Court does not deem it fit to hold an enquiry into the allegations and the counterallegations made by the parties as the same are in the realm of disputed questions of fact which cannot be adverted to under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 35. This Court has also perused the judgments relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner. However, considering the nature of factual matrix of the case and the controversy involved, the aforesaid judgments are of no assistance to the petitioner having no bearing in the present case. 36. As consequent upon the order passed by the appellate authority on 18.12.2014, the voters’ list has been finalized, thereafter the notification under rule 28 of the Nirvachan Rules,1995 was issued, the date of filing of the nominations has come to an end on 1.1.2015 and the polling is scheduled on 5.2.2015, no further interference is warranted and the election must proceed as per the schedule. 37. In view of the aforesaid, in the opinion of this Court, the appellate authority has not committed error of law or jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 38. Petition sans merit and is hereby dismissed.