JUDGMENT : P.S. Dinesh Kumar, J. In this intra-Court appeal, appellant is challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 5-11-2008 in W.P. No. 17225 of 2007 (GM-KEB), quashing the order dated 10-7-2007 passed by the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum, Bengaluru in Case No. CGRF/18/2007/2131. 2. Brief facts of the case.-Appellant is an Engineering College situated in Ramanagaram District. First respondent, is a state owned Electricity Supply Company. Appellant obtained power supply to the college under HT Installation bearing R.R. No. HT 27 which was serviced on 30-8-2001. At the time of service, the installation was classified under the Tariff Head HT-2A(ii) and Energy Consumption was being charged and collected as per the said tariff. 3. It appears the Audit Officer attached to the office of the Accountant General pointed out during the course of audit that the appellant being a private unaided educational institution is classifiable under HT-2B(ii). In pursuance thereof, the first respondent addressed a communication No. AEE/RUS BESCOM/2006-07 No. 3477-82, dated 26-3-2007 conveying inter alia that the installation was wrongly classified and the same had resulted in a revenue loss of Rs. 13,94,624/-. Accordingly, the appellant was called upon to pay'' the said audit short claim within 30 days therefrom. 4. Appellant refuted the demand raised by the first respondent and submitted a compliant in Form I before the second respondent together with a memorandum of appeal contending inter alia that the classification was correctly made by the first respondent at the time of sanctioning the power and servicing. Appellant conceded that Universities, Educational Institutions belonging to the Government and Local Bodies are classifiable under HT-2A. However, the appellant sought to make a fine distinction that major portion of power was being consumed by hostels maintained within the college campus which is classifiable under HT-2A. Therefore, the classification was correct. 5. The complaint and appeal filed by the appellant before the second respondent was contested by the first respondent. Upon adjudication, the second respondent-forum vide order dated 10-7-2007, held as follows:- "CONCLUSION 1. Short claims to be limited to two years as per Clause 29.08 of conditions of supply of Electricity of Distribution Licensees. 2. The licensee has incurred loss of Rs. 8,38,420-00 for not applying of correct tariff schedule by the concerned. 3. The statement of actual short claims and the amount recoverable from the petitioner is as per Annexure. ORDER 1. Short claims to be limited to two years as per Clause 29.08 of conditions of supply of Electricity of Distribution Licensees. 2. The licensee has incurred loss of Rs. 8,38,420-00 for not applying of correct tariff schedule by the concerned. 3. The statement of actual short claims and the amount recoverable from the petitioner is as per Annexure. ORDER 1. The revised bill issued by respondent in the Letter Nos. 3477 to 3482, dated 26-3-2007 for Rs. 13,94,624/- is set aside. 2. Revise the short claims under HT-2B and HT-2B(ii) Tariff schedule for back period of 2 (Two) years from the date of detection of short claims as per Clause 29.08 of conditions of supply of the Electricity of Distribution Licensees." 6. Thus, the order passed by the second respondent was in two parts. Firstly, the demand for a sum of Rs. 13,94,624/- was set aside. Secondly, the first respondent was directed to revise the short claim under HT-2B/HT-2B(ii) for a period two years preceding the date of the order. 7. Being aggrieved, the first respondent challenged the order passed by the second respondent which is quashed by the impugned order by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition. Hence, this appeal. 8. We have heard Sri M. Sivappa, learned Senior Counsel and Sri H.V. Devaraju, learned Counsel for the first respondent and perused the records. 9. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the first respondent could not have raised a demand in the year 2007 in respect of power consumed for the period between October 2001 and February 2007 as the same is opposed to Section 56(2) of the Electricity' Act, 2003 ('Act' for short). He has mainly urged following two contentions in support of this appeal: (i) that in terms of Section 56(2) of the Act, the first respondent is estopped from raising any' demands for a period beyond two years without being shown as arrears in the bills raised by the supply company; (ii) that Clause 29.08 of conditions of supply of Electricity could not have been pressed into service even if there was any short claim because the said provision also places an embargo against recovery of any arrears after a period of two years from the date when such sum became first due unless it is shown continuously in the bill as arrears of electricity charges. 10. 10. Learned Senior Counsel strenuously contended that in view of the said two express provisions and the admitted date of issuance of first demand on 26-3-2007, the first respondents attempt to recover difference in tariff for the period from October 2001 to February 2007 is wholly illegal and therefore the impugned order is unsustainable in law. Accordingly, he prayed for allowing this appeal. 11. Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the first respondent came to know about the wrong classification only after the same was pointed out by the audit officials. Therefore, reckoned from the date of knowledge, the issuance of demand is in conformity with Section 56(2) of the Act as also Clause 29.08 of Conditions of Supply. He further submitted that it is conceded by the appellant in the memorandum of appeal filed before the second respondent, that the concession of classification under HT-2A is available for Educational Institutions belonging to the Government, Local Bodies, Aided Institutions, Hostels of Educational Institutions etc. In view of the said specific admission, the appellant would not be entitled for the benefit of classification under HT-2A. Accordingly, he prays for dismissing the appeal. 12. In the light of the rival contentions of the parties, the point that arises for our consideration is: "Whether the first respondent was right in raising a demand for short claims as per communication dated 26-3-2007 for the period from October 2001 to February 2007 in the light of Section 56(2) of the Act and Clause 29.08 of Supply Regulation?" 13. Gravamen of appellant's case is that demand raised by the first respondent by its communication dated 26-3-2007 is unsustainable in view of the bar contained in Section 56(2) of the Act. The said provision reads as follows:- "56. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no sum due from any consumer, under this section shall be recoverable after the period of two years from the date when such sum became first due unless such sum has been shown continuously as recoverable as arrear of charges for electricity supplied and the licensee shall not cut-off the supply of the electricity." 14. We notice that, above provision places an embargo from recovering any sum by a consumer after a period of two years from the date when it became due unless the sum was shown as recoverable arrears continuously in the bill. 15. Similarly, conditions of supply of electricity also provide a contingency to make supplemental claims under Clause 29.08. It also contains a similar embargo in pari materia with Section 56(2) prohibiting the first respondent from recovering any arrears after a period of two years from the date when a sum became due and payable unless it is continuously shown as arrears in the bills raised. 16. There is no dispute with regard to the embargo contained in both provisions of law namely, Section 56(2) of the Act as also Clause 29.08 of conditions of supply. 17. While there cannot be any dissension with regard to the statutory injunction contained in the aforementioned provisions, what is required to be examined here is the application of the said provisions vis-a-vis the facts of this case. 18. At the time when the installation was serviced, admittedly, the nature of supply was classified as HT-2A. The energy consumption charges commencing with the next immediate billing month after installation, were being generated on the premise that the tariff applicable was HT-2A. However, the factum of wrong classification came to the knowledge of the first respondent only after the auditing officials attached to the office of the Accountant General conveyed their observations. Therefore, for the first time, the first respondent-authority learnt about the occurrence of a mistake in classification simultaneously with the receipt of audit observations. In the circumstances, the embargo contained in the aforementioned provisions is not applicable because there is a subtle difference between a demand having been raised under HT-2A if the installation was classified under HT-2B at time of installation and raising a supplemental demand at a later date due to bona fide mistake of wrong classification. If it was the former case, the same would be entitled for protection under Section 56(2) as also Clause 29.08 of the Supply Conditions. However, in the latter case, the consumer namely, the appellant herein would not be entitled for such protection for the simple reason that the installation was classified under HT-2A and the energy consumption charges were raised under the tariff applicable to HT-2A. However, in the latter case, the consumer namely, the appellant herein would not be entitled for such protection for the simple reason that the installation was classified under HT-2A and the energy consumption charges were raised under the tariff applicable to HT-2A. It is only on receipt of the audit report that the first respondent has sought to recover the difference in tariff. In the backdrop of this fine difference between the two contingencies, in our considered view, the protection of Section 56(2) as also of Clause 29.08 of supply conditions would not be available for the appellant. 19. During the course of the argument, in response to a specific query with regard to second portion of the order passed by the second respondent with regard to revision of short claim under HT-2B for a period of two years preceding the date of detection of short claim, it was submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that the appellant has admitted and paid the difference in tariff for a period two years preceding the date of demand and for subsequent period, the appellant has accepted the classification on HT-2B and paying energy consumption charges accordingly. Thus, there is no controversy with regard to the applicability of HT-2B tariff in the case of appellant. 20. In the result, what emerges is the validity of the claim for the period exceeding two years preceding the date of demand. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that the first respondent did not raise any bill under HT-2B tariff as it was under a bona fide view that the installation correctly classified under the tariff HT-2A. The demand stemmed out of the audit observations which resulted in reclassification of the installation. A demand raised pursuant to reclassification cannot be brought within the teeth of Section 56(2) as also Clause 29.08 of Supply Conditions for the simple reason that no demand could have been raised under HT-2B classification. Consequently, the question of its reflection as arrears of energy consumption charges would not arise at all. 21. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has placed strong reliance on Paragraph 18, a Full Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Sanjay Balvantrai Desai and Others v. Dakshin Gujarat Vij Company Limited and Others, AIR 2013 Guj. 21. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has placed strong reliance on Paragraph 18, a Full Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Sanjay Balvantrai Desai and Others v. Dakshin Gujarat Vij Company Limited and Others, AIR 2013 Guj. 167 , to contend that the appellant cannot be saddled with the dues, if any, arising out of reclassification. The facts of the judgment relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel are with regard to saddling of outstanding dues payable by an erstwhile owner assets to the purchaser of said assets. Hence, in our view, the ratio of the judgment would not lead the case of the appellant any further. 22. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that this appeal is devoid of merits and accordingly stands dismissed. No costs.