JUDGMENT : The sole question which falls for consideration in this writ petition is whether, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the University-respondents are barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel from withholding the result of the B.A. Part-II Examination of the petitioner held in 1999? 2. The facts giving rise to this writ petition are that the petitioner passed the B.A. Part-I Examination in the year 1995 and appeared in the B.A. Part-II Examination in the year 1996, but was debarred from the examination Hall and was expelled from the examination for two years on the instruction of the College authorities. In the year 1999, she filled up the application form for the B.A. Part-II Examination by paying the requisite examination fees. The University-respondents issued the Admit Card for the Examination whereafter the petitioner duly sat for the Examination and waited for her result. However, the College authority informed her that her result was withheld. This induced her to approach this Court in WP(C) No. 273/2011 with the prayer for directing the University-respondents to either disclose the reason for withholding her result or declare the result forthwith. This Court by the order dated 21-1-2011 disposed of the writ petition by directing the Controller of Examination of the University-respondents to dispose of the representation dated 3-7-2010 within three months. The University-respondents by the letter dated 10-2-2011 addressed to the Advocate of the petitioner disposed of her representation, the relevant portion whereof are reproduced below: “Sir, With reference to the Case No. WP(C) 273/2011 in respect of the Jayanti Sarkar of Lakhimpur Girls’ College, I am to inform that is a registered student of this University of 1992-1993 so he had to appear B.A Part-I examination in 1994, but she cleared Part-I examination in 1995 in her second attempt. Accordingly she had to clear her Part-II examination in three consecutive chanches i.e. in 1998. But she appeared Part-II examination only in 1999 which is over chance.” 3. Obviously, the petitioner had missed her chance to pass Part-II examination within the period permitted by the statute governing the field for clearing the same i.e. by 1998. There is no dispute on this issue. However, the contention of Mr. But she appeared Part-II examination only in 1999 which is over chance.” 3. Obviously, the petitioner had missed her chance to pass Part-II examination within the period permitted by the statute governing the field for clearing the same i.e. by 1998. There is no dispute on this issue. However, the contention of Mr. M.A. Sheikh, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the University-respondents, having duly issued the Admit Card to the petitioner for the examination and having allowed her to sit in the examination, for which she had not played fraud, are now barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel from withholding her result, and it would be most inequituous to do so in this manner. To fortify his submission, the learned counsel takes me to the decision of the Apex Court in Shri Krishnan v. The Kurukshetra University, AIR 1976 SC 376 and the decision of this Court in Archana Goswami v. State of Assam, 1998 (1) GLT 188. Per contra, Mr. R. Mazumdar, the learned standing counsel for the University-respondents, submits that the decision of the University-respondents to withhold the result of her examination is based on the statutes, which barred the petitioner from appearing in the B.A. Part-II examination after 1998, and the law is now well-settled that there can be no estoppel against the statute. He contends that the petitioner cannot take advantage of the issuance of the Admit Card to her for claiming declaration of her result: she completely overlooks the fact that the Admit Card issued to her was a provisional Admit Card enabling the University-respondents to cancel the examination subsequently if any defects were found in her candidature. He relies on the decision of the Apex Court in Maharashi Dayanand University v. Surjeet Kaur, (2010) 11 SCC 159 to buttress his contentions. He, therefore, maintains that the writ petition has no merit and is liable to be dismissed with costs: “6. Mr Sibal, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted two points before us. In the first place it was argued that once the appellant was allowed to appear at LL.B. Part II examination held on May 19, 1973 his candidature could not be withdrawn for any reason whatsoever in view of the mandatory provisions of clause 2(b) of the Kurukshetra University Calendar, Vol. I, Ordinance 10 under which the candidature could be withdrawn before the candidate took the examination. I, Ordinance 10 under which the candidature could be withdrawn before the candidate took the examination. Secondly it was argued that the order of the university was mala fide because the real reason for cancelling the candidature of the appellant was the insistence of the District Education Officer that the appellant should not have been admitted to the Law Faculty unless he had obtained the permission of his superior officers. In order to appreciate the first contention it may be necessary to extract the relevant portions of the statute contained in Kurukshetra University Calendar, Volume I, Ordinance 10. Clause 2 of this ordinance runs as follows: “2. The following certificates, signed by the Principal of the College/Head of the Department concerned, shall be required from each applicant:— (a) that the candidate has satisfied him by the production of the certificate of a competent authority that he has passed the examinations which qualified him for admission to the examination; and (b) that he has attended a regular course of study for the prescribed number of academic years. Certificate (b) will be provisional and can be withdrawn at any time before the examination if the applicant fails to attend the prescribed course of lectures before the end of his term.” The last part of this statute clearly shows that the university could withdraw the certificate if the applicant had failed to attend the prescribed course of lectures. But this could be done only before the examination. It is, therefore, manifest that once the appellant was allowed to take the examination, rightly or wrongly, then the statute which empowers the university to withdraw the candidature of the applicant has worked itself out and the applicant cannot be refused admission subsequently for any infirmity which should have been looked into before giving the applicant permission to appear. It was, however, submitted by Mr Nandy, learned Counsel for the respondent that the names of the candidates who were short of percentage were displayed on the notice board of the college and the appellant was fully aware of the same and yet he did not draw the attention of the university authorities when he applied for admission to appear in LL.B. Part II examination. Thus the appellant was guilty of committing serious fraud and was not entitled to any indulgence from this Court. 7. Thus the appellant was guilty of committing serious fraud and was not entitled to any indulgence from this Court. 7. It appears from the averments made in the counter-affidavit that according to the procedure prevalent in the college the admission forms are forwarded by the Head of the Department in December preceding the year when the examination is held. In the instant case the admission form of the appellant must have been forwarded in December 1971 whereas the examination was to take place in Apri1/May 1972. It is obvious that during this period of four to five months it was the duty of the university authorities to scrutinise the form in order to find out whether it was in order. Equally it was the duty of the Head of the Department of Law before submitting the form to the university to see that the form complied with all the requirements of law. If neither the Head of the Department nor the university authorities took care to scrutinise the admission form, then the question of the appellant committing a fraud did not arise. It is well settled that where a person on whom fraud is committed is in a position to discover the truth by due diligence, fraud is not proved. It was neither a case of suggestio falsi, or suppressio veri. The appellant never wrote to the university authorities that he had attended the prescribed number of lectures. There was ample time and opportunity for the university authorities to have found out the defect. In these circumstances, therefore, if the university authorities acquiesced in the infirmities which the admission form contained and allowed the appellant to appear in Part I examination in April 1972, then by force of the university statute the university had no power to withdraw the candidature of the appellant. A somewhat similar situation arose in Premji Bhai Ganesh Bhai Kshatriya v. Vice Chancellor, Ravishankar University, Raipur [AIR 1967 Madh Ora 194] . “From the provisions of Ordinance Nos. 19 and 48 it is clear that the scrutiny as to the requisite attendance of the candidates is required to be made before the admission cards are issued. Once the admission cards are issued permitting the candidates to take their examination, there is no provision in Ordinance 19 or Ordinance 48 which would enable the Vice Chancellor to withdraw the permission. Once the admission cards are issued permitting the candidates to take their examination, there is no provision in Ordinance 19 or Ordinance 48 which would enable the Vice Chancellor to withdraw the permission. The discretion having been clearly exercised in favour of the petitioner by permitting him to appear at the examination, it was not open to the Vice Chancellor to withdraw that permission subsequently and to withhold his result.” (Underlined for emphasis) 4. I have to reproduce the above extracts at length so that the ratio therein could be understood and culled out. The basic contentions of the learned standing counsel for the University advanced now in the instant case were also evidently argued by Mr. Kapil Sibal, the learned counsel for the appellant before the Apex Court in Shri Hrishan case (supra). It seems to me that the argument by the learned counsel therein that the Admit Card issued therein was only provisional and could, therefore, be cancelled/withdrawn once it was detected that the candidature of the appellant was found to be defective for any reason did not appeal to the Apex Court. According to the Apex Court, such cancellation/withdrawal could be done only before the examination and not after the examination. The Apex Court further held that once the appellant was allowed to sit in the examination, rightly or wrongly, then the statute which empowers the University to withdraw the candidature of the appellant therein had worked itself out and the appellant could not be refused the admission subsequently for any infirmity which should have been looked into before giving the appellant permission to appear. No fraud was played by the petitioner therein upon the University. According to the Apex Court, there was time and opportunity for the University authorities to have found out the defect. Under that circumstances, held the Apex Court, the respondent authorities had acquiesced in the infirmities which the admission form contained and allowed the appellant to appear in Part-I Examination in April, 1972, then by the force of the University Statute, the University had no power to withdraw the candidature of the appellant. Under that circumstances, held the Apex Court, the respondent authorities had acquiesced in the infirmities which the admission form contained and allowed the appellant to appear in Part-I Examination in April, 1972, then by the force of the University Statute, the University had no power to withdraw the candidature of the appellant. The learned standing counsel for the University, however, submits that the latest decision of the Apex Court in Surjeet Kaur case (supra) has conclusively and finally settled the issue in favour of the University when it held that mistake on the part of the authorities does not confer any right to make a claim against the statute as there can be no estoppel against statute inasmuch as this decision is latter in point of time. In order to appreciate this contention of the learned standing counsel for the University, I may also extensively quote the decision of the Apex Court in Surjeet Kaur case (supra) as under: “11. It is settled legal proposition that neither the court nor any tribunal has the competence to issue a direction contrary to law and to act in contravention of a statutory provision. The Court has no competence to issue a direction contrary to law nor the court can direct an authority to act in contravention of the statutory provisions. 12. In State of Punjab v. Renuka Singla [ (1994) 1 SCC 175 ], dealing with a similar situation, this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 178, para 8) “8. … We fail to appreciate as to how the High Court or this Court can be generous or liberal in issuing such directions which in substance amount to directing the authorities concerned to violate their own statutory rules and regulations….” 13. Similarly, in Karnataka SRTC v. Ashrafulla Khan [ (2002) 2 SCC 560 : AIR 2002 SC 629 ], this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 572-73, para 27) “27. … The High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is required to enforce rule of law and not pass order or direction which is contrary to what has been injuncted by law.” Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel [ (2010) 4 SCC 393 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 162 : AIR 2010 SC 1099 ]. 14. 14. It is worth noting that the respondent at the time of filling up of her form for BEd course at the first instance had not made any disclosure about her pursuit of postgraduate student (sic studies) in Political Science. 15. The Notification dated 16-3-1998 read as under: “It is notified that the University has granted last mercy chance to the candidates of undergraduate (under pattern 10+2+3) as well as postgraduate examination(s) (annual system after discontinuation of semester system) except MBBS/BDS/MD/PG diploma courses, who could not clear their reappear paper(s) within stipulated chances and have been declared as fail and those who could not pass/complete the degree within the stipulated period e.g. within six years of undergraduate and four years for postgraduate courses, as per the latest syllabi. The examination fee will be Rs. 1000.” 16. A bare perusal of the same would demonstrably make it clear that the said provision was not meant for candidates like the respondent. As a matter of fact, under the garb of the said notification, the respondent managed to get her form registered with the appellant and when this discrepancy was discovered, the appellant chose to set it right which in our opinion was perfectly justified. The respondent cannot plead any estoppel either by conduct or against a statute so as to gain any advantage of the fact that she was allowed to appear in the examination. 5. Thus, after reviewing the various case-laws, the Apex Court came to the conclusion that the principle of equitable estoppel did not apply to the facts of Surjeet Kaur case (supra) and observed thus: “18. There can be no estoppel/promissory estoppel against the legislature in the exercise of the legislative function nor can the Government or public authority be debarred from enforcing a statutory prohibition. Promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, must yield when the equity so requires. There can be no estoppel/promissory estoppel against the legislature in the exercise of the legislative function nor can the Government or public authority be debarred from enforcing a statutory prohibition. Promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, must yield when the equity so requires. [Vide H.S. Rikhy (Dr.) v. New Delhi Municipal Committee [ AIR 1962 SC 554 ], M.I. Builders (P) Ltd. V.Radhey Shyam Sahu [(1999) 6 SCC 646], Shish Ram V. State of Haryana [ (2000) 6 SCC 84 ], Chandra Prakash Tiwari V. Shakuntala Shukla [ (2002) 6 SCC 127 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 830], ITC Ltd. V.Agricultural Market Committee [ (2004) 2 SCC 794 : AIR 2004 SC 1796 ], State of U.P. V. U.P. Rajya Khanij Vikash Nigam Sangharsh Samitti [ (2008) 12 SCC 675 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 237], Sneh Gupta V. Davi Sarup [ (2009) 6 SCC 194 ]. 19. On the other hand, the conduct of the respondent was such that even though she had no statutory right or any vested right to pursue her BEd course, the mistake on the part of the appellant to allow her to appear in the examination cannot be by any logic treated to be a conduct of the appellant to confer any such right on the respondent. The rules and regulations cannot be allowed to be defeated merely because the appellant erroneously allowed the respondent to appear in the BEd examination. The records reveal that the respondent did not challenge the cancellation of her results in respect of the 1995 examination. The said order attained finality. The respondent straightaway approached the District Forum in the year 2000 for the conferment of BEd degree in pursuance of the examinations conducted under the Notification dated 16-3-1998. This, in the opinion of the Court, was a totally misdirected approach and the District Forum fell into error by granting the relief.” 6. On comparative reading of the two decisions of the Apex Court in Shri Krishan case (supra) and Surjeet Kaur case (supra), it is noticed that there are evident conflict between the two decisions. Shri Krishan case was rendered by a three-Judge Bench whereas Surjeet Kaur case, even though latter in point of time, was decided a two-Judge Bench. The question is which of the two judgments are to be followed by this Court while deciding this writ petition. Shri Krishan case was rendered by a three-Judge Bench whereas Surjeet Kaur case, even though latter in point of time, was decided a two-Judge Bench. The question is which of the two judgments are to be followed by this Court while deciding this writ petition. Article 141 of the Constitution categorically provides that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. The aforesaid Article empowers the Supreme Court to declare the law. It is, therefore, an essential function of the Court to interpret a legislation. The statements of the Court on matters other than law like facts may have no binding force as the facts of two cases may not be similar. But what is binding is the ratio of the decision and not any finding of facts. It is the principle found out upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. To determine whether a decision has “declared law” it cannot be said to be a law when a point is disposed of on concession and what is binding is the principle underlying a decision. 7. A judgment of the Court has to be read in the context of questions which arose for consideration in the case in which the judgment was delivered. An “obiter dictum” as distinguished from a ratio decidendi is an observation by the Court on a legal question suggested in a case before it but not arising in such manner as to require a decision. Such an obiter may not have a binding precedent as the observation was unnecessary for the decision pronounced, but even though an obiter may not have a binding effect as a precedent, but it cannot be denied that it is of considerable weight. The law which will be binding under Article 141 would, therefore, extend to all observations of points raised and decided by the Court in a given case. In my opinion, ratio laid down in Shri Krishan case and Surjeet Kaur case are thus in conflict with each other. What is to be done then? The law is now well-settled that the decision of a larger Bench is always binding upon the smaller Bench.- See Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours, (2012) 5 SCC 651. In my opinion, ratio laid down in Shri Krishan case and Surjeet Kaur case are thus in conflict with each other. What is to be done then? The law is now well-settled that the decision of a larger Bench is always binding upon the smaller Bench.- See Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours, (2012) 5 SCC 651. If the decision rendered by the larger bench of the Apex Court is binding upon the smaller bench of the Apex Court, then, a fortiori, there is no reason why the decision rendered by the three-Judge Bench in Shri Krishan case, rather than the decision rendered by the two-Judge Bench in Surjeet Kaur case, though latter in point of time, should not be binding upon and followed by this Court. So understood, the University-respondents are, therefore, barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel from cancelling the examination of the petitioner or from withholding the result of her B.A. Part-II Examination held in 1999 once they had, rightly or wrongly, allowed her to sit in the examination. 8. The offshoot of the foregoing discussion is that this writ petition succeeds. The decision of the University-respondents conveyed by the Controller of Examination, Dibrugarh University in his letter dated 10-2-2011 is hereby quashed. The University-respondents are, therefore, directed to declare the result of the examination of the petitioner in B.A. Part-II of the three years degree course commencing on 4-5-1999 within two weeks from the date of receipt of this judgment. No costs.