JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal under Section 100 CPC has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 20.5.1994 passed by Additional Civil Judge, Jhunjhunu in Civil Regular Appeal No. 36/1986 (24/90 new number) confirming the judgment and decree dated 23.9.1986 passed by Munsiff, Jhunjhunu in Civil Suit No. 270/1970. 2. The short facts of the case leading to filing of this appeal are that suit for declaration and injunction has been filed by the plaintiff -respondent on the ground that the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the disputed property. A patta has been issued in favour of the father of the plaintiff by Thakur Sahib Harnath Singh Ji in Falgun Sudi 13 Samvat 1987 which is corresponding to 1930. The plaintiff's father died in 1990. Thereafter, plaintiff -respondent remained in possession of the property. He has made constructions over the property thereafter, notice under Section 91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 has been issued hence suit for declaration and injunction has been filed. The contention of the respondent was that the property in dispute was not in possession and ownership of the plaintiff respondent and Thakur Sahib Harnath Singh Ji was not competent to issue the patta and apart from it, it has been specifically pleaded that patta is not registered and not admissible in evidence. The trial court has decreed the suit and appeal has also been dismissed, hence this appeal. 3. The appeal has been admitted on 30.10.95 on the following substantial question of law: (1) Whether on the basis of the unregistered patta, Ex.1 relief for declaration of title in respect of the disputed land could be given by the lower courts to the plaintiff respondent ? 4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the judgments and decree under appeal as well as the original record of the cases. 5. The only contention of the appellant is that Ex.1 patta is unregistered and hence relief of declaration could not be allowed to the respondent on the strength of unregistered patta and even it could not be looked into for collateral purposes. No title confers on the respondent on the strength of unregistered document and when respondent is not in ownership of the property, no relief could be allowed to him. No title confers on the respondent on the strength of unregistered document and when respondent is not in ownership of the property, no relief could be allowed to him. In Ex.1, there is no narration that possession has been handed over to him and in absence of relief for possession, the suit should have been dismissed. Per contra, the contention of the respondent is that in 1930 there was no law which requires compulsory registration of the patta and otherwise also it is in the shape of Sanad and does not require any registration. It is not in dispute that Ex.1 is not registered and counsel for the appellant has relied upon Hidayat dated 10th August, 1894 by which law of registry have been made applicable for the documents, Will, Talaknama, acknowledgment deed etc. but admittedly Hidyat contained in 10.8.1894 have no application on the sale deed or documents relating to title. Further reliance has been placed on Jaipur Registration Act, 1944 but it has come into force on 8.2.1944 and Ex.1 relates to 1930, hence the Jaipur Registration Act can have no application on Ex.1. The counsel for the appellant has also relied upon Inder Lal and ors. v. Abdul Salam and ors., AIR 1983 Raj. 57 in which this Court has considered Hidayat from January, 1894 to the end of December, 1896 published in gazette of Jaipur State in December, 1897 and it has been held that only provisions for realisation of the prescribed penalty has been indicated but it has not been prescribed that the document would be altogether inadmissible in evidence and there is no provision that in absence of registration, the document would not be admitted in evidence in the Court. Further reliance has been placed on Motilal & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh and ors., AIR 1964 Raj. 11 where it has been held that pattas ought to have been registered but admittedly, in the matter patta has been executed on 27.9.1948 after coming into force of the United State of Rajasthan Ordinance No.1 of 1948 and provisions of the Indian Registration Act have been applied which is not the case here. Further reliance has been placed on Madhab Chandra Barua & ors. Further reliance has been placed on Madhab Chandra Barua & ors. v. Smt. Joymati Kalitani Barua, AIR 1976 Gauhati 10 where by applying the provision of Indian Registration Act, it has been found that the document relinquished deed is inadmissible in evidence but admittedly Ex.1 patta disputed herein is not governed by the Indian Registration Act, 1908. 6. Further reliance has been placed on Kaisar Vardha Reddy v. Manvat Rao, AIR 1951 Hyderabad 63 where on same analogy, unregistered document has not been taken. The counsel has also placed reliance on K.B. Saha & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Development Consultant Ltd., (2008) 8 SCC 564 where general proposition as regards the Registration Act have been explained which are not in dispute here. The appellant could not show any law prevailing in 1930 by virtue of which the registration of Ex.1 was essential and in the absence of registration, the document could be treated as altogether inadmissible. Nothing has been shown that any law requiring registration was prevailing at that time or unregistered document could not be admitted in evidence. Per contra, the contention of the respondent is that looking to the provisions of Section 90 of the Registration Act of 1908 and Section 90 of the Jaipur Registration Act, Ex.1 patta which has been granted by Thikanedar is exempted from registration. As held earlier Ex.1 patta could not be governed by the Registration Act, 1908 or Jaipur Registration Act, 1944, hence the contention of the respondents are not acceptable. The respondent has rightly relied upon Bachh Raj v. Sunder Mal & ors., AIR 1963 Raj. 119 wherein it has been held as under: "On giving proper consideration to these facts, we can safely arrive at a conclusion that ordinarily the grant of a patta followed a prior oral sale in a proper proceeding and that pattas used to be issued to recognise the oral sale in the customary manner by the grant of patta and that the patta merely contained a recital of a prior completed oral sale. In these circumstances, in our opinion, a patta cannot ordinarily be considered a sale-deed or a document by itself creating rights in immovable properties. Such a document, in our opinion, did not require to be registered compulsorily. 17. In these circumstances, in our opinion, a patta cannot ordinarily be considered a sale-deed or a document by itself creating rights in immovable properties. Such a document, in our opinion, did not require to be registered compulsorily. 17. We may at this stage refer to a decision of the former Chief Court reported in Jutha v. Bhoma, 1939 Mar LR 266 (Civil) where a Bench of that Court observed as follows: "The Transfer of Property Act is not in force an Marwar so that the statutory provisions of that Act embodied in Section 54 as to the modes of transfer of property cannot be enforced and an oral sale can be recognised as valid. The Patta which is issued by the Thikana is not a sale deed. It is only a sanad evidencing the sale of land by Thikana. In case of Thikana land sold by public auction according to the principles of Patta Ordinance as in case of Khalsa land, it is not necessary to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the purchaser." There can be no doubt that the Chief Court had the advantage of having intimate knowledge of the practices relating to the grant of pattas by jagirdars and, therefore, the view taken by that Court deserves to be given due weight and we see no good reason to differ from it. We are not unconscious of the fact that in some cases the jagirdar might have combined transaction of sale and the issue of a patta and might have issued a patta which by itself might have purported to create rights in immovable property. Such a patta might require to be registered compulsorily. The final conclusion then to which we reach is that whether a patta should be registered or not, cannot be decided in the abstract and must be decided on the facts and the circumstances under which the patta was granted. Ordinarily the presumption will be that the patta was intended to be the sanad evidencing the sale of land by thikana and did not require registration." 7. Ordinarily the presumption will be that the patta was intended to be the sanad evidencing the sale of land by thikana and did not require registration." 7. In view of the above, it can safely be concluded that grant of patta by Zagirdar was a common practice and ordinarily it does not require registration as patta is not a sale in view of the law laid down in Bachh Raj (supra), patta was not registrable and in absence of registration Ex.1 Patta was admissible in evidence and rightly relied upon by the courts below when the appellant could not show any law which requires registration of the disputed patta. 8. It has also been contended that as regards Ex.1, presumption has been wrongly raised under Section 90 of the Evidence Act as it was not signed and for seal no presumption could be raised and reliance has been placed on Maganmal & Anr. v. Ujjanmal & ors., WLN (UC) 1975 486 where on the facts of the particular document, presumption has not been raised but here in the present case, the courts below have considered the rival contentions Ex.1 patta has been proved before the courts below and apart from it, no substantial question of law has been framed on this issue in the present appeal. PW/2 Ratan Singh has been examined to prove the patta Ex.1 who was the son of Rawal Harnath Singh. He has categorically proved the patta and in addition to evidence submitted by the plaintiff respondent, presumption has also been rightly raised and no interference is needed. 9. The other contention with a new plea has been raised by the appellant that no possession has been handed over to respondent vide Ex.1 and when no relief for possession has been claimed, the suit is not maintainable and reliance has been placed on Yamuna Nagar Improvement Trust v. Khariati Lal, (2005) 10 SCC 30 and Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by LRs & ors., AIR 2008 SC 2033 where position in regard to suit for injunction and declaration has been explained. Here in the present case, the plaintiff has come with a case that he is the owner of the property. Here in the present case, the plaintiff has come with a case that he is the owner of the property. Ownership and possession has been proved, hence declaration and injunction has rightly been allowed in favour of respondent and counsel for the respondent has relied upon Corporation of the City of Bangalore v. M. Papaiah & Anr., AIR 1989 SC 1809 and Habib Fatma & ors. v. Mohd. Shafi, AIR 1989 SC 2191 . Here in the present case, the issue of title and possession has directly been considered by the courts below and rightly decided in favour of the respondent. The counsel for the appellant could not show any perversity or patent illegality in the conclusion and reasoning arrived at by the courts below. The appellant has tried to make out a new case that possession of the property never handed over to respondent. Issue of title and possession was expressly raised and evidence has been adduced by both the parties on the same, hence the contentions of the appellant are not acceptable and in view of the concurrent findings of both the courts below, question No.1 is decided against the appellant.Thus, the appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******