ORDER : R.S. Chauhan, J. 1. The petitioner has challenged the legal validity of the notice dated 2-9-2015 issued by the Executive Officer, T. Narasipura Taluk Panchayat, whereby the Executive Officer has called for a special meeting on 11-9-2015 at 11.00 a.m. for considering the 'No Confidence Motion' moved against the petitioner. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner belongs to the Scheduled Tribe category. On 4-1-2011, she was elected as a member of Taluk Panchayat. Subsequently, since the post of Adhyaksha (President) of the Taluk Panchayat was reserved for the category of Scheduled Tribe (Woman), the petitioner contested for the said post. On 1-7-2014, she was declared to be duly elected to the said post. While she was holding the said post, on 3-8-2015, the Executive Officer received a letter from fifteen members requesting him to call for a special meeting for considering a 'No Confidence Motion' against the petitioner. Therefore, the Executive Officer issued a notice on 4-8-2015 calling for the special meeting to be held on 10-8-2015. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by the notice, she filed a writ petition, namely, Writ Petition No. 33186 of 2015 before this Court. By an interim order dated 7-8-2015, this Court stayed the operation of the notice dated 4-8-2015. During the pendency of the said writ petition, and after passing of the interim order, on 17-8-2015, the same set of fifteen members submitted a letter to the President, that is, the petitioner, for convening a special meeting to move a 'No Confidence Motion' against her. However, the petitioner, as the President, did not call for the special meeting. Meanwhile, on 24-8-2015, this Court set aside the notice dated 4-8-2015 and allowed the petition filed by the petitioner. 2. On 2-9-2015, the Vice-President requested the Executive Officer for calling a special meeting for considering the 'No Confidence Motion' against the petitioner. Consequently, the Executive Officer issued the notice dated 2-9-2015 calling for a special meeting on 11-9-2015 for considering the said 'No Confidence Motion' against the petitioner. Hence, this petition before this Court. 3. Mr. 2. On 2-9-2015, the Vice-President requested the Executive Officer for calling a special meeting for considering the 'No Confidence Motion' against the petitioner. Consequently, the Executive Officer issued the notice dated 2-9-2015 calling for a special meeting on 11-9-2015 for considering the said 'No Confidence Motion' against the petitioner. Hence, this petition before this Court. 3. Mr. Dilip Kumar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has raised the following contentions before this Court: firstly, if during the pendency of the notice dated 4-8-2015, a request is made to the President for convening the special meeting for considering the 'No confidence Motion', the said request is deemed to have been merged with the first request made to the Executive Officer. Since only the meeting scheduled on 10-8-2015 had been stayed by this Court by an interim order dated 7-8-2015, the first request, dated 3-8-2015, was operational even on 17-8-2015. Therefore, the request made by the fifteen members on 17-8-2015 would merge with the request made by them on 3-8-2015. Hence, the Executive Officer was not justified in issuing the notice dated 2-9-2015. In order to buttress this plea, the learned Counsel has relied upon second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 140 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 ('the Act' for short). 4. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The contention raised by the learned Counsel is highly misplaced for the following reasons: Firstly, the request made on 3-8-2015 by the fifteen members before the Executive Officer culminated in the notice dated 4-8-2015 passed by the Executive Officer. The said notice was challenged before this Court. The learned Counsel is unjustified in claiming that by the order dated 7-8-2015, this Court had merely stayed the meeting. In fact, a bare perusal of the interim order dated 7-8-2015 (Annexure-C) clearly reveals that this Court had stayed the operation of the notice dated 4-8-2015. Therefore, as on 7-8-2015, the first request made to the Executive Officer, and the notice issued thereupon, were no longer operational in the eyes of the law. Secondly, if during the pendency of the writ petition, the fifteen members have decided to adhere to the procedure established under Section 141 of the Act, their action, in requesting the President for convening a special meeting, cannot be faulted. Secondly, if during the pendency of the writ petition, the fifteen members have decided to adhere to the procedure established under Section 141 of the Act, their action, in requesting the President for convening a special meeting, cannot be faulted. Merely because they have made a request on 17-8-2015, that is, after the operation of the notice was stayed, it cannot be argued that second request thereby merges with the first request made on 3-8-2015. Hence, a fresh request had been made by the fifteen members to the President for convening a special meeting. Therefore, after the notice dated 4-8-2015 was set aside by this Court by order dated 24-8-2015, the Vice-President on 2-9-2015 requested the Executive Officer to call for the special meeting. Thirdly, according to Section 141(2)(a), in case "the President fails to call for a special meeting as requested by not less than one-third of total number of members, the Vice-President or one-third of total number of members may call for special meeting, for a day not more than fifteen days after presentation of such request and require the Executive Officer to give notice to the members and to take such action as may be necessary to convene the meeting". In the present case, since the President did not call for a meeting on the request made by the members, the Vice-President was certainly justified in requesting the Executive Officer, on 2-9-2015, for calling a special meeting. If the Executive Officer has thereafter called the meeting on 11-9-2015 by the impugned notice dated 2-9-2015, the said impugned notice cannot be faulted with. After all, the said notice is in conformity with Section 141(2)(a) of the Act. Section 140 of the act is as under: "140. Resignation or removal of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha.--(1) A member holding office as Adhyaksha of the Taluk Panchayat may resign his office at any time by writing under his hand addressed to the Deputy Commissioner and the Upadhyaksha may resign his office at any time by writing under his hand addressed to the Adhyaksha and in the absence of Adhyaksha to the Deputy Commissioner and the office shall become vacant on the expiry of fifteen days from the date of such resignation unless within the said period of fifteen days he withdraws such resignation by writing under his hand addressed to the Deputy Commissioner or the Adhyaksha, as the case may be. (2) Every Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha of Taluk Panchayat shall vacate office if he ceases to be a member of the Taluk Panchayat. (3) Every Adhyaksha and every Upadhyaksha of the Taluk Panchayat shall be deemed to have vacated his office forthwith if a resolution expressing want of confidence in him is passed by a majority of the total number of elected members of the Taluk Panchayat at a meeting specially convened for the purpose: Provided that no resolution expressing want of confidence in Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha shall be moved within six months, from the date of his selection: Provided further that where a resolution expressing want of confidence in Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha has been considered and negatived by a Taluk Panchayat, a similar resolution in respect of the same Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha shall not be given notice of, or moved, within six months from the date of the decision of the Taluk Panchayat. (4) Every Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of the Taluk Panchayat shall, after an opportunity is afforded for hearing him, and if necessary after obtaining a report from the Zilla Panchayat and considering the same be removable from his office as Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha by the Government for misconduct in the discharge of his duties, for being persistently remiss in the discharge of his duties and an Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha so removed who does not cease to be a member under sub-section (2) shall not be eligible for re-election as Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha during the remaining term of office as member of such Taluk Panchayat. (5) An Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha removed from his office under sub-section (4) may also be removed by the Government from membership of the Taluk Panchayat. (6) Where the offices of both Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of Taluk Panchayat are vacant, the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Social Justice shall exercise the powers and perform the duties of the Adhyaksha, until an Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha is duly elected." A bare perusal of the provision reveals that the second proviso to sub-section (3) does not support the petitioner's case. For it deals with a situation where a no confidence motion has been considered and negatived at the level of Taluk Panchayat. However, in the present case, the no confidence motion is yet to be considered. Moreover, the non-confidence motion is being moved at the Gram Panchayat level, and not at the level of Taluk Panchayat. For it deals with a situation where a no confidence motion has been considered and negatived at the level of Taluk Panchayat. However, in the present case, the no confidence motion is yet to be considered. Moreover, the non-confidence motion is being moved at the Gram Panchayat level, and not at the level of Taluk Panchayat. Hence, the reliance on Section 140 of the Act by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is highly misplaced. For the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any merit in the petition. Petition is, hereby, dismissed.