CHAKRADHARI SHARAN SINGH, J.:–The appellant herein stands convicted of the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27(1) of the Arms Act, 1959, by judgment, dated 04/09/2009, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court - IV, Buxar, in Sessions Trial No. 338 of 2006. By order, dated 09/09/2009, passed by the learned trial Court, the appellant has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- has been imposed upon him for his conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code with a stipulation that in default of the payment of fine, he would be undergoing rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. For his conviction under Section 27(1) of the Arms Act, 1959, the appellant has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of four years and pay a fine of Rs. 3,000/- and, in default thereof, the appellant has been directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four months. No separate punishment has been imposed upon the appellant for his conviction under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. In terms of the order of the learned trial Court, all the sentences are to run concurrently. 2. The aforesaid judgment and order of the learned trial Court has been put to challenge in the present appeal, preferred under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 3. By order, dated 29/10/2009, this appeal was admitted for hearing and the lower Court records were called for. As regards the appellant’s prayer for bail, it was observed by this Court by the said order that the prayer shall be considered after receipt of the lower Court records. On 04/02/2010, when the matter came to be taken up by this Court, Mr. Varun Kumar, learned Advocate of this Court, who had filed the present appeal on behalf of the appellant, namely, Dhananjay Rai @ Guddu Rai, informed this Court that the brief of the case had been taken back by his client and no instruction had been given to him to press the application for grant of bail during the pendency of the appeal. Learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the informant, on the other hand, informed this Court, on that day, that the appellant had absconded from the custody and that was the reason why the prayer for bail was not being pressed by the learned counsel representing the appellant. 4. In the above backdrop, this Court declined to take up the issue of grant of bail to the appellant and rejected the prayer for bail. This Court, by said order, dated 04/02/2010, called for a report from the learned trial Court, i.e., Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court - IV, Buxar, in connection with Sessions Trial No. 338 of 2006, as to what steps were being taken to apprehend the appellant and bring him to custody to serve out the sentences passed against him. The Court observed that the report must reach this Court within four weeks. 5. In response to this Court’s order, dated 04/02/2010, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court - IV, Buxar, through his Letter No. 101, dated 06/03/2010, communicated to the Assistant Registrar of this Court, that an information, regarding the fact that appellant had absconded from custody, had been received from the Senior Superintendent Jail, Varanashi (U.P.), on 06/02/2010 and an order, issuing non-bailable warrant for apprehending the appellant had already been passed on that very date. By his said report, the learned Additional Sessions Judge further reported to this Court that non-bailable warrants against the appellant had been issued, on 05/03/2010, through Superintendent of Police, Buxar, and Superintendent of Police, Ghazipur (U.P.), for apprehending the appellant and reminders had also been sent, on 08/02/2010, to them for execution of non-bailable warrants. 6. The appellant is still absconding and has not been apprehended so far. 7. By way of counter affidavit, sworn by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (H.R.), an order, issued by the Director General of Police, Bihar, dated 30/07/2015, has been brought on record showing that the amount of reward for arrest of the appellant has been enhanced to Rs. 50,000/- from Rs. 25,000/-. From the said order, it appears that by Memo No. 167/Abhiyan (SIG), dated 28/01/2014, the Bihar Police Headquarters had earlier announced reward of Rs. 25,000/- for arrest of the appellant. By the said order, dated 30/07/2015, the amount of the reward has been enhanced to Rs. 50,000/-. 50,000/- from Rs. 25,000/-. From the said order, it appears that by Memo No. 167/Abhiyan (SIG), dated 28/01/2014, the Bihar Police Headquarters had earlier announced reward of Rs. 25,000/- for arrest of the appellant. By the said order, dated 30/07/2015, the amount of the reward has been enhanced to Rs. 50,000/-. The appellant has been shown to have been absconding in as many as twenty one (21) cases, under the said order, dated 30/07/2015. 8. A question has arisen in the background of the facts, set out above, as to whether this Court is required to consider the appellant’s appeal on merits on the basis of the lower Court records. 9. We have heard Mr. Ajay Mishra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, for the State of Bihar, and Mr. Amish Kumar, learned Amicus curiae, who has extended valuable assistance to this Court at the Court’s request. 10. In case of Shyam Deo Pandey & Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar, reported in 1971 (1) SCC 855 , the Supreme Court had occasion to consider as to what should be the approach of the appellate Court, in an appeal preferred against an order of conviction, if at the time of the hearing of the appeal, there is no representation on appellant’s behalf. Dealing with Section 423 of the old Code, i.e., Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, corresponding to Sections 385 and 386 of the new Code, i.e., the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Supreme Court held that if the appellant or his Counsel or the Public Prosecutor, both are not present, the appellate Court, though has jurisdiction to proceed with the disposal of the appeal, such disposal must be after the appellate Court has considered the appeal on merits while examining the reasoning and findings, recorded by the trial Court, in the light of the materials on record, Paragraph 19 of the Supreme Court decision, in Shyam Deo Pandey (supra), being relevant, is extracted hereinbelow:— “19. A reading of Section 423 makes it clear that a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for default of appearance of the appellants or their counsel. The Court has either to adjourn the hearing of the appeal in order to enable them to appear or it should consider the appeal on merits and pass final orders. A reading of Section 423 makes it clear that a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for default of appearance of the appellants or their counsel. The Court has either to adjourn the hearing of the appeal in order to enable them to appear or it should consider the appeal on merits and pass final orders. The consideration of the appeal on merits at the stage of final hearing and to arrive at a decision on merits so as to pass final orders will not be possible unless the reasoning and findings recorded in the judgment under appeal are tested in the light of the record of the case. After the records are before the Court and the appeal is set down for hearing, it is essential that the Appellate Court should: (a) peruse such record; (b) hear the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and (c) hear the public prosecutor, if he appears. After complying with these requirements, the Appellate Court has full power to pass any of the orders mentioned in the section. It is to be noted that if the appellant or his pleader is not present or if the public prosecutor is not present it is not obligatory on the Appellate Court to postpone the hearing of the appeal. If the appellant or his counsel or the public prosecutor, or both, are not present, the Appellate Court has jurisdiction to proceed with the disposal of the appeal; but hat disposal must be after the Appellate Court has considered the appeal on merits. It is clear that the appeal must be considered and disposed of on merits irrespective of the fact whether the appellant or his counsel or the public prosecutor is present or not. Even if the appeal is disposed of in their absence, the decision must be after consideration on merits. Under Section 421 the Appellate Court has to decide whether the appeal is to be taken on file or dismissed summarily. The obligation of the Court at that stage is only to peruse, the petition of appeal and the copy of the order or judgment appealed against. A summary dismissal of the appeal will then be legal if the Appellate Court considers that there is no sufficient ground for interference. The obligation of the Court at that stage is only to peruse, the petition of appeal and the copy of the order or judgment appealed against. A summary dismissal of the appeal will then be legal if the Appellate Court considers that there is no sufficient ground for interference. But even in such circumstances it has been held that a summary decision is a judicial decision which vitally affects the convicted appellant and in a fit case, it is also open to be challenged on an appeal before this Court. Though a summary rejection, without giving any reasons, is not violation of any statutory provisions, such a manner of disposal removes every opportunity for detection of errors in the order. It has been further held that when an appeal in the High Court raises a serious and substantial point, which is prima facie arguable, it is improper for an Appellate Court to dismiss the appeal summarily without giving some indication of its view on the point. The interest of justice and fair play require that in such cases an indication must be given by the Appellate Court of its views on the point argued before it. The earliest decision on this aspect is the one reported in Mushtak Hussein Vs. The State of Bombay. The entire case law has been referred to and reiterated in Govinda Kadluki Kadam and Others Vs. The State of Maharashtra. The recent decision on this aspect is of Challappa Ramaswami Vs. State of Maharashtra. We have referred to the above decisions to show that though a summary rejection by an Appellate Court under Section 421 may not be violative of the section, nevertheless when an arguable or substantial question arises for consideration, the Appellate Court in its order should indicate its views on such point. If the position is as indicated above that even under Section 421, which contemplates dismissal of an appeal summarily, under Section 423, in our opinion, a very rigorous test must be applied to find out whether the Appellate Court has complied with the provisions contained therein. There is no emphasis on the perusal of the record in Section 421, whereas under Section 423 one of the essential requirements is that the Appellate Court should peruse the record. There cannot be any controversy that Section 423 applies to cases in which appeals have been presented and admitted. There is no emphasis on the perusal of the record in Section 421, whereas under Section 423 one of the essential requirements is that the Appellate Court should peruse the record. There cannot be any controversy that Section 423 applies to cases in which appeals have been presented and admitted. Though Section 423 does not provide any limitation on the power of the Appellate Court that it is incompetent to dispose of the appeal if the appellant or his pleader is not present, nevertheless there is limitation. That limitation, which is provided by the section is that the Appellate Court, before disposing of the appeal, must peruse the record. No doubt if the appellant or his pleader is present, he must be heard. Similarly, if the public prosecutor is present, he too must be heard. The Legislature in Section 423 contemplates clearly that in certain cases a criminal appeal might be disposed of without hearing the appellant or any one on his behalf or the public prosecutor. The expression “after perusing such record” in the section is, in our opinion, a condition precedent to a proper disposal of an appeal either by dismissing the same or in any other manner contemplated in the said section. The powers which the Appellate Court in criminal appeals possesses are depicted in Section 423. It has power not only to dismiss the appeal but also pass any one of the orders enumerated in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) and sub-section (1-A). These provisions show the enormous powers which the Appellate Court possesses in regard to a criminal appeal. These powers, it cannot be gainsaid are very vast. Any one of the orders, mentioned above, could be passed by the Appellate Court whether the appeal is disposed of on hearing or without hearing the appellant or his pleader. These provisions, in our opinion, clearly indicate the nature of a judgment or order that is expected of the Appellate Court in its judgment. It is in this context that the expression “after perusing such record” assumes great importance. Absence of those words in Section 421, brings out in bold contrast the differences in the nature of jurisdiction exercised under the two sections.” 11. The view taken by the Supreme Court, in Shyam Deo Pandey (supra), came to be reaffirmed by a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Bani Singh & Ors. Absence of those words in Section 421, brings out in bold contrast the differences in the nature of jurisdiction exercised under the two sections.” 11. The view taken by the Supreme Court, in Shyam Deo Pandey (supra), came to be reaffirmed by a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Bani Singh & Ors. Vs State of U.P., reported in (1996) 4 SCC 720 . In the case of Bani Singh (supra), the Supreme Court has taken a view, referring to Section 385 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that in the event, the appellate Court does not consider an appeal fit for summary dismissal, it must call for the records of the trial Court and, upon the records having been received, dispose of the appeal after hearing the accused or his Counsel. The Supreme Court held, in Bani Singh (supra), that the law expects the appellate Court to dispose of the appeal on merits not merely by perusing the reasoning of the trial Court in the judgment, but by cross-checking whether the reasoning and findings, recorded by the trial Court, are consistent with the materials on record. The Supreme Court’s relevant observation, appearing in Paragraph 14 of Bani Singh’s case (supra), read, “............The law, therefore, does not envisage the dismissal of the appeal for default or non-prosecution but only contemplates disposal on merits after perusal of the record”. 12. The question, in the present case is, as to whether the law, laid down by the Apex Court in Shyam Deo Pandey (supra) and Bani Singh (supra), requiring the appellate Court to dispose of an appeal after perusal of the records on merits and not to dismiss an appeal on the ground of absence of learned counsel for the appellant or the appellant himself; would be applicable to a situation, where the appellant has escaped from jail custody, during the pendency of an appeal, for whose apprehension, the State police has announced reward.? 13. A similar situation, as depicted above, had arisen before this Court in Daya Shankar Singh & Anr. 13. A similar situation, as depicted above, had arisen before this Court in Daya Shankar Singh & Anr. Vs The State of Bihar, reported in (2004) 3 BLJR 2330 , wherein this Court, describing the act of the appellant of that case as brazen defiance to law and system of criminal administration of justice, held, taking aid of Rule 8 of Chapter XII of the Patna High Court Rules, that the appellant was not entitled to any indulgence from the Courts inasmuch as Rule 8 of Chapter XII of the Patna High Court Rules mandates, “No appeal against conviction, application or motion shall be heard for admission unless the accused has surrendered to the order of the Court below convicting him to sentence of imprisonment for a term and an intimation to this effect has been filed, except in case where the appellant has been released on bail by the trial court.” 14. In case of Daya Shankar Singh (supra), this Court had allowed learned counsel representing the appellant, who was absconding, to give an intimation to the Court as regards his surrender and as no intimation, as regards the appellant’s surrender was filed before this Court, this Court dismissed the appeal of the absconding appellant No. 2, namely, Maya Shankar Singh, with following observations:— “20. Though Maya Shankar Singh’s appeal is dismissed without reference to its merit, it needs to be clearly stated that the dismissal of the case is not for default, that is, non-appearance of the lawyer representing him. The dismissal of the appeal is for a far basic reason.” 15. Though Maya Shankar’s appeal was dismissed without reference to its merit, it was clearly recorded that dismissal of the case was not for default, i.e., non-appearance of the lawyers representing him. The Division Bench of this Court, in case of Daya Shankar Singh (supra), declined to hear the appeal on merits on the ground, inter alia, that the act of the appellant, Maya Shankar Singh, in escaping from custody, was a willful, deliberate and gross violation of the judicial process and it amounted to defiance of criminal administration of justice and was, therefore, not entitled to any indulgence from the Court. 16. In the case of K.S. Panduranga Vs. 16. In the case of K.S. Panduranga Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 71, the Supreme Court, having comprehensively analyzing previous decisions as to what an appellate Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is required to do, when it is confronted with a situation, where the convict as well as his counsel are absent, laid down the position of law in the following words,— “(a) That the High Court cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution simpliciter without examining the merits, (b) That the Court is not bound to adjourn the matter if both the Appellant or his counsel/lawyer are absent; (c) That the Court may, as a matter of prudence or indulgence, adjourn the matter, but it is not bound to do so; (d) That it can dispose of the appeal after perusing the record and judgment of the trial Court; (e) That if the accused is in jail and cannot, on his own, come to Court, it would be advisable to adjourn the case and fix another date to facilitate the appearance of the Appellant-accused if his lawyer is not present, and if the lawyer is absent and the Court deems it appropriate to appoint a lawyer at the State expense to assist it, nothing in law would preclude the Court from doing so; and (f) That if the case is decided on merits in the absence of the Appellant, the higher Court can remedy the situation.” 17. In a later decision, in Surya Baksh Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2013 (2) SCALE 492, the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the decision in the case of K.S. Panduranga (supra), faced with a situation, where neither the appellant before the High Court, who was on bail during the pendency of the appeal, nor his Counsel was found present at the time of hearing of the appeal. Dealing with the validity of the order of the High Court dismissing the appeal, in a situation of the one indicated above, the Supreme Court held, in Surya Baksh Singh (supra), that in such circumstance, the appellate Court is essentially required to proceed against the person, who stood surety at the time, when the convict was granted bail. Dealing with the validity of the order of the High Court dismissing the appeal, in a situation of the one indicated above, the Supreme Court held, in Surya Baksh Singh (supra), that in such circumstance, the appellate Court is essentially required to proceed against the person, who stood surety at the time, when the convict was granted bail. If even this exercise fails to locate and bring forth the convict, the Apex Court held that the appellate Court is empowered to dismiss the appeal. 18. For coming to a conclusion reached above, the Apex Court, in Surya Baksh Singh (supra), pressed into operation inherent powers of the High Court, under Section 482 of the Code, to the effect that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders, as may be necessary, to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Apex Court, dealing with the significance of Section 482 of the Code, laid down, in Surya Baksh Singh (supra), that it can be employed to ensure obedience of any order passed by the Court, because of the phrase “to give effect to any order under this Code”. The Court held, in Surya Baksh Singh (supra), that use of the word ‘otherwise’, appearing in Section 482 of the Code, has the “avowed effect of boundlessly broadening the boundaries of inherent powers of the High Court in exercise of its criminal jurisdiction”. 19. In the present case, we find that it is not a case, where the appellant, after having been granted bail during the pendency of his appeal against his conviction, remained unrepresented through his counsel or otherwise at the time and date fixed for hearing of the appeal. Here is a case, where the appellant was in custody upon his conviction, on his trial held by a Court having jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The appellant escaped from the custody and absconded and, despite efforts having made by the police, he could not be apprehended. 20. Here is a case, where the appellant was in custody upon his conviction, on his trial held by a Court having jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The appellant escaped from the custody and absconded and, despite efforts having made by the police, he could not be apprehended. 20. In our considered view, following the decision of the Supreme Court, in Surya Baksh Singh (supra), as well as invoking provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, this Court, in the circumstances pointed out above, is not required to peruse the records of the trial Court for consideration of his appeal on merits. 21. Though, the remedy of appeal is a valuable right, the appellant forfeited his right the moment he escaped from the custody and, thus, flagrantly abused the process of law. Such deliberate act of the appellant amounts to defiance of criminal administration of justice and, therefore, as held by this Court, in the case of Daya Shankar Singh (supra), the appellant is not entitled for any indulgence by this Court of perusal of the records of the trial Court for the purpose of consideration of his appeal on merit. 22. The present one is, in our opinion, an exceptional circumstance and one of the rarest of rare cases, where this Court is required to deviate from the well settled principle of law that once the appellate Court has refused to dismiss an appeal summarily and decided to call for the record of the case, the appeal should be decided on merits, on perusal of the records by invoking Section 482 of the Code. The power of this Court to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and to secure the ends of justice is inherent and the said provision declares that nothing in the Code could be said to limit such powers of the High Court. Similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of Delhi High Court, in the case of Mukesh Vs. State, decided on 01.08.2008 in Crl. A. 186 of 1992. 23. We are, thus, of the considered view that the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 24. This appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. 25. Let the lower Court records be sent back.