JUDGMENT K.M. Thaker, J. 1. This appeal under Section 374 of the Code is directed against the judgment dated 31.8.2012 below Exh. 71 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Limbdi, District: Surendranagar in Sessions Case (Old Case) No. 68 of 2011 (New Case No. 70 of 2012) whereby the learned Court has convicted the appellant, i.e. original accused No. 2 for the offence under Section 376 of IPC and the appellant - original accused No. 2 is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and he is also ordered to pay fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default further rigorous imprisonment for a period of 6 months. The appellant is also convicted for the offence under Section 506(2) of IPC and is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period 1 year and fine of Rs. 250/- and in default further rigorous imprisonment for a period of 15 days. The appellant is also convicted for the offence under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act and is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period 6 months and fine of Rs. 250/- and in default further rigorous imprisonment for a period of 1 month. 1.1 So far as the accused No. 1 is concerned, learned trial Court has recorded judgment of acquittal and acquitted the accused No. 1 by giving benefit of doubt and the Court is informed that any proceedings by the complainant or the victim or by the State is not filed against the decision acquitting accused No. 1. 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 5.4.2011 at about 9.00 a.m. as a part of the conspiracy hatched with accused No. 2, the accused No. 1, who happens to be aunt of the victim, asked the victim to join her and accompany her as she was going to her field and that the victim, i.e. minor girl, aged 15 years, joined the accused No. 1. When they reached the field, the accused No. 2 was present there and was sitting on a cot - bedstead. The accused No. 1 told the victim girl that she will return in short while and till then, she may sit there with the accused No. 2 and wait for her. The accused No. 1 then left the victim girl with the accused No. 2. The accused No. 1 told the victim girl that she will return in short while and till then, she may sit there with the accused No. 2 and wait for her. The accused No. 1 then left the victim girl with the accused No. 2. After the accused No. 1 left, the accused No. 2 threatened the victim by showing a knife and then at knife point he pushed her to the cot and then gagged the victim by putting a piece of cloth in her mouth and forcibly, and without her consent, committed sexual intercourse with her and thereby committed the offence punishable under section 376 of IPC. The accused No. 2 also threatened the victim girl that if she told anybody about the incident then he would kill her. At the time when accused No. 2 committed the offence and threatened the victim at knife point, a notification issued by the Magistrate under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act was in force and that, therefore, the accused also committed offence under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. 3. The first informant is father of the victim who submitted written/private complaint in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Chotila on 25.4.2011 and pursuant to the order passed by the learned Magistrate, the complaint was registered as M Case No. 1 of 2011. During the course of investigation, various statements were recorded and panchnama were drawn. 4. Upon completion of the investigation, charge-sheet came to be filed. Since the case would be triable by the Sessions Court, learned Magistrate committed the case to the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Limbdi, Surendranagar. 4.1 The learned trial Court framed the charge against accused No. 1 and 2 at Exh. 5, to which both the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution examined 17 witnesses including following persons/witnesses: Sr. No. Witness Name Exhibit 1. Dr. Methlon Kuniyark 11 2. Dr. Priyanka Dilipbhai Jogiya 18 3. Complaint Mavjibhai Talshibhai Sanghani 40 4. Victim Jyotsnaben Mavjibhai Talshibhai Sanghani 42 5. Chothiben w/o Mavjibhai Talshibhai Sanghani 43 6. ASI Narendrabhai Hamirbhai Parmar 47 7. Sureshbhai Ramjibhai Rojasara – Talati-cum-Mantri 53 8. Nausad Ijjatali Ukani – School Principal 54 4.2 The prosecution relied on panch witnesses and also relied on 27 documents, details whereof are mentioned in paragraph No. 5 of the impugned judgment. 5. Victim Jyotsnaben Mavjibhai Talshibhai Sanghani 42 5. Chothiben w/o Mavjibhai Talshibhai Sanghani 43 6. ASI Narendrabhai Hamirbhai Parmar 47 7. Sureshbhai Ramjibhai Rojasara – Talati-cum-Mantri 53 8. Nausad Ijjatali Ukani – School Principal 54 4.2 The prosecution relied on panch witnesses and also relied on 27 documents, details whereof are mentioned in paragraph No. 5 of the impugned judgment. 5. Then statement of the accused persons, under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, were recorded. In their further statement, both the accused denied all incriminating evidence and circumstances emerging from the evidence adduced by the prosecution and put to them by the learned trial Court and both the accused stated that they did not commit the offence. In his further statement, the accused No. 2 claimed that on account of land dispute between the father of the victim and his family, he has been falsely implicated in the case. 6. After considering and evaluating, oral and documentary evidence on record, and after considering the submissions by both sides, learned trial Court recorded acquittal in favour of accused No. 1 and recorded conviction of the accused No. 1 for the offence punishable under sections 376 and 506(2) of IPC and section 135 of the Bombay Police Act and awarded sentence as referred to hereinabove in this judgment. The conviction judgment dated 31.8.2012 and the sentence have given rise to this appeal. 7. At the outset, Mr. Shah, learned counsel for the appellant declared, stipulated and submitted that considering the oral and documentary evidence on record and more particularly in light of the evidence of the victim girl (PW-10) Exh. 42, the appellant (i.e. the accused No. 2) does not challenge the conviction and does not assail the judgment recording conviction against him (i.e. the accused No. 2) and restricts this appeal only qua the sentence with a request and prayer to reduce the sentence to the extent undergone. 7.1 Mr. 42, the appellant (i.e. the accused No. 2) does not challenge the conviction and does not assail the judgment recording conviction against him (i.e. the accused No. 2) and restricts this appeal only qua the sentence with a request and prayer to reduce the sentence to the extent undergone. 7.1 Mr. Shah, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that (a) there are contradictions in the evidence of the victim and so also the complainant, (b) none of the panch witnesses have supported the case of prosecution and the panchnama and that the panch witnesses are declared hostile and (c) there is delay in filing the complaint, inasmuch as the complaint in respect of the incident which occurred on 5.4.2011, is filed on 25.4.2011, (d) he also claimed animosity between the family of the victim and the accused No. 2 on account of land dispute, and (e) he also claimed love affair between the accused No. 2 and the victim and they were frequently meeting and had also exchanged gifts and (f) there were no marks of any external injury thus there was no sign of force and that therefore, the judgment recording conviction against the appellant may be set aside. However, immediately, he reiterated the request and submission which he made at the outset viz. considering the evidence the appellant does not challenge the conviction but having urged above mentioned submission and having regard to the age of the appellant and having regard to the fact that at the relevant time victim's age, according to the decision by learned trial Court, was border age i.e. 15 years and 10 months and having regard to the fact that the appellant has undergone sentence of 4 years and 4 months and considering age of the appellant and also considering that there was affair between him and the victim, the appellant requests and urges that the sentence may be reduced to the extent undergone. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that while fixing quantum of sentence, learned trial Court did not consider the said facts, including age of the accused, who at the relevant time was 22 years old. 8. Learned APP submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. Learned APP emphasized that learned APP submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that while fixing quantum of sentence, learned trial Court did not consider the said facts, including age of the accused, who at the relevant time was 22 years old. 8. Learned APP submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. Learned APP emphasized that learned APP submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. Learned APP emphasized that the victim is a minor girl and her age is established by evidence of the principal of the school and her school leaving certificate and the offence is committed by her uncle. Learned APP submitted that the delay caused in lodging the complaint is satisfactorily explained and that merely because some delay has occurred, it does not frustrate the case of the prosecution in any manner or to any extent. With reference to the contentions by learned counsel for the appellant that panch witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution and are declared hostile and that therefore, the panchnama are not proved. The learned APP submitted that now it is common that in almost all cases, the panch witnesses turn hostile and Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed and held that merely because panch witnesses turn hostile, prosecution case would not fail. In response to the submission by learned counsel for the appellant that the accused No. 2 and the victim had love affair, the learned APP submitted that even otherwise, the said aspects are not relevant in view of the fact that at the relevant time, the victim was minor and her age was less than 16 years. The learned APP submitted that mere absence of external injury is no ground to reject and discard case of the prosecution. So as to support his submission, learned APP relied on the decisions in cases of Hem Raj S/o. Moti Ram v. State of Haryana (2014) 2 SCC 395 , Munna v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2014) 10 SCC 254, Mukesh v. State of Chhattisgarh (2014) 10 SCC 327 and Krishan v. State of Haryana (2014) 13 SCC 574 . 9. So as to support his submission, learned APP relied on the decisions in cases of Hem Raj S/o. Moti Ram v. State of Haryana (2014) 2 SCC 395 , Munna v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2014) 10 SCC 254, Mukesh v. State of Chhattisgarh (2014) 10 SCC 327 and Krishan v. State of Haryana (2014) 13 SCC 574 . 9. In rejoinder, learned counsel for the appellant again referred to the age of the victim and he submitted that the victim's age is not established and while repeating his objection with reference to the victim's age the learned counsel for the appellant reiterated that the appellant does not challenge the conviction but having regard to the fact that the victim was not minor and the prosecution has failed to prove victim's age and even according to the findings by learned trial Court, the age of the victim was border age at the relevant time i.e. 15 years and 10 months and the age of accused was 22 years and in light of such facts, the sentence may be reduced to the extent of sentence undergone. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on unreported judgment by Division Bench dated 12.9.2011 in Criminal Appeal No. 1231 of 2007 to support his submissions and request to reduce the sentence. 10. In view of the said submission by learned counsel for the appellant, it would not be necessary to scrutinize, analyze, evaluate and reappreciate and discuss entire evidence in light of which learned Court has recorded conviction for the offence under the aforesaid provisions. 11. However, even to consider the submission and request by learned advocate for the appellant it would be appropriate to take into account some of the relevant facts and evidence. Thus, I have considered the submissions by learned advocates and I have also considered the evidence on record. So as to consider the submission by learned advocate for the appellant and his request, it is appropriate to examine the evidence. 11.1 The prosecution has examined two doctors i.e. PW No. 1 and PW No. 2 as witnesses which are recorded at Exh.11 and Exh. 18. So as to consider the submission by learned advocate for the appellant and his request, it is appropriate to examine the evidence. 11.1 The prosecution has examined two doctors i.e. PW No. 1 and PW No. 2 as witnesses which are recorded at Exh.11 and Exh. 18. The PW No. 1 - the doctor who first examined the victim, has stated in his evidence that he had asked the history to the victim and she had specifically said that while her aunt (i.e. the accused No. 1) was going to her farm she stopped - by her and had asked her (the victim) to accompany her and when she and her aunt reached the farm, accused No. 2 was already present in the farm and her aunt with whom she (i.e. the victim) had gone to the farm told her to sit with the accused No. 2 for sometime and she (i.e. the aunt-accused No. 1) will be back within short time and that after her aunt left her with the accused No. 2, the accused No. 2 pushed her on the cot and pressed a piece of cloth in her mouth and took out a knife and threatened her with dire consequences and thereafter removed her clothes and committed rape. 11.2 The PW No. 1 - doctor is an independent witness. From the deposition by PW-1, it comes out that he had examined the victim girl on 2.6.2011. The PW No. 1, doctor, who first examined the victim, has, in the certificate issued by him, mentioned the details/history given by the victim and has also mentioned that when he examined the victim, there were no external injury marks on victim's body, however, her hymen was not intact and he could conduct two finger test. The PW-1 has mentioned in his evidence that he had taken blood sample, saliva, pubic hair, nail vaginal swab and handed over the samples to Chotila Police Station and then he referred her to gynecologist at Rajkot Hospital. He had issued certificate (which is admitted on record at Exh. 12). 11.3 The PW-1 also examined the accused. The PW-1 has mentioned in his evidence that he had taken blood sample, saliva, pubic hair, nail vaginal swab and handed over the samples to Chotila Police Station and then he referred her to gynecologist at Rajkot Hospital. He had issued certificate (which is admitted on record at Exh. 12). 11.3 The PW-1 also examined the accused. In his deposition, PW-1 has mentioned that while he asked that the details/history of the incident to accused No. 2 he said that accused No. 1 had brought the victim girl to the farm and that he was present there and the accused No. 1 had left the victim girl in his company and thereafter he committed sexual intercourse with the victim. 11.4 The prosecution then examined PW No. 2, Dr. Priyanka Jogiya (Gynecologist) whose evidence is recorded below Exh. 18. She subsequently examined the victim, upon being referred by the doctor at CHC (PW No. 1). From the deposition of the prosecution of PW-2 it emerges that when asked about the case history, the victim girl had repeated the same facts which she had told before the doctor at CHC, i.e. before the PW-1. The PW-2 has also mentioned in her deposition that the victim girl informed her that after the incident, she had taken bath. 11.5 The PW-2 has also mentioned in her deposition that on physical examination of the victim girl any external marks of the injury were not seen and she found that the victim girl's hymen was ruptured. In the certificate issued by her, she has mentioned the history mentioned by the victim, and that victim's secondary sexual character was developed and one finger p/v could be done and hymenal tear at 7-8 o'clock position was present. She also mentioned in her certificate that "from all above findings and examination, it is concluded that possibility of sexual intercourse cannot be ruled out." 11.6 All pancha witnesses have been declared hostile. At Exh. 40 deposition of PW-9, i.e. father of the victim girl is recorded. In his deposition, father of the victim girl mentioned that since for couple of days his daughter looked depressed and dejected her mother and he had inquired as to what had happened and after his wife repeatedly asked her as to why she looked sad and why was she crying, their daughter, i.e. victim girl told them about the incident. In his deposition, father of the victim girl mentioned that since for couple of days his daughter looked depressed and dejected her mother and he had inquired as to what had happened and after his wife repeatedly asked her as to why she looked sad and why was she crying, their daughter, i.e. victim girl told them about the incident. In his deposition, PW-9 has tried to explain why complaint was filed after almost 20 days and how the complaint was filed in the Court of learned Magistrate. 11.7 The prosecution examined the victim as PW No. 10. Her deposition is recorded at Exh. 42. In her deposition, the victim girl has mentioned the details about the incident as to how her aunt had asked her to accompany her to the farm and when they reached the farm, accused No. 2 was also present and that accused No. 1 told her to sit there with accused No. 2 and wait for her and she would be back within short time and after the accused No. 1 left her with accused No. 2, the accused No. 2 pushed her to the cot and gagged her by pushing a piece of cloth in her mouth and then showed a knife and removed her clothes and told her not to tell anybody about the incident otherwise she will suffer dire consequences. The victim girl mentioned same details and facts which she had narrated before the doctor while mentioning the history of the incident to the doctor and she also mentioned in her deposition that after gaging her by showing knife the accused No. 2 forcibly committed sexual intercourse against her will and thereby committed rape. In her deposition, the victim girl has also mentioned that since she was threatened she was terribly shaken due to threats of accused No. 2, initially she had not informed anyone about the incident. In her cross-examination the victim girl admitted that before her clothes were handed over to the police but before that the cloths were washed. In her deposition, the victim girl has also mentioned that after few days, she was again obstructed on her way to the field by accused No. 2 and he demanded physical relation with her, however, she escaped from the grip of accused No. 2 and ran away and on reaching home, she told about the incident to her mother. In her deposition, the victim girl has also mentioned that after few days, she was again obstructed on her way to the field by accused No. 2 and he demanded physical relation with her, however, she escaped from the grip of accused No. 2 and ran away and on reaching home, she told about the incident to her mother. 11.8 The prosecution examined the victim's mother as PW No. 11. Her evidence is recorded at Exh. 43. Substantially her evidence is based on the details told by her daughter, i.e. the victim. So far as the details with regard to the incident is concerned, her evidence is similar to and corroborates the evidence of the victim's father. 12. This is the backdrop of facts and evidence. 13. As mentioned at the outset, learned counsel for the appellant declared, stated and stipulated that the appellant does not challenge judgment recording conviction and that therefore, it is not necessary to scrutinize, re-analyze, re-appreciate and discuss in detail the evidence in light of which the learned court has recorded judgment of conviction. 14. From the facts of the case and from the evidence available on record, it has emerged that the victim girl was subjected to sexual intercourse without her consent. In this context, it is relevant to consider the deposition by PW No. 1 - the Doctor. 14.1 It has emerged from the evidence of the doctor PW No. 1 who examined the victim as well as the appellant that when, at the time of examining the appellant he had asked the facts about the incident (i.e. the history), the appellant himself had mentioned that he had entered into sexual relation with the victim and had committed sexual intercourse with her. 14.2 On this count, it is also relevant to mention that at the stage of recording further statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court had brought to the notice of the appellant - accused all incriminating facts, evidence and other material on record and requisite opportunity was offered to the appellant and the Court had asked the appellant - accused for his explanation and whether he wanted to lead any evidence on that count. However, the appellant - accused did not offer any reply or explanation, except making simple denial. However, the appellant - accused did not offer any reply or explanation, except making simple denial. 14.3 It has also emerged from the record that different and contradictory stand - defence was raised by the appellant before the learned trial Court inasmuch as at one stage it was claimed that there was love affair between the appellant and the victim. The victim girl was even put such suggestions/questions during her evidence - deposition which she specifically denied during her deposition (cross-examination). 14.4 In the same breath, the defence/appellant also raised contention on the ground that the relations between the family of the appellant and the victim girl were strained on account of land dispute and the appellant was falsely involved in the case by the victim's family. Thereafter, during the hearing of this Appeal again the defence on the ground that the victim and the appellant had love affair is repeated. 15. Besides this, one of the most important aspect is the medical evidence i.e. evidence by PW No. 1 doctor who examined the victim girl as well as the appellant wherein the PW No. 1 mentioned the facts/details or the history told by the accused No. 2 i.e. appellant. Second important aspect is the evidence by PW No. 2 i.e. the gynecologist who examined the appellant. The deposition by the Doctors coupled with the certificates issued by the Doctors i.e. PW No. 1 and P.W. No. 2 wherein the PW No. 2 (gynecologist) also mentioned that sexual intercourse is not ruled out. 15.1 The said medical evidence and forensic evidence corroborates the evidence of the victim that she was subjected to sexual intercourse. 15.2 The report clarified that from sample No. A1 [the dress (kurta) of the victim] presence of semen was found and from sample No. E (vaginal swab) presence of blood and semen were found and from sample No. A2 (pyajama of victim's dress) presence of blood was found and from sample No. M5 and M6 (vaginal slide and survical slide) presence of blood and semen was found, which established that the victim girl was subjected to sexual intercourse. It is relevant that the FSL test report/serology report mentioned that the group of semen found on sample A1 is 'B' i.e. same as that of the appellant. It is relevant that the FSL test report/serology report mentioned that the group of semen found on sample A1 is 'B' i.e. same as that of the appellant. 15.3 The learned trial Court has rejected the contention (on behalf of the accused - present appellant) that since any marks or sign of external injury were not found on victim's body the prosecution's case that the victim was forcibly subjected to sexual intercourse does not deserve to be accepted. The said submission for the appellant is not sustainable and is rightly rejected by the learned trial Court. 15.4 Besides this, merely because any external injuries or marks were not found on victim's body, it cannot be said that the learned trial Court ought to have rejected prosecution's case and it committed error in rejecting the said contention. 15.5 It is pertinent to recall that the victim girls has mentioned that at knife point she was pushed to the cot-bedstead and forcible act was committed at knife point. In such circumstances, there may not have been such physical resistance by minor girl which may cause external injuries. In this context, it is appropriate to take into consideration observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Krishan v. State of Haryana (2014) 13 SCC 574 , where the Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that:-- "13...He also submitted that the Courts below have erred in relying on the statement of prosecutrix that the appellant pushed her twice, gagged her mouth and dragged her holding both hands on the dry field of the Arhar and forcibly committed rape. He submitted that when such a forcible assault is committed on a girl, one would expect some sort of injury on any part of her body, but the prosecution story is totally concocted as it is unbelievable that in spite of all the alleged forcible rape, the victim did not sustain any injury and it is evident from her Medical Report that there was no external mark of injury anywhere on her body. 17....It is not expected that every rape victim should have injuries on her body to prove her case. 17....It is not expected that every rape victim should have injuries on her body to prove her case. The findings of the medical experts clearly established that there was a rape committed against the victim." 15.6 Thus, merely because any external injury marks are not seen - found, the victim's evidence does not become worthless and cannot be discarded more so when the Doctor who examined the victim have found that hymen was ruptured and they did not rule out forcible sexual intercourse. 15.7 In this context, it will be appropriate to refer to the observation by Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision in case of Gurcharan Singh v. State of Haryana 1972 (2) SCC 749 where Hon'ble Apex Court has, in paragraph No. 8 of the judgment observed, inter alia, that, "absence of violent or stiff resistance in the present case may as well suggest, helpless surrender to the inevitable due to sheer timidity. Hon'ble Apex Court observed in the said decision that:-- "[8] The counsel has then contended that there was no question of the commission of rape in this case and for that purpose he has tried to seek support from the medical evidence. We consider it unnecessary to deal at length with this argument, which, in face of the medical evidence and the statement of the prosecutrix, does not seem to possess any merit, 'Me suggestion that, there being no marks of violence on the private parts or elsewhere on the person of the prosecutrix, there could be no offence of rape on her, is wholly misconceived. Rape has been defined in S.375, I.P.C., according to which a man is said to commit "rape", who, except in the cases therein excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the five descriptions stated therein. We need not deal with all the descriptions. Suffice it to point out that where a person on whom rape is committed is under 16 years of age, even consent is immaterial (vide fifthly of s. 375) and penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape (vide : explanation to S.375). No attempt has been made on behalf of the appellant to take his case out of these provisions. No attempt has been made on behalf of the appellant to take his case out of these provisions. No other argument was addressed on the basis of the medical evidence for contending that there was no penetration except, as already noted, that there were no marks of violence on the person of the prosecutrix. That is clearly immaterial 'because that would merely suggest want of violent resistance on the part of the prosecutrix, which is wholly Inconsequential when the prosecutrix is under 16 years of age. Absence of violent or stiff resistance in the present case may as well suggest, helpless surrender to the inevitable due to sheer timidity. In any event her consent would not take the case out of the definition of rape. So far as the age of the prosecutrix is concerned, it is noteworthy that in the High Court her age was not questioned at least by the counsel appearing for Dalip Singh as expressly noticed in the impugned judgment. Even on behalf of Gurcharan Singh, appellant, we do not find any challenge to the age of the prosecutrix in the High Court. In any event the High Court considered the evidence on the point and believing the testimony of Tilak Raj (P.W. 8), who is the head master of the school in which the prosecutrix had been studying, and the evidence of the mother of the prosecutrix, came to the conclusion that her date of birth- was April 10, 1952 and, therefore, she was less than 16 years of age on the date of the occurrence. This conclusion is unquestionable." 15.8 On this count, it is also appropriate to refer to Section 114-A of the Evidence Act, which reads thus:-- "114A. This conclusion is unquestionable." 15.8 On this count, it is also appropriate to refer to Section 114-A of the Evidence Act, which reads thus:-- "114A. Presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecution for rape.--In a prosecution for rape under Clause (a), Clause (b), Clause (c), Clause (d), Clause (e), Clause (f), Clause (g), Clause (h), Clause (i), Clause (j), Clause (k), Clause (l), Clause (m) or Clause (n) of Sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and such woman states in her evidence before the Court that she did not consent, the Court shall presume that she did not consent." 15.9 The said provision prescribes that when sexual intercourse is proved and the case falls under sub-section(2) of Section 376, then, Court shall presume that the act was without victim's consent. In present case, the doctors who examined the victim have said that forcible sexual intercourse with the victim is not ruled out since hymen is raptured. FSL report also indicates marks of semen and blood on the clothes. Thus, the learned trial Court has recorded conclusion that sexual intercourse is proved. In this view of the matter, Section 114-A will be attracted in the facts of this case. In light of the said provision, there is no ground to disturb the findings by learned trial Court. 15.10 Moreover, in case of sexual abuse/rape, the Court has to be conscious about the difference/distinction between the consent and submission and that every consent may involve submission, but converse is not always true. The victim cannot be put at par with accomplish and cannot be considered accomplish in the act of sexual intercourse against the will of the girl. 15.11 The victim girl, a 151/2 years old minor, had no reason or justification to make any incorrect allegation or statement of such nature against the accused No. 1 and/or accused No. 2, much less about forcible sexual intercourse with her. 15.11 The victim girl, a 151/2 years old minor, had no reason or justification to make any incorrect allegation or statement of such nature against the accused No. 1 and/or accused No. 2, much less about forcible sexual intercourse with her. Besides this, considering the fact related to the victim's age and her marriage prospects even the family and/or the victim herself would not come forward with false allegation of such nature and that too against her uncle which would not only affect and tarnish the name and honour of the family but would also affect the girl's marriage prospects. Moreover, in present case, the doctors have found that the girl was subjected to sexual intercourse and her hymen was ruptured and that sexual intercourse is not ruled out. From the FSL and serology report, it has emerged that stains/presence of blood and semen was found on sample - A2 (victim's pyjama) and presence/stains of blood was found from sample - M5 and M6 (vaginal slide and survical slide). In light of such evidence, the conclusion that the minor girl was subjected to sexual intercourse, cannot be faulted. 15.12 Before stipulating that the appellant does not challenge conviction and restricts the challenge qua sentence, the learned counsel had urged that there are some differences or contradictions in victim's deposition. Therefore, it would be appropriate to also consider that submission, though conviction is not challenged. It is claimed that there are certain contradictions in her evidence vis-à-vis the complaint and it is claimed that the complaint was filed after long delay. The said submissions are required to be considered in light of the fact that as the girl was minor - under 16 years of age and she was dependent - in the matter of taking decision as to whether to file complaint against their relative or not on her parents. She was obliged to follow her parents' decision. Moreover, it has also come on record from the deposition of victim's father that initially, police had not recorded the complaint - FIR, then, the complaint was filed in the Court by father of the victim. The delay caused in filing complaint is, thus, explained. She was obliged to follow her parents' decision. Moreover, it has also come on record from the deposition of victim's father that initially, police had not recorded the complaint - FIR, then, the complaint was filed in the Court by father of the victim. The delay caused in filing complaint is, thus, explained. Further, merely because there are some difference in the details mentioned in the complaint/FIR and the victim's deposition (examination-in-chief or cross-examination) before the learned trial Court, entire evidence of the victim - which has support and corroboration in form of evidence of two doctors and FSL report - cannot be dismissed or rejected or discarded or thrown out. On overall examination of the deposition/evidence of the victim, the conclusion by the learned trial Court that the said evidence does not create doubt and is not unworthy of reliance cannot be faulted. Besides this, proceeding on the premise that there is some difference or variation in the deposition of the victim which the appellant claims or brands as contradictory, then also, the question which would arise is as to whether such difference or variation or contradiction is such which renders entire evidence of the victim unacceptable. Minor difference or contradictions can be eschewed if overall and substantial testimony by the victim is found reliable and when the victim's testimony is such which inspires confidence and does not create doubt. In such circumstance, victim's testimony can be considered even in absence of corroborating evidence. 15.13 The learned trial Court has relied on the testimony of the victim, therefore, it would be appropriate to refer to the observation by Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision in case of State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain (1990) 1 SCC 550 . In the said decision, Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that:-- "16. A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. We have, therefore, no doubt in our minds that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix who does not lack understanding must be accept- ed. The degree of proof required must not be higher than is expected of an injured witness. For the above reasons we think that exception has rightly been taken to the approach of the High Court as is reflected in the following passage: "It is only in the rarest of rare cases if the Court finds that the testimony of the prosecutrix is so trustworthy, truthful and reliable that other corroboration may not be necessary." With respect, the law is not correctly stated. If we may say so, it is just the reverse. If we may say so, it is just the reverse. Ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix must carry the same weight as is attached to an injured person who is a victim of violence, unless there are special circumstances which call for greater caution, in which case it would be safe to act on her testimony if there is independent evidence lending assurance to her accusation. 17. We think it proper, having regard to the increase in the number of sex-violation cases in the recent past, particularly cases of molestation and rape in custody, to remove the notion, if it persists, that the testimony of a woman who is a victim of sexual violence must ordinarily be corroborated in material particulars except in the rarest of rare cases. To insist on corroboration except in the rarest of rare cases is to equate a woman who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that her story of woe will not be believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars as in the case of an accomplice to a crime. Ours is a conservative society where it concerns sexual behaviour. Ours is not a permissive society as in some of the Western and European countries. Our standard of decency and morality in public life is not the same as in those countries. It is, however, unfortunate that respect for womanhood in our country is on the decline and cases of molestation and rape are steadily growing. An Indian woman is now required to suffer indignities in different forms, from lewd remarks to eve-teasing, from molestation to rape. Decency and morality in public life can be promoted and protected only if we deal strictly with those who violate the societal norms. The standard of proof to be expected by the Court in such cases must take into account the fact that such crimes are generally committed on the sly and very rarely direct evidence of a person other than the prosecutrix is available. Courts must also realise that ordinarily a woman, more so a young girl, will not stake her reputation by levelling a false charge concerning her chastity." 15.14 In the decision in case of State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors. Courts must also realise that ordinarily a woman, more so a young girl, will not stake her reputation by levelling a false charge concerning her chastity." 15.14 In the decision in case of State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors. (1996) 2 SCC 384 ], Hon'ble Apex Court observed, in paragraph No. 8, inter alia, that:-- "8.....The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the Courts should not over-look. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl of a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The Court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost at par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost at par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another persons's lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable..... " 15.15 In the decision in case of Bharwada Boginbhai Harjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 ], Hon'ble Apex Court has observed, inter alia, that:-- "10.....Without the fear of making too wide a statements or of overstating the case, it can be said that rarely will a girl or a woman in India make false allegations of sexual assault on account of any such factor as has been just enlisted. The statement is generally true in the context of the urban as also rural Society. It is also by and large true in the context of the sophisticated, not so sophisticated, and unsophisticated society. Only very rarely can one conceivably come across an exception or two and that too possibly from amongst the urban elites. The statement is generally true in the context of the urban as also rural Society. It is also by and large true in the context of the sophisticated, not so sophisticated, and unsophisticated society. Only very rarely can one conceivably come across an exception or two and that too possibly from amongst the urban elites. Because: (1) A girl or a woman in the tradition bound non- permissive Society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. (2) She would be conscious of the danger of being ostracised by the Society or being looked down by the Society including by her own family members, relatives, friends and neighbours. (3) She would have to brave the whole world. (4) She would face the risk of losing the love and respect of her own husband and near relatives, and of her matrimonial home and happiness being shattered. (S) If she is unmarried, she would apprehend that it would be difficult to secure an alliance with a suitable match from a respectable or an acceptable family. (6) It would almost inevitably and almost invariably result in mental torture and suffering to herself. (7) The fear of being taunted by others will always haunt her. (8) She would feel extremely embarrassed in relating the incident to others being over powered by a feeling of shame on account of the upbringing in a tradition bound society where by and large sex is taboo. (9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family name and family honour is brought into controversy. (10) The parents of an unmarried girl as also the husband and members of the husband's family of a married woman would also more often than not, want to avoid publicity on account of the fear of social stigma on the family name and family honour. (11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to be promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of her innocence. (12) The reluctance to face interrogation by the investigating agency, to face the court, to face the cross examination by Counsel for the culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent. 11. (11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to be promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of her innocence. (12) The reluctance to face interrogation by the investigating agency, to face the court, to face the cross examination by Counsel for the culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent. 11. In view of these factors the victims and their relatives are not too keen to bring the culprit to books. And when in the face of these factors the crime is brought to light there is a built-in assurance that the charge is genuine rather than fabricated. On principle the evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands on par with evidence of an injured witness. Just as a witness who has sustained an injury (which is not shown or believed to be self inflicted) is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of a sex-offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. And while corroboration in the form of eye witness account of an independent witness may often be forthcoming in physical assault cases, such evidence cannot be expected in sex offences, having regard to the very nature of the offence. It would therefore be adding insult to injury to insist on corroboration drawing inspiration from the rules devised by the courts in the Western World. Obeisance to which has perhaps become a habit presumably on account of the colonial hangover. We are therefore of the opinion that if the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity, and the probabilities-factors does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general 291 rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from the medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming, subject to the following qualification: Corroboration may be insisted upon when a woman having attained majority is found in a compromising position and there is a likelihood of her having levelled such an accusation on account of the instinct of self-preservation. Or when the 'probabilities-factor' is found to be out of tune." 15.16 In the context of the said suggestion and submission, it is relevant to keep in focus that even if the contention on ground of absence of resistance and/or consent and/or affair is taken into account, then also, in light of the minor age of the victim - whose age, at the relevant time, was 15 years 10 months, such submission is immaterial and does not help the appellant. The conclusion by learned trial Court cannot be faulted. 16. So far as the age of the victim is concerned, the prosecution has examined Principal of the school who issued School Leaving Certificate. The Principal produced relevant original record. The Principal also mentioned in his evidence that School Leaving Certificate was issued on 19.7.2005 and the School Leaving Certificate was prepared on the basis of the details recorded in the school register and according to the details, the birth date of the victim girl is 1.6.1995. The Principal also mentioned that the details in the school record was recorded on the basis of certificate issued by other school where the victim studied earlier. On this count, it is relevant to mention that the gynecologist - PW No. 2 has mentioned in her evidence that she relied on the school leaving certificate. She had examined school leaving certificate and she found that the details regarding victim's age recorded in the certificate was proper and therefore, she did not consider it necessary to call for opinion of the Radiologist. 16.1 Having regard to the date of incident and date of birth mentioned in the school leaving certificate, learned trial Court calculated the victim's age at the relevant time as 15 years, 10 months and 16 days. 16.2 In present case, learned trial Court has relied on the school leaving certificate. The said decision of the learned trial Court viz. to rely on the school leaving certificate for ascertaining the age of the victim cannot be faulted and does not warrant interference. 16.3 In this context, profitable reference may be made to the decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Jarnailsingh v. State of Haryana [ 2013 (7) SCC 263 ]. In the said decision Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the issue related to determination of minor's age. 16.3 In this context, profitable reference may be made to the decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Jarnailsingh v. State of Haryana [ 2013 (7) SCC 263 ]. In the said decision Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the issue related to determination of minor's age. With reference to the said issue Apex Court considered the provision under Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2000 as well as Rules framed thereunder viz. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules 2007, more particularly Rule 12 thereof. 16.4 The said issue was considered in a case where the victim of the crime was subjected to kidnapping and gang rape. The Apex Court, in the said decision observed that the procedure prescribed under Rule 12 of the aforesaid 2007 Rules can be availed for the purpose of determining ascertaining the age of the victim of rape. The relevant part of the observation in said decision read thus:-- "22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000..... 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the victim VW-PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion. 24. Following the scheme of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, it is apparent that the age of the victim VW-PW6 could not be determined on the basis of the matriculation (or equivalent) certificate as she had herself deposed, that she had studied up to class 3 only, and thereafter, had left her school and had started to do household work. The prosecution in the facts and circumstances of this case, had endeavoured to establish the age of the victim VW-PW6, on the next available basis, in the sequence of options expressed in Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules. The prosecution produced Satpal (PW4), to prove the age of the victim VW-PW6. Satpal (PW4) was the Head Master of the Government High School, Jathlana, where the victim VW-PW6 had studied upto class 3. The prosecution produced Satpal (PW4), to prove the age of the victim VW-PW6. Satpal (PW4) was the Head Master of the Government High School, Jathlana, where the victim VW-PW6 had studied upto class 3. Satpal (PW4) had proved the certificate Exhibit-PG, as having been made on the basis of the school records indicating, that the victim VW-PW6, was born on 15.5.1977. In the scheme contemplated under Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules, it is not permissible to determine age in any other manner, and certainly not on the basis of an option mentioned in a subsequent clause. We are therefore of the view, that the High Court was fully justified in relying on the aforesaid basis for establishing the age of the victim VW-PW6. It would also be relevant to mention, that under the scheme of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, it would have been improper for the High Court to rely on any other material including the ossification test, for determining the age of the victim VW-PW6. The deposition of Satpal-PW4 has not been contested. Therefore, the date of birth of the victim VW-PW6 (indicated in Exhibit P.G. as 15.7.1977) assumes finality. Accordingly it is clear, that the victim VW-PW6, was less than 15 years old on the date of occurrence, i.e., on 25.3.1993. In the said view of the matter, there is no room for any doubt that the victim VW-PW6 was a minor on the date of occurrence. Accordingly, we hereby endorse the conclusions recorded by the High Court, that even if the victim VW-PW6 had accompanied the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh of her own free will, and had had consensual sex with him, the same would have been clearly inconsequential, as she was a minor." 16.5 Thereafter, recently in case of State of M.P. v. Anoopsingh 2015 7 SCC 773 , Hon'ble Apex Court again considered issue about appropriate evidence/document which may be relied on while determining the issue related to age of minor victim. In the said recent decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of M.P. (supra) Hon'ble Apex Court has observed, inter alia, that:-- "13. In the present case, the central question is whether the victim was below 16 years of age at the time of the incident. The prosecution in support of their case adduced two certificates, which were the birth certificate and the middle school certificate. In the present case, the central question is whether the victim was below 16 years of age at the time of the incident. The prosecution in support of their case adduced two certificates, which were the birth certificate and the middle school certificate. The date of birth of the victim has been shown as 29.08.1987 in the Birth Certificate (Ext. P/5), while the date of birth is shown as 27.08.1987 in the Middle School Examination Certificate. There is a difference of just two days in the dates mentioned in the abovementioned Exhibits. The Trial Court has rightly observed that the birth certificate Ext. P/5 clearly shows that the registration regarding the birth was made on 30.10.1987 and keeping in view the fact that registration was made within 2 months of the birth, it could not be guessed that the victim was shown as under-aged in view of the possibility of the incident in question. We are of the view that the discrepancy of two days in the two documents adduced by the prosecution is immaterial and the High Court was wrong in presuming that the documents could not be relied upon in determining the age of the victim. 14. This Court in the case of Mahadeo S/o. Kerba Maske v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2013) 14 SCC 637, has held that Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, is applicable in determining the age of the victim of rape..... 15. This Court further held in paragraph 12 of Mahadeo S/o. Kerba Maske (supra) as under: Under rule 12(3)(b), it is specifically provided that only in the absence of alternative methods described under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii), the medical opinion can be sought for. In the light of such a statutory rule prevailing for ascertainment of the age of the juvenile in our considered opinion, the same yardstick can be rightly followed by the courts for the purpose of the ascertaining the age of a victim as well. (Emphasis supplied) This Court therefore relied on the certificates issued by the school in determining the age of the victim. In paragraph 13, this Court observed: 13. (Emphasis supplied) This Court therefore relied on the certificates issued by the school in determining the age of the victim. In paragraph 13, this Court observed: 13. In light of our above reasoning, in the case on hand, there were certificates issued by the school in which the prosecutrix did her V standard and in the school leaving certificate issued by the school under Exhibit 54, the date of birth has been clearly noted as 20.05.1990 and this document was also proved by PW 11. Apart from that the transfer certificate as well as the admission form maintained by the Primary School, Latur, where the victim had her initial education, also confirmed the date of birth as 20.05.1990. the reliance placed upon the said evidence by the Courts below to arrive at the age of the victim to hold that the victim was below 18 years of age at the time of occurrence was perfectly justified and we do not find any grounds to interfere with the same. 17. The High Court also relied on the statement of PW-11 Dr. A.K. Saraf who took the X-ray of the victim and on the basis of the ossification test, came to the conclusion that the age of the victim was more than 15 years but less than 18 years. Considering this the High Court presumed that the girl was more than 18 years of age at the time of the incident. With respect to this finding of the High Court, we are of the opinion that the High Court should have relied firstly on the documents as stipulated under Rule 12(3)(b) and only in the absence, the medical opinion should have been sought. We find that the Trial Court has also dealt with this aspect of the ossification test. The Trial Court noted that the respondent had cited Lakhan Lal v. State of M.P., 2004 Cri.L.J. 3962, wherein the High Court of Madhya Pradesh said that where the doctor having examined the victim and found her to be below 181/2 years, then keeping in mind the variation of two years, the accused should be given the benefit of doubt. The Trial Court noted that the respondent had cited Lakhan Lal v. State of M.P., 2004 Cri.L.J. 3962, wherein the High Court of Madhya Pradesh said that where the doctor having examined the victim and found her to be below 181/2 years, then keeping in mind the variation of two years, the accused should be given the benefit of doubt. Thereafter, the Trial Court rightly held that in the present case the ossification test is not the sole criteria for determination of the date of birth of the victim as her certificate of birth and also the certificate of her medical examination had been enclosed." 16.6 In light of the said decisions and observations by Hon'ble Apex Court, there is no reason or justification to not accept or to upset the learned trial Court's decision with regard to the age of the victim and the learned trial Court has not committed any error in holding that at the material point of time, the age of the victim girl was under 16 years. 17. In present case, below mentioned facts have emerged. "[a] the victim is a minor girl, who was under 16 years of age at the relevant time (15 years and 8 months); [b] the accused/culprit happened to be her uncle; [c] while mentioning history of the incident before the doctor (who examined the accused) the accused - appellant himself mentioned that he had entered into sexual intercourse with the victim; [d] while recording his further statement under Section 313, the Court had put the appellant to notice about all incriminating material and evidence on record, including the deposition of the doctor, who examined the appellant wherein he (the doctor) deposed that while mentioning the history of the incident, the appellant had said that he had entered into sexual intercourse with the victim, however, the appellant did not offer any reply or explanation during his further statement under Section 313 of the Code except simple denial. [e] at one point, during the trial, the appellant raised plea of love affair with the victim, suggesting or implying that the sexual intercourse with the victim was committed in view of love affair between them, i.e. with consent; [f] another point the appellant raised is plea of strained relation with the family of the victim; [g] during hearing of present appeal, the appellant - accused again urged ground of love affair. Thus, differing or contradicting stand is adopted by appellant. Having regard to the age of the victim, the suggested love affair and the suggestion about consent are immaterial. [h] the PW No. 1 - Doctor and PW No. 2 - Gynecologist have said that victim's hymen was ruptured and that sexual intercourse could not be ruled out, though any external injuries were not noticed on physical examination of the victim. [i] the FSL/serology report lends support and corroboration to the deposition/evidence by the victim. [j] In this factual backdrop, even if the deference or variation (which are branded as contradictions by the appellant) between the complaint and the deposition of the victim are taken into account, they cannot be considered to be material or of substantial nature and effect to cast doubt on the victim's deposition/evidence which derives support and corroboration from other evidence." 18. When these aspects are taken into account, then, it emerges that the reasons, findings and the conclusions recorded by the learned trial Court are based on material on record and cannot be faulted. The learned trial Court is right and justified in concluding that the prosecution has established commission of offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and the learned trial Court is also right and justified in holding the appellant guilty for the said offence. This Court is in agreement with the final conclusion recorded by the learned trial Court. 19. This leaves behind the issue related to sentence. Having regard to the age of the victim and the provision under sub-section (2) of Section 376 of Indian Penal Code the learned trial Court has imposed minimum sentence applicable in case where section 376(2) of Indian Penal Code is attracted. As regards the sentence, it is relevant to recall that (a) the victim girl was minor at the relevant time and she was subjected to forcible rape, (b) the accused is uncle of the minor which makes the offence by accused No. 1 more grave, (c) the accused No. 1 - uncle of the victim committed offence by threatening the minor girl at knife point, and (d) after few days the accused again attempted to force the victim girl for physical relationship by making indecent demand, (e) the learned trial Court has imposed minimum sentence prescribed under sub-section (2) of Section 376 of Indian Penal Code. It is needless to mention that in view of the facts of this case, the offence falls within purview of Section 376(2)(f) and (i) of Indian Penal Code. Thus, there is no justification to reduce the sentence. 20. In light of the above mentioned facts, this Court finds no justification to interfere with the sentence ordered by learned trial Court i.e. to reduce the sentence or to impose sentence less than prescribed for the offence falling within purview of sub-section (2) of Section 376. 21. In this background of evidence and material on record and after evaluating and assessing diverse aspects of the case, the learned counsel for the appellant, as mentioned earlier, submitted that the appellant does not challenge the conviction and the appeal is not pressed on the count of conviction recorded by the learned trial Court and this appeal is pressed only qua the quantum of sentence. In this context, it is pertinent that at the relevant time the victim was minor and her age was 15 years, 10 months and 16 days i.e. less than 16 years. Having regard to the said fact, the learned trial Court has sentenced the appellant to undergo RI for 10 years. In this view of the matter, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision dated 12.9.2011 in case of Dinesh alias Dinu A. Chunara (Koli) v. State of Gujarat [Criminal Appeal No. 1231 of 2007]. 22. However, the said decision is of no assistance to the appellant since it rests on different set of facts and circumstances than the facts of present case. In the cited decision, age of the victim girl was more than 16 years (i.e. 16 years and 11 months) and according to the facts of cited decision, it was established that the accused - appellant and the victim girl had moved together to different place for period of about 2 months. Therefore, the view taken by the Division Bench in the said decision and the final directions issued by the Division Bench while partly modifying the decision of the learned trial Court, are of no assistance to the appellant in present case. 23. The learned trial Court has after considering and evaluating entire material on record found the appellant No. 2 guilty and has recorded conviction against him for the offence punishable under Section 376 of Indian Penal Code. 23. The learned trial Court has after considering and evaluating entire material on record found the appellant No. 2 guilty and has recorded conviction against him for the offence punishable under Section 376 of Indian Penal Code. The learned trial Court has mainly relied on the evidence by the Doctors i.e. PW No. 1 and PW No. 2 and Exh. 12 and 13 issued by PW No. 1 and Exh. 19 and 20 issued by PW No. 2. The learned trial Court has also relied on Exh. 40, 55, 56 and 57 so far as the controversy as to victim's age is concerned. The learned trial Court has also relied on Exh. 61 and 70 i.e. the FSL and serology report. The learned trial Court has considered the evidence on record and analyzed the evidence at length and in detail. After due and proper analysis and appreciation of evidence, documentary as well as oral, learned trial Court has reached to the conclusion that the physical relation and sexual intercourse are established. Any evidence to support and justify the explanation given by the accused in his statement under section 313 that the relations between two families were strained is not proved and that there is nothing on record to believe that merely because the relations between two families were strained, minor girl, about 15 years old, would make such incorrect allegations against her own uncle. Further, contradicting or opposite or multiple plea or explanation raised by the appellant do not provide any ground to doubt or discard evidence of the victim. In light of such evidence, the learned trial Court recorded conclusions and findings against the accused - appellant. In this view of the matter, the findings by the learned trial Court do not warrant interference. 24. Upon appreciation of evidence available on record and upon consideration and examination of the judgment impugned in present petition, any material or substantial error is not found. This Court is in agreement with the conclusions reached and recorded by the learned trial Court. For the foregoing reasons, this court agrees with the decision by learned trial Court and confirms the conviction of the appellant as well as the sentence awarded by the learned trial Court by impugned judgment. There is no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and this Court does not find any substance in the appeal. For the foregoing reasons, this court agrees with the decision by learned trial Court and confirms the conviction of the appellant as well as the sentence awarded by the learned trial Court by impugned judgment. There is no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and this Court does not find any substance in the appeal. The judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court is hereby confirmed. The appeal is dismissed. The Court is informed that the appellant is in jail. Therefore, any order is not required to be made. In the circumstances, present appeal deserves to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed. The Record & Proceedings be sent back to the learned trial Court forthwith.