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2015 DIGILAW 110 (JHR)

Steel Authority of India Limited v. Union of India

2015-01-27

SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR

body2015
ORDER : Seeking quashing of Reference Order dated 04.06.2012 under Section 10 (1)(d) and 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the present writ petition has been filed. A further prayer seeking a declaration that the Reference Order dated 04.06.2012 made by the Central Government is not maintainable as the dispute referred therein is not an industrial dispute within the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has been made. 2. The facts narrated in the writ petition are summarised thus; The petitioner Steel Authority of India Limited is a Government Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. The respondent was appointed as Construction Supervisor on 24.11.1970. He filed an application under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 seeking promotion in different grades and to the post of Executive. The said application was registered as Misc. Case No. 10 of 1986. An award dated 17.01.1991 was passed directing the Steel Authority of India Limited to promote the respondent to the post of Construction Supervisor GradeI with effect from 06.06.1977, Additional Divisional Engineer with effect from 21.06.1979, Divisional Engineer with effect from 17.02.1983 and Zonal Manager with effect from 30.06.1987. The award was challenged by the petitioner SAIL in C.W.J.C No. 1485 of 1991 which was quashed by the High Court vide judgment dated 08.09.1995. The respondent approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the appeal preferred by him was dismissed however, a direction was issued that the promotion granted to the respondent may not be interfered with and he may not be reverted to any lower post from the post to which he was already promoted. The respondent thereafter, filed an application under Section 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for computation of the benefits amounting to Rs.19,540/with interest at the rate of 12%. A prayer seeking refund of penal rent deducted during the period December, 1986 to April, 1989 was also made in the said case which was registered as M.J. Case No. 05 of 1989. The said M.J. Case No. 05 of 1989 was dismissed and the writ petition [WP (L) No. 318 of 2002] challenging the said order was also dismissed vide order dated 06.11.2007. The respondent opted for V.R.S. and received the benefits under the V.R.S. Scheme and accepted the separation order dated 27.03.2004. Accordingly, the respondent was released from service of the petitioner SAIL with effect from 31.03.2004. The respondent opted for V.R.S. and received the benefits under the V.R.S. Scheme and accepted the separation order dated 27.03.2004. Accordingly, the respondent was released from service of the petitioner SAIL with effect from 31.03.2004. About 8 years thereafter, the respondent raised a dispute which was referred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunalcum Labour Court No. 1, Dhanbad. Aggrieved, the present writ petition has been filed. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. Relying on decisions in “Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty and Others” reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 and in “Director Food and Supplies, Punjab and Another Vs. Gurmit Singh” reported in (2007) 5 SCC 727 , the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, a stale claim cannot be referred for adjudication to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. Since, the Labour Court would have no power and jurisdiction to invalidate the reference on the ground of delay, the only remedy to the petitioner is to approach this Court seeking quashing of reference order dated 04.06.2012. 5. Before referring to the contention, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty and Others” and in “Director Food and Supplies, Punjab and Another Vs. Gurmit Singh” cases may usefully be noticed. In “Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty and Others” (supra) the workman who was working as a clerk with the Bank was proceeded in a disciplinary proceeding for misappropriation of a sum of Rs.1185/and for falsifying the books of the Bank. The workman admitted his guilt and prayed for mercy and after considering the circumstances of the case, he was dismissed from the service of the Bank. He filed an appeal which was also dismissed and thereafter, the workman received the benefits due to him under the Rules of the Bank. Seven years thereafter, the workman served a notice on the Bank alleging discrimination on the ground that two other similarly situated employees were reinstated in service however, he was dismissed from service. After a series of litigation, the Central Government made reference, “whether the action of the management of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. in dismissing Sri K. P. Madhavankutty from service with effect from 11.08.1972 is justified? If not, to what relief the workman concerned is entitled?” In these facts the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under. 6. After a series of litigation, the Central Government made reference, “whether the action of the management of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. in dismissing Sri K. P. Madhavankutty from service with effect from 11.08.1972 is justified? If not, to what relief the workman concerned is entitled?” In these facts the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under. 6. “Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent.” 7. From the above observation in Nedungadi Bank Ltd. case it is apparent that whether a claim has become stale or not, is a question of fact. In the said case the termination order attained finality after the appeal of the workman stood dismissed. The learned counsel for the petitioner in the present case has contended that in the present case there is delay of 8 years in making the reference whereas, in the Nedungadi Bank Ltd. case the delay was only 7 years and therefore, the subject matter under reference must be held stale. The learned counsel for the petitioner in the present case has contended that in the present case there is delay of 8 years in making the reference whereas, in the Nedungadi Bank Ltd. case the delay was only 7 years and therefore, the subject matter under reference must be held stale. I am unable to accept this contention. In the Nedungadi Bank Ltd. case a dispute was raised, 7 years after the appeal of the workman was dismissed. In the present case it has not been stated by the petitioner, when the respondent workman raised the dispute, that is, how many years after taking VRS the dispute in issue was raised by the workman. The learned counsel has calculated delay of 8 years between the date of VRS and the reference order. Moreover, I am of the opinion that length of delay is immaterial. The real test would be whether the workman kept the issue alive by raising dispute, making representation etc. The writ petition is completely silent on this aspect. 8. In “Director Food and Supplies, Punjab and Another Vs. Gurmit Singh” (supra) the workman who was working as Chowkidar on daily wages had raised a dispute with respect to his termination from service with effect from 25.08.1986. In the proceeding before the Labour Court a plea was taken that the appellant was not an industry and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 thus, was not applicable. An award was made directing reinstatement of the workman however, no finding as to applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was recorded by the Labour Court nor a finding was recorded on the plea taken by the appellant that the claim was made after 9 years without explaining the belated action. In the above facts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under; 10. “Apparently, the Labour Court had not considered the plea about no applicability of the ID Act. This was specifically pleaded. It is true that the Labour Court could not have declined to answer the reference. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the Labour Court as the case may be in dealing with an industrial dispute is limited. The point was mentioned in Section 10(4) of the ID Act in National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan[ (2000) 1 SCC 371 ]. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the Labour Court as the case may be in dealing with an industrial dispute is limited. The point was mentioned in Section 10(4) of the ID Act in National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan[ (2000) 1 SCC 371 ]. It was held that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is an allegation that there is no industrial dispute which could be the subject matter of reference for adjudication to the Tribunal under Section 10 of the ID Act. Thus the existence of the industrial dispute is a jurisdictional factor. Absence of jurisdictional fact results in invalidation of the reference. The Tribunal or the Labour Court under Section 10 gets jurisdiction to decide an industrial dispute only upon a reference by the appropriate Government.” 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed as under; 11. “The Tribunal or the Labour Court cannot invalidate the reference on the ground of delay. If the employer makes a grievance that the workman has made a stale claim then an employer can challenge the reference by way of a writ petition and contend that since the claim is belated there was no industrial dispute. The Tribunal or the Labour Court cannot strike down the reference on this ground. As observed in Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P. SEB [ (2001) 6 SCC 222 ] there are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval, it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanised by the workmen or the Union on account of other justified reasons it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. The long delay for making the adjudication could be considered by the adjudicating authority while moulding the reliefs. That is a different matter altogether.” 10. As noticed above, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court the main ground for assailing the award and the order of the High Court was that no finding was recorded with respect to no applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The observation made in paragraph no. That is a different matter altogether.” 10. As noticed above, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court the main ground for assailing the award and the order of the High Court was that no finding was recorded with respect to no applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The observation made in paragraph no. 11 that “if the employer makes a grievance that the workman has made a stale claim then the employer can challenge the reference by way of a writ petition and contend that since the claim is belated there was no industrial dispute”, has to be understood in the context of the facts of the case and observation in para 10 of the judgment and it cannot be read to mean that once the management raises grievance that the workman has made a stale claim, the writ petition must be entertained. The question whether a claim is stale or not is essentially a question of fact. Moreover a decision is an authority what it actually decides. In “Amrendra Pratap Singh Vs. Tej Bahadur Prajapati & Ors.”, reported in (2004) 10 SCC 65 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus, 28. “............A judicial decision is an authority for what it actually decides and not for what can be read into it by implication or by assigning an assumed intention to the judges, and inferring from it a proposition of law which the judges have not specifically laid down in the pronouncement..........” 11. In the present case the Central Government has made the following reference: “Whether the action of the management of Bokaro Steel Plant, SAIL in deducting penal rent for occupation of Q. No. VII 2255 w.e.f Dec. 1986 to October, 1990 from the wages of Shri C.P. Agarwal, Staff No. 075855 is proper and justified? And whether the action of the management of Bokaro Steel Plant, SAIL in allegedly wrong fixing the scales of the said workman from 21/6/1979 till the date of VRS is proper and justified? What relief the workman is entitled to? ” 12. From the decision in “C.P. Agarwal Vs. P.O Labour Court and Another” reported in (1996) 11 SCC 97 it is apparent that the respondent had approached the Labour Court under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 alleging that his service conditions were altered to his disadvantage while the Reference Case No. 39 of 1973 was pending. ” 12. From the decision in “C.P. Agarwal Vs. P.O Labour Court and Another” reported in (1996) 11 SCC 97 it is apparent that the respondent had approached the Labour Court under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 alleging that his service conditions were altered to his disadvantage while the Reference Case No. 39 of 1973 was pending. The Labour Court passed an award on 17.01.1991 granting promotion to the respondent to different posts with effect from different dates. It appears from the Reference Order dated 14.06.2012 that the workman raised a dispute with respect to wrong fixation of scale from 21.06.1979 till the date of VRS. The petitioner has contended that though the award dated 17.01.1991 was quashed by the High Court and the said order has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and thus, the respondent was not entitled for promotion as awarded by the Labour Court, however, in view of the fact that the respondent was already granted promotion in terms of award dated 17.01.1991, promotions granted to him were not interfered with. It is thus, contended that in view of decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in C.P. Agarwal Vs. P.O Labour court and Another”, (supra) no industrial disputes exists and the claim raised by the respondent is a stale claim. I do not find merit in the above contention. Even though it has been found that the respondent was not entitled for grant of promotion as ordered vide award dated 17.01.1991, once the promotion granted to the respondent was not interfered with, I am of the opinion that the respondent workman cannot be prevented from raising a dispute with respect to wrong fixation of his scale. Though, the order passed in M.J. Case No. 05 of 1989 and order dated 06.11.2007 of the High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the respondent challenging order passed in M.J. Case No. 05 of 1989 have not been brought on record, even if the plea with respect to deduction of penal rent for occupation of Qr. No. VIIA2255 is accepted to have been declined, the grievance with respect to wrong fixation of pay scale cannot be said to be a stale claim. In the writ petition nowhere it has been averred that before the Separation Order dated 27.03.2004 was passed, the workman never raised a dispute with respect to wrong fixation of his scale. No. VIIA2255 is accepted to have been declined, the grievance with respect to wrong fixation of pay scale cannot be said to be a stale claim. In the writ petition nowhere it has been averred that before the Separation Order dated 27.03.2004 was passed, the workman never raised a dispute with respect to wrong fixation of his scale. It has also not been stated in the writ petition whether after his release from service with effect from 31.03.2004, the respondent workman raised a grievance with respect to wrong fixation of his pay scale or not. The petitioner has already filed written statement before the Industrial Tribunal and it has also preferred an application raising preliminary objection as to maintainability of the reference. An objection has been raised in the written statement that the respondent is not a “workman” under Section 2 (s) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and therefore, the reference is not maintainable. In the written statement a plea has been taken that the scale of the respondent workman was not wrongly fixed rather it was fixed in terms of office order dated 17.02.1992. It is thus, apparent that a dispute has arisen between the parties. In the written statement the petitioner SAIL has not taken the plea as to a stale claim being referred by the Central Government vide reference order dated 04.06.2012. It has also not been averred in the written statement that the petitioner has raised the industrial dispute so belatedly that his right has extinguished and no industrial dispute remains. Only because the promotions granted vide Award dated 17.01.1991 have been held unsustainable, it cannot be said that the claim for grant of proper pay scale also stood denied by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and thus, there existed no industrial dispute when the reference was made. In the above facts I hold that the claim of the respondent workman is not stale. 12. In view of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition and accordingly, it is dismissed.