ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. Though respondents are served but unrepresented. 2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant questioned the correctness of the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 3938 of 2004 in upholding the judgment and decree of dismissal of Civil Suit No. 234 of 1995 filed by the plaintiff for declaration dated 13.06.1995, urging various legal contentions. 3. The grounds of attack with the said judgment and decree is that the High Court has failed to consider the case of the appellant that the impugned judgment sought to be declared as null and void as it was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation by the first defendant. The said plea was negatived by the courts below. Before the first Appellate Court, a plea was taken by the plaintiff(s) that non-registration of the decree obtained by the first defendant which is mandatorily required as provided under Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) has not been done and therefore the decree is vitiated in law. This legal contention is noted by the first Appellate Court at Paragraph 10 and the same is answered at Paragraphs 15 and 16 with reference to a finding that the decree was passed in favour of the first defendant in the earlier suit on the basis of a family settlement, therefore, the property could be settled on him. Further, the first Appellate court has observed that the necessity of having a remote chance of succession is held in a case of Shakuntla Yadav and Ors. vs. Yadvinder Singh and Ors., 1998 (2) PLJ 547 . After adverting to the said judgment, at paragraph 16, it has held that the ratio in the case of Lal Singh vs. Jaswant Singh, 2002 (2) RCR Civil 219, squarely covers the facts of the case as Madan Lal, defendant No. 1, got antecedent title in the suit property which was acknowledged and declared by way of the impugned judgment and decree. Such decree is exempted from registration by clause (vi) to sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. It is further held that the decision relied upon by the first defendant provided the requisite precedent to be followed in the case on hand. Such decree is exempted from registration by clause (vi) to sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. It is further held that the decision relied upon by the first defendant provided the requisite precedent to be followed in the case on hand. Therefore, the first Appellate Court did not accept the ratio laid down in Asha Rani vs. The Controller of Estate Duty case, 1997 (4) RCR (Civil) 210 upon which reliance is placed by the appellant's counsel holding that it is not applicable to the fact situation. In Asha Rani's case it is held that the concept of Joint Hindu Family is no requirement of family arrangement. By a reading of Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the impugned judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court, in our opinion, it has fell into an error in law in not appreciating the facts involved in the case and applying the ratio laid down by this Court in the case referred to supra to the fact situations. The fact situations are totally different upon the case on which reliance was placed by the first Appellate Court to the facts of the present case and the reasoning assigned by the first Appellate Court in its judgment stating that the family settlement is in favour of the first respondent-Madan Lal is the basis on which the decree is passed in favour of the first defendant is not legally correct. That the decree passed in favour of the first defendant was required to be compulsorily registrable under Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act that has not been admittedly done. This important legal aspect of the case has been omitted to be considered by the trial court and the first Appellate Court so also the High Court. The non-registration of a decree passed in favour of the first defendant is not valid in law. The reason given by the first Appellate Court in Paragraphs 15 and 16 of its judgment that the decree in favour of the first respondent is passed on the basis of a remote chance of succession in a family settlement, the property could be settled upon the defendant. The reason given by the first Appellate Court in Paragraphs 15 and 16 of its judgment that the decree in favour of the first respondent is passed on the basis of a remote chance of succession in a family settlement, the property could be settled upon the defendant. Necessity of his having a remote chance of succession as held in the case of Shakuntala Yadav (supra), on the basis of which much reliance is placed to hold that the decree passed in favour of the first respondent on the basis of a family settlement is not required to be registered is not correct. The second Appellate Court was required to examine this aspect of the case. As it is a substantial question of law which fell for consideration under Section 100 CPC, as could be seen, the impugned judgment passed by the High Court is simply concurred with the finding of fact concurred with by the first Appellate Court in its judgment in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and it had not adverted to the substantial question of law with respect to compulsory registration of a decree in favour of the first defendant and the consequences for non registration of a decree under Section 17(2)(vi) of the Act and the law laid down by this Court in the case of Bhoop Singh vs. Ram Singh Major & Ors., (1995) 5 SCC 709 is not applied to the case on hand, which rendered the impugned judgment and decree bad in law. 4. In view of the reasons stated supra, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree passed by the High Court and remand the matter to it with a request to reconsider the matter after framing the substantial questions of law that would arise for consideration and hear the parties and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. Since the matter is of 1995 we request the High Court to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible but not later than six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order. 5. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.