Judgment :- 1. The petition challenges the award dated 30.10.2010 passed by the Labour Court at Buldhana, in Reference No. 69 of 2004. The Reference Court has answered the reference in the affirmative and directed reinstatement of an employee with continuity in service and also full backwages. The Labour Court has recorded the finding that there was violation of Sections 25F and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act (in short "the I.D. Act), the termination has been effected by way of punishment without holding an enquiry. 2. The facts of the case are as under: The respondent was appointed initially by an order dated 23.11.1995 as an Assistant Store Keeper with effect from 01.12.1995 in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1500 purely on temporary basis for a period of 5 months, with a condition that the appointment is liable to be terminated even before expiry of the tenure of appointment without issuing any notice. The respondent-employee was required to execute an undertaking stating that the terms and conditions stated in the order of appointment shall be binding upon him. Thereafter, similar orders were issued to him from time to time, the second order being dated 16.05.1996 and the last order is dated 09.10.1996. The services of the respondent-employee were terminated by an order dated 17.12.1996 on the basis of the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Committee appointed for that purpose and accepted by the Principal of the College, by an order dated 16.12.1996. This was the subject matter of reference under Section 10(1)(C) of the I.D. Act to the Labour Court. The question referred to was regarding the validity of the termination of the respondent-employee from service. 3. Initially, by award dated 09.03.2005 delivered in Reference No. 60 of 2004, the Labour Court set aside the dismissal dated 17.12.1996 and directed reinstatement with continuity in service and full backwages. This was the subject matter of challenge before this Court in Writ Petition No. 6335 of 2005. During the pendency of this writ petition, the respondent-employee was held entitled to wages under Section 17B of the I.D Act to the extent of ?.1,75,000/-. The petitioner was also directed to deposit the amount and the respondent-employee has withdrawn total amount of Rs. 2,57,379/-. This was not the entire amount of backwages. During the pendency of this writ petition, the respondent-employee was held entitled to wages under Section 17B of the I.D Act to the extent of ?.1,75,000/-. The petitioner was also directed to deposit the amount and the respondent-employee has withdrawn total amount of Rs. 2,57,379/-. This was not the entire amount of backwages. This court by its judgment and order dated 13.01.2010, set aside the award passed by the Labour Court and remitted the matter back to the Labour Court to decide the question of delay and its impact on the ultimate relief to be granted to the respondent-employee in the reference. It was made clear in the said judgment that it is incumbent for the Labour Court to find out whether on 09.03.2005 it was open to it to grant reinstatement to the employee with full backwages or then the reinstatement could have been given at the most only till 15.03.1997. 4. Upon remand of the matter back, the Reference Court has permitted the parties to lead evidence and by impugned award dated 30.10.2010, it has been held that it was the employer who was responsible for the delay in reference and the respondent – employee cannot be punished for it. The Court has also held that there was violation of Sections 25F and 25G of the I.D. Act, no material documents forming the part of alleged fraud are produced before the Court to prove misconduct. 5. The first question which falls for consideration is whether it was a case of "retrenchment" within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, so as to attract the compliance of the provisions of Sections 25F and 25G of the I.D. Act. If it is not a case of retrenchment, then the provisions of Sections 25F and 25G of the I.D. Act shall not be attracted. Hence, the definition of "Retrenchment" contained in Section 2(oo) is reproduced below. "2. If it is not a case of retrenchment, then the provisions of Sections 25F and 25G of the I.D. Act shall not be attracted. Hence, the definition of "Retrenchment" contained in Section 2(oo) is reproduced below. "2. Definitions – In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, … (oo) "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include – (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of the employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein. …..... From the aforesaid definition of "retrenchment", it is apparent that if the termination is by way of punishment, then it would not be a case of retrenchment. Similarly, if the case is covered by clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) i.e. the termination of service as a result of non renewal of contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, it would not be a case of retrenchment. 6. The initial order of appointment placed on record dated 23.11.1995, as has been pointed out earlier, contains certain terms and conditions. It is for fixed period of 5 months and is liable to be terminated at any time even before expiry of the period without issuing any notice. The employee was required to execute an undertaking stating that the terms and conditions contained in the order of appointment shall be binding upon him. It is not the case that such an undertaking was not given by the employee. The second and third orders of appointment also contain the same stipulation. The appointments were made purely on temporary basis for a period of 5 months and was liable to be terminated without issuing any notice. It is not the case that such an undertaking was not given by the employee. The second and third orders of appointment also contain the same stipulation. The appointments were made purely on temporary basis for a period of 5 months and was liable to be terminated without issuing any notice. It is thus apparent that it was a case covered by clause (bb) of Section 2 (oo) i.e. of termination the contract of employee in terms of the stipulation contained in such contract. The appointment was for a fixed period and therefore, it would not be a case of "retrenchment" within a meaning of Section 2(oo) of I.D. Act. 7. Shri Saboo, the learned counsel appearing for respondent-employee has invited my attention to the finding recorded by the Labour Court that the muster rolls produced on record clearly indicate that the respondent-employee was continuously working on the post from the date of his initial appointment i.e. 23.11.1995 till the date of his termination from service on 17.12.1996. He has relied upon the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Tata Consulting Engineers vrs. Valsala K. Nair (Ms.) and Ors, reported in 1997 II CLR 1099, in which it has been held that though the initial appointment was for a period of two months, it was extended from time to time and on facts, it cannot be said that the case was covered by clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) and it cannot be said that workmen's termination was not retrenchment. The learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of S.M.Nilajkarand others vrs. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, reported in 2003 II CLR 233. He has further relied upon the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of BhuvneshKumar Dwivedi vrs. Hindalco Industries Limited, reported in (2014) 11 SCC 85. 8. Even if the finding of the Labour Court is accepted that the respondent was continued in employment from 23.11.1995 till the date of termination on 17.12.1996 and that he had rendered continuous service of 240 days preceding the date of his retrenchment, the case would not be covered by the definition of "retrenchment" for the reason that the respondent-employee has come forward before the Reference Court with a case of punitive termination after holding an enquiry. In view of this also, the question of attracting provisions of Sections 25F and 25G would not at all arise. The Labour Court has committed an error in holding that it was a case of retrenchment and there was violation of Sections 25F and 25G of the I.D. Act, resulting in setting aside the retrenchment and granting reinstatement with continuity in service and full backwages. 9. Upon remand of the matter back to the Labour Court, the Court was required to consider the question of delay and its impact on the ultimate relief to be granted to the respondent-employee. The period of employment stipulated in the order of employment dated 9-10-1996 was only till 15-3-1997, that is for a period of five months. The reference was sought in the year 2002, that is after a period of five years, and it was registered in the year 2004, setting aside the order of dismissal dated 17-12-1996. The parties were permitted to lead evidence by the Labour Court. The finding is recorded that there is sufficient documentary evidence available on record indicating that repeatedly applications were submitted to the employer for permitting to join the duties by the respondent-employee. The Labour Court has held that only inference possible is that the respondent-employee was assured to wait till the conclusion of the enquiry and, therefore, the respondent-employee did not initiate any legal proceedings. The Labour Court has also recorded the finding that the employer was responsible for delayed reference and the respondent-employee cannot be punished for it. 10. In the decision of this Court in the case of Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Wardha v. NamdeoGovindrao Nandurkar, reported in 2011(4) Mh.L.J. 33 , the question of delayed reference has been considered after taking into consideration the law laid down by the Apex Court. In para 19 of the said decision, certain principles are culled out as under: “19. In view of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court, it has to be held that though the Court cannot import the period of limitation and the reference cannot be dismissed merely on the ground of delay, it does not mean that irrespective of the facts and circumstances of the case, a stale claim must be entertained and the relief should be granted. In case of delay, no formula of universal application can be laid down and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court dealing with the reference will have to hold an enquiry and record its finding on the question whether the reference should be dismissed on the ground of delay. In appropriate cases, the Court may mould the relief either by reducing the backwages or by denying it completely. While considering the question of delay, the Court will have to be guided by certain principles, which are culled out from various judgments of the Apex Court, discussed above, are stated as under: (a) A plea of delay must be specifically raised so that an employee gets an opportunity to lead evidence and explain it. (b) There is a need to raise an industrial dispute within a reasonable period and the onus of showing that the dispute was raised within a reasonable time is upon the employee. (c) It is for the employee to explain, the delay by furnishing acceptable explanation to the satisfaction of the Court or that he was not responsible for the delay caused. (d) The fact that the workman was making repeated representations, is not sufficient to explain the delay. (e) Delayed reference causes prejudice to both the employer and the employee. Lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. (f) Whether relief to the workman should be denied on the ground of delay or it should be appropriately moulded by denying full or partial backwages, is a matter of discretion, which should be judicially exercised depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case and no fixed formula can be laid down. (g) The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to the adjudication being lost and rendered unavailable. (h) The person supervising cannot be expected to prove after long delay that the employee/workman did not work for 240 days in a year or that he voluntarily left the work. It would be difficult to obtain witnesses, who would be competent to give evidence so many years later if the Labour Court wishes to hold an enquiry into the matter. It would be difficult to obtain witnesses, who would be competent to give evidence so many years later if the Labour Court wishes to hold an enquiry into the matter. (I) An administrative order making reference of industrial dispute, which does not take into consideration the statutory requirements or travels outside, can be a subject-matter of judicial review by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This does not mean that the adjudicating authority/Labour Court cannot make an enquiry to find out whether the reference should be dismissed on the ground of delay or that the relief is required to be moulded keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. Item (d), reproduced above, clearly shows that the fact that the workman was making repeated representations, is not sufficient to explain the delay. There is no acceptable explanation furnished by the respondent-employee. There is no evidence on record to hold that the respondent-employee was assured to wait till the conclusion of the enquiry, as has been held by the Labour Court. The respondent-employee was dismissed from service, in the present case, on 17-12-1996, and in such a situation, the question of asking the respondent-employee to wait till the conclusion of enquiry, does not at all arise. At any rate, on this ground, the respondent-employee was not entitled to any back wages. 11. Though the Labour Court has held that there are no material documents placed on record, forming the alleged fraud on the part of the respondent-employee, there was no issue framed as to whether the enquiry conducted and the order of dismissal passed was in breach of the principles of natural justice. There was also no issue framed as to whether the findings recorded in the enquiry were perverse. The employer was not given an opportunity to lead evidence to establish the charges of misconduct. In the absence of such compliance, the Labour Court could not have held that the order of dismissal was in any manner illegal and liable to be quashed and set aside. The tenure of appointment of the respondent-employee came to an end on 15-3-1997 and, therefore, no direction could have been given to reinstate the respondent-employee with continuity in service. 12. For the reasons stated above, the award dated 30.10.2010 passed by the Reference Court in Reference No.69 of 2004 cannot be sustained. The tenure of appointment of the respondent-employee came to an end on 15-3-1997 and, therefore, no direction could have been given to reinstate the respondent-employee with continuity in service. 12. For the reasons stated above, the award dated 30.10.2010 passed by the Reference Court in Reference No.69 of 2004 cannot be sustained. The same will have to be set aside and the reference will have to be answered in the negative. The petitioners have deposited an amount of Rs. 4,32,378/- in this Court, which ?the petitioners will be permitted to withdraw the same. The respondent-employee would be entitled to an amount of Rs. 1,75,000/- towards the compliance of Section 17B of the I.D. Act and the amount withdrawn by the respondent-employee to that extent cannot be recovered. The respondent-employee has withdrawn the amount of Rs. 2,57,379/- and the employer, therefore, would be entitled to recover the balance amount by enforcing the security furnished by the respondent-employee. 13. In the result, writ petition is allowed. The award dated 30.10.2010 passed by the Reference Court in Reference No. 69 of 2004 is hereby quashed and set aside. The Reference is answered in the negative. No order as to cost.