Ritu Bahri, J.:- 1. This judgment shall dispose of RSA Nos. 3049 of 2013, 3171 of 2013 and 4846 of 2013 as common questions of law and facts are involved in all the appeals being arisen out of same judgment. For reference, facts are being taken from RSA No. 3049 of 2013. 2. M/s. Ansal Properties and Industries Pvt. Ltd.-appellant has come up in regular second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 16.04.2013 passed by the Additional District Judge, Gurgaon, whereby suit filed by plaintiff-Shashi Bhushan (respondent N.1) for specific performance of a contract dated 08.07.1985 (Annexure P-1) has been decreed and the defendants have been directed to deliver vacant possession of 8 plots in favour of the plaintiff after removing the structure, if any, raised upon the said plots at their own costs and expenses. 3. The trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 06.11.2004 had dismissed the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance of the contract dated 08.07.1985. It was held that he was not entitled to decree for recovery of Rs. 7,73,884/-. However, the plaintiff was held entitled to decree for damages of Rs. 15,55,244/- with costs and interest at the rate of 10% per annum. Pursuant to the judgment passed by the trial Court, the appellant- defendant No. 1 had deposited approximately Rs. 38 lacs before the lower Court. 4. The lower appellate Court, in para No. 28 of the judgment, has observed that plot No.B734 of 420 sq. meters did not exist in the layout plan. Hence, no specific performance of this non existing plot could be allowed. Ultimately, the lower appellate Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff for allotment of eight numbers of plots, as the property was identified by way of allotment letter dated 27.10.1986, Ex.P30, where a clear distinction of old numbers and new numbers of the plots of various sizes has been given. 5. On 28.11.2013, the parties to the dispute expressed their intention to refer the matter before Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court to expedite the process of amicable settlement. Thereafter, on 26.03.2014, the following order was passed by this Court:- "In view of the compromise dated 25.03.2014 arrived at between the parties before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court, an amount of Rs. Thereafter, on 26.03.2014, the following order was passed by this Court:- "In view of the compromise dated 25.03.2014 arrived at between the parties before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court, an amount of Rs. 7.75 crores has been handed over by the learned counsel for the appellants in the form of Bank Draft amounting to Rs. 25 lakhs and the remaining amount in the form of post dated cheques, as per the details given in para 1 at page 4 of the compromise, to the learned counsel for the respondents, in the Court today Learned counsel for the parties jointly pray for adjourning the matter till 1st week of January, 2015. Adjourned to 14.01.2015." 6. Thereafter, applicant-respondent No. 1 filed an application i.e. CM No. 1174-C of 2015, under Order 23 Rule 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the alleged agreement dated 25.03.2014. In para 20 of the application, it is so stated that the coercive, forceful and threatening method was used by Ansals-appellant against Shashi Bhushan. The representatives of Ansals threatened Shashi Bhushan to face consequences, in case he did not accept the meager amount of interest on the initial deposited amount of Rs. 15,55,244/-. In this regard, a detailed reply (Annexure A-1) was filed by Shashi Bhushan before the Mediation Centre of this Court. As a result of coercive and forceful threats, the agreement/settlement dated 25.03.2014 (Annexure A-2) was entered into between the parties. Therefore, the applicant-respondent No. 1 sought setting aside of the agreement/settlement dated 25.03.2014 on the following grounds:- (i) that the applicant was a senior citizen of 81 years of age and was coerced into signing the agreement/settlement dated 25.03.2014. This facts are given in detailed affidavit dated 01.02.2015 (Annexure A-3). (ii) As per clause 4 of the aforesaid agreement/settlement, in case the company refuses to make the balance payment as per schedule, the amount received shall stand forfeited and the respondent-plaintiff shall have a right to pursue his execution and the company shall have no right to pursue the RSA. The parties had agreed to make a joint request before the Court for adjourning the RSA to make the final payment. After receiving the entire amount, decree/orders dated 16.04.2013 and 06.11.2004 passed by the District Court and the trial Court would stand fully satisfied and executed. The parties had agreed to make a joint request before the Court for adjourning the RSA to make the final payment. After receiving the entire amount, decree/orders dated 16.04.2013 and 06.11.2004 passed by the District Court and the trial Court would stand fully satisfied and executed. The parties further agreed that the compromise would stand executed only with the full and final payment of entire amount agreed amount. The applicant-respondent No. 1 received a sum of Rs. 6,75,00,000/- out of the total amount of Rs. 7,75,00,000/- and the last post dated cheque bearing No. 128692 dated 31.12.2014 for an amount of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- was lying unencashed with the applicant. Since the full and final payment of Rs. 7.75 crores has not been accepted, therefore, the compromise did not stand executed. The applicant was ready to return the amount, already received by him, i.e. Rs. 6,75,00,000/- by way of demand draft. (iii) The rough cost of the present 8 plots, measuring 3290 sq. meters, is Rs. 40 crores. (iv)When the talks of compromise were going on, The ansals had offered applicant-Shashi Bhushan to refund the initial deposit of Rs. 15,55,244/- along with interest, total amounting to Rs. 16,41,93,697/-. The credibility of the agreement is vitiated as the plaintiff-appellant was coerced into dire consequences to sign/enter the same. (v) The alleged settlement/agreement dated 25.03.2014 was nullity in the eyes of law, as it sought to compromise two regular second appeals before this Curt i.e. RSA No. 3049 of 2013 and RSA No. 3171 of 2013. Neither the appellants in RSA No. 3171 of 2013 were present nor their signatures were affixed on the alleged agreement/settlement dated 25.03.2014. The proper remedy would be to get the main suit decided on merits. 7. The appellant, thereafter, filed reply to the aforesaid application on 11.05.2015 taking preliminary objections that plaintiff-respondent No. 1 was seeking to withdraw from a valid and binding settlement agreement dated 25.03.2014 executed between the parties. The said settlement/compromise was signed by both the parties after six prolonged mediation meetings before the learned Mediator, Mr. Swarn Sandhir and the same was counter-signed by the Advocate/counsel of applicant-respondent No. 1. Thereafter, on 26.03.2014, the parties had appeared and informed the Court that they had reached an amicable settlement and eight post dated cheques along with one bank demand draft for the total amount of Rs. Swarn Sandhir and the same was counter-signed by the Advocate/counsel of applicant-respondent No. 1. Thereafter, on 26.03.2014, the parties had appeared and informed the Court that they had reached an amicable settlement and eight post dated cheques along with one bank demand draft for the total amount of Rs. 7,75,00,000/- have been handed over to applicant-respondent No. 1 in accordance with the terms of the settlement. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned to 14.01.2015 to allow completion of the payment procedure envisaged under the settlement/agreement dated 25.03.2014. After withdrawing the sum of Rs. 6,75,00,000/- out of the total settled amount of Rs. 7,75,00,000/- (i.e. 87%), the applicant-respondent No. 1 did not encash the last post dated cheque by 31.12.2014 and thereafter, has proceeded to file the present application on 01.02.2015. The applicant-respondent No. 1 is resiling from a valid and binding settlement/agreement and the application should be dismissed with costs. 8. The allegation that the appellant has exercised threat, coercion and undue influence to enter into the settlement/agreement dated 25.03.2014, was false and baseless. No affidavit of his former Advocate and counsel Mr. Mayank Mathur has been filed in order to show that during the mediation proceedings, the applicant-plaintiff was extended threat, coercion and undue influence. No allegation has been made against the conduct of the Mediator. The application for setting aside the agreement has been filed after the last date of cheque and as per clause 4 of the mediation agreement, the appellant-Ansals has not defaulted in making the entire payment by way of post dated cheques. As per Annexure R-5, all the post dated cheques were duly accepted by the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 on 26.03.2014. After accepting the said cheques, as per clause 4 of the agreement/settlement, in case of dishonour or non payment of amount at any stage, the entire amount received by the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 would stand forfeited. Instead of encashing the last post dated cheque dated 31.12.2014, the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 has now filed the present application to get the agreement/settlement dated 25.03.2014 set aside as he has not received the last payment of the cheque amounting to Rs. 1,00,00,000/-. This ground would not be sufficient to get the agreement set aside. It was further stated that the applicant-respondent No. 1 has not come to the Court with clean hands and the application is liable to be dismissed. 9. Mr. 1,00,00,000/-. This ground would not be sufficient to get the agreement set aside. It was further stated that the applicant-respondent No. 1 has not come to the Court with clean hands and the application is liable to be dismissed. 9. Mr. M.L. Sarin, learned senior counsel, has argued that as per Rule 23 of Mediation and Conciliation Rules, when an agreement reached between the parties, the same was to be reduced into writing by the parties or their power of attorneys. In the present case, the alleged agreement has not been signed by the appellant(s) of RSA No. 3171 of 2013 and hence, the agreement is incomplete. He has referred to the judgment delivered by the Punjab High Court in Manohar Lal Vs. Onkar Das @ Omkar Dass and others, 1959 PLR 264 to contend that there was no provision in the Indian Oaths Act under which, a suit can be decided against a party merely because the said party has refused to make an oath which he at one stage accepted to make. He has referred to another judgment passed by this Court in Harbans Lal and another Vs. Pardip Kumar and others, 2008 (1) PLR 820 , wherein it was held that if, all the parties have not signed the compromise deed, the same could not be a base for passing any compromise decree. He has further referred to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in R. Rajanna Vs. S.R. Venkataswamy and others, AIR 2015 Supreme Court 706, to contend that under Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC, where a party is disputing lawfulness of a compromise, it is the Court which had passed the decree alone, can consider the lawfulness of such compromise and no direction could be given to the parties to file a separate suit. In support of his contention, he has referred the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Banwari Lal Vs. Chando Devi, through LRs, and another, (1993) 1 Supreme Court Cases 581 and another judgment passed by this Court in Hamelo (deceased) Vs. Jang Sher Singh, AIR 2002 P&H 147 . 10. Mr. Amir Singh Pasrich, Advocate, appearing on behalf of appellant-respondent has argued that no undue influence was exercised by the appellant upon the applicant-respondent No. 1 during mediation proceedings when compromise dated 25.03.2014 was effected. Jang Sher Singh, AIR 2002 P&H 147 . 10. Mr. Amir Singh Pasrich, Advocate, appearing on behalf of appellant-respondent has argued that no undue influence was exercised by the appellant upon the applicant-respondent No. 1 during mediation proceedings when compromise dated 25.03.2014 was effected. The mediation proceedings continued for six sessions from 09.09.2013 to 19.09.2014 when the matter was compromised. He has argued that as per Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, there was nothing to suggest that the relationship subsisting between the parties allowed anyone on behalf of the appellant to dominate the will of applicant-respondent No. 1 or that any real or apparent authority was exercised over the applicant- respondent No. 1. After signing the agreement/settlement and encashing the cheques voluntarily, presumption under Section 16(3) of the Act remains paramount. The settlement/agreement was signed by Mr. Mayank Mathur, Advocate, on behalf of the applicant-respondent No. 1 and he was consistently advising him, therefore, there exists no fraud or coercion by the Mediator while finalising the terms of the mediation agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, all the post dated cheques were accepted and thereafter, seven cheques were encashed by the applicant-respondent No. 1. Now he is estopped from resiling from a valid and binding settlement dated 25.03.2014. Pursuant to the judgment and decree dated 06.11.2004, appellant-company had deposited Rs. 15,55,244/- plus interest. The compromise is for a sum that is much higher, therefore, the applicant- respondent No. 1 could not substantiate his allegation that he had been threatened to compromise the matter. He has referred to the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grasim Industries Ltd. & another Vs. Agarwal Steel, 2010 (1) Supreme Court Cases 83, on the proposition that when a person signs the document, there is a presumption that he has read the document properly and understood it and thereafter, affixed his signatures thereon. This presumption was more in favour of a businessmen, who are capable persons. Further reference has been made to a judgment passed in Pushpa Devi Bhagat Vs. Rajinder Singh and others, 2006 (5) Supreme Court Cases 566, on the proposition that relationship of a counsel and his party is a matter of contract. Under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, a pleader shall not act in any Court unless, he is appointed by a person by way of a document in writing or by his recognized agent. Under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, a pleader shall not act in any Court unless, he is appointed by a person by way of a document in writing or by his recognized agent. He has further argued that learned counsel for the applicant- respondent No. 1 had participated in the mediation proceedings and for all intents and purposes had accepted the terms of the agreement when he signed it and hence, the applicant-respondent No. 1 was bound by the terms of the compromise, more so, when he has encashed seven cheques out of eight post dated cheques accepted by him on 26.03.2014. He has referred to the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gangadeep Pratisthan (P) Ltd. and others Vs. Mechano and others, 2005 (11) Supreme Court Cases 273, another judgment passed in Damera Raj Kumar Vs. Doli Srinivas, AIR 2007 Andhra Pradesh 14 and a judgment passed by Delhi High Court in Naveen Kumar Vs. Smt. Khilya Devi and another, CS (OS) No. 2248 of 2010 (decided on 01.09.2011). 11. A Division Bench of this Court in Manohar Lal's case (supra) had examined the provisions of the Oaths Act (X of 1873). In that case, a suit for partition was filed. During the pendency of said suit, the parties had made certain statements that if the plaintiff had taken a particular type of oath at Ghanteshwar Mandir to the effect that Kidar Nath-defendant was not adopted by Kanahaya Lal and that no partition had been effected by father of the plaintiff qua immovable property as per writing produced by the defendants, the plaintiff/s suit might be decreed and each of the parties might be declared to have 1/3rd share in the property in suit. If the plaintiff did not take the oath, the partition as alleged by the defendants would stand. The plaintiff agreed to take the proposed oath, but subsequently, changed his mind. The Court appointed a local commissioner for the purpose of administering the oath, which the plaintiff refused to take. Thereafter, he made an application stating that the agreement to take oath had been made under coercion and undue influence. The Court asked him to file an affidavit in support of the application. On the next date, he absented himself and the Court dismissed his suit. Thereafter, he made an application stating that the agreement to take oath had been made under coercion and undue influence. The Court asked him to file an affidavit in support of the application. On the next date, he absented himself and the Court dismissed his suit. In the aforesaid case, the Division Bench observed as under:- ".........Under Section 9 of the Indian Oaths Act, any party to any judicial proceedings can make an offer to be bound by an oath or solemn affirmation as is mentioned in Section 8 of the Act and the Court is empowered to ask such party whether he would make the oath or affirmation; the Court cannot, however, compel the party to attend personally in Court solely for the purpose of answering such question. Under Section 10 of the Act, if the party agrees to make an oath or affirmation, the Court may proceed to administer it or may issue a commission to any person to administer it and authorise him to take the evidence of the person to be sworn or affirmed and return it to the Court. Under Section 11 of the Act, the evidence so given shall, as against the person who offered to be bound as aforesaid, be conclusive proof of the matter stated. Section 12 of the Act provides that if a party or witness refuses to make the oath referred to in Section 8, he shall not be compelled to make it, but the Court shall record, as part of the proceedings, the nature of the oath or affirmation proposed, the facts that he was asked whether he would make it and that he refused it, together with any reason which he may assign for his refusal. There is no provision in the Indian Oaths Act under which a suit can be decided against a party merely because the said party has refused to take the oath which he at one stage accepted to take. It is true that the person offering to take oath cannot withdraw the offer after the same has been accepted, unless, of course he gives adequate reasons for the same and the Court permits him to do so. It is true that the person offering to take oath cannot withdraw the offer after the same has been accepted, unless, of course he gives adequate reasons for the same and the Court permits him to do so. The person accepting to take the oath is, however, not bound to take the oath and the suit cannot be deemed to have been adjusted merely by the statement that if he took the oath, one result will follow....." 12. After making the above observations, the High Court accepted the appeal of the plaintiff and remanded the case back to the trial Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law, as the plaintiff before taking the oath, had made an application that he was made to take the said oath under undue influence. 13. The ratio of the aforesaid judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In this case, applicant-respondent No. 1 had participated in six meetings before the Mediation through his counsel Mr. Mayank Mathur, Advocate and final settlement between the parties was duly signed and thereafter, the compromise was sent to this Court. Pursuant to the settlement, eight post dated cheques were accepted by the applicant- respondent No. 1. It is not a case, where applicant-respondent No. 1 has refused to enter into a mutual agreement. In fact, he had accepted the Mediation agreement and signed it and thereafter, on 26.03.2014, he had appeared before the Court and accepted eight post dated cheques. Hence, as per the observations of the Division Bench, the person offering to take oath cannot withdraw the offer after the same has been accepted, unless for adequate reasons, the Court 'permits him to do so'. 14. Next judgment cited by learned counsel for the applicant- respondent No. 1 in Harbans Lal's case (supra) is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. No doubt, as per this judgment, a compromise cannot be held to be lawful or valid unless all the parties have signed it. In the present case, applicant-respondent No. 1 had initially filed a suit against M/s. Ansal Properties & Industries Pvt. Ltd. etc. for allotment of eight plots after accepting an amount of Rs. 15,55,244/-. M/s. Ansal Properties & Industries Pvt. Ltd. in due course of time had allotted these eight plots to subsequent purchasers. In the present case, applicant-respondent No. 1 had initially filed a suit against M/s. Ansal Properties & Industries Pvt. Ltd. etc. for allotment of eight plots after accepting an amount of Rs. 15,55,244/-. M/s. Ansal Properties & Industries Pvt. Ltd. in due course of time had allotted these eight plots to subsequent purchasers. The main relief for allotment of the plots was sought from M/s. Ansal-appellant and pursuant to the trial Court decree, they had deposited a sum of Rs. 15,55,244/- plus interest i.e. Rs. 38 lacs. Since the lower appellate Court had decreed the suit of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 for specific performance, it was M/s. Ansal Properties Ltd. who had to give them possession of the vacant plots in execution. Hence, M/s. Ansal Properties Ltd. was the main contesting defendant, who had to execute the initial agreement of allotment of eight plots as well as the judgment dated 16.04.2013 passed by the lower appellate Court. Representatives of M/s. Ansal Pvt. Ltd. had participated in the Mediation proceedings and had agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 7,75,00,000/- pursuant to the agreement for allotment of eight plots. Thus, they have discharged the burden of executing the agreement in favour of applicant-respondent No. 1 and the agreement before the Mediation was duly signed by the authorized representatives on behalf of the said company. Hence, in this background, it was not necessary that all the subsequent purchasers should have signed the agreement/compromise dated 25.03.2014. In these circumstances, the judgment passed in Harbans Lal's case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 15. The judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in R. Rajanna's case (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the applicant- respondent No. 1, is also not applicable to the facts of the present case, as the Court is considering an application filed by the applicant-respondent No. 1 alleging that on account of non encashment of 8th cheque, the Mediation agreement has not been carried out and the present regular second appeal be decided on merits. 16. Further, learned counsel for the applicant has made reference to the judgment passed in Banwari Lal's case (supra). It was a case, where compromise had been effected between the parties and the application was made by the plaintiff that the compromise was obtained by fraud. 16. Further, learned counsel for the applicant has made reference to the judgment passed in Banwari Lal's case (supra). It was a case, where compromise had been effected between the parties and the application was made by the plaintiff that the compromise was obtained by fraud. The Subordinate Judge found on material that the compromise had not been signed by the parties. It had recalled its earlier order and directed restoration of the suit to its original number. Against that order, a revision application was made before the High Court, whereupon the said order was set aside saying that the petition which was filed on February 27, 1991 as petition of compromise was really an application filed on behalf of the appellant for withdrawal of the suit under Order 23 Rule 1 CPC and there was no occasion to recall the order dismissing the suit treating it to be an order under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. The Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the SLP and held that the Subordinate Judge was justified in recalling its earlier order and restoring the suit. Even this judgment will not be applicable to the facts of the present case, as the applicant-respondent No. 1 (herein) had participated in the Mediation proceedings and signed the agreement, whereas in Banwari Lal's case (supra), the compromise had not been signed by all the parties and the suit was restored to its original number, which is not the facts in the present case. In the present case, the Court is considering an application, wherein it is alleged that despite signing an agreement before the Mediation, no compromise has been effected and carried out as per its terms. 17. The judgment cited by learned counsel for the applicant- respondent No. 1 in Hamelo's case (supra) is also based on separate set of facts. In that case, the plaintiff had filed a suit to declare a registered sale deed in favour of the defendant as null and void. It was alleged that the plaintiff gave her land for one year on lease to the defendants, but the defendant took the suit land on lease for 99 years by fraud. The defendant was unable to prove that the transaction was bona fide, as the plaintiff was an illiterate, ignorant and old woman. It was alleged that the plaintiff gave her land for one year on lease to the defendants, but the defendant took the suit land on lease for 99 years by fraud. The defendant was unable to prove that the transaction was bona fide, as the plaintiff was an illiterate, ignorant and old woman. Ultimately, the suit of the plaintiff was decreed and the Court had concluded that the character of the document itself underwent a change, which showed that the plaintiff had given her thumb impression on the lease document to consent for lease for a period of one year. Even this judgment will not help the present applicant-respondent No. 1, as neither he is illiterate nor an ignorant person from village. He is 81 years old and was always assisted through his counsel Mr. Mayank Mathur, Advocate in the Mediation proceedings. Rather, after having signed the agreement before the Mediation, he appeared before the Court and accepted eight post dated cheques amounting to Rs. 7,75,00,000/- and quietly encashed seven cheques as and when the due date came till November, 2014. At the stage of encashing the last cheque, which was due in December, 2014, he decided not to present it for encashment before the bank and after January, 2015, made the present application that the compromise had not been fulfilled and the case be decided on merits. The applicant was all along aware that he was participating in the Mediation proceedings to get compensation in lieu of allotment of eight plots. The applicant-respondent No. 1 was negotiating the cost of eight plots after his suit for specific performance had been decreed by the lower appellate Court on 16.04.2013. 18. The case of the applicant-respondent No. 1 can now be examined with respect to the agreement settlement arrived at between the parties before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court on 25.03.2014 (Annexure A-2). The relevant terms, which bind the parties, are reproduced as under:- "4. 18. The case of the applicant-respondent No. 1 can now be examined with respect to the agreement settlement arrived at between the parties before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court on 25.03.2014 (Annexure A-2). The relevant terms, which bind the parties, are reproduced as under:- "4. The parties have further decided and accepted that in case after making part payment, the company refuses or do not make the balance payment or today if the company do not make the entire payment, as per schedule mentioned in paragraph No. 1 above, the payment received, shall stand forfeited and the respondent shall have the right to pursue his execution while the company shall have the right to pursue the RSA, which is being kept pending. Both the parties agreed to make a joint request to the Hon'ble Court for adjourning the RSA to ensure making of the final payment. Similarly after receiving the entire amount by the respondents, the decree/order passed by the District Court dated 16.04.2013 along with decree dated 06.11.2004 passed by the Trial Court shall stand fully satisfied and executed. The parties further agree that the compromise shall stand executed only with full and final payment of entire above agreed amount. XX XX XX XX 10. That the parties undertake before the Hon'ble Court to abide by the terms and conditions set out in the agreement and not to dispute the same hereinafter in future. The draft/cheques shall be handed over in Court on 26.03.2014 at the time of hearing of the present RSA and this compromise will be effected only after the delivery of the draft/cheques to the respondent." 19. As per clause 10 of the agreement, the parties had undertaken to abide by the terms and conditions and drafts/cheques were to be handed over in Court on 26.03.2014. The compromise was to be effected completely after acceptance of draft/cheques by the applicant-respondent No. 1 in Court on 26.03.2014. This condition was fulfilled by both the parties as is evident from the order dated 26.03.2014, when the applicant- respondent No. 1 had accepted the drafts/cheques in Court. Hence, for all intents and purposes, on 26.03.2014, after accepting the drafts/cheques in Court, the compromise had been effected. This condition was fulfilled by both the parties as is evident from the order dated 26.03.2014, when the applicant- respondent No. 1 had accepted the drafts/cheques in Court. Hence, for all intents and purposes, on 26.03.2014, after accepting the drafts/cheques in Court, the compromise had been effected. As per clause 4 of the compromise, in case of default in making payment pursuant to the post dated cheques, appellant-M/s. Ansal Properties was to forfeit its amount and at that stage, the applicant-respondent No. 1 had a right to pursue his execution, which was pending. But, after having accepted the drafts/cheques in the Court, the only option available with the parties was to request for adjourning the RSA to ensure making of the final payment and thereafter, when the money was received, the decree dated 16.04.2013 along with decree dated 06.11.2004 passed by the lowed Courts would stand fully satisfied and executed. For the applicant-respondent No. 1, after having received the drafts/cheques in Court on 26.03.2014, the compromise had been effected. As per condition No. 4 of the compromise, the obligation was of M/s. Ansal Properties to ensure that all the post dated cheques could be encashed. To ensure that the cheques were encashed, a stringent condition was imposed that in case the payment is not made as per schedule, the amount received shall stand forfeit. The stringent condition was put, so that the appellant-M/s. Ansal Properties ensures that payment is made on presentation of each of the eight post dated cheques. In these circumstances, for all intents and purposes, the applicant-respondent No. 1 had effected the compromise. 20. After receiving the aforesaid cheques, applicant-respondent No. 1 proceeded to encash seven post dated cheques and the last cheque was encashed on 31.10.2014 for a sum of Rs. 1,00,00,000/-. The last post dated cheque bearing No. 128692, which could be encashed on 31.12.2014, was wilfully not presented by the applicant-respondent No. 1 for encashment. It is not the case of the applicant-respondent No. 1 that the cheque had been dishonoured on presentation, rather he himself chose not to encashed the same and thereafter, made this application under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC alleging that the compromise dated 25.03.2014 had not been effected and no decree could be passed pursuant to non-compliance of the conditions of the said compromise. 21. 21. At this stage, reference can be made to the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat Vs. Rajinder Singh and others, 2006 (5) SCC 566 . This was a case pertaining to a litigation between the landlord and tenant. The tenant had undertaken to vacate the premises as per compromise/consent decree, but thereafter, instead of vacating on time, prolonged the litigation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court confirmed the consent decree of eviction and awarded mesne profit to the landlord from the date on which he had undertaken to vacate the premises till the possession was handed over. The observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to Order 23 Rule 3 CPC are reproduced as under:- "18. Order 23 deals with withdrawal and adjustment of suits. Rule 3 relates to compromise of suits, relevant portion of which is extracted below: "3. Compromise of suit.- Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall passed a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit." The said Rule consists of two parts. The first part provides that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the court shall order such agreement or compromise to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith. The second part provides that where a defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the court shall order such satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith. The second part provides that where a defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the court shall order such satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith. The Rule also makes it clear that the compromise or agreement may relate to issues or disputes which are not the subject-matter of the suit and that such compromise or agreement may be entered not only among the parties to the suit, but others also, but the decree to be passed shall be confined to the parties to the suit whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit. We are not, however, concerned with this aspect of the Rule in this appeal." 22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further examined the meaning of words "signed by parties" under Order 2 Rule 1 CPC in relation to the compromise effected with the assistance of an engaged counsel by giving him the implied authority with regard to the dispute between the parties. In paragraph 23 of the judgment, it was observed as under:- "23. We will first consider the meaning of the words "signed by parties". Order 3 Rule 1 of CPC provides that any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf. The proviso thereto makes it clear that the Court can, if it so desires, direct that such appearance shall be made by the party in person. Rule 4 provides that no pleader shall act for any person in any Court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognized agent or by some other person duly authorized by or under a power-of-attorney to make such appointment. Rule 4 provides that no pleader shall act for any person in any Court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognized agent or by some other person duly authorized by or under a power-of-attorney to make such appointment. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 provides that every such appointment shall be filed in Court and shall, for the purposes of sub-rule (1), be deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client or the pleader, as the case may be, and filed in Court, or until the client or the pleader dies, or until all proceedings in the suit are ended so far as regards the client. The question whether 'signed by parties' would include signing by the pleader was considered by this Court in Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India, 1992 (1) SCC 31 with reference to Order 3 of CPC : "30. There is no reason to assume that the legislature intended to curtail the implied authority of counsel, engaged in the thick of proceedings in court, to compromise or agree on matters relating to the parties, even if such matters exceed the subject matter of the suit. The relationship of counsel and his party or the recognized agent and his principal is a matter of contract; and with the freedom of contract generally, the legislature does not interfere except when warranted by public policy, and the legislative intent is expressly made manifest. There is no such declaration of policy or indication of intent in the present case. The legislature has not evinced any intention to change the well recognized and universally acclaimed common law tradition..... 35. So long as the system of judicial administration in India continues unaltered, and so long as Parliament has not evinced an intention to change its basic character, there is no reason to assume that Parliament has, though not expressly, but impliedly reduced counsel's role or capacity to represent his client as effectively as in the past...... 37. 35. So long as the system of judicial administration in India continues unaltered, and so long as Parliament has not evinced an intention to change its basic character, there is no reason to assume that Parliament has, though not expressly, but impliedly reduced counsel's role or capacity to represent his client as effectively as in the past...... 37. We may, however, hasten to add that it will be prudent for counsel not to act on implied authority except when warranted by the exigency of circumstances demanding immediate adjustment of suit by agreement of compromise and the signature of the party cannot be obtained without undue delay. In these days of easier and quicker communication, such contingency may seldom arise. A wise and careful counsel will no doubt arm himself in advance with the necessary authority expressed in writing to meet all such contingencies in order that neither his authority nor integrity is ever doubted.... 38. Considering the traditionally recognized role of counsel in the common law system, and the evil sought to be remedied by Parliament by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, namely, attainment of certainty and expeditious disposal of cases by reducing the terms of compromise to writing signed by the parties, and allowing the compromise decree to comprehend even matters falling outside the subject matter of the suit, but relating to the parties, the legislature cannot, in the absence of express words to such effect, be presumed to have disallowed the parties to enter into a compromise by counsel in their cause or by their duly authorized agents.... 39. To insist upon the party himself personally signing the agreement or compromise would often cause undue delay, loss and inconvenience, especially in the case of non-resident persons. It has always been universally understood that a party can always act by his duly authorized representative. If a power-of-attorney holder can enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of his principal, so can counsel, possessed of the requisite authorization by vakalatnama, act on behalf of his client.... If the legislature had intended to make such a fundamental change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and needless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated." 23. If a power-of-attorney holder can enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of his principal, so can counsel, possessed of the requisite authorization by vakalatnama, act on behalf of his client.... If the legislature had intended to make such a fundamental change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and needless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated." 23. As per the ration of the aforesaid judgment, if the defendant complies with all the conditions of the compromise, as agreed between the parties and nothing further remains to be done or enforced and thereafter, then the regular second appeal is to be disposed of after recording satisfaction that the decree of the trial Court has been executed. Moreover, as per the above observations, if a compromise is signed by a counsel engaged by a party being its recognized agent, then no interference is warranted therein. Even a counsel appointed by a party can sign a compromise on its behalf. 24. The applicant-respondent No. 1, in the present case, was represented before the Mediation proceedings by a counsel namely Mr. Mayank Mathur, Advocate, during six hearings and the settlement agreement was signed by the applicant-respondent No. 1 as well as his counsel. The said settlement was sent to the Court and on 26.03.2014, Mr. Mayang Mathur, Advocate, had appeared and accepted eight post dated cheques on behalf of the applicant-respondent No. 1 Hence, as per condition No. 10 of the compromise/agreement, after accepting the drafts/cheques by the applicant-respondent No. 1, the compromise had been effected. 25. In Grasim Industries Ltd. Vs. Agrawal Steel, 2010 (1) SCC 83 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if, a person signs a document, there was a presumption, unless there was proof of fraud, that he had read the document properly and understood it when he affixed his signatures. It was so observed as under:- "6. In our opinion, when a person signs a document, there is a presumption, unless there is proof of force or fraud, that he has read the document property and understood it and only then he has affixed his signatures thereon, otherwise no signature on a document can ever be accepted. In particular, businessmen, being careful people (since their money is involved) would have ordinarily read and understood a document before signing it. Hence, the presumption would be even stronger in their case. In particular, businessmen, being careful people (since their money is involved) would have ordinarily read and understood a document before signing it. Hence, the presumption would be even stronger in their case. There is no allegation of force or fraud in this case." 26. The Delhi High Court in Naveen Kumar's case (supra) was examining a case where the matter had been referred to the Mediation under Section 89(1)(d) CPC. The settlement had been arrived at between the parties after participating on eight occasions in the presence of the counsel. After signing the settlement/agreement, the matter was sent to the Court and no objection was raised when it was present in the Court through counsel. After a gap of about 15 days, the defendant tried to assail the settlement on flimsy grounds despite the fact that two post dated cheques had been accepted. The Delhi High Court accepted the compromise and observed as under:- "12. In my view, if such pleas are sustained the very sanctity and purpose of an amicable settlement through the process of mediation, would stand totally eroded. In Double Dot Finance Limited v. Goyal MG Gases Ltd., 2005 (2) AD Del 534 though that case arose out of the arbitration proceedings, a Single Judge of this Court has observed as under:- "If such pleas are sustained, the sanctity and purpose of amicable settlements between the parties would stand totally eroded. Amicable resolution of disputes and negotiated settlements is 'public policy in India'. Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as well as Legal Services Authorities Act, 1995 call upon the Courts to encourage settlements of legal disputes through negotiations between the parties. If amicable settlements are discarded and rejected on flimsy pleas, the parties would be wary of entering into negotiated settlements and making payments thereunder as a shrewd party after entering into a negotiated settlement, may pocket the amount received under it and thereafter, challenge the settlement and reagitate the dispute causing immeasurable loss and harassment to the party making payment thereunder. This tendency has to be checked and such litigants discouraged by the Courts. It would be in consonance with public policy of India." 27. Another argument of learned counsel for the applicant- respondent No. 1 was that the aforesaid settlement agreement had been the result of coercion, fraud and duress. This tendency has to be checked and such litigants discouraged by the Courts. It would be in consonance with public policy of India." 27. Another argument of learned counsel for the applicant- respondent No. 1 was that the aforesaid settlement agreement had been the result of coercion, fraud and duress. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gangadeep Pratisthan (P) Ltd. and others Vs. Mechano and others, 2005 (11) Supreme Court Cases 273 had examined the effect of duress or coercion in a dispute with regard to vacating of factory premises, where a compromise had been effected. As per the compromise decree, Rs. 7.5 lakhs were to be paid by way of cheque and another sum of Rs. 7.5 lakhs was to be paid in cash. After agreeing to the said payment, the compromise was effected and payment was made on the basis of mutual faith. The eviction from the factory was effected on 24.12.1997 and the settlement was recorded on 29.12.1997 under duress and coercion. Respondent No. 1, before Supreme Court, was the tenant. The date of eviction and settlement was 27.12.1997 and the tenant after eviction had encashed all the cheques, which was sufficient proof of the fact that he had himself bound by the terms of the settlement. Subsequently, he changed his mind and gave a twist to the happenings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal of the landlord and set aside the judgment of the High Court, holding that the consent decree was valid in law. A further direction was given that sum of Rs. 7.50 lakhs, which was deposited with the Registry of the High Court, be released to the tenant/respondent No. 1. 28. The facts of the aforesaid case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, are applicable to the facts of the present case. The applicant- respondent No. 1 (in the present case), participated in the Mediation proceedings and signed the agreement. On 26.03.2014, he accepted eight post dated cheques, out of which, has encashed seven cheques and in order to give a twist to the compromise, did not present 8th cheque for encashment. The present application was made by alleging that no compromise had been effected and the regular second appeal be decided on merits. 29. At this stage, reference can be made to a decision given by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Damera Raj Kumar Vs. Doli Srinivas, AIR 2007 Andhra Pradesh 14. The present application was made by alleging that no compromise had been effected and the regular second appeal be decided on merits. 29. At this stage, reference can be made to a decision given by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Damera Raj Kumar Vs. Doli Srinivas, AIR 2007 Andhra Pradesh 14. This was a case, where the matter was referred to the Lok Adalat for recording a compromise between the parties. The award passed by the Lok Adalat was challenged on the ground that the consent of the petitioner had been taken by coercion, by extending threats and the said consent was not free. Plea of coercion or obtaining the award by threats were questions of facts and after a settlement was arrived at between the parties, the award passed by the Lok Adalat could not be vitiated. 30. In Rajesh Kumar Bajaj Vs. Purshotam Lal Bajaj and others, IA No. 12888 of 2008 in C.S. (OS) No. 1495 of 2005 (decided on 06.07.2009), the Delhi High Court had examined a case, which was referred to the Mediation and Conciliation Centre. After having voluntarily arrived at a settlement, an application for modification of the said settlement was made on the ground that the plaintiff had embarrassed defendant No. 2 in the presence of her family members, therefore, the settlement be set aside. The Delhi High Court held that on emotional ground a party cannot turn around and oppose the said settlement, which had already been agreed between the parties before the Mediation proceedings. 31. In Khaleek Ahmed Vs. Mohd. Naved Ansari & another, CM (M) 291/2011 & CM Nos. 5250/2011 & 6278/2011 (decided on 30.01.2012), the Delhi High Court was examining a case where, an attempt was made to negate the settlement arrived at between the parties in Mediation Centre, where both the parties had duly signed the settlement. Subsequently, the matter was taken up by the Court for recording compliance of the terms and conditions of the settlement. Thereafter, the petitioner made an application to withdraw from the settlement without any sufficient reason or plausible explanation. His apprehension was that he was being threatened by goons standing outside the Mediation Centre. Subsequently, the matter was taken up by the Court for recording compliance of the terms and conditions of the settlement. Thereafter, the petitioner made an application to withdraw from the settlement without any sufficient reason or plausible explanation. His apprehension was that he was being threatened by goons standing outside the Mediation Centre. The plea that the petitioner had been, was held to be a far fetched story and it was not held to be a valid ground to discharge defendant No. 2 from settlement effected between the parties on 20.07.2010. 32. Finally, the objection taken by the applicant-respondent No. 1 that he being a senior citizen of 81 years of age, was consistently threatened by M/s. Ansal Properties-appellant to enter into the compromise before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre is merely an attempt to frustrate the settlement arrived at with open minds in the Mediation. The applicant- respondent No. 1, after signing the settlement, had appeared before the Court on 26.03.2014 and accepted eight post dated cheques and thereafter, encashed seven cheques. He is a clever litigant and made an attempt to give a twist to the whole scenario by not presenting the 8th cheque for encashment. His frivolous plea that he was threatened by M/s. Ansal Properties-appellant, is liable to be rejected, as he was always assisted by his counsel, Mr. Mayank Mathur, Advocate, before the Mediation Centre. He seems to be trying to wriggle out of the settlement at the fag end when he had encashed seven post dated cheques. By his behaviour, the object of referring the dispute to Mediation and Conciliation Centre shall be frustrated. If the plea of applicant-respondent No. 1 is accepted, then the sanctity and purpose of amicable settlement between the parties would stand totally eroded. In today's time, all efforts are being made to encourage the parties to settle their disputes through negotiations and if some settlement is arrived at, it cannot be rejected on frivolous pleas. 33. In the present case, after the suit was decreed by the lower Courts, M/s. Ansal Properties-appellant had deposited Rs. 36 lacs before the trial Court. Before the Mediation Centre, an amount of Rs. 7.75 crores was agreed between the parties as an out of Court settlement for those eight plots, which were to be allotted to the applicant-respondent No. 1. In the present case, after the suit was decreed by the lower Courts, M/s. Ansal Properties-appellant had deposited Rs. 36 lacs before the trial Court. Before the Mediation Centre, an amount of Rs. 7.75 crores was agreed between the parties as an out of Court settlement for those eight plots, which were to be allotted to the applicant-respondent No. 1. In a suit for specific performance, the alternative relief of return of the earnest money along with interest can be granted by a Court. In the present case, applicant-respondent No. 1, with open eyes, had accepted the settlement and signed the agreement with the assistance of his counsel and after accepting the cheques, as far as the applicant-respondent No. 1 is concerned, the compromise had been effected. Even the stringent condition imposed upon M/s. Ansal Properties-appellant was not flouted. Therefore, the settlement arrived at between the parties, cannot be set aside. 34. In the light of the above discussion, once the applicant- respondent No. 1 (Shashi Bhushan) had encashed seven post dated cheques, the application under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC is dismissed with costs of Rs. 50,000/- to be deposited by the applicant-respondent No. 1 with Punjab and Haryana High Court Legal Service Committee at the Camp Office. The compromise effected between the parties before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre is accepted as having been complied with in all terms and conditions. The present regular second appeals i.e. RSA Nos. 3049 of 2013, 3171 of 2013 and 4846 of 2013 are disposed of in terms of settlement agreement dated 25.03.2014. 35. A direction is given to the appellant to deposit a fresh cheque in lieu of cheque No. 128692 amounting to Rs. 1 crore with the Registry of this Court within two weeks. Thereafter, the Registry shall hand over the said cheque to the applicant-respondent No. 1 along with other cheques which are tagged by him with his application (CM No. 1174-C of 2015).