JUDGMENT : Hon'ble RAFIQ, J.—This writ petition has been filed by petitioner M/s Naraini Metals Industries challenging the order dated 18.07.2011 passed by the Rent Tribunal, Jaipur, and order dated 19.02.2015 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Jaipur, with prayer that the same be set aside and the original application filed by the landlord-respondent for eviction of the tenant-petitioner be dismissed. 2. Factual matrix of the case is that the disputed premises were let out to the tenant-petitioner by late Shri Mathura Das Kotewala, the predecessor in title of the landlord-respondent. He, during his lifetime, filed a suit for eviction against the tenant-petitioner, which was dismissed on 30.06.1978. He thereafter filed another suit in the year 1982, which too was dismissed in default as well as for want of prosecution, because in the meantime another petition for eviction of the tenant-petitioner was filed by respondent Ajay Kumar, the grandson of Seth Mathura Das, under Sections 9 and 18 of the Rent Control Act, 2001. He also filed another application under Sections 6 and 14 of the Rent Control Act for determination of rent, and both the applications were consolidated vide order dated 23.09.2010. Issue no.5 framed in the said application was to the effect whether in the respect of the suit premise there exists relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties? Issue no.6 was to the effect whether the application filed under the new Act is maintainable while pendency of the suit under the repealed Act, by the landlord? Issue no.7 was to the effect whether the will executed by late Shri Mathura Das in favour of grandson Ajay Kumar is a forged document executed with oblique motive to get rid of tenant. 3. It would be pertinent to mention here that Ajay Kumar on the basis of will dated 10.07.2000 executed in his favour by Seth Mathura Das, filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC, for his impleadment as plaintiff in the suit for eviction filed by original landlord Mathura Das. The application was allowed by order dated 23.07.2005. Tenant-petitioner M/s. Naraini Metals Industries challenged the aforesaid order in Writ Petition No.8317/2006. The application was allowed by order dated 23.07.2005. Tenant-petitioner M/s. Naraini Metals Industries challenged the aforesaid order in Writ Petition No.8317/2006. This court, vide order dated 13.04.2007, disposed of the writ petition on the premise that regardless of the fact that as to who is substituted as a landlord or the plaintiff, the status of the petitioner would always continue to be that of the tenant. However, opportunity was given to the tenant-petitioner to raise the objections before the Rent Tribunal. The said suit was later not prosecuted by the landlord and was dismissed in default. 4. The tenant-petitioner filed an application before the Rent Tribunal that the aforementioned Issues nos.5, 6 and 7 be tried as preliminary issues. The application was rejected. The Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Rent Tribunal both directed eviction of the tenant-petitioner. Therefore two writ petitions, being S.B. Civil Writ Petitions No.5571/2007 and 5598/2007 were filed by the tenant-petitioner M/s Naraini Metals Industries, before this court against the order dated 21.05.2007 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal. This court, vide order dated 25.08.2010, disposed of the same with direction that the Rent Tribunal, Jaipur City, Jaipur, shall first decide the Issues No.5, 6 and 7 within a period of one month. In case those issues are decided against the tenant-petitioner, the Rent Tribunal shall decide rest of the issues within further one month. The orders passed by the Rent Tribunal and Appellate Rent Tribunal were set aside accordingly and the writ petitions were disposed of. 5. After hearing both the parties, the Rent Tribunal, vide order dated 18.07.2011, decided the Issues no.5, 6 and 7 against the tenant-petitioner. Aggrieved thereby, the tenant-petitioner approached the Appellate Rent Tribunal by filing appeal, which came be dismissed vide judgment dated 19.02.2015. Hence this writ petition. 6. Shri R.P. Garg, learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner, argued that the late Shri Mathura Das filed a suit against tenant-petitioner, which was dismissed on 30.06.1978 and thereafter he filed another suit on false grounds which remained pending before the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.5 till 2011. Present Eviction Petition filed during the pendency of the said suit was not maintainable. Said suit was got dismissed in default with a view to maintain the present proceedings before the Rent Tribunal, which are legally not tenable and cannot be continued. Present Eviction Petition filed during the pendency of the said suit was not maintainable. Said suit was got dismissed in default with a view to maintain the present proceedings before the Rent Tribunal, which are legally not tenable and cannot be continued. The findings recorded by both the courts below on issues no.5, 6 and 7 are perverse. There must exist relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, which is absent in the present case. Admittedly the petitioner was tenant of late Shri Mathura Das. The suit filed by late Shri Mathura Das remained pending even after his death on 01.11.2001. After his death, his son Nand Kumar filed an application to substitute him as plaintiff/legal representative in the suit, and, as such, the present eviction petition filed before the Rent Tribunal under the provisions of new Act is ab-inito void and cannot be said to have been filed by the competent person i.e. Ajay Kumar, who is not the landlord. He prepared a fabricated will dated 10.07.2000, which cannot be relied. The said will was never brought to the notice of the courts below in civil suit and after death of late Shri Mathura Das, Nand Kumar became his legal representative in the suit pending before the court of Additional Civil Judge. It is only when he was not sure of success in the suit, that a fabricated will was prepared to take advantage under the new Act. The property in question has thus been fictitiously shown to be given in will to respondent Ajay Kumar. 7. Shri R.P. Garg, learned counsel, argued that the courts below have committed an error in not taking into consideration the report of handwriting expert filed by tenant-petitioner, which proves that the alleged will was fabricated. The will is neither stamped nor attested and the same is prepared only on the letter head. As per the contents of the will, Mathura Das appointed Manohar Das as arbitrator, but Manohar Das has not been produced in the witness box. As per PW-3 Raman Lal, who was appointed as executor of the will, the will was to be acted upon within six months of the death of Mathura Das, but the same was not acted upon within that period and for the first time it was disclosed in January, 2003. He stated that he was unaware of the contents of the will. He stated that he was unaware of the contents of the will. He was present on the 12th day ceremony of deceased Mathura Das but was not informed about the will. In the original application, it was stated that the alleged will was given by Ghanshyam Das (PW-5) but PW-1 in cross-examination admitted that the will was given by Raman Das to Nand Kumar and a perusal of statement of Raman Kumar goes to show that he is not stating truth. In view of the above, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. 8. Learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner argued that in view of the provisions of Section 32 of the Rent Control Act, 2001, another suit could not be filed without withdrawing the previous suit. The courts below have committed gross error in deciding Issue no.6 against the tenant-petitioner only on the ground that the grounds in previous suit, which was pending, and new suit, are different, whereas both the suits were filed on the same grounds. Learned counsel, in support of his arguments, has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in SK. Sattar SK. Mohd. Choudhary vs. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate – (1996) 6 SCC 373 , and argued that filing of the eviction petition in the new Act was barred in view of pendency of the suit filed for eviction against the tenant-petitioner by the original landlord Mathura Das. 9. On the other hand, Shri G. Bardhar, learned counsel for landlord-respondent, opposed the writ petition and submitted that there is no inter-se dispute between the family members of late Shri Mathura Das, who acknowledged the correctness of the will. Shri Mathur Das, in his will, has bequeathed different parcels of his property to various other legal heirs and not only to Nand Kumar. Ajay Kumar even otherwise happens to be his grandson and therefore there was nothing unusual in the will. The tenant-petitioner has no locus to allege that the will was forged or fabricated and that it was prepared only with a view to evicting him from the disputed property. It was vide order of this court dated 25.08.2010 passed in the two writ petitions filed by tenant-petitioner that Issues no.5, 6 and 7 were directed to be decided first as preliminary issues. It was vide order of this court dated 25.08.2010 passed in the two writ petitions filed by tenant-petitioner that Issues no.5, 6 and 7 were directed to be decided first as preliminary issues. Now that those issues have been decided against the tenant-petitioner, he cannot be allowed to say that they have been wrongly decided. The main suit is still to be decided on merits. 10. I have given my anxious consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. 11. Perusal of the impugned orders passed by the Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Rent Tribunal goes to show that both the courts below have examined the evidence led by the parties on Issues no.5, 6 and 7. The tenant-petitioner, in his capacity as tenant, has indeed no locus to question the correctness of the will. He has no valid justification not to acknowledge Ajay Kumar as landlord, whose entitlement is apparent from the will executed by late Mathura Das. No credence can be given to the report of private handwriting expert particularly when there is no allegation about any forgery in execution of the will by any other family member of late Shri Mathura Das and no police case was registered by any one of them or any third party. The tenant-petitioner cannot be permitted to chose his landlord. It is another matter as to what would be the decision of the Rent Tribunal on merits of the original application but the decision of the courts below on the question of existence of relationship the landlord and tenant between the parties and the maintainability of eviction petition, despite pendency of the suit and bona-fides of will, cannot be faulted. 12. There is no bar in law in filing a fresh suit under the new Act if the suit under the repealed Act was pending. Even as per provisions of Section 32(3) of the new Act, if the suit is pending under the repealed Act, it can be withdrawn with liberty to file fresh suit. Even if the suit so filed by original landlord was dismissed on the ground on which it was earlier filed, fresh suit on new grounds would not be barred. 13. Even as per provisions of Section 32(3) of the new Act, if the suit is pending under the repealed Act, it can be withdrawn with liberty to file fresh suit. Even if the suit so filed by original landlord was dismissed on the ground on which it was earlier filed, fresh suit on new grounds would not be barred. 13. This court had an occasion to deal with somewhat similar argument in Chetna Dadhich, supra, in which case the landlord had filed a suit for eviction against tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent in the Act of 1950, which was dismissed and appeal against that suit, was pending at the time of enforcement of the Act of 2001. Landlord filed a fresh petition for eviction. The objection as to maintainability of such fresh petition for eviction was raised by the tenant on the ground that according to Section 32(3) if the suit/appeal was pending between the landlord and tenant, the landlord had liberty to withdraw the suit or even appeal, with a view to filing of fresh eviction petition. Reliance in this connection was placed on sub-section 3(1) (a) of Section 32 of the Act of 2001, according to which if the landlord wanted to file a fresh petition for eviction of the tenant, he was required to obtain permission of the court prior to doing so. In those facts, this court in Para 5 and 6 of the report held thus, “5. What was intended to be withdrawn was the pending suit or appeal, as would be evident from the language used in sub-sec. 3(1) (a) that the “plaintiff within a period of one hundred and eight days of coming into force of this Act shall be entitled to withdraw any suit or appeal or any other proceeding pending under the repealed Act”. A right has therefore been given to the plaintiff to decide to withdraw the suit or appeal as the case may be to institute fresh proceeding under the Act of 2001 on the basis of same cause of action and grounds on which that suit / appeal was filed. A right has therefore been given to the plaintiff to decide to withdraw the suit or appeal as the case may be to institute fresh proceeding under the Act of 2001 on the basis of same cause of action and grounds on which that suit / appeal was filed. Such fresh proceedings are required to be filed within a period of 270 days i.e. nine months and if so done, such fresh proceedings shall be deemed to have been filed on the date of filing of the suit/appeal/other proceedings which were so withdrawn. 6. Right has therefore been conferred on the plaintiff/appellant to continue the proceedings under the old Act for which clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 32 provides that all prosecutions instituted under the provisions of the repealed Act shall be effective and disposed of in accordance with such repealed law, including the right of appeal which has been provided in clause (b) providing that “the provision for appeal under the repealed Act shall continue in force in respect of applications, suits and proceedings disposed of thereunder”. If however the plaintiff does not decide to withdraw the suit or the appeal in case the suit or appeal is pending at the time of commencement of Act of 2001, it would be continued and decided in accordance with old law. Such non withdrawal of suit or appeal however does not debar instituting a fresh proceeding by filing fresh petition under any of the provisions of the Act of 2001 provided it is based on a fresh cause of action, though nature of ground for ejectment may even be same.” 14. The Supreme Court in Surajmal vs. Radheshyam – AIR 1988 SC 1345 , held that even after dismissal of first suit for eviction, second suit for eviction of premises on the ground of bona-fide need is competent. Similar view was expressed in N.R. Narayan Swamy vs. B. Francis Jagan – AIR 2001 SC 2469 , wherein the Supreme Court, while dealing with a case arising out of Sec. 45 of Karnataka Rent Control Act, which contains the provisions analogous to Sec. 10 of the CPC relating to res-judicata, held that successive suits can be filed by landlord on ground of bona fide requirement or non-payment of rent. Even if the first suit is withdrawn as not pressed, second suit would not be barred either by Order 23 Rule 1(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure or by Section 45 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. In that case, previous suit for eviction was withdrawn as not pressed and second suit was filed on the ground of bona-fide requirement of landlord. It was held by the Supreme Court that Section 45 incorporates principle of res-judicata. This Section would have no application as to previous proceedings for taking possession of the suit premise and it was not pressed and the suit was decided without any issue. 15. I therefore do not find any merit in this writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. Stay application is also dismissed.