JUDGMENT 1. - The instant writ application witnesses a challenge to the award dated 6th September, 1996, passed by the Labour Court, Ajmer. The President, Ajmer Adhyogik Karmachari Sangh, Ajmer, (hereinafter referred to as 'petitioner-Sangh', for short), in the writ application, has prayed for the following relief(s):- "(A) Call for the relevant file LCR No.4/96(35/84- Ajmer Udyog Karmachari Sangh v. M/s Toshniwal Industries Pvt. Ltd., Ajmer ) from the Respondent No.1. (B) To issue a writ of mandamus, order or direction and thereby quash and set aside the Award Ex.3 and consequently declare "lay off" of workman of Servashri Dhan Singhi, Shanker Singh and Ratan Singh (vide Ex.1/Ex. M-3 and Ex.2/ Ex.-M-5) as illegal, unlawful and invalid. (C) Issue a writ of mandamus, order or direction and thereby direct the managements to pay to the aforesaid workmen the arrears of wages with all consequential benefits, deducting the amount already paid to them. (D) Costs of this writ petition be also allowed to the petitioner from the Respondent. (E) Any other relief in the facts and circumstances of the case that this Hon'ble High Court deems just and proper, may also kindly be allowed and passed in favour of the petitioner." 2. Briefly, the indispensable material facts necessary for appreciation of the controversy raised needs to be first noticed. The reference, made by the State Government on 23rd January, 1984, was forwarded to the Labour Court, Jaipur for adjudication, which was registered as LCR No. 35/1984, and was subsequently transferred to the Labour Court, Ajmer, and was registered as LCR No.4/1996 at Ajmer. 3. The petitioner-Sangh assailing the legality, validity and correctness of the action of the management of M/s Toshniwal Industries Pvt. Ltd., Ajmer (hereinafter referred to as 'respondent-employer', for short) while resorting to "lay off" and "retrenchment", in their factory from January, 1981 and in the year 1980, wherein the number of workers on the Muster Roll was more than 300, alleged it to be illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the provisions under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1947', for short). 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner-Sangh, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application, strenuously argued that the impugned award is perverse and contrary to the facts and materials available on record. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner-Sangh, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application, strenuously argued that the impugned award is perverse and contrary to the facts and materials available on record. The learned counsel would further submit that "lay off" of Shri Shankar Singh was made effective from 16th May, 1983 and that of Shri Dhan Singh and Shri Ratan Singh was w.e.f. 1st October, 1983. Shri Dhan Singh and Shanker Singh were continued on "lay off" by the management for a period of more than 13 years and that by itself is an illegal, unlawful and unfair action on the part of the management of respondent-employer. 5. Further, payment of 50% of wages by the management, under the provisions of Section 25-C of the Act of 1947, was immaterial and the Labour Court lost sight of this aspect. It is contended that the power under the provisions of Section 2(kkk) of the Act of 1947, for "lay off" could be exercised only for a short period and not for several years. The learned counsel to reinforce his submissions has placed reliance on the opinion of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Special Officer & Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies Vanivilas Sugar Factory Hariyar and another etc. etc. v. Workman of Vanivilas Co-operative Sugar Factory & Others: 1996(2) Labour & Industrial Cases, 2531. 6. The finding of the Labour Court as to locus-standi, has also been assailed referring to documents exhibit W-13, W-14, W-15 and W-16. The management had recognised the petitioner-Sangh, as would be evident from the settlement, which dates back to 15th July, 1979. Moreover, the Labour Court erred in relying upon the citations/precedents referred to and relied upon by the respondent-employer while ignoring the citations/precedents which were referred to on behalf of the petitioner-Sangh. It is further urged that one of the worker namely Smt. Sarla Sharma, who too was "laid off", was reinstated by the management as would be evident from the settlement arrived at by the petitioner-Sangh and the management of respondent-employer on 15th December, 1983 (Ex.13). The impugned award has also been faulted for the respondent-employer did not adopt any valid criteria while resorting to "lay off". Illustration of re-instating of the junior workmen in the same branch while leaving out the seniors is the ground pleaded while assailing the action. 7. The impugned award has also been faulted for the respondent-employer did not adopt any valid criteria while resorting to "lay off". Illustration of re-instating of the junior workmen in the same branch while leaving out the seniors is the ground pleaded while assailing the action. 7. Moreover, there was considerable improvement in the financial position of the establishment of the respondent-employer, and therefore, "lay off" could not have been continued for a long time of 13 years. Shri Ratan Singh, a Class IV employee was "laid off" w.e.f. 1st October, 1983, while he was on service on that very day at 9.00 am and he was not extended any alternative employment while being senior most amongest Class IV employees and that fact itself is an indicative of mala fide intention and victimization. 8. The number of workmen in the employment of the establishment of respondent-employer was more than 300 at the relevant time, and therefore, the action of the respondent-employer is in violation of provisions of Section 25-M, which prohibits "lay off" by virtue of application of Chapter V-B in view of Section 25-K. 9. According to the learned counsel, 'lay off' does not result in termination of employer employee relationship rather the relationship stands suspended only for a temporary period for grounds which have temporary significance. To support his submissions, he has relied upon the opinion of the Bombay High Court in Rastriya Maharashtra v. K. B. Satpute, Assistant, decided on 18th July, 1983; (1984) IILLJ 781 Bom referring to paragraph 11-A of the judgment. 10. Per contra Mr. Rahul Sharma, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of respondent-employer, reiterating the stand before the Labour Court and contents of reply to the writ application while supporting the impugned award dated 6th September, 1996, submitted that the findings have been arrived at by the Labour Court, taking into consideration, the pleadings of the parties, evidence adduced by the parties and in the light of the precedents; which are perfectly legal and valid and calls for no interference by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel would further submit that the instant case is that of "lay off" as defined under Section 2(kkk) of the Act of 1947, and not that of "retrenchment", and therefore, the arguments raised are absolutely misconceived. 11. The learned counsel would further submit that the instant case is that of "lay off" as defined under Section 2(kkk) of the Act of 1947, and not that of "retrenchment", and therefore, the arguments raised are absolutely misconceived. 11. According to the learned counsel the number of workmen in the establishment of respondent No.2, at the relevant time, was far less than 300, and therefore, the grounds pleaded and assertions made alleging application of the provisions of Chapter V-B of the Act of 1947, are absolutely baseless and without any substance. According to the learned counsel, the total number of employees in the establishment of respondent No.2 was 252 out of whom only 192, were permanent workmen. The relevant record, to substantiate these facts, was also produced before the Labour Court and was perused by the representative of the petitioner-Sangh, as would be evident from the findings recorded by the Labour Court in paragraph 19 of the impugned award. Further, it is permissible for the management of the respondent No.2, to resort to "lay off" and "retrenchment" under Chapter V-A of the Act of 1947, for which the provisions were made under the standing orders of the establishment. 12. The fact that the services of Shri Dhan Singh were never terminated and he continued to work in the establishment is a fact proved before the Labour Court, and therefore, the question of his reinstatement with full back wages simply did not arise. 13. Furthermore, the issue of reinstatement of Shri Ratan Singh was rendered in fructuous in view of his "retrenchment", which was held to be legal and valid by the Labour Court. All the original records and registers, were produced by the management of the respondent No.2 before the Labour Court to justify the action of the management while resorting to "lay off". 14. In the face of the finding arrived at by the Labour Court to the effect that the total number of employees in the establishment of respondent No.2, was 252 out of whom only 192 were permanent workmen, therefore, no consent by the State Government was necessary in view of the provisions of Section 25-K and 25-M of the Act of 1947. The amendment in Section 25-K is not retrospective in application. Further, there is no limitation prescribed for 'lay off' either under Section 25-C or under any other provisions of Act of 1947. 15. The amendment in Section 25-K is not retrospective in application. Further, there is no limitation prescribed for 'lay off' either under Section 25-C or under any other provisions of Act of 1947. 15. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the materials available on record. 16. At the outset, the learned counsel for the petitioner-Sangh submitted that Shri Dhan Singh, who was "laid off" vide order dated 30th September, 1983, continued as such up to the year 2004, and stood retired attaining the age of superannuation on 18th April, 2004. The order of "lay off" dated 14th May, 1983, qua Shri Shankar Singh was revoked on 30th June, 2004, and was taken on duty w.e.f 1st July, 2004. Subsequent to "lay off" w.e.f 1st October, 1983, Shri Ratan Singh was "retrenched" on 29th May, 1984, and his termination was held to be legal and valid vide award dated 25th June, 1996, as is reflected from the Additional Affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No.2. It is further reflected from the Additional Affidavit that gratuity has also been paid to Shri Dhan Singh on 19th April, 2004. 17. From the materials available on record and the findings arrived at by the Labour Court, it is evident that the number of workmen, in the establishment of respondent No.2, at the relevant time, in the month of May, September and October, 1983, was 192. The provisions of Chapter V-B, are applicable to an Industrial Establishment in which not less than 300 workmen were employed on an average number of working days in the preceding 12 months. Lateron, the number of workmen from 'three hundred' was substituted by 'one hundred' w.e.f. 21st August, 1984, by way of an amendment. Thus, the prohibition of "lay off" as contemplated under Section 25-M, is not attracted. 18. In the case of Special Officer & Joint Registrar(supra), the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court dealt with the issue of determination as to whether the sugar factory was a seasonal industry or not . Thus, the prohibition of "lay off" as contemplated under Section 25-M, is not attracted. 18. In the case of Special Officer & Joint Registrar(supra), the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court dealt with the issue of determination as to whether the sugar factory was a seasonal industry or not . The observations made by the Court in that case, as referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner-Sangh, were made in the back drop of the singular facts of the case wherein the "lay off" notice issued was assailed, for it recited the industry as seasonal industry and was running in losses and the provisions of Section 25-C to 25-E of Chapter V-A were not applicable. Furthermore, the factory in that case claimed that to utilise the optimum level of capacity, the Factory required 2.00 lakh tonnes of sugarcane every year, but from the date of inception, the Factory was unable to secure the sugarcane for the purpose of reaching the optimum level for a period of over 13 years and never felt it necessary to give "lay-off" to the workmen, and therefore, the "lay-off" for a substantial long period was observed not to be the bona fide exercise of power. The plea that Factory was a seasonal industry was not accepted. The number of workmen was 600 out of whom 338 were permanent and remaining were seasonal. 19. From the facts of the case relied as aforesaid, it is revealed that the decision to declare the Factory as a 'seasonal industry' was already taken on behalf of the Government as guided by the Cabinet without application of mind whereas the facts of the instant case at hand are entirely distinct, different and distinguishable from the one, referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner-Sangh. 20. The fact that law does not lay down any specific or definite period for 'lay off' is not in dispute. Whether the 'lay off' at a particular time, is legal and valid would depend upon the attending circumstances of a particular case. Thus, there is no principle of law involved in the argument that in the instant case at hand, the 'lay off' which continued for over a period of more than 20 years was illegal by virtue of its period itself. 21. Thus, there is no principle of law involved in the argument that in the instant case at hand, the 'lay off' which continued for over a period of more than 20 years was illegal by virtue of its period itself. 21. In the case of Rashtriya Maharashtra Elektrosmelt Kamgar Sangh (supra), the Bombay High Court dealt with a question as to whether the management can take its own time for commencing the "lay off" even though the date of commencement of "lay off" is mentioned in the application or the management must start giving the "lay off" from the date mentioned in the application or if no date is mentioned or the date mentioned has already expired before permission is granted or is deemed to have been granted, then the "lay off" must be given from the date of the order granting the permission. Further, the case aforesaid was an establishment where 'lay off' became necessary to the extent of 500 employees for a period of 3 to 6 months, out of total 895 workmen which attracted the application of Chapter V-B. 22. The definition of 'lay off' as contained under Section 2 (kkk) of the Act of 1947, reads thus: "Section 2(kkk). "lay-off" (with its grammatical and cognate expressions) means the failure, refusal or inability of an employer on account of shortage of coal, power or raw materials or the accumulation of stocks or the breakdown of machinery [or natural calamity or for any other connected reason] to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls of his industrial establishment and who has not been retrenched. Explanation.--Every workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls of the industrial establishment and who presents himself for work at the establishment at the time appointed for the purpose during normal working hours on any day and is not given employment by the employer within two hours of his so presenting himself shall be deemed to have been laid-off for that day within the meaning of this clause: Provided that if the workman, instead of being given employment at the commencement of any shift for any day is asked to present himself for the purpose during the second half of the shift for the day and is given employment then, he shall be deemed to have been laid-off only for one-half of that day: Provided further that if he is not given any such employment even after so presenting himself, he shall not be deemed to have been laid-off for the second half of the shift for the day and shall be entitled to full basic wages and dearness allowance for that part of the day;]" 23. A glance of the text of the definition clause of 'lay off' as defined under Section 2(kkk) of the Act of 1947, would reveal that it confers a new right upon the employer during the period as contemplated under the definition of 'lay off' were in existence with reference to the circumstances detailed out therein where the employer is unable to give employment to a workman, as would be reflected from the use of phrase 'for any other connected reason'. 24. By now, it is well settled law that Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal while adjudicating an industrial dispute, are vested with wide discretion and if the discretion vested is exercised keeping in view the facts and attending circumstances of the case, having regard to the pleaded facts, evidence adduced and material available on record; it will not be open for the High Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, to interfere with the same, but for well settled principles propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, for exercise of writ of certiorari while examining the legality and validity of an order/award passed by the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. 25. 25. For the reasons and discussions herein above, the writ application is devoid of any substance and lacks in merit, so as to warrant any interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 26. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. 27. No costs.W.P. dismissed. *******