ORDER : Ashok B. Hinchigeri, J. 1. The petitioning Transport Corporation, a beneficiary of the compulsory acquisition of lands in question, has called into question the order, dated 16.01.2013 (Annexure-G) passed by the Assistant Commissioner allowing the application filed by the private respondents under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to 'the said Act') by re-determining the market value of the land at Rs. 8,000/- per gunta. 2. Sri. V.P. Kulkarni, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the first respondent Assistant Commissioner and the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) awarded Rs. 18,000/- per acre and that aggrieved by the same, some land-owners sought the reference under Section 18 of the said Act. He submits that the private respondents herein had not sought the reference. In the reference proceedings of other land-owners, the market value was raised to Rs. 2,000/- per gunta by the Reference Court by its award, dated 30.09.2002. He submits that as the market value was raised upwards without making the beneficiary of the acquisition a party, it (beneficiary) filed W.P. No. 35006/2004. It came to be disposed of by this Court, by its order, dated 8.12.2006 (Annexure-R1) by remanding the matter to the Reference Court for the re-determination of the market value after affording adequate opportunities to the beneficiary. On the matter being remanded and on holding the re-enquiry, the Reference Court raised the market value to Rs. 8,000/- per gunta by its award, dated 20.12.2008. The determination of the market value at Rs. 8,000/- was confirmed in the appeal. 3. Sri. V.P. Kulkarni raises two contentions. When the contesting respondents herein have not made Section 28-A application pursuant to the Reference Court's first award, dated 30.09.2002, they are not entitled to maintain 28-A application pursuant to the Reference Court's second award, dated 20.12.2008 and its confirmation by the Appellate Court. The second contention urged by Sri. V.P. Kulkarni is that Section 28-A application is not signed by all the contesting respondents. He submits that the respondent No. 19 alone has signed the said application claiming to be the power of attorney holder of the other contesting respondents. He submits that the power of attorney document itself is not produced. 4. Sri. Ravi V. Hosamani, the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the SLAO and Sriyuths P.H. Gothkindi and V.G. Patil, learned advocates appearing for the respondent Nos. He submits that the power of attorney document itself is not produced. 4. Sri. Ravi V. Hosamani, the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the SLAO and Sriyuths P.H. Gothkindi and V.G. Patil, learned advocates appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 to 35 would however support the impugned order. Sri. P.H. Gothkindi and Sri. V.G. Patil submit that the general power of attorney document was indeed produced before the first respondent SLAO. 5. The only question that falls for my consideration is whether Section 28-A application ought to have been dismissed on the ground that it is not filed within three months from the date of the Reference Court's first award dated 30.9.2002. 6. To answer this question, advertence has to be made to the provisions contained in Section 28-A of the said Act. They are extracted herein below:- "28-A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court.-(1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11.1 the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under section 4.1 sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court." 7. A perusal of the aforesaid extracted provisions reveals that under Section 28-A of the said Act, the application has to be filed within three months from the date of the award of the Reference Court. Nowhere in Section 28-A, it is stated that it has to be from the date of the first award. If it is read that it has to be from the date of the first award only, it defeats the very object of introducing Section 28-A. In exercise of its wisdom, the legislature has said that the application has to be filed within three months from the date of the award. If it is read that it has to be from the date of the first award only, it defeats the very object of introducing Section 28-A. In exercise of its wisdom, the legislature has said that the application has to be filed within three months from the date of the award. The determination of the market value takes place at different tiers - (i) the Deputy Commissioner (in the instant case the SLAO) (ii) Reference Court in the L.A.C. (iii) by this Court in Miscellaneous First Appeal and finally (iv) by the Apex Court in the Special Leave Petition. There are always the possibilities of the Apex Court and this Court remanding the matter to the Reference Court. 8. It cannot be contended with any rate of success that Section 28-A benefit can be denied on the ground that the applicants have not filed the applications within three months from the date of the first award. In any case, the reference proceedings culminate in the last of the awards passed pursuant to the remand orders. The earlier award/awards passed by the Reference Court become non-existent in the wake of their setting aside by the Appellate Court. 9. The statement of objects and reasons of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68/1984, by virtue of which Section 28-A is inserted, inter-alia, reads as follows:- "The individual and institutions who are unavoidably to be deprived of their property rights in land need to be adequately compensated for the loss keeping in view the sacrifice they have to make for the larger interests of the community. The pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods often causes hardship to the affected parties and renders unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to them. (ix) Considering that the right of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the Act is not usually taken advantage of by inarticulate and poor people and is usually exercised only by the comparatively affluent landowners and that this causes considerable inequality in the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land to different interested parties, it is proposed of provide an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered under the same notification to seek re-determination of compensation, once any one of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference court under Section 18 of the Act." 10. The statement of objects and reasons appended to the Bill which became Amendment Act 68/1984 reveals the background, the purpose for which the amendment was made, that is for removing the manifest injustice. Introducing Section 28-A is to ensure that the benefit of claiming the just compensation is conferred even on those land-losers, who have not sought Section 18 reference for reasons of poverty, etc. Benevolent provision should not be read with non-benevolent eye. 11. It is helpful to refer to the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Union of India and another v. Pradeep Kumari and others, reported in AIR 1995 SC 2259 , wherein it is held that the limitation does not necessarily start from the date of the first award. The word 'first' cannot be read into Section 28-A. The relevant portion of the said decision is extracted here-in-below:- "9.... Section 28-A is, therefore, in the nature of a beneficent provision intended to remove inequality and to give relief to the inarticulate and poor people who are not able to take advantage of right of reference to the Civil Court under Section 18, of the Act. In relation to beneficent legislation, the law is well-settled that while construing the provisions of such a legislation the court should adopt a construction which advances the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than a construction which has the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it. The provisions of Section 28-A should, therefore, be construed keeping in view the object underlying the said provision.... 10..... There is nothing in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A to indicate that this right is confined in respect of the earliest award that is made by the Court after the coming into force of Section 28-A. By construing the expression 'where in an award under this Part' in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A to mean 'where in the first award made by the court under this part, the word 'first', which is not found in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A, is being read therein and thereby the amplitude of the said provision is being curtailed so as to restrict the benefit conferred by it........... 11. 11. By holding that the award referred to in Section 28-A(1) is the first award made after the coming into force of Section 28-A, such persons would be deprived of the benefit extended by Section 28-A. Such a construction would thus result in perpetuating the inequality in the payment of compensation which the legislature wanted to remove by enacting Section 28-A. The object underlying Section 28-A would be better achieved by giving the expression "an award" in Section 28-A its natural meaning as meaning the award that is made by the court in Part III of the Act after the coming into force of Section 28-A.............. 12. Since the cause of action for moving the application for re-determination of compensation under Section 28-A arises from the award on the basis of which re-determination of compensation is sought, the principle that "once the limitation begins to run, it runs in its full course until its running is interdicted by an order of the court" can have no application because the limitation for moving the application under Section 28-A will begin to run only from the date of the award on the basis of which re-determination of compensation is sought. 12. The aforesaid decision was also reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese and another v. Land Acquisition Collector and another, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 746 : AIR 1997 SC 1915 , by holding that the period of limitation has to be computed from the date of the Reference Court's award on the basis of which the re-determination is sought. It is helpful to refer to the Apex Court's judgment in the case of State of Tripura and another v. Roopchand Das and others, reported in (2003) 1 SCC 421 : 2002 AIR SCW 4859. Relevant portions of paragraph No. 4 of the said decision are extracted here-in-below:- "4....... Any construction to the contra introducing such words, not found engrafted in the very provision would amount to curtailing the amplitude of the provision resulting virtually in restricting a benefit conferred, particularly of a beneficent provision normally not permissible by judicial interpretation. Relevant portions of paragraph No. 4 of the said decision are extracted here-in-below:- "4....... Any construction to the contra introducing such words, not found engrafted in the very provision would amount to curtailing the amplitude of the provision resulting virtually in restricting a benefit conferred, particularly of a beneficent provision normally not permissible by judicial interpretation. It was also held therein that there is nothing in the wordings of Section 28-A to indicate that the legislature intended to confer any such limited benefit thereunder which would have the inevitable consequence of denying the benefit of higher amount on the basis of the subsequent award. Such an interpretation as would restrict the benefit of Section 28-A to the first of the awards in the series and in point of time, was also considered to result more in the perpetuation of the inequality in the payment of compensation, which the legislature specifically intended to remove by enacting the provision and that, therefore, the object underlying Section 28-A would be better served and achieved by giving the words "an award" in Section 28-A their natural meaning, as meaning any one of the awards made by the court under Part-III, after the coming into force of Section 28-A. That apart, in our view, even the later part of Section 28-A which stipulates, "require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court", leaves the choice to the person making such an application for re-determination, without confining or restricting the area of choice of such person to any one or the other, though it could be availed of only once and not as many number of times as there are so many awards." 13. It is also profitable to refer to the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in the case of State of Orissa and others v. Chitrasen Bhoi, reported in (2009) 17 SCC 74 : AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 397. Paragraph No. 12 of the said decision is extracted herein below: "12. In Union of India v. Kamail Singh a Bench of two Hon'ble Judges of this Court held that provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, as inserted by Act 68 of 1984, are prospective in nature and do not apply to an award made by a civil court prior to 24-9-1984. In Union of India v. Kamail Singh a Bench of two Hon'ble Judges of this Court held that provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, as inserted by Act 68 of 1984, are prospective in nature and do not apply to an award made by a civil court prior to 24-9-1984. The limitation of three months for making an application for re-determination of compensation is to be computed from the date of earliest award made by the civil court. However, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, AIR 1995 SC 2259 , overruled the judgment in Union of India v. Kamail Singh to the extent that an application for re-determination may be filed within three months from the date of the first award of the Reference Court observing that intention of the legislature was not to restrict the benefit of the amended law, to the extent that a claimant has to apply within limitation from the date of the first award of the Reference Court. Thus, it is permissible even to make an application on the basis of a subsequent Reference Court Award. However, it must be within the limitation from the date of making of the said subsequent award. This view was further clarified by this Court in State of Tripura v. Roopchand Das, 2002 AIR SCW 4859." 14. Considering the statement of objects and reasons, the unambiguous language employed in the statute itself and the laudable interpretation put by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above referred cases, I have no hesitation in holding that Section 28-A provides for making application within three months from the date of the award, on the basis of which the re-determination of the market value is sought. 15. As far as the second contention of the petitioner is concerned, I do not see any foundation for contending that all the parties have not signed Section 28-A application. Such a contention is neither taken in the objections filed by the petitioner to Section 28-A application nor any averments are made in the memorandum of this writ petition. The second contention therefore is liable to be negatived and accordingly it is negatived. 16. Such a contention is neither taken in the objections filed by the petitioner to Section 28-A application nor any averments are made in the memorandum of this writ petition. The second contention therefore is liable to be negatived and accordingly it is negatived. 16. Be that as it may, when the lands are acquired for the similar purpose, covered under the same notification, adjacent to each other and they possess similar features, some land-losers cannot be given higher compensation and others lesser compensation. If different market values are arrived at in respect of the similarly situated lands, it would violate the equal protection of law guaranteed by the Constitution. 17. If the SLAO has any difficulties as to which of the contesting respondents is entitled to what portion of the compensation-amount, it is always open to him to refer the matter to the Reference Court for apportionment. 18. In the result, I dismiss W.P. No. 77015/2013. 19. W.P. Nos. 77572-77574/2013 are filed seeking the writ of mandamus to the second respondent N.W.K.R.T.C. to deposit the amounts as per the second respondent S.L.A.O.'s award, dated 16/1/2013 (Annexure-A). It is trite that the pre-requirement for filing the petition for a writ of mandamus is making a demand upon the concerned authorities for the performance of the duty and on the inaction being shown by them, the writ of mandamus can be sought. In the instant case, the filing of this writ petition is not preceded by the making of the demand. I therefore dispose of W.P. Nos. 77572-77574/2013 with a direction to the petitioners to file appropriate representations to the respondent no. 2 within three weeks from the date of the issuance of the certified copy of today's order. There is no reason as to why the (NWKRTC and LAO) should not deposit the amounts as per the award at Annexure-A. If the respondents show any inaction in the matter of depositing the amounts with the Reference Court, it is always open to the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 77572-77574/2013 to seek the enforcement of the said award. 20. No order as to costs. Order accordingly.