JUDGMENT Rajan Roy, J. 1. Heard Dr. L.P. Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Ramesh Pandey, Advocate alongwith Sri Prashant Kumar Singh for opposite party No. 4, Sri S.B. Pandey, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India for the opposite party No. 1. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the judgment and order dated 5.3.2015 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow, whereby the Original Application No. 302 of 1997, Ashok Kumar Singh v. Union of India and others, filed by opposite party No. 4 herein has been allowed and the appointment of the petitioner herein on the post of Extra Departmental Branch Post Master (hereinafter referred as 'E.D.B.P.M.') has been quashed. 2. Facts of the case giving rise to this writ petition are that a selection was held for the post of E.D.B.P.M. in the year 1996-97, wherein the opposite party No. 4 was placed at Serial No. 1 in the merit-list, and the petitioner herein was placed at Serial No. 2. However, when the antecedents of the opposite party No. 4 were verified, two non-cognizable reports - one under Section 323 /504, I.P.C., and the other under Section 107 /116, Cr.P.C. - were found registered against him. Consequently, opposite party No. 4 was not given appointment, instead the petitioner herein was appointed vide order dated 1.7.1997. 3. Being aggrieved, the opposite party No. 4 herein filed an Original Application No. 302 of 1997 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow Bench. The Original Application was allowed on 6.5.2002 on the ground that the applicant therein could not have been denied appointment merely on account of existence of two non-cognizable reports against him. The appointment of respondent No. 4 therein (petitioner herein) was quashed. The official respondents were directed to consider the appointment of the applicant (respondent No. 4 herein) to the post in question within one month. 4. The appointment of respondent No. 4 therein (petitioner herein) was quashed. The official respondents were directed to consider the appointment of the applicant (respondent No. 4 herein) to the post in question within one month. 4. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed Satish Kumar Singh v. Union of India and others, Writ Petition No. 778 (SB) of 2002, challenging the aforesaid judgment of the Tribunal dated 6.5.2002 and on 22.5.2002 an interim order was passed by this Court, inter alia, to the effect "since the petitioner has been working for the last more than five years, he may continue till the next date of listing." As luck would have it, the writ petition could not be heard till 15.10.2014, when it was allowed with a direction to the Tribunal to decide claim of the petitioner strictly on the parameters of Rules and guidelines framed in the said direction as per the dictum of the Apex Court, and the judgment dated 6.5.2002 was quashed. This Court was of the view that higher marks in the High School by itself was not the determining factor for appointment on the post in question and there were other parameters also, such as adequacy of income, etc., which were also relevant. Thereafter, the Tribunal reconsidered the Original Application No. 302 of 1997 in the light of the judgment of this Court dated 15.10.2014 and has now again allowed the same by means of the impugned judgment dated 5.3.2015. 5. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal and before this Court since 1997 it is the petitioner has been functioning as E.D.B.P.M., but now as his appointment has been quashed, he has preferred the instant writ petition challenging the judgment of the Tribunal dated 5.3.2015. 6. Dr. 5. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal and before this Court since 1997 it is the petitioner has been functioning as E.D.B.P.M., but now as his appointment has been quashed, he has preferred the instant writ petition challenging the judgment of the Tribunal dated 5.3.2015. 6. Dr. L.P. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that while deciding the Original Application, the Tribunal has not kept in mind the observations/directions of this Court, as contained in the judgment dated 15.10.2014 nor the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case of Kiran Singh v. Union of India and others, 2007 (9) SCC 716 : 2007 (6) AWC 5946 (SC), wherein, it has been held in no uncertain terms that the eligibility criterion for selection of the candidate to the post of E.D.B.P.M. as per the Service Rules was not only the merit between the two candidates in High School examination, but the additional criterion was that the candidate must be one who has "adequate means of livelihood derived from landed property or immovable assets", if the candidate is otherwise eligible for appointment. No weightage is available for any higher qualification. Moreover, the opposite party No. 4 does not possess adequate and secure accommodation for running the post office, as his house is a Kachcha house. The learned Tribunal has erred in taking the view that the Rules do not envisage a comparative study of affluence of the parties and merely because a person owns a Kachcha house, that itself cannot be a ground for rejection of his candidature. 7. Dr. Mishra also contended that the opposite party No. 4 though had secured more marks than the petitioner in the High School, but did not have adequate source of livelihood from landed property and immovable assets, as, he had a holding of only 0.209 Hectares, while the, petitioner herein owned 0.334 Hectares of land and derived adequate source of livelihood therefrom. Apart from it, the petitioner owned a pucca house, as compared to the kachha house of the opposite party No. 4, which could not be said to be a secure place for running a post office. Apart from it, the petitioner owned a pucca house, as compared to the kachha house of the opposite party No. 4, which could not be said to be a secure place for running a post office. In this context, he invited the attention of the court to the relevant rules relating to recruitment of E.D.B.P.M. and the notification dated 23.5.1995 in pursuance to which the selection in question was held, as also a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Hari Ram Yadav v. Central Administrative Tribunal and others, 2012 (3) ESC 1368. According to him, the petitioner has been functioning since 1997, i.e., for the last about twenty-seven years, therefore, the quashing of his appointment at this stage, apart from being unsustainable in law, is also inequitable. 8. On the other hand, Sri Ramesh Pandey, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 4, has submitted that the only ground on which his client was not offered appointment in the year 1997 inspite of being placed at serial No. 1 in the merit-list, was, the alleged non-cognizable reports against him, which could not have been made a ground for rejection of his claim, as was ultimately held by the Central Administrative Tribunal and was also affirmed by the Division Bench while disposing of the writ petition filed by the petitioner vide judgment dated 15.10.2015. In pursuance to the said judgment the matter was reconsidered by the Tribunal, which has rightly allowed the Original Application No. 302 of 1997 by quashing the appointment of opposite party No. 4 (petitioner herein). The said judgment does not suffer from any error. Indisputably opposite party No. 4 has secured higher merit, High School marks and his candidature was not rejected on the ground of inadequacy of source of livelihood, but, only on the ground of existence of two non-cognizable reports. The said judgment does not suffer from any error. Indisputably opposite party No. 4 has secured higher merit, High School marks and his candidature was not rejected on the ground of inadequacy of source of livelihood, but, only on the ground of existence of two non-cognizable reports. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case of Suman Verma v. Union of India and others, (2004) 12 SCC 58 : 2004 (4) AWC 3381 (SC), wherein it was, inter alia, held that as respondent No. 6 (therein) possessed agricultural land and had obtained more marks than the appellant (therein), the direction of the Central Administrative Tribunal as well as the High Court to appoint her cannot be said to be illegal and that her case could not have been ignored by the authorities, and also that as the respondent No. 6 had approached the competent Tribunal for ventilating her grievance immediately after the issuance of order in favour of the appellant (therein), therefore, prejudice should not be caused to her merely on account of pendency of the dispute before the Courts/Tribunals, as she had approached the Tribunal in time. 9. Learned counsel for the opposite party No. 4 has further submitted that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Kiran Singh (supra) needs to be read in its totality, as, in the said case though the concerned party had secured higher marks in the High School, but did not have adequate source of livelihood from landed property and immovable assets, which were also necessary. The said party in the said case had only 15 decimal of unarable land, which was filled by rubbles, therefore, the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the said case have to be read and understood in this background. He further stated that owning a kachha house is not a disadvantage for such appointment and, in fact, now his client owns a pucca house. 10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. A perusal of the relevant rules relating to recruitment on the post in question, as annexed with the writ petition as Annexure-13, shows that the minimum educational qualification for the post of E.D.B.P.M. is Matriculation. The candidate should have adequate means of livelihood. 10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. A perusal of the relevant rules relating to recruitment on the post in question, as annexed with the writ petition as Annexure-13, shows that the minimum educational qualification for the post of E.D.B.P.M. is Matriculation. The candidate should have adequate means of livelihood. He should be able to offer office space to serve as the agency premises for postal operations. The relevant rule annexed with the writ petition refers that rent upto Rs. 10 payable heretofore, under the Directorate letter dated 21.1.1963, will cease to be payable with immediate effect. The premises must be such, as will serve as a small post office with provision for installation of even a P.C.O. (Business premises such as shops etc. may be preferred). The person who takes over the agency, must be a permanent resident of the village, where the post office is located. 12. Rule 6 refers to "Preferential Categories", namely Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, Ex-Army Postal Service Personnel, including Backward Classes and weaker sections of Society and educated unemployed persons, subject however to first and foremost condition that the candidate selected should have an adequate means of livelihood. The criterion to judge "adequate means of livelihood" should be that in case he loses his main source of income, he should be adjudged as incurring a disqualification to continue as E.D.B.P.M. 13. A perusal of judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kiran Singh's case (supra), reveals that it refers to a circulation dated 6.12.1993, which provides for preference being given to the candidate who has "adequate means of livelihood" derived from landed property or immovable assets, if they are otherwise eligible for appointment. 14. In Kiran Singh's case both the candidates possessed the qualifications of Matriculation, the one who had higher marks did not have adequate source of livelihood, as referred above. He owned only 15 decimals of unarable land which was filled with rubbles, whereas, the other candidate had adequate source of livelihood from landed property, therefore, in these circumstances, the Supreme Court upheld the appointment of the latter. The ratio of the judgment is that merit in the High School exam alone is not the determinative criterion for appointment on E.D.B.P.M., the candidate should also fulfil the income criterion as per the circular referred therein. The ratio of the judgment is that merit in the High School exam alone is not the determinative criterion for appointment on E.D.B.P.M., the candidate should also fulfil the income criterion as per the circular referred therein. Paragraph 20 of the judgment reads as under: "20. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view the order of C.A.T. which has been affirmed by the High Court is manifestly erroneous and cannot be sustained. The appellant and respondent No. 5 both have qualified the High School examination by securing first division. The eligibility criterion for the selection of the candidate to the post of E.D.B.P.M. as per the Service Rules was not only the merit between the two candidates in High School examination but the additional criterion was that the candidate must be one who has "adequate means of livelihood derived from landed property or immovable assets" if the candidate is otherwise eligible for appointment. The instructions governing the eligibility of the candidates also provide that no weightage will be given for any higher qualification. The appellant has fulfilled the essential qualification and required eligibility criterion and as such her selection to hold the post in question was valid whereas respondent 5 was not eligible to be appointed on the post for lack of income criterion in terms of the Circular." 15. However, the said judgment does not lay down any such proposition that in every case there has to be a comparative assessment of adequacy of livelihood of the candidates. Therefore, the judgment of the Tribunal to this extent is correct. If a candidate has higher marks in High School and also has inadequate source of livelihood from landed property or immovable assets in the sense that he will not be solely dependent for his sustenance on the remuneration received as E.D.B.P.M., then he qualifies for appointment, subject to being able to provide adequate and secure space for the post office. So, there was no occasion in such a scenario for a comparative assessment of the adequacy of livelihood of the candidates. So, there was no occasion in such a scenario for a comparative assessment of the adequacy of livelihood of the candidates. However, if such candidate did not have adequate source of livelihood, as in Kiran Singh's case (supra), then the one who had secured lessor marks in High School, but, fulfilled the income criterion as per the circular of the official opposite parties, would qualify for appointment, subject, of course, to the same condition, as referred above. 16. A perusal of the notification dated 23.5.1995 by which the selection in question was initiated reveals a recital at serial No. 1 to the effect that the candidate should have a residential house in the village and will have to make adequate arrangement for the post-office. Serial No. 4 refers to the requirement of income-certificate by the Revenue Officer to be annexed with the application form and that such candidates would be given preference who have adequate source of livelihood from landed property and immovable assets, if they are otherwise eligible. Clause 7 therein mentions that a certificate of the Village Pradhan will be submitted certifying that the candidate resides in the village where the post office is situated or is to be situated and that he has made arrangement of an adequate and secure place for such post office. However, it also goes on to say that after appointment the candidate will have to make arrangement for a suitable and secure place for running the post office. Thereafter, at the end of the notification under the heading 'Special Note' it is, inter alia mentioned, that the application-form should clearly mention that the candidate had made suitable and secure arrangement for the post-office prior to the selection. 17. Thus, we are of the view that apparently the notification contained contrary recitals as regards the arrangement to be made for the purpose of post-office. It is not clear as to whether necessary arrangements for running the post-office were to be made prior to the selection or after appointment, as there are contradictory recitals therein. Circulars are also not very clear on this issue. Rules annexed with the writ petition refer to the factum of rent being payable prior to 1963, but not thereafter, but there is no stipulation barring the candidate from taking an accommodation on rent for running the post-office. Circulars are also not very clear on this issue. Rules annexed with the writ petition refer to the factum of rent being payable prior to 1963, but not thereafter, but there is no stipulation barring the candidate from taking an accommodation on rent for running the post-office. In fact the appointment order of the petitioner on the post of E.D.B.P.M. itself states that he will have to provide suitable accommodation for housing the post-office, for which no rent will be payable by the department. This again suggests that such accommodation could be provided after the appointment, yet there are contrary recitals in the notification referred above. But in any case, the condition in the appointment order does not bar the renting of accommodation by the candidate for the purposes of post-office, though there is no clear provision in this regard. Learned counsel appearing for Union of India was also not in a position to clarify the position in this regard. The judgment impugned herein as also the other judgments relied upon also do not throw any light on this issue. 18. It is not in dispute that the opposite party No. 4 was placed at serial No. 1 in the merit-list prepared on the basis of High School marks. The counter-affidavit filed before the Tribunal reveals that he was not offered appointment on account of existence of two non-cognizable reports under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It does not state the suitability of the opposite party No. 4 based on the parameters of adequacy of source of livelihood and arrangement of suitable and secure place for post-office was considered by opposite parties in the year 1997. Counter-affidavit does not say that the opposite party No. 4 was in any other manner ineligible or unsuitable, though it says that the merit secured in the High School is not the main criteria. 19. The opposite party No. 4 owns landed property measuring 0.290 Hectare. He had annexed income certificate issued by the Revenue Official, wherein his annual income was mentioned as 24,000. His own case was that he owned a kachha house, though it was submitted at the Bar by his counsel that now he owns a pucca house also, but this plea has not been made in the pleadings. 20. He had annexed income certificate issued by the Revenue Official, wherein his annual income was mentioned as 24,000. His own case was that he owned a kachha house, though it was submitted at the Bar by his counsel that now he owns a pucca house also, but this plea has not been made in the pleadings. 20. On a perusal of the impugned judgment, the relevant rules and the judgments referred to by the rival parties, we are of the view that the learned Tribunal insofar as it has observed that merit alone (merit in the High School) is not the determining criterion and the governing principle is adequacy of livelihood and adequate arrangement for running post-office, without there being any requirement of a comparative study of affluence, is right in saying so, subject to the caveat that firstly the High School marks and adequacy of source of the livelihood based on landed property or immovable assets are to be seen. If a candidate has secured higher marks in the High School and has adequate source of livelihood from the landed property and immovable assets, then there is no question of a comparative assessment of adequacy of livelihood with another candidate. However, another aspect which is to be kept in mind is whether he is able to offer a suitable and secure place for running the post-office. As far as this particular aspect is concerned, there is ambiguity in the policy and notification of the official opposite parties. It is not clear as to whether only pucca houses are suitable and secure according to them, or even kachha houses in rural areas pass the test. Observations contained in the judgment in Hari Ram Yadav's case (supra), relied upon by the petitioner, in this regard, are not based on any policy, rule or circular applicable in such matters. They have been made in the facts of the case, therefore, they do not constitute a binding precedent on this issue. It is also not clear as to whether an accommodation could be taken on rent, if so, whether this is to be done prior to the selection or after appointment. This aspect ought to have been clarified by the Tribunal from the official opposite parties, but it did not do so, instead it proceeded to decide the matter on its own understanding of the parameters of selection. 21. This aspect ought to have been clarified by the Tribunal from the official opposite parties, but it did not do so, instead it proceeded to decide the matter on its own understanding of the parameters of selection. 21. The Tribunal further held that the opposite party No. 4 herein had secured higher marks in High School and had some landed property, which was only marginally different from the petitioner herein, therefore, the respondent before it did not score a march, based on these parameters. The difference was only with regard to the houses owned. It has held that mere possession of kachha house cannot be a disqualification, as many rural post-offices are running from them. There is nothing to show that areawise there is no place to locate a post-office. We have reservations about this last portion, which finds place in paragraph 7 of the copy of the impugned judgment, annexed with the writ petition. The policy/circulars are not clear on the issue of providing adequate and secure space to be offered. The Tribunal did not have the necessary information before it nor the expertise to embark upon an exercise of assessment of suitability of the candidates, may be, it was persuaded to do so by the directions issued by this Court in the judgment dated 15.10.2014 referred earlier, but in our view it was not obligatory on its part to do so, certainly not without having sufficient information. The Tribunal lost sight of the fact that the case of the applicant before it had not been considered or rejected by the official opposite parties on these parameters, but had been rejected only on account of two non-cognizable reports relating to criminal offence, therefore, first of all the assessment of suitability based on adequacy of livelihood etc. was required to be considered by the concerned authorities. The Tribunal should have relegated the matter to the authorities instead of deciding the suitability of the candidates itself. The judgment of the Tribunal, therefore, to this extent is erroneous and cannot be sustained. Subject to above, it is hereby set aside. 22. was required to be considered by the concerned authorities. The Tribunal should have relegated the matter to the authorities instead of deciding the suitability of the candidates itself. The judgment of the Tribunal, therefore, to this extent is erroneous and cannot be sustained. Subject to above, it is hereby set aside. 22. In view of the above discussion, the official respondents are directed to reconsider the case of the petitioner and the opposite party No. 4 for selection and appointment on the post of E.D.B.P.M. in respect of the post office in question as per the relevant rules and parameters framed for the said purpose, after seeking necessary clarification from the concerned Head of the Department/Ministry as regards the ambivalence in the policy, keeping in mind the observations made hereinabove, but ignoring the observations of the learned Tribunal, as contained in paragraph 7 of the impugned judgment. 23. Normally such selections are open to all, but considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, wherein opposite party No. 4 has been litigating since 1997, having approached the Tribunal well within time and he should not be prejudiced on account of mere pendency of this dispute for almost 27 years before the courts/Tribunals, as also the fact that the petitioner has been functioning ever since then, we confine this re-consideration to the warring parties before us. 24. Based on the aforesaid, the concerned authority shall take a fresh decision in this matter within a period of four months from the date of communication of a certified copy of this judgment. 25. Till a fresh decision is taken, the petitioner shall be allowed to function on the post in question, subject, however, to the fresh decision to be taken, as aforesaid. The writ petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.