JUDGMENT : Hon'ble AHLUWALIA, J.—On 21.5.2008, at about 9:30/10:00 PM, Dabi @ Sahil was murdered by Bunty @ Shoyab s/o Shaukat, Shahzad s/o Babu Bhai, Shakil s/o Shafi, Arif and Boniya at the tea vend of Irfan. At the very initial stage Arif was determined as delinquent juvenile in conflict with law and was sent for trial before the concerned Juvenile Justice Board. Three accused, Bunty @ Shoyab, Shehzad and Shakil were sent for trial, on the basis of written report (Exhibit-P/8), which led to registration of FIR No.295/2008 at Police Station Gumanpura, Kota. 2. In the written report (Exhibit-P/8), the complainant Shanu Painter (P.W.7) stated that on 21.5.2008, at about 9:00/9:30 PM, he along with Dabi @ Sahil @ Mohd. Arif, Akhtar (P.W.3), Abdul Rameez (P.W.8), Ali Bahadur (P.W.10) and Ramchandra Meghwal (P.W.9) were taking tea at the Tea Vend of Irfan. Dabi @ Shoyab in order to urinate himself went behind the tea vend. After sometime, Dabi @ Shoyab raised noise of 'Bachao Bachao' upon which they all ran at the back of tin shed of tea vend and witnessed that Bunty s/o Shaukat armed with sword, Shakil, Boniya, Shahzad and Arif all four armed with knives were causing injuries to Dabi @ Sahil. Bunty gave a sword blow on the left side of head of Dabi @ Sahil. Shahzad gave a knife blow on the right arm pit. Boniya and Arif gave knife blows each on the chest and Shakil gave knife blow on buttocks. Due to receipt of injuries, Dabi @ Sahil died at the spot. Shanu Painter, Sikku, Ramchandra Meghwal, Akhtar and Ali Bahadur ran to save him then, all the accused persons ran away from the spot along with their weapons. The complainant along with other witnesses brought Dabi @ Sahil in an auto-rickshaw to MBS Hospital, Kota, where he was got admitted for treatment. During treatment, after sometime Dabi @ Sahil was declared dead. Few days before, Dabhi @ Sahil had a fight with Bunty, Shahzad etc. Keeping that as grudge in mind, the above said persons armed with sword and knives have caused injuries. The above said persons have caused injuries with intention to cause murder of Dabi @ Sahil. 3. The court of Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.2, Kota, vide impugned judgment dated 13.8.2010 held three accused namely, Bunty, Shakil and Shahzad guilty of offence under Section 302/34 IPC. The above said persons have caused injuries with intention to cause murder of Dabi @ Sahil. 3. The court of Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.2, Kota, vide impugned judgment dated 13.8.2010 held three accused namely, Bunty, Shakil and Shahzad guilty of offence under Section 302/34 IPC. Bunty @ Shoyab was also held guilty of offence under Section 4/25 of Arms Act. 4. Having convicted the accused for the above said offences, the trial court vide a separate order of even date, sentenced them as under:- U/s 302/34 IPC- to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo two months S.I. U/s 4/25 Arms Act- to undergo two years S.I., and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo fifteen days S.I. 5. Aggrieved against their conviction and sentence, Bunty @ Shoyab preferred D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 238/2011, Shakil filed D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 398/2011 and Shahzad instituted D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 847/2010. During the pendency of the Appeal No. 238/2011, Bunty took a plea that on the day of occurrence, he was delinquent juvenile in conflict with law and due to retrospective operation of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children), Act, 2000 (hereinafter to referred as 'the Act of 2000'), because of amendment carried in the Act, and in view of Section 2(k), 2(I) and 7(A) read with Section 20 of the Act of 2000, he is to be treated as delinquent juvenile in conflict with law and he is to be dealt with as per provisions of the Act of 2000 and rules made thereunder. 6. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court on 12.9.2013, while deciding the D.B. Criminal Misc. Application No. 7905/2013 in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 238/2011, Bunty vs. State of Rajasthan granted benefit of retrospective operation of Juvenile Justice Act to the co-accused appellant, Bunty and disposed of his appeal by ordering his release. 7. The co-accused Shakil had preferred an D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 398/2011. In the said appeal, he filed D.B. Criminal Misc. Application No. 13058/2014 and a co-ordinate Bench of which one of us (Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J.) was a member had ordered Juvenile Justice Board to hold enquiry that whether on the date of the occurrence, Shakil was a delinquent juvenile in conflict with law or not? In the said appeal, he filed D.B. Criminal Misc. Application No. 13058/2014 and a co-ordinate Bench of which one of us (Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J.) was a member had ordered Juvenile Justice Board to hold enquiry that whether on the date of the occurrence, Shakil was a delinquent juvenile in conflict with law or not? The Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Kota, held the enquiry and vide her communication dated 5.2.2015 informed that Shakil s/o Shafi was also delinquent juvenile in conflict with law. Consequently, vide a separate order of even date, his appeal has also been decided in same terms as in the case of co-accused, Bunty on the ground of parity. 8. Now, we are left with the case of the present appellant, Shahzad. A perusal of the written report (Exhibit-P/8) reveals that Bunty @ Shoyab has caused a sword injury on the left side of head of Dabi @ Sahil, whereas, the present appellant Shahzad had caused injury on the right armpit of the deceased Dabi @ Sahil. 9. Dr. Ashok Mundra (P.W.6) on 22.5.2008 at 9:30 PM, had conducted the autopsy on the dead body of Dabi @ Sahil aged 21 years and as per Post Mortem Report (Exhibit-P/7), he had found the following injuries on the person of the deceased:- “(i) Stitched wound, 3cm long on temporo-parietal region left side. (ii) Stitched wound, 2 cm long on left pectoral region. (iii) Stitched wound, 2cm long on right pectoral region. (iv) Stitched wound (two) 1 cm long, left inguinal region. (v) Stitched wound, 3cm long on right side of abdomen, lower part.” 10. On dissection of injuries No. 2 and 3, doctor who had conducted autopsy had found the following as an internal damage caused to the lungs of the deceased: “Dissection of Injuries: Injury No.2 is passing through 4th ICS then passing posteriorly cutting the pleura then entering the left lung. There is incised wound 1½ x ½ cm x 1cm on left lung. Injury No.3 is passing through 4th ICS on right side then cutting the pleura then producing stab wound 1½ x ½ cm x 2 cm on right lung. Walls, ribs, cartilages- Both sides walls having stab wound with haemetoma. The wounds passing through 4th ICS. There is incised wound 1½ x ½ cm x 1cm on left lung. Injury No.3 is passing through 4th ICS on right side then cutting the pleura then producing stab wound 1½ x ½ cm x 2 cm on right lung. Walls, ribs, cartilages- Both sides walls having stab wound with haemetoma. The wounds passing through 4th ICS. Pleura- Both pleura cut along with injury No.2 and 3 and having collection of blood about 500 lt on both sides.” “Injury No.5 passing through abdominal wall on right side passing posteriorly upward and medially passing through cutting the peritoneum then through right kidney and finally at liver. There is incised wound 3 x ½ cm x 1cm, on right kidney and incised wound 1 x ½ cm x ½ cm on lower border of right lobe of liver with haematoma. There is collection of about 750 ml blood and blood clotts in peritoneal cavity.” 11. As per opinion of the doctor, the cause of death was due to shock as a result of ante mortem multiple stab injuries with injuries to both lungs, liver and right kidney, which were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The prosecution in all had examined twelve witnesses. 12. Shabbir Hussain (P.W.1) being Head Constable was In-charge of Malkhana and witness Constable, Indra Singh (P.W.2) had carried sealed packets to the Forensic Science Laboratory. Therefore, both Shabbir Hussain (P.W.1) and Indra Singh (P.W.2) were examined to prove link evidence. 13. Mohammad Shanu (P.W.4) and Mohammad Salim (P.W.5) are witnesses to recovery of weapons effected from the accused. 14. Chandan Singh (P.W.11) and Babu Lal Meena (P.W.12) both had conducted investigation and had proved various facets of the investigation. 15. The prosecution examined Akhtar Ali (P.W.3), Shanu Painter (P.W.7), Abdul Rameez (P.W.8), Ram Chandra (P.W.9) and Ali Bahadur (P.W.10) as eyewitnesses of the occurrence. These witnesses while appearing in the court in categoric terms have stated that the present appellant Shahzad had caused a knife injury on the right side of the armpit. The said injury correspond to the injury No.3, which has caused damage to Pleura and right lung. Dissection and internal examination of injury No.3 as per Post Mortem Report (Exhibit-P/7) has cut the pleura and caused stab wound on the right lung. Thus, the injury attributed to the appellant Shahzad has also proved fatal. 16. The said injury correspond to the injury No.3, which has caused damage to Pleura and right lung. Dissection and internal examination of injury No.3 as per Post Mortem Report (Exhibit-P/7) has cut the pleura and caused stab wound on the right lung. Thus, the injury attributed to the appellant Shahzad has also proved fatal. 16. There is an unusual feature of this case. On behalf of the appellant Shahzad, no cross-examination of the witnesses was carried even though opportunity was granted to the appellant. The court had requested the appellant, Shahzad to take counsel from the legal aid but the appellant had refused the same. The court had recorded a note that the appellant purposely and for malafide reasons had turned down the request of the court to take counsel from the legal aid. 17. Mr. Aladeen Khan, the learned Public Prosecutor has stated that this Court can take a judicial notice of the fact that as a matter of tactic where the witnesses in examination in chief have deposed against the accused, an adjournment is sought so that later witnesses could be threatened and are made to resile in the cross-examination. 18. To counter this argument, Mr. Laxman Madnani, the learned counsel for the appellant, has submitted that principle of fair trial demand that we should remand the case and grant an opportunity to the appellant to cross-examine the witnesses. 19. Akhtar Ali (P.W.3) was examined on 2.2.2009 and on the said date, after his examination-in-chief was recorded, cross-examination was deferred for 4.2.2009. However, Akhtar Ali was subjected to thorough long cross-examination on 12.2.2009 and when the turn of the counsel for the appellant came to cross-examine the witness, Mr. Sadik Khan, counsel for the appellant refused to prosecute (?????) the case and the appellant turned down the request of the court to accept counsel form the legal aid. However, Akhtar Ali was subjected to thorough long cross-examination on 12.2.2009 and when the turn of the counsel for the appellant came to cross-examine the witness, Mr. Sadik Khan, counsel for the appellant refused to prosecute (?????) the case and the appellant turned down the request of the court to accept counsel form the legal aid. The note given by the court is reproduced below:- ^^ftjg % eqyfte 'kgtkn dh vksj ls %& eqyfte }kjk vf/koäk lkftn [kku dks viuk vf/koäk crk;k x;k ijUrq mä vf/koäk us iSjoh us bUdkj fd;kA iwoZ esa Hkh tc tc mä xokg mifLFkr gqvk gS eqyfte }kjk ckj ckj viuk vf/koäk djus ckcr~ dgk x;k ijUrq vf/koäk mifLFkr ugha vk;sA blls nf'kZr gksrk gS fd eqyfte ek= xokg ls ftjg u gks bl gsrq u rks vf/koäk djrk gS vkSj ckj ckj vf/koäk dks cqykus dh ckr dgrk gSA mldh vksj ls vf/koäk u gksus o ftjg u djus ftjg cUn dh xbZA yhxy ,M ls Hkh odhy ysus ls bUdkj fd;kA** 20. Shanu Painter (P.W.7) another eyewitness and first informant was examined on 11.5.2009. Counsel for the co-accused, Bunty @ Shoyab and Shakil had carried extensive cross-examination. Mr. Sadik Khan, counsel for the appellant, Shahzad refused to prosecute (?????) on the behalf of the appellant and the appellant refused to accept counsel from the legal aid. Thus, the court made the cross-examination on behalf of the appellant as NIL by giving the following note:- ^^eqyfte dh vksj ls dksbZ vf/koäk mifLFkr ughaA eqyfte ds }kjk vf/koäk lkftn [kku dk viuk vf/koäk gksuk crk;k x;kA vf/koäk lkftn [kku }kjk eqyfte dh vksj ls iSjoh ls bUdkj fd;k x;kA eqyfte dks yhxy ,M ls vf/koäk nsus dks dgk x;k rks mlus bUdkj fd;k vkSj dgk fd og vf/koäk dj ysxkA iwoZ esa Hkh mlds }kjk ,sls gh dFku fd;s x;s Fks ysfdu vkt rd dksbZ vf/koäk ugha fd;k x;k gSA u gh fof/kd lgk;rk ls dksbZ vf/koäk ysrk gSA vr% eqyfte dh vksj ls ftjg fuy dh tkrh gSA** 21. Similarly, when another eyewitness, Abdul Rameez was examined and was called for cross-examination on 16.6.2009, no body was present on behalf of the appellant and the appellant refused to take counsel from the legal aid. Similarly, when another eyewitness, Abdul Rameez was examined and was called for cross-examination on 16.6.2009, no body was present on behalf of the appellant and the appellant refused to take counsel from the legal aid. The trial court had given the following note while making the cross-examination NIL on behalf of the appellant, as under:- ^^ftjg%& eqyfte 'kgtkn dh vksj ls %& eqyfte dh vksj ls ftjg gsrq dksbZ Hkh vf/koäk mifLFkr ughaA iwoZ esa eqyfte }kjk xokgku~ ls vf/koäk dh ftjg ugha djokbZ xbZ vkSj ;g dgk x;k fd og vf/koäk dj ysxkA yhxy ,M ls Hkh vf/koäk ysus ls eqyfte }kjk bUdkj fd;k tkrk gSA blls nf'kZr gksrk gS fd tkucw>dj vfHk;kstu lk{; esa ftjg ds vHkko esa rduhdh =qfV NksM+uk pkgrk gS] ftldk ykHk og o vU; eqyfteku ckn esa mBk ldsaA eqyfte dks ftjg dk volj fn;k x;kA ftjg ugha dh xbZA fuy dh tkrh gSA** Similar note has been given by the trial court regarding the cross-examination of various other witnesses. 22. Mr. Laxman Madnani, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon Rajoo @ Ramakant vs. State of Madhya Pradesh ((2008) 8 SCC 553), wherein reliance was placed on the case of Hussainara Khatoon vs. State of Bihar ( (1980) 1 SCC 98 ), in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “....free legal service is an inalienable element of “reasonable, fair and just”, procedure for a person accused of an offence and it must be held implicit in the guarantee of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.” 23. The learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently urged that it is a constitutional right of every person, who is unable to engage a lawyer to secure free legal services and principle of fair trial demand that the trial Judge ought to have deferred the trial to enable the accused to engage a counsel. The learned counsel for the appellant has further relied upon Ramchandra Nivrutti Mulak vs. The State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No. 487/2008), a judgment rendered by the Bombay High Court, wherein the court formulated the following question:- “4. The learned counsel for the appellant has further relied upon Ramchandra Nivrutti Mulak vs. The State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No. 487/2008), a judgment rendered by the Bombay High Court, wherein the court formulated the following question:- “4. The question that we have been called upon to answer in this appeal can be framed as under: “If the lawyer appearing for the accused files application for withdrawal, which is rejected by the court, and the lawyer fails to turn up for trial, is a duty cast on the trial court to ask the accused to make alternative arrangement for appearance by lawyer or appoint a lawyer for the accused under legal aid scheme?” After having formulated the above question, the Bombay High Court has answered the same as follows:- “In our opinion, the case where the accused is unrepresented and a case where accused is represented and the lawyer seeks to withdraw his appearance by filing pursis and does not attend trial stand on an equal footing. The learned Judge by rejecting the application for withdrawal, at the highest could have taken steps against the concerned lawyer on failure to remain present. The Court did not pose to itself the question whether in such a case the trial could be proceeded with and if proceeded with it would satisfy the mandate of Article 21. Courts cannot play lip service to the right under Article 21. Courts in such a case must play an active role to ensure a fair trial. In the instant case it was clearly an infraction of the appellant’s right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This is not a case where the appellants engaged a Lawyer and the Lawyer choose not to appear on that day or dates. We are not examining the effect of such a situation in the present case. In the instant case, the lawyer filed an application for withdrawal. We, therefore, are only considering a class of cases where appearance is filed on behalf of an accused but before commencement of the trial, the lawyer seeks to withdraw and his application for withdrawal is rejected by the learned Court and the lawyer does not take part in the trial. The right under Article 21 was not satisfied by rejecting the application for withdrawal filed by the lawyer. The right under Article 21 was not satisfied by rejecting the application for withdrawal filed by the lawyer. Such rejection was an empty formality as the lawyer did not put in his appearance and the trial proceeded and concluded without his appearance. Article 21 is not merely to be read from a textbook, it must breathe life in a Court. The mandate of Article 21 therefore, is not dependant whether a Vakalatnama is filed or not. Though when a Vakalatnama is filed and the lawyer appears the mandate of Article 21 is satisfied. Once a lawyer applies to withdraw and chooses not to appear, there is burden cast on the courts to inform the accused either to engage another lawyer or to inform him that he is entitled to free legal aid if he so desires. It is only in the event that the accused does not seek to engage the services of the Lawyer after being informed and declines assistance under free legal aid scheme, can the trial proceed. The trial, therefore in the instant case ought not to have proceeded with in the absence of the accused being informed of his right to be represented by lawyer. In our opinion, therefore, on the facts of this case, the trial was in contravention of the appellant’s right to fair trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The conviction and sentence of the appellant for the offences for which he has been charged, convicted and sentenced will have to be set aside.” 24. We are of the view that the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is not attracted on the facts of the present case. It goes without saying that to have a free legal aid and to be represented by a counsel, is an inalienable guarantee acknowledged by the courts since Hussainara Khatoon's (supra) case. 25. In the present case, when the counsel again refused to prosecute (to do parivi), immediately at that time the court had offered to provide counsel from the legal aid but the accused-appellant had refused to accept the same and thus, there is a waiver on the part of the appellant. The trial court was privy to demeanor of the witnesses and the accused. The trial court has recorded that intentionally the accused is not accepting counsel from the legal aid. The trial court was privy to demeanor of the witnesses and the accused. The trial court has recorded that intentionally the accused is not accepting counsel from the legal aid. We cannot reject the submission made by the State counsel that withdrawal of the counsel for the appellant and refusal on the part of the appellant to accept counsel from the legal aid was a ploy or a devise to secure an adjournment to prevail upon the witnesses later by threat or interruption. 26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Kumar vs. State of Punjab (Criminal Appeal No. 554/2012) decided on 21.1.2015 has held that unwarranted adjournment sought by the counsel conducting the trial no longer remain a disturbance or a disorder but has become a disease. In the case of Vinod Kumar (supra), the court relying upon the various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “Be it noted, in the said case, the following passage from Swaran Singh V. State of Punjab (2000) 5 SCC 668 , was reproduced. "It has become more or less a fashion to have a criminal case adjourned again and again till the witness tires and gives up. It is the game of unscrupulous lawyers to get adjournments for one excuse or the other till a witness is won over or is tired. Not only is a witness threatened, he is abducted, he is maimed, he is done away with, or even bribed. There is no protection for him. In adjourning the matter without any valid cause a court unwittingly becomes party to miscarriage of justice." In this regard, it is also fruitful to refer to the authority in State of U.P. V. Shambu Nath Singh(4), wherein this Court deprecating the practice of a Sessions Court adjourning a case in spite of the presence of the witnesses willing to be examined fully, opined thus: "9. We make it abundantly clear that if a witness is present in court he must be examined on that day. The court must know that most of the witnesses could attend the court only at heavy cost to them, after keeping aside their own avocation. Certainly they incur suffering and loss of income. The meagre amount of bhatta (allowance) which a witness may be paid by the court is generally a poor solace for the financial loss incurred by him. The court must know that most of the witnesses could attend the court only at heavy cost to them, after keeping aside their own avocation. Certainly they incur suffering and loss of income. The meagre amount of bhatta (allowance) which a witness may be paid by the court is generally a poor solace for the financial loss incurred by him. It is a sad plight in the trial courts that witnesses who are called through summons or other processes stand at the doorstep from morning till evening only to be told at the end of the day that the case is adjourned to another day. This primitive practice must be reformed by the presiding officers of the trial courts and it can be reformed by everyone provided the presiding officer concerned has a commitment towards duty." xxxxxx xxxxxx Before parting with the case we are constrained to reiterate what we have said in the beginning. We have expressed our agony and anguish the manner in which trials in respect of serious offences relating to corruption are being conducted by the trial courts. Adjournments are sought on the drop of a hat by the counsel, even though the witness is present in court, contrary to all principles of holding a trial. That apart, after the examination-in-chief of a witness is over, adjournment is sought for cross-examination and the disquieting feature is that the trial courts grant time. The law requires special reasons to be recorded for grant of time but the same is not taken note of. As has been noticed earlier, in the instant case the cross-examination has taken place after a year and 8 months allowing ample time to pressurize the witness and to gain over him by adopting all kinds of tactics. There is no cavil over the proposition that there has to be a fair and proper trial but the duty of the court while conducting the trial to be guided by the mandate of the law, the conceptual fairness and above all bearing in mind its sacrosanct duty to arrive at the truth on the basis of the material brought on record. If an accused for his benefit takes the trial on the path of total mockery, it cannot be countenanced. The Court has a sacred duty to see that the trial is conducted as per law. If an accused for his benefit takes the trial on the path of total mockery, it cannot be countenanced. The Court has a sacred duty to see that the trial is conducted as per law. If adjournments are granted in this manner it would tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually turn such trials to a farce. It is legally impermissible and jurisprudentially abominable. The trial courts are expected in law to follow the command of the procedure relating to trial and not yield to the request of the counsel to grant adjournment for non-acceptable reasons. In fact, it is not all appreciable to call a witness for cross-examination after such a long span of time. It is imperative if the examination-in- chief is over, the cross-examination should be completed on the same day. If the examination of a witness continues till late hours the trial can be adjourned to the next day for cross-examination. It is inconceivable in law that the cross-examination should be deferred for such a long time. It is anathema to the concept of proper and fair trial. The duty of the court is to see that not only the interest of the accused as per law is protected but also the societal and collective interest is safe-guarded. It is distressing to note that despite series of judgments of this Court, the habit of granting adjournment, really an ailment, continues. How long shall we say, "Awake! Arise!". There is a constant discomfort. Therefore, we think it appropriate that the copies of the judgment be sent to the learned Chief Justices of all the High Courts for circulating the same among the learned trial Judges with a command to follow the principles relating to trial in a requisite manner and not to defer the cross- examination of a witness at their pleasure or at the leisure of the defence counsel, for it eventually makes the trial an apology for trial and compels the whole society to suffer chicanery. Let it be remembered that law cannot allowed to be lonely; a destitute.” 27. In view of the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Kumar (supra), we are of the view that no case is made out to remit the matter to the trial court to again recall the witnesses for cross-examination. Let it be remembered that law cannot allowed to be lonely; a destitute.” 27. In view of the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Kumar (supra), we are of the view that no case is made out to remit the matter to the trial court to again recall the witnesses for cross-examination. We have also read the testimony of the witnesses and are of the view that on behalf of the co-accused, namely Shakil and Bunty @ Shoyab, extensive cross-examination was carried and all questions to impeach the credibility of the witnesses or their presence which could be asked have been put to the witnesses. Thus, on appraisal of the evidence also, we are of the view that no prejudice has been caused to the appellant. 28. Reverting to the merits of the case, we are of the view that all eyewitnesses are consistent and they have stated that the appellant has caused a knife blow below the right armpit. This assertion of the witnesses is in consonance with the averment made in the FIR. In the present case, the occurrence had taken place on 21.5.2008 at about 9:30 PM, the written report (Exhibit-P/8) was submitted on 21.5.2008 at 11:30 PM and the case was registered at the Police Station Gumanpura, Kota on 21.5.2008 at 11:55 PM. Thus, the FIR has been very promptly lodged. It contains the spontaneous version. Furthermore, the ocular version stands duly corroborated by the medical evidence. 29. Taking totality of the circumstances, we find nothing from the record or in statement of the eyewitnesses to disturb the well reasoned finding given by the trial court. Thus, we affirm the conviction and sentence of the appellant awarded by the trial court and dismiss the appeal being devoid of any merit.