JUDGMENT 1. Appellant is a Public Charitable Trust. On 10.3.2005, a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [‘Act’ for short’] was issued for acquisition of land for the purpose of appellant – Trust. Since the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was not made within one year, the notification lapsed. Three days before the expiry of one year period, appellant filed a writ petition, in which, an interim order was passed, directing the appellant to deposit Rs.11,43,36,600/, which according to the appellant was deposited by it. However, said writ petition was dismissed on merits. The intra court appeal filed against the order of the learned Single Judge was also dismissed, and so was the review petition filed before the Appellate Court also dismissed. Appellant herein filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court, which was also dismissed on 19.7.2010 with the following order: “The Special Leave Petitions are dismissed. The dismissal will not come in the way of the petitioner approaching the Government for any fresh proposal for consideration of the Government. If such a proposal is given, we are sure the Government will consider it on merits and will not dismiss it merely on the ground of breach of the earlier proposal.” Then a clarification application was filed by the land owners, which was disposed off by Supreme Court on 29.11.2010 with the following order: “These applications are filed in matters disposed of on 19.7.2010. The order does not create or recognize any specific right in the petitioner, for acquisition. At all events, if there is any fresh proposal from petitioner for acquisition, the Respondent No.10 or the other land owners, may raise all objections available in law, before the concerned authority.” 2. Thereafter, on 9.12.2010, appellant gave its proposal for fresh acquisition of land, which was rejected by the order/endorsement dated 10.12.2010. Challenging the said order as well as the circular dated 14.3.2008 (on the basis of which order dated 10.12.2010 was passed), appellant filed a writ petition, with a further prayer for mandamus to direct the respondents to consider the proposal of the petitioners for acquisition of land as per the directions of Supreme Court. By the impugned order dated 25.2.2011, the said writ petition has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge, which order is under challenge in this appeal. 3. By the impugned order dated 25.2.2011, the said writ petition has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge, which order is under challenge in this appeal. 3. We have heard Sri V.Lakshminarayana, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Ms.Shilparani, learned counsel for the appellant, as well as Sri R.Devdas, learned Principal Government Advocate appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 4 – State, Sri B.V.Krishna for respondent No.5, Sri M.R.Rajagopal for respondent No.8 and Sri B.R.Vishwanath for respondent No.10, and perused the records. 4. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that the circular dated 14.3.2008 applies to private housing societies and institutions for acquisition of land for any public purpose. It is contended that the purpose of acquisition of land on behalf of the appellant herein is for establishing educational institutions on such land which may be acquired, and as such, since it is for a public purpose for an educational institution, the said circular dated 14.3.2008, on the basis of which the proposal of appellant has been rejected, would not be applicable. 5. It has also been contended that the impugned order dated 10.12.2010 passed by the respondent – State is in complete violation of the principles of natural justice as no opportunity of hearing was given to the appellant before rejecting the proposal. It was lastly submitted that the direction of Supreme Court was to the State Government to decide the proposal for acquisition, whereas the Under Secretary has passed the order, who would not be a competent officer to pass such order on behalf of State Government. 6. By the circular dated 14.3.2008, it is provided that no land shall be acquired by the State for private institutions and societies, including house building cooperative societies. In the first paragraph of the said circular, the case of acquisition of land for private house building cooperative societies has been dealt with, and thereafter the case of acquisition of land on behalf of private societies and Trusts has been considered. It has been mentioned in the circular that to avoid exploitation of land owners and farmers by acquiring agricultural land, which they are holding for the livelihood, and to avoid misuse of the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, acquisition of land by the Government for private institutions, societies and Trusts was debarred. 7. It has been mentioned in the circular that to avoid exploitation of land owners and farmers by acquiring agricultural land, which they are holding for the livelihood, and to avoid misuse of the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, acquisition of land by the Government for private institutions, societies and Trusts was debarred. 7. In such view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the said circular does not apply only to the house building cooperative societies, but also to the Trusts and other societies and thus, the same would cover the case of appellant herein, which is a Trust. The Under Secretary to the Government has rightly, after considering the said circular, rejected the proposal of appellant for acquisition of land on its behalf. The purpose of acquisition for a Trust, whether it be for public or private purpose, would thus not be relevant, because in terms of circular dated 14.3.2008, the land is not to be acquired by the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act for such Trusts. 8. The Government acts through its Secretaries and other Officers, and it is not necessary that an officer of a particular rank, of the choice of appellant, be required to decide the proposal made by the appellant. Even otherwise, appellant has not been able to show any legal right, under which its proposal for acquisition of land is to be considered. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has fairly stated that though there is no provision in law requiring the proposal of the appellant for acquisition of land to be considered, but its right flows from the order of the Supreme Court, wherein, it is stated that if any such proposal was given by the appellant, the same may be considered on merits and was not to be decided merely on the ground of breach of earlier proposal by the appellant. 9. The Apex Court had observed that the dismissal of Special Leave Petition filed by the appellant would not come in the way of appellant in approaching the Government for any fresh proposal for consideration by the Government. 9. The Apex Court had observed that the dismissal of Special Leave Petition filed by the appellant would not come in the way of appellant in approaching the Government for any fresh proposal for consideration by the Government. While clarifying its earlier order dated 19.7.2010, the Apex Court, vide order dated 29.10.2010, clarified that ‘the order does not create or recognize any specific right in the petitioner, for acquisition.” Thus, the Supreme Court did not mean that the appellant would get a right for its proposal to be considered, even if there was no provision in law for making such proposal. It would only mean that if the appellant had any legal right for consideration of its proposal for acquisition of land, the same was to be considered on merits, and the application/proposal would not be dismissed merely on the ground that appellant had not complied with the conditions, because of which its earlier land acquisition proceedings had lapsed. 10. A prayer for mandamus for a direction to the respondents to consider the proposal of the appellant for grant of land, can be considered only when the appellant has a legal right. It is well settled law that a mandamus would be issued only when an Authority is required in law to perform a duty, which is not being performed by it. In the present case, in the absence of there being any legal right of the appellant to have its proposal considered, or any legal duty cast on the respondent to decide the application/proposal of the appellant for acquisition of land, no such mandamus as prayed for by the appellant deserves to be granted. As such, in our view, the Writ Court has rightly rejected such prayer and declined to issue such a mandamus. 11. In the facts of the present case, submission of learned counsel for the appellant that appellant should have been given a personal hearing before rejecting the proposal, does not have any merit. The proposal of the appellant was to be considered on merits, in the light of observations of the Apex Court made while dismissing the Special Leave Petition of the appellant. The question of personal hearing would arise only when the proposal of the appellant was found to be maintainable. The proposal of the appellant was to be considered on merits, in the light of observations of the Apex Court made while dismissing the Special Leave Petition of the appellant. The question of personal hearing would arise only when the proposal of the appellant was found to be maintainable. As we have already observed above, in the absence of the appellant having any right in law to have its application for acquisition of land considered, there would be no question of being given opportunity of hearing. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in these writ appeals, which are accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.