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2015 DIGILAW 112 (ALL)

KAMLA v. GULABI DEVI

2015-01-17

SUDHIR AGARWAL

body2015
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard Sri C.K. Rai, Advocate, for appellant. None appeared on behalf of respondents though the case has been called in revised and name of Sri Avadhesh Singh has been shown in the cause list and counsel for respondents. In these circumstances, I proceed to hear and decide this appeal after hearing learned counsel for appellant. 2. This appeal was admitted vide order dated 12.5.2014 on the following substantial questions of law: “(i) Whether in view of the law laid down in Azahar Husain and others v. District Judge, Saharanpur and others, 1998 RD 493, the decision of the Courts below for upholding the Civil Court jurisdiction suffers from the error of law? (ii) Whether the Courts below have erred in holding that the Suit of the plaintiff-respondent is not barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act is contrary to law laid down in AIR 1991 SC 249 ? (iii) Whether the decree passed by the Courts below suffers from the error of law as the Courts below have acted on conjecture and surmises in ignoring the entries in the revenue papers in favour of the appellant?” 3. Both the Courts below have found that defendant-appellant was in possession of property in dispute and in the revenue record, his name was entered but observing that revenue entries have been obtained probably fraudulently, Courts below have granted injunction in favour of plaintiff by ignoring the said entries. It is contended that once the revenue entries exists in favour of defendant, the same could not have been ignored by Civil Court and the revenue entries could have been disputed before the Revenue Court. Reliance is placed on the Apex Court’s decision in Azhar Hasan and others v. District Judge, Saharanpur and others, 1998 (89) RD 493. 4. Learned counsel for respondents, however, sought to support the judgments impugned in this appeal and contended that the revenue entries have rightly been ignored by Courts below since they were obtained illegally and fraudulently and, therefore, the jurisdiction of Civil Court was not barred. 5. Before answering the questions as above, it would be appropriate to look into certain relevant facts giving rise to the dispute in the present appeal. 6. 5. Before answering the questions as above, it would be appropriate to look into certain relevant facts giving rise to the dispute in the present appeal. 6. Original Suit No. 417 of 1987 was instituted by Smt. Gulabi Devi and her son Ram Asrey, seeking permanent injunction in respect to property in dispute shown as ABCD in the map appended to the plaint situated in Plot No. 632/346, new number 148, area 55 kari. It is not in dispute that aforesaid property belong to one Ram Badan Pandey. The case set up by plaintiffs was that aforesaid property alongwith other holdings of Ram Badan was transferred by sale in favour of plaintiff No. 1 Smt. Gulabi Devi, widow of Ram Briksh Pandey vide registered sale-deed dated 7.7.1958 and since then it is in her possession but defendant, Kamala Prasad, an influential person, is trying to interfere in the peaceful possession of plaintiffs, therefore, should be restrained from such interference. 7. The case set up by defendant-appellant was that plaintiffs have no connection with the property in dispute and it was never in their possession. There was consolidation proceeding in the village in question in 1958 in which no attempt was made by plaintiffs at any point of time to get their name recorded in the revenue records. The disputed land was transferred by sale by Sri Ram Badan vide sale-deed dated 11.11.1985 to Vijay Shankar, Jai Prakash and Ramdei who thereafter transferred the same to the defendant vide sale-deed dated 3.2.1987 and it is recorded in revenue record in the name of defendant who is also in possession thereof. He pleaded that suit was barred by Section 49 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1953”) as also Section 331 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act, No. 1 of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1950”) read with Section 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1963”). The Trial Court formulated 8 issues and relevant issues No. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 are as under: ^^¼1½ D;k oknhx.k fookfnr Hkwfe ds Lokeh o vf/kO;; Hkksxh gSa\ ¼2½ D;k okn /kkjk&49 m0iz0 pdcUnh vf/k0 ls ckf/kr gS\ ¼3½ D;k okn dk n'kZukf/kdkj bl U;k;ky; dks ugha gS\ ¼4½ D;k okn /kkjk&331 tehankjh mUewyu vf/k0 ls ckf/kr gS\^^ ^^¼6½ D;k okn /kkjk 34 fo0vuqrks”k vf/k0 ls ckf/kr gS\ English Translation by the Court: “(1) Whether the plaintiffs are owners in occupation over the disputed land? (2) Whether the suit is barred by Section 49 of The Uttar Pradesh Consolidation Act? (3) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the suit? (4) Whether the suit is barred by Section 331 of The Zamindari Abolition Act? (6) Whether the suit is barred by Section 34 of The Specific Relief Act? 8. The plaintiffs placed on record the registered sale-deed dated 7.7.1958 and copy of Khatauni of 1371-1373 fasali showing that her name was recorded in revenue records after striking off name of Ram Badan. On the contrary, the documentary evidence relied by defendant included the copy of Khatauni of 1390 fasali and 1395 fasali which shows that on 15.3.1986 name of Ram Badan was cancelled and in his place names of Vijay Shankar, Jai Prakash sons of Ram Badan were recorded. Thereafter, on 16.5.1986 name of defendant was recorded on the basis of sale-deed dated 12.3.1987 after cancelling names of Vijay Shankar, Jai Prakash and Ram Dei. An order was passed for recording the name of defendant-appellant Kamla Prasad. The sale-deeds executed by Ram Badan in favour of Vijay Shankar etc. and subsequently in favour of defendant were not challenged by plaintiffs. 9. It is no doubt true that the revenue entries are not an evidence to show title of tenure holder but shows possession of property concerned by the person, whose name is recorded in the revenue entries. That too a presumption only. This presumption is rebuttable. 10. In Narain Prasad Agarwal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2007 (8) SCALE 250, the Court said: “Record of right is not a document of title. That too a presumption only. This presumption is rebuttable. 10. In Narain Prasad Agarwal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2007 (8) SCALE 250, the Court said: “Record of right is not a document of title. Entries made therein in terms of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act although are admissible as a relevant piece of evidence and although the same may also carry a presumption of correctness, but it is beyond any doubt that such a presumption is rebuttable.” 11. In Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar and others v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund and others, AIR 2008 SC 901 , the Court said: “A revenue record is a not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to the possession. Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof both forward and backward can also be raised under Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act.” 12. The entries in revenue record may refer to the possession of the person on the land in dispute and prima facie it may raise a presumption of title but such presumption is rebuttable. 13. In Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander and others, AIR 1968 SC 1165 , construing Section 110 of Evidence Act, the Court said: “Possession may prima facie raise a presumption of title no one can deny but this presumption can hardly arise when the facts are known. When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides.” 14. In Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collector and others, AIR 2003 SC 1805 , the Court said: “Presumption, which is rebuttable is attracted when the possession is prima facie lawful and when the contesting party has no title.” 15. Recently, referring to above authorities, the Court in State of A.P. and others v. M/s Star Bone Mill and Fertilizer Co., JT 2013 (3) SC 401, said: “13. The principle enshrined in Section 110 of the Evidence Act, is based on public policy with the object of preventing persons from committing breach of peace by taking law into their own hands, however good their title over the land in question may be. It is for this purpose, that the provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and Sections 154 and 158 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, were enacted. All the afore- said provisions have the same object. It is for this purpose, that the provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and Sections 154 and 158 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, were enacted. All the afore- said provisions have the same object. The said presumption is read under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, and applies only in a case where there is either no proof, or very little proof of ownership on either side. The maxim “possession follows title” is applicable in cases where proof of actual possession cannot reasonably be expected, for instance, in the case of waste lands, or where nothing is known about possession one-way or another. Presumption of title as a result of possession, can arise only where facts disclose that no title vests in any party. Possession of the plaintiff is not prima facie wrongful, and title of the plaintiff is not proved. It certainly does not mean that because a man has title over some land, he is necessarily in possession of it. It in fact means, that if at any time a man with title was in possession of the said property, the law allows the presumption that such possession was in continuation of the title vested in him. A person must establish that he has continued possession of the suit property, while the other side claiming title, must make out a case of trespass/encroachment etc. Where the apparent title is with the plaintiffs, it is incumbent upon the defendant, that in order to displace this claim of apparent title and to establish beneficial title in himself, he must establish by way of satisfactory evidence, circumstances that favour his version. Even, a revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession. Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof, both forward and backward, can also be raised under Section 110 of the Evidence Act.” 16. Even, a revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession. Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof, both forward and backward, can also be raised under Section 110 of the Evidence Act.” 16. Trial Court, while answering issue No. 1, chose to ignore the revenue entries of 1390 and 1395 fasali by observing that there was a registered sale-deed executed in 1958 in favour of plaintiff No. 1 and in 1373 fasali her name was also shown to have been recorded, how it got removed and name of defendant came to be recorded in revenue entries has not been demonstrated and therefore, subsequent revenue entries showing possession of defendant cannot be relied on. Therefore after ignoring the said revenue entries, it answered Issue No. 1 in favour of plaintiffs. Then considering Issue No. 2, it held that alteration/change in entries of revenue records may be by fraud or misrepresentation, therefore, those subsequent entries can be ignored and in that view of the matter, the suit is not barred by Section 49 of Act, 1953. 17. The Lower Appellate Court then considered the same question No. 1 and held that once a registered sale-deed was executed by Ram Badan in 1958, the subsequent sale-deed would have no legal consequences and, therefore, no right would have been conferred upon Vijay Shankar etc. It also observed that pursuant to sale-deed dated 7.7.1958, by order dated 14.7.1966, name of Gulabi Devi was mutated in place of Ram Badan. Thereafter again name of Ram Badan reappeared though there was no transfer by Gulabi Devi to any one which shows that the said change in entry was on account of fraud and such revenue entry would have no legal consequences. It also noticed some of the authorities which laid down the exposition of law that if a revenue entry has been made fraudulently, the same can be cancelled by filing a suit under Section 229-B of Act, 1950 but having said so, he has said that since revenue entries, if has been obtained by fraud, would not confer any legal or otherwise right upon individual concerned, has proceeded to hold that in such a case, suit would not be barred by Section 49 of Act, 1953. 18. In my view, the approach of Courts below in the case in hand was clearly erroneous. 19. 18. In my view, the approach of Courts below in the case in hand was clearly erroneous. 19. It is no doubt true that there were certain instruments executed in favour of defendant also, on the basis whereof entries in revenue record were made in his favour. Whether all those documents were on account of any fraud or misrepresentation, neither there was any issue raised in this regard nor any such issue was framed. In absence thereof, those documents could not have been nullified in an injunction suit on mere presumption while answering the question whether plaintiffs were owner and in possession of property in dispute or not. Except of initial sale-deed of 1958 and the order of 1966 for mutation of name of plaintiff, no other document was placed on record to show that at the time of filing of suit, plaintiff was in possession of property in dispute. On the contrary, there were revenue entries of subsequent period of 1966 showing possession of defendant over property in dispute. Once defendant was a recorded tenure holder, his rights and status as recorded tenure holders could not have been affected by Civil Court in an injunction suit in which it became necessary to consider correctness of revenue entries. In such a case, a suit should have been filed before Revenue Court. The Civil Court in such case would have no jurisdiction. The aforesaid judgement of Apex Court in Azhar Hasan and others v. District Judge (supra) has made it very clear and this is evident from following: “The instant suit was filed by the plaintiff-appellants claiming that the revenue records were wrong and that on the abandonment of tenancy of tenants, possession ought not to have been recorded in favour of those persons and, as a corollary, the sale-deed executed in favour of the last mentioned persons was illegal and based on fraud. The Courts below have taken the view that who should have been recorded in possession of the land in dispute, was a matter for the Revenue authorities to determine, and thus the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. The plaint accordingly was ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs to be filed before an appropriate Revenue Court. The appeal of the plaintiffs in the first appellate Court was dismissed. The plaint accordingly was ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs to be filed before an appropriate Revenue Court. The appeal of the plaintiffs in the first appellate Court was dismissed. Instead of filing a second appeal, they moved the High Court by way of a writ petition which, too, was dismissed. On reading the plaint and on understanding the controversy, we get to the view that whether those persons who succeeded the recorded tenants, were rightly recorded as tenants or not, was a question determinable by the Revenue authorities. Besides that, the sale-deed which has been questioned on the basis of fraud, was not executed by the plaintiffs but by others, and they were not parties thereto so as to allege the incidence of fraud. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the plaint was rightly returned to the plaintiffs.” 20. In the present case also, the sale-deed executed by Ram Badan in 1985 could not have been ignored by declaring illegal since neither Ram Badan was a party nor Vijay Shankar, Jai Prakash and Ram Dei were party in the suit though the documents were executed by them. Accordingly, I answer all the three question in favour of defendant-appellant and against plaintiffs. 21. In the result, the appeal stands allowed. The impugned judgments and decree dated 11.8.1998 and 20.2.1992 are hereby set aside and Original Suit No. 417 of 1987 of plaintiff-respondent stands dismissed. —————