JUDGMENT : D.N. Patel, J. 1. These Letters Patent Appeals have been preferred by the original petitioners of W.P. (S) Nos. 382 of 2012, 472 of 2012 and 474 of 2012, as these petitions have been dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 10th October, 2014. 2. FACTUAL MATRIX Advertisement was given by the National Thermal Power Corporation for the post of Engineering Executive Trainees in the month of March, 2011. Last date for submission of the application was 12th March, 2011. Examination was conducted in the month of April, 2011 for the aforesaid posts. Candidates who had applied for the posts appeared in the examination and these appellants cleared the said examination. Thereafter, in the month of June, 2011, interview was convened and these appellants cleared the interview also. They were offered appointment vide order dated 29th August, 2011 in the Other Backward Classes category candidates reservation quota. Thereafter, medical check-up was also carried out of these appellants. Time limit to submit a certificate of Other Backward Classes was extended upto 30th November, 2011. As this certificate could not be produced by these appellants, offer of appointment was cancelled vide order dated 21st December, 2011. It further appears from the facts of the case that these appellants are belonging to castes Halwai, Agrahari Vaishya and Roniyar Vaishya. These castes were never included in the list published by the Central Government under Section 2(c) of the National Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993 (herein after referred to as ‘the Act of 1993’ for the sake of brevity). Under Section 9(1) of the Act of 1993, recommendation was made by the National Commission for Backward Classes for inclusion of the castes of Halwai, Agrahari Vaishya and Roniyar Vaishya as Other Backward Classes vide their recommendation in the month of October, 2010. Under Section 9(1) of the Act of 1993, recommendation was made by the National Commission for Backward Classes for inclusion of the castes of Halwai, Agrahari Vaishya and Roniyar Vaishya as Other Backward Classes vide their recommendation in the month of October, 2010. On the basis of these advice of the National Commission for Backward Classes, Central Government through its Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment, prepared necessary notes and ultimately the said advice given by the National Commission for Backward Classes reached upto the cabinet of Union of India and after discussions, deliberations and ultimately declaration in the form of notification was published by the Union of India on 8th December, 2011 (Annexure 8 to the memo of these Letters Patent Appeals), whereby the castes of Halwai, Agrahari Vaishya and Roniyar Vaishya were included in the list of Other Backward Classes. Looking to this notification which is at Annexure 8 to these Letters Patent Appeal, it was brought into force from the date of publication of the notification. As the Central Government could not publish immediately the notification after recommendation of the National Commission for Backward Classes made in October, 2010, these appellants lost their chance to be appointed as Engineering Executive Trainees in the National Thermal Power Corporation, because cut-off date was 12th March, 2011 and extended time limit to produce the certificate of Other Backward Classes was also over by 30th November, 2011. These appellants preferred writ petition being W.P. (S) Nos. 382/2012, 472/2012 and 474/2012. These writ petitions have been dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 10th October, 2014 with detailed reasons and hence, these Letters Patent Appeals have been preferred by the original writ petitioners. 3. ARGUMENT CANVASSED BY THE COUSNEL FOR THE APPELLANTS Counsel for the appellants submitted that initially the caste namely Halwai, Agrahari Vaishya and Roniyar Vaishya were already in the list of Other Backward Classes from 1993 to 2007, but, these castes were not included in the list of Other Backward Classes from the year 2007 till 7th December, 2011. The State of Jharkhand has been bifurcated from the erstwhile State of Bihar under Bihar Reorganization Act, 2000 in the erstwhile State of Bihar as well as in the State of Jharkhand. The State of Jharkhand has been bifurcated from the erstwhile State of Bihar under Bihar Reorganization Act, 2000 in the erstwhile State of Bihar as well as in the State of Jharkhand. After 15th November, 2000 these castes were included in the list of Other Backward Classes, but, by mistake, these castes were thereafter not published in the list of Other Backward Classes and, therefore, representations were made before the National Commission for Backward Classes and ultimately the National Commission for Backward Classes made recommendation under Section 9(1) of the Act of 1999. This advice of National Commission for Backward Classes is binding upon the Union of India. This advice was given in the month of October, 2010 and, therefore, immediately the Union of India ought to have published the list of Other Backward Classes castes, whereas, in the facts of the present case, the Union of India took more than one year and on 8th December, 2011, a notification was published in exercise of powers conferred upon the Union of India under Section 2(c) of the Act of 1993, wherein all the aforesaid three castes were included in the Other Backward Classes list for the State of Jharkhand. This has resulted into a difficulty with these appellants as the cut-off date to submit all types of certificates for the post of Engineering Executive Trainees in the National Thermal Power Corporation was 12th March, 2011. These certificates could not be produced by these appellants. Time limit to submit these certificates were extended upto 30th November, 2011, but, the notification was not published and, therefore, the same could not be given to the National Thermal Power Corporation and, hence, ultimately offer of appointment was cancelled by the National Thermal Power Corporation on 21st December, 2011. Thus, the advice which was given by the National Commission for Backward Classes under Section 9(1) of the Act of 1993 was binding upon the Union of India, as, belated published notification dated 8th December, 2011 is nothing but clarificatory or explanatory in nature and, therefore, it must be given retrospective effect. Counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2015) 4 SCC 697 and (2007) 10 SCC 513 and (2006) 6 SCC 581 . Counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2015) 4 SCC 697 and (2007) 10 SCC 513 and (2006) 6 SCC 581 . On the basis of the aforesaid decision, it is submitted by the counsel for the appellants in all the three Letters Patent Appeals, even if the notification is published on 8th December, 2011 upon the advice given by the National Commission for Backward Classes in the month of October, 2010, the said notification should be given retrospective effect and if retrospective effect is given as on cut-off date prescribed by the National Thermal Power Corporation viz 12th March, 2011, these appellants will be the candidates covered by Other Backward Classes list. These aspects of the matter have not been property appreciated by the learned Single Judge and, hence, the judgment and order delivered by learned Single Judge in all the three writ petitions deserved to be quashed and set aside. It is submitted by the counsel for the appellants that the requirement of National Thermal Power Corporation was that if any candidate is covered by the list of Other Backward Classes published by the Union of India, then unlike reserved seats for Engineering Executive Trainees, that list should be produced and as no retrospective effect has been given in the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge, these appellants lost their chance to be appointed as Engineering Executive Trainees. In fact, subsequently published notification is nothing but explanatory or clarificatory in nature. 4. ARGUMENT CANVASSED BY THE ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA Counsel for the Union of India submitted that no time limit has been prescribed of the Act of 1993 for publishing the list of Other Backward Classes under Section 2(c) thereof, upon recommendation of the National Commission for Backward Classes under Section 9(1) of the Act. After receiving the recommendation from the National Commission for Backward Classes, which is in the form of advice, the Union of India has to apply the mind. Thinking process of Union of India always takes time. Nothing is to be accepted mechanically. After receiving the recommendation from the National Commission for Backward Classes, which is in the form of advice, the Union of India has to apply the mind. Thinking process of Union of India always takes time. Nothing is to be accepted mechanically. There are bound to be discussions, deliberations and thereafter declarations in the form of notification under Section 2(c) of the Act of 1993, otherwise, the Commission will publish the list of Other Backward Classes which will be binding to the Union of India, but, the Act of 1993 does not prescribed these types of procedure at all. It is further submitted by the Assistant Solicitor General of India that detailed counter affidavit has been filed in W.P. (S) No. 472 of 2014 and as stated in paragraph 5 to be read with paragraphs 17 and 18 of the counter affidavit filed by the Union of India, it is abundantly clear that after receiving the recommendation of the National Commission for Backward Classes in the month of October, 2010, the Department of Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, has prepared a necessary note and thereafter the same was placed before the cabinet of Union of India where discussions and deliberations had taken place and ultimately the Union of India published the 8th notification on December, 2011 (Annexure 8 to these Letters Patent Appeals). Annexure 8 was published where all the three cases, namely, Halwai, Agrahari Vaishya and Roniyar Vaishya, were included in the list of Other Backward Classes and this notification is made effective from the date of publication. There is no legal obligation on the part of the Union of India to publish the notification immediately on a next day, no sooner did the recommendation/advice was received from the National Commission for Backward Classes. Therefore, there is no right vested in these appellants that such notification ought to be published on a next day. On the contrary, it is a power vested in the Union of India to publish such type of notice and once there is a power vested in the Union of India, there is no corresponding right vested in a particular citizen and, hence, no writ of mandamus can be issued upon the Union of India as there is no violation of any public duty. It is further submitted by the Assistant Solicitor General of India that the notification published by Union of India dated 8th December, 2011 can never be treated as a clarificatory or explanatory in nature, because, this notification is never explaining the earlier notification, nor it clarifies the earlier notification. By virtue of the notification dated 8th December, 2011, the said three castes have been added in the list. Never was it a doubtful situation with already published list of Other Backward Classes earlier which included Halwai, Agrahari Vaishya and Roniyar Vaishya. Earlier castes notified as Other Backward Classes were never ambiguous or equivocal, so that the same requires to be clarified by subsequent notification. Therefore, no retrospective effect can be given to the 8th notification dated December, 2011. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petitions preferred by these appellants and hence, these Letters Patent Appeals may not be entertained by this Court. It is further submitted by the Assistant Solicitor General of India that whenever any cut-off date is prescribed to submit certificates, etc, as prescribed in this case which is 12th March, 2011 by National Thermal Power Corporation, there are bound to be few candidates who will fall on a wrong side of the cut-off date. There cannot be any cut-off date where not a single candidate will not fall on a wrong side of the cut-off date and, therefore, merely because these appellants could not produce their Other Backward Classes certificates published by the Union of India prior to 12th March, 2011, or, prior to the extended period of cut-off date i.e. 30th November, 2011, that does not mean that the notification which is published on 8th December, 2011, should be made operative with retrospective effect. Assistant Solicitor General of India has relied upon the following decisions:- (a) (2013) 11 S.C.C. Page 58 (b) (2013) 2 J.C.R. Page 21 On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by the Assistant Solicitor General of India that merely because these appellants could not produce their Other Backward Classes certificates on or before the cut-off date, the notification dated 8th December, 2011 cannot be given retrospective effect, because, whenever any cut-off date is prescribed, there are bound to be few candidates who are at a disadvantaged position. It is submitted by the counsel for the Union of India that no time limit has been prescribed under Section 9 of the Act of 1993 for publication of the notification. In fact, there is no need of explaining any delay on the part of the Union of India, because, Union of India is bound to consume some time for clearly understanding the recommendation/advice given by the National Commission for Backward Classes under Section 9(1) of the Act of 1993. These aspects of the matter have been property appreciated by learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petitions and, hence, these Letters Patent Appeals may not be entertained by this Court. 5. ARGUMENT CANVASSED BY COUNSEL FOR THE NATIONAL THERMAL POWER STATION It is submitted by counsel for respondent No.2 that these appellants could not produce the certificates before 12th March, 2011 nor before even extended time limit i.e. 30th November, 2011 and, hence, the offer of appointment was cancelled by the National Thermal Power Corporation on 21st December, 2011. If this type of cut-off date is not prescribed and if these appellants are allowed to produce the necessary certificates even after the cut-off date, it will cause great injustice to those who are law-abiding similarly situated candidates who have not applied for the post of Engineering Executive Trainees because, there is no such notification of the Other Backward Classes prior to the cut-off date. It is further submitted by the counsel for the respondent no.2 that if these appellants are allowed to produce Other Backward Classes certificates at any time whenever they like, perhaps, recruitment process could not be completed at all. Such type of open-ended time limit cannot be given any candidate. Counsel for the respondent No.2 has also relied upon the decisions which are relied upon by the Assistant Solicitor General of India and has submitted that no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while deciding the writ petition preferred by these appellants. Hence, these Letters Patent Appeals may not be entertained by this Court. Reasons : 6. Counsel for the respondent No.2 has also relied upon the decisions which are relied upon by the Assistant Solicitor General of India and has submitted that no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while deciding the writ petition preferred by these appellants. Hence, these Letters Patent Appeals may not be entertained by this Court. Reasons : 6. Having heard learned counsels for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we see no reason to entertain these Letters Patent Appeals mainly for the following facts and reasons:- (i) These appellants applied for the post of Engineering Executive Trainees upon the public advertisement given by the National Thermal Power Corporation in the month of March, 2011. There was a requirement that if any candidate is seeking appointment under reserved category of Other Backward Classes, then they must produce the certificate of Other Backward Classes category in the list published by the Union of India. Looking to the advertisement, the cut-off date was dated 12th March, 2011. (ii) It appears that for the State of Jharkhand as on 12th March, 2011, the castes to which these appellants are belonging viz Halwai, were admittedly not within the list of Other Backward Classes category published by the Union of India. (iii) It further appears from the facts of the case that time limit to give this Other Backward Classes certificate was extended upto 30th November, 2011. (iv) Meanwhile, in the month of April, 2011, examination was conducted by the National Thermal Power Corporation followed by oral interview in the month of June, 2011 which were cleared by these appellants. Appointment was also offered on 29th August, 2011. Medical check-up was also cleared by all these appellants. (v) Even during extended period of submission of Other Backward Classes certificate and the list published by the Union of India could not be provided by these appellants, their offer of appointment was cancelled on 21st December, 2011. Thereafter, these appellants preferred three writ petitions as stated herein above, which were dismissed by learned Single Judge vide order dated 10th October, 2014. Thereafter, these appellants preferred three writ petitions as stated herein above, which were dismissed by learned Single Judge vide order dated 10th October, 2014. (vi) Section 2(c) and Section 9 of the National Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993 read as under:- “2(c) “lists” means lists prepared by the Government of India from time to time for purposes of making provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of backward classes of citizens which, in the opinion of that Government, are not adequately represented in the services under the Government of India and any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India;” “9. Functions of the Commission.- (1) The Commission shall examine requests for inclusion of any class of citizens as a backward class in such lists and hear complaints of over-inclusion or under-inclusion of any backward class in such lists and tender such advice to the Central Government as it deems appropriate. (2) The advice of the Commission shall ordinarily be binding, upon the Central Government.” (vii) On the basis of the aforesaid Section (1) of the Act of 1993, counsel for the appellant mainly submitted that the recommendation was already made by the National Commission for Backward Classes in the month of October, 2010 to include the castes, namely Halwai, Agrahari Vaishya and Roniyar Vaishya in the Other Backward Classes category for the State of Jharkhand and, as the advice was binding upon the Union of India, immediately the notification ought to have been published, so that on or before the cut-off date namely 12th March, 2011, these appellants could have got the benefit of the reservation under the Other Backward Classes category, or, such notification ought to have been published prior to the extended cut-off date namely 30th November, 2011, but, the 8th notification has been published on December, 2011 (Annexure 8 to these Letters Patent Appeals) and, therefore, valuable right to be appointed on the post of Engineering Executive Trainees in a public sector undertaking is being taken away. This contention is not accepted by this Court mainly for the reason that : (a) No time limit has been prescribed for Union of India for publication of the notification after receiving the advice from the National Commission for Backward Classes under Section 9(1) of the Act of 1993. This contention is not accepted by this Court mainly for the reason that : (a) No time limit has been prescribed for Union of India for publication of the notification after receiving the advice from the National Commission for Backward Classes under Section 9(1) of the Act of 1993. (b) As there is no time limit prescribed, there is no need to explain delay by the Union of India in publication of the notification. (c) To publish a list of Other Backward Classes castes for a particular State is power vested in the Union of India and once there is a power vested in the Union of India, there is no corresponding right vested in the candidates and there was no public duty vested in the Central Government and, therefore, no writ of mandamus can be issued upon the Union of India. (d) Union of India is bound to consume some time in discussion, deliberation and declaration by the way of the notification. Nothing is required to be accepted mechanically, much less, the advice given by the National Commission for Backward Classes, otherwise, the Commission may have published the list which is binding upon the Union of India, but, there are no such provisions under the Act of 1993. (e) Looking to paragraphs, 5, 17 and 18 of the affidavit filed by the Union of India in a W.P. (S) No. 472 of 2014, the detailed procedures followed by the Union of India after receiving the advice of the Commission under Section 9(1) of the Act of 1993 has been mentioned. (f) This Court will never give a direction to the Union of India for acceleration in the thinking process. Thinking process, especially for reservation, is bound to be with a controlled speed, as explained in paragraphs 5, 17 and 18 of the counter affidavit. (g) The Court will be very slow while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to give one more advice to the Central Government to immediately publish a notification. Those who have published the notification, they know very well with what speed the notification ought to be published. (g) The Court will be very slow while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to give one more advice to the Central Government to immediately publish a notification. Those who have published the notification, they know very well with what speed the notification ought to be published. (viii) Looking to the notification at Annexure 8 to these Letters Patent Appeal dated 8th December, 2011, the castes namely Halwai, Agrahari Vaishya and Roniyar Vaishya have been included in the Other Backward Classes by Union of India for the State of Jharkhand and is made operative from the date of notification. No retrospective effect has been given. (ix) Counsel for the appellants has further submitted that for the period running from 1993 to 2007, these casts were included in the Other Backward Classes category. Thereafter, by mistake these three castes were dropped from the list of Other Backward Classes category and again they are added by the notification dated 8th December, 2011 and therefore, this notification at Annexure 8 is clarificatory and explanatory in nature. This contention is also not accepted by this Court mainly for the reason that; (a) Looking to the notification dated 8th December, 2011, nothing has been explained or clarified which was formally ambiguous or equivocal. (b) Prior to 8th December, 2011, these three castes were not included in the Other Backward Classes category, therefore, several representations were made before the National Commission for Backward Classes. Thereafter, the said Commission took much longer time and ultimately advice was given to the Union of India under Section 9(1) of the Act of 1993 in the month of October, 2010 for inclusion of the aforesaid three castes in the Other Backward Classes list. There was no such advice that the Union of India should clarify or explain the earlier unambiguous or equivocal notification and, therefore also, the notification dated 8th December, 2011 cannot be treated as explanatory or clarificatory in nature. (c) Counsel for the appellants has relied upon decision rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2007) 10 S.C.C. Page 513 and has submitted that as the aforesaid notification is clarificatory or explanatory in nature, retrospective effect should be given. (c) Counsel for the appellants has relied upon decision rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2007) 10 S.C.C. Page 513 and has submitted that as the aforesaid notification is clarificatory or explanatory in nature, retrospective effect should be given. We Are not in agreement with this submission with the counsel for the appellants mainly for the reasons that the notification dated 8th December, 2011 is never a clarificatory or explanatory in nature and, hence, it cannot be given retrospective effect. This notification includes the three castes, namely Halwai, Agrahari Vaishya and Roniyar Vaishya. Previously, list of Other Backward Classes were also enough. Nothing was ambiguous or equivocal in the previous notification. Nothing was required to be clarified, nor to be explained by the Union of India and, hence, the decision citied by the counsel for the appellants is not helpful to these appellants, looking to the facts of the present case. (x) Looking to the provisions of the Act of 1993, to be read with the notification published on 8th December, 2011 under Section 2(c) of the Act of 1993, it appears that the three castes have been added with effect from the date of publication of the notification and, therefore, these appellants cannot get the benefit of subsequent inclusion of these three cases in the Other Backward Classes list with retrospective effect i.e. from 12th March, 2011, which is a cut-off date prescribed by the National Thermal Power Station for submitting necessary documents including the Other Backward Classes certificates with the list of Other Backward Classes published by the Union of India. Even before extended date i.e. before 30th November, 2011, the said notification was not published and, hence, these appellants cannot get the benefit of subsequent published notification. (xi) When there is any cut-off date prescribed, there are bound to be few candidates who are falling on the wrong side of the cut-off date, but, that does not mean that the cut-off date should be further extended or the subsequently obtained caste certificates or subsequently published notification should be given retrospective effect. It appears that by hook or crook, these appellants want benefit of subsequently published notification, which cannot be given to these appellants. (xii) It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1985 Supp SCC 45, in paragraph no.30 as under: “30. It appears that by hook or crook, these appellants want benefit of subsequently published notification, which cannot be given to these appellants. (xii) It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1985 Supp SCC 45, in paragraph no.30 as under: “30. The object of this legislation was to provide for absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing. So therefore experience and continuous employment were necessary ingredients. The Hindi version of the Ordinance used the expression “ke prarambh ke samaya is roop me karya kar rahe hein” is capable of meaning “and are continuing” to work as such at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance. Keeping the background of the purpose of the Act in view that would be the proper construction and if that is the proper construction which is in consonance with the English version of the Ordinance and the Act as well as with the object of the Act then in our opinion the Act and the Ordinance should be construed to mean that only those would be eligible for screening who were appointed prior to June 25, 1975 and were continuing at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. June 12, 1978 i.e. approximately about three years. If that is the correct reading, then we are unable to accept the criticism that those who were for a short period appointed prior to June 25, 1975 then again with interruption were working only at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. June 12, 1978 would also be eligible. In other words people with very short experience would be eligible for absorption. That cannot be the purpose of the Act. It cannot be so read reasonably. Therefore on a proper construction it means that all temporary lecturers who were appointed as such on or before June 25, 1975 and were continuing as such at the commencement of the Ordinance shall be considered by the University for screening for absorption. The expression “were continuing” is significant. This is in consonance with the object of the Act to ensure continuity of experience and service as one of the factors for regularising the appointment of the temporary lecturers. For regularising the appointment of temporary lecturers, certain continuous experience is necessary. The expression “were continuing” is significant. This is in consonance with the object of the Act to ensure continuity of experience and service as one of the factors for regularising the appointment of the temporary lecturers. For regularising the appointment of temporary lecturers, certain continuous experience is necessary. If a Legislature considers a particular period of experience to be necessary, the wisdom of such a decision is not subject to judicial review. Keeping the aforesaid reasonable meaning of clause 3 of the Ordinance and Section 3 of the Act in view, we are of the opinion that the criterion fixed for screening for absorption was not an irrational criterion not having any nexus with the purpose of the Act. Therefore, the criticism that a teacher who was working even for two or three months only before June 25, 1975 and then with long interruptions was in employment of the University at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance would be eligible but a teacher who had worked continuously from June 26, 1975 i.e. after the date fixed i.e. June 25, 1975 for three years would be ineligible and as such that will be discrimination against long experience, cannot be accepted. Such a construction would be an unreasonable construction unwarranted by the language used in the provisions concerned. It is well-settled that if a particular period of experience is fixed for screening or for absorption, it is within the wisdom of the Legislature, and what period should be sufficient for a particular job or a particular employment is not subject to judicial review. We need not refer to a large number of decisions on this point.” (emphasis supplied) (xiii) It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 368 , in paragraph no.8 as under:- “8. In the present case as pointed out earlier the past practice was to fix the last date for receipt of applications a month or one and a half months after the date of actual publication of the advertisement. Following the past practice the State Government fixed the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988. Those who had completed the required experience of three years by that date were, therefore, eligible to apply for the posts in question. Following the past practice the State Government fixed the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988. Those who had completed the required experience of three years by that date were, therefore, eligible to apply for the posts in question. The respondents and some of the intervenors who were not completing the required experience by that date, therefore, challenged the fixation of the last date as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is obvious that in fixing the last date as January 31, 1988 the State Government had only followed the past practice and if the High Court’s attention had been invited to this fact it would perhaps have refused to interfere since its interference is based on the erroneous belief that the past practice was to fix June 30 of the relevant year as the last date for receipt of applications. Except for leaning on a past practice the High Court has not assigned any reasons for its choice of the date. As pointed out by this Court the choice of date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the same unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The choice of the date for advertising the posts had to depend on several factors, e.g. the number of vacancies in different disciplines, the need to fill up the posts, the availability of candidates, etc. It is not the case of anyone that experienced candidates were not available in sufficient numbers on the cutoff date. Merely because the respondents and some others would qualify for appointment if the last date for receipt of applications is shifted from January 31, 1988 to June 30, 1988 is no reason for dubbing the earlier date as arbitrary or irrational. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was clearly in error in striking down the government’s action of fixing the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988 as arbitrary.” (emphasis supplied) (xii) It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ami Lal Bhat (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 614 , in paragraph nos. 5, 7, 11 and 17 as under:- “5. This contention, in our view, is not sustainable. 5, 7, 11 and 17 as under:- “5. This contention, in our view, is not sustainable. In the first place the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post is not, per se, arbitrary. Basically, the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age required for a post, is in the discretion of the rule-making authority or the employer as the case may be. One must accept that such a cut-off date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision and in such a manner as would avoid hardship in all conceivable cases. As soon as a cutoff date is fixed there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the cut-off date and some persons who will fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date. That cannot make the cut-off date, per se, arbitrary unless the cut-off date is so wide off the mark as to make it wholly unreasonable. This view was expressed by this Court in Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works and has been reiterated in subsequent cases. In the case of A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra the relevant service rule stipulated that the candidate should not have completed the age of 26 years on the 1st day of July of the year in which the selection is made. Such a cut-off date was challenged. This Court considered the various steps required in the process of selection and said, “when such are the different steps in the process of selection the minimum or maximum age of suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinise the applications”. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinise the applications”. This Court, therefore, held that in order to avoid uncertainty in respect of minimum or maximum age of a candidate, which may arise if such an age is linked to the process of selection which may take an uncertain time, it is desirable that such a cut-off date should be with reference to a fixed date. Therefore, fixing an independent cut-off date, far from being arbitrary, makes for certainty in determining the maximum age. 7. In the present case, the cut-off date has been fixed by the State of Rajasthan under its Rules relating to various services with reference to the 1st of January following the year in which the applications are invited. All Service Rules are uniform on this point. Looking to the various dates on which different departments and different heads of administration may issue their advertisements for recruitment, a uniform cut-off date has been fixed in respect of all such advertisements as 1st January of the year following. This is to make for certainty. Such a uniform date prescribed under all Service Rules and Regulations makes it easier for the prospective candidates to understand their eligibility for applying for the post in question. Such a date is not so wide off the mark as to be construed as grossly unreasonable or arbitrary. The time-gap between the advertisement and the cut-off date is less than a year. It takes into account the fact that after the advertisement, time has to be allowed for receipt of applications, for their scrutiny, for calling candidates for interview, for preparing a panel of selected candidates and for actual appointment. The cut-off date, therefore, cannot be considered as unreasonable. It was, however, strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cut-off date is the last date for receipt of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cut-off date. But there is no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cut-off date. Even such a date is liable to question in given circumstances. It was, however, strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cut-off date is the last date for receipt of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cut-off date. But there is no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cut-off date. Even such a date is liable to question in given circumstances. In the first place, making a cutoff date dependent on the last date for receiving applications, makes it more subject to vagaries of the department concerned, making it dependent on the date when each department issues an advertisement, and the date which each department concerned fixes as the last date for receiving applications. A person who may fall on the wrong side of such a cut-off date may well contend that the cut-off date is unfair, since the advertisement could have been issued earlier; or in the alternative that the cut-off date could have been fixed later at the point of selection or appointment. Such an argument is always open, irrespective of the cut-off date fixed and the manner in which it is fixed. That is why this Court has said in the case of Parameswaran Match Works and later cases that the cut-off date is valid unless it is so capricious or whimsical as to be wholly unreasonable. To say that the only cut-off date can be the last date for receiving applications, appears to be without any basis. In our view the cut-off date which is fixed in the present case with reference to the beginning of the calendar year following the date of application, cannot be considered as capricious or unreasonable. On the contrary, it is less prone to vagaries and is less uncertain. 11. In our view this kind of an interpretation cannot be given to a rule for relaxation of age. The power of relaxation is required to be exercised in public interest in a given case; as for example, if other suitable candidates are not available for the post, and the only candidate who is suitable has crossed the maximum age-limit; or to mitigate hardship in a given case. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. There cannot be any wholesale relaxation because the advertisement is delayed or because the vacancy occurred earlier especially when there is no allegation of any mala fides in connection with any delay in issuing an advertisement. This kind of power of wholesale relaxation would make for total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate. It might be unfair to a large number of candidates who might be similarly situated, but who may not apply, thinking that they are age-barred. We fail to see how the power of relaxation can be exercised in the manner contended. 17. In the premises the appeals of the candidates who have challenged the cut-off date under the relevant rules are dismissed while the appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan are allowed. The validity of the Rules concerned relating to the cut-off date being fixed with reference to 1st of January of the year following the application is upheld. There will be no order as to costs. (emphasis supplied) (xiv) It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn., reported in (2004) 2 SCC 76 , in paragraph nos.29, 31, 32 and 33 as under:- “29. It is now well settled that for the purpose of effecting promotion, the employer is required to fix a date for the purpose of effecting promotion and, thus, unless a cut-off date so fixed is held to be arbitrary or unreasonable, the same cannot be set aside as offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, the cut-off date so fixed having regard to the directions contained by the National Industrial Tribunal which had been given a retrospective effect cannot be said to be arbitrary, irrational, whimsical or capricious. 31. It is not in dispute that a cut-off date can be provided in terms of the provisions of the statute or executive order. In University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary it has been observed: (SCC p. 546, para 21) “21. 31. It is not in dispute that a cut-off date can be provided in terms of the provisions of the statute or executive order. In University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary it has been observed: (SCC p. 546, para 21) “21. … It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. (See: Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works, SCC at 310 : SCR at p. 579 and Sushma Sharma (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan, SCC at 66 : SCR at p. 269.)” 32. If a cut-off date can be fixed, indisputably those who fall within the purview thereof would form a separate class. Such a classification has a reasonable nexus with the object which the decision of the Bank to promote its employees seeks to achieve. Such classifications would neither fall within the category of creating a class within a class or an artificial classification so as to offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 33. Whenever such a cut-off date is fixed, a question may arise as to why a person would suffer only because he comes within the wrong side of the cut-off date, but, the fact that some persons or a section of society would face hardship, by itself cannot be a ground for holding that the cut-off date so fixed is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. (emphasis supplied) (xv) It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Govt. of A.P. v. N. Subbarayudu, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 702 , in paragraph nos. 5, 7, 8 & 9 as under: 5. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cut-off date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending circumstances. 5, 7, 8 & 9 as under: 5. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cut-off date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending circumstances. This Court is also of the view that fixing cut-off dates is within the domain of the executive authority and the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. (See State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal.) 7. There may be various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cut-off date has been fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. The court must exercise judicial restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cut-off date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. 8. In fact several decisions of this Court have gone to the extent of saying that the choice of a cut-off date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is given for the same in the counter-affidavit filed by the Government (unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical), vide State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal (vide SCC para 5), Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn. (vide SCC para 31), University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary, etc. It follows, therefore, that even if no reason has been given in the counter-affidavit of the Government or the executive authority as to why a particular cut-off date has been chosen, the court must still not declare that date to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 unless the said cut-off date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result. 9. As has been held by this Court in Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass and in Govt. of A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi the court must maintain judicial restraint in matters relating to the legislative or executive domain. 9. As has been held by this Court in Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass and in Govt. of A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi the court must maintain judicial restraint in matters relating to the legislative or executive domain. (emphasis supplied) (xvi) In view of the aforesaid decisions, neither the cut-off date can be extended which is already extended upto 30th November, 2011, nor the notification dated 8th December, 2011 (Annexure 8) can be given retrospective effect. These aspects of the matter have been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petitions preferred by the appellants. No error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in deciding these writ petitions. We see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single Judge. 7. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, there is no substance in these Letters Patent Appeals. Hence, they are dismissed. 8. Interim order passed vide order dated 11th December, 2014 is hereby vacated. Appeal dismissed.