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Gauhati High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 1130 (GAU)

Tarun Dev Sarma v. State of Assam

2015-09-02

C.R.SARMA

body2015
JUDGMENT : C.R. Sarma, J. 1. The above two criminal petitions, filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, Cr.P.C.) have arisen out of the same F.I.R., lodged by private respondent in both the petitions aforesaid. By the said petitions, the petitioners, who are accused persons, in GR Case No. 355/2015, arising out of Complaint Case No. 4361C/2013 (Jalukbari P.S. Case No. 25/2014), pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Kamrup (M), Guwahati, under Sections 120B/406/420/468 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, IPC), have prayed for quashing the order, dated 30.12.2013, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class (M), Kamrup, Guwahati, whereby the learned Magistrate, exercising power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., directed the Police to register a case and investigate into the matter and the First Information Report dated 10.01.2014 i.e. the complaint filed by the private respondent. The private respondent, as complainant, filed a complaint (CR Case No. 4361C/2013) with a prayer under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., for sending the said complaint to the Officer-in-charge, Jalukbari P.S. for registering a case and investigate into the matter and accordingly the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Kamrup (M), Guwahati sent the complaint to Police. 2. The complaint's case, may, in brief, be stated as follows: The complainant i.e. the private respondent, who was running a business, under the name and style "M/s. M.R. Trading Company", was approached by the accused No. 1, i.e. the petitioner, in Criminal Petition No. 97/2015, with a proposal for purchasing a Large Format Inject Printer Machine for starting a business of printing on glass, tiles etc. with the assurance of earning huge profit. It was also assured that the machine would be installed by the Company of the accused No. 3 i.e. petitioner in Criminal Petition No. 569/2014, from whom the same would be purchased. On being so assured and persuaded for purchasing the said machine, the complainant, after having discussion with the said accused No. 1 and one Sri Dhananjay Tiwari, (both accused person Nos. 1 and 2, respectively in the said complaint) agreed to purchase the said machine. He was told that the total price of the machine would be Rs. 30 Lakhs and that the same would be installed, after payment of Rs. 5 Lakhs, as advance and that the remaining amount would be required to be paid within a period of nine months. He was told that the total price of the machine would be Rs. 30 Lakhs and that the same would be installed, after payment of Rs. 5 Lakhs, as advance and that the remaining amount would be required to be paid within a period of nine months. Accordingly, the complaint, along with the said two accused persons, visited the office of the accused No. 3 i.e. petitioner in Criminal Petition No. 569/2014, on 09.05.2013 at New Delhi and after discussion, the deal was finally settled and accordingly, the complainant had paid an amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the accused No. 3, as advance towards the purchase of the printer, namely, "Nutek Machine, Model No. Fortune Jet 2512/4". The complainant, on being asked by the accused No. 1, signed the money receipt and the agreement in good faith. As the machine was not sent for about 2 (two) months, the complainant contacted the accused No. 3, who, demanded full payment of Rs. 30 Lakhs and the complainant, having no other alternative, had paid Rs. 25 Lakhs in installments. Though, earlier, it was assured by the accused persons that the transportation cost and sales tax up to 30 Lakhs would be borne by the accused No. 3, subsequently, the accused No. 3 demanded the transportation cost and sale tax also. In the circumstances, the complainant was compelled to pay the transportation cost and other charges. 3. Even after receipt of the said amount by the accused No. 3, the machine was not sent to the petitioner and as such he had deputed the accused No. 1 to go to Delhi to find out the status, regarding delivery of the said machine. The complainant came to know that the accused No. 3, despite receiving the transportation cost, did not pay the same to the carrier and as such the complainant contacted the transport company of Mr. R.K. Singh and paid an amount of Rs. 87,000/- for carrying the machine to Guwahati. 4. Though the transport company assured to deliver the machine within 10 (ten) days, unfortunately, the said transport company had sent the machine, in a truck with back load of 6 to 8 ft. and in the said condition, the truck, with the machine reached Guwahati after 20 to 22 days i.e. on 25.12.2013. 4. Though the transport company assured to deliver the machine within 10 (ten) days, unfortunately, the said transport company had sent the machine, in a truck with back load of 6 to 8 ft. and in the said condition, the truck, with the machine reached Guwahati after 20 to 22 days i.e. on 25.12.2013. The Handyman and the Driver of the truck visited the complainant and requested him to take delivery of the machine and the relevant papers/documents, sent by the accused No. 3. 5. The complainant, after making inspection, found that the machine was loaded in the truck in a damaged/broken condition, for which, he refused to take delivery. The complainant informed the matter to the accused No. 3 requesting him to send his man to inspect the machine, but he failed to receive any response from the accused No. 3. However, on 25.02.2014, the Driver and the Handyman of the said truck left, keeping the truck near the house of the complainant. 6. In view of the above, the complainant, by filing the said complaint, alleged that the accused persons had cheated him and misappropriated an amount of Rs. 30 Lakhs, by sending a damaged/broken machine and thus, they committed the offences under Sections 120B/406/420/468/34 IPC. 7. The said complainant, as prayed for, was sent to the O/C, Jalukbari Police Station for registering a case and investigate into the matter and submit report in final form, at the earliest. 8. On receipt of the said complaint, the O/C, Jalukbari P.S. registered the same as Jalukbari P.S. Case No. 25/2014, under Sections 120B/406/420/468 IPC and launched investigation into the matter. 9. Aggrieved by the registration of the said F.I.R., the accused Nos. 1 and 3, as petitioners, have come up with the present set of quashing proceedings. 10. According to the accused No. 1, who is the petitioner in Criminal Petition No. 97 of 2015, he is no way involved with the alleged offences, except introducing the complainant with the Company, which performed its contractual legal duty by sending the machine to the complainant as per the agreement and that he has been unnecessarily detained and harassed for no fault, on his part. 11. 11. It has also been contended by the said petitioners that the complainant has brought false and concocted allegations, only for the purpose of pressurizing the petitioner for making good of the monetary loss, he might have suffered in connection with the purchase of the said machine. 12. The accused No. 3 i.e. the petitioner, in Criminal Petition No. 569/2014, while admitting the purchase of the said machine by the complainant, averred that the allegations made against the petitioner are false, concocted, baseless and that the complaint has been lodged with a view to unnecessarily harass the petitioner, who was not connected with the concerned Company at the relevant time, in as much as, he had resigned from the said Company in 2007 i.e. much prior to the transaction aforesaid. 13. According to this petitioner, he could gather, from the Company, that the complainant, for the purpose of purchasing the printing machine had entered into an agreement with M/s. Ess Dee Nutek Infinities Private Limited and paid an amount of Rs. 11 Lakhs as price of the said machine and that the machine, as per the contract, was sent to the complainant. 14. Praying for setting aside the impugned order, dated 30.12.2013, passed by the learned Magistrate, whereby the complaint aforesaid was sent to Police, under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and also for quashing the F.I.R., registered by Police in connection with Jalukbari P.S. Case No. 25/2014. The petitioner averred, in the petition, supported by an affidavit, that for purchasing a printing machine, the complainant executed two written agreements on 09.05.2013 and that the machine, sent by the Company, got damaged in the transit, for which, the complainant has unnecessarily created some dispute, in as much as the Company's i.e. seller's liability, as provided by the agreement dated 09.05.2013 was to the extent of ex-factory delivery from the premises of the company. 15. It has also been contended that the Company advised the complainant to get the damaged consignment surveyed by an approved surveyor and clear the dues of Rs. 20 Lakhs with tax for sending" the second consignment, as per the second agreement. 15. It has also been contended that the Company advised the complainant to get the damaged consignment surveyed by an approved surveyor and clear the dues of Rs. 20 Lakhs with tax for sending" the second consignment, as per the second agreement. It has also been averred, by the petitioner, that the said Company took steps for resolving the dispute by initiating a conciliation proceeding, as per the provision of the agreement, but the complainant failed to respond to the said conciliation proceeding for which, as per the terms and conditions, mentioned in the said agreement, the Company referred the matter to arbitration with notice to the complainant, but, the complainant failed to participate in the said arbitration proceeding and initiated the criminal proceeding with ulterior motive and mela fide intention. 16. As contended by the petitioner, the arbitrator, appointed by the Company, in terms of the said agreement, gave award, holding, amongst others that the Company received an amount of Rs. 11 Lakhs only from the complainant towards the supply of the said machine. 17. The petitioner, contends that, despite his resignation from the Company, prior to the said transaction and he being the son of the Managing Director of the said Company, the complainant has been unnecessarily dragged him into the criminal proceeding with a view to pressurize the Company to bow down to the illegal demands of the complainant. 18. The petitioner has contended that, in view of the agreed terms and conditions of the transaction, as indicated in the written agreements, the allegations, brought by the complainant are false, baseless and concocted and that continuance with the proceeding would amount to abuse of process of law, inasmuch as the alleged dispute involves civil liability without the existence of any ingredients of criminal offence. It is also contended that transportation cost, transit risk, insurance etc. are the responsibilities and liabilities of the complainant and that the Company's liability was only ex-factory delivery from its premises, which has been done. 19. It is also contended that transportation cost, transit risk, insurance etc. are the responsibilities and liabilities of the complainant and that the Company's liability was only ex-factory delivery from its premises, which has been done. 19. According to the petitioner, the said proceeding has been initiated for wrecking vengeance on the petitioner for private and personal gain, with a view to harass his father, who is the Managing Director of the said Company and that, in view of existence of provision for arbitration, all disputes, arising out of the said transaction, are required to be resolved by way of arbitration and as such, no criminal proceeding can lie for such commercial transaction. 20. Another contention, raised by the petitioner, is that the learned Magistrate committed error and illegality by sending the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., to Police for investigation, without recording his satisfaction for such investigation. In view of the above, it is submitted that the impugned order, dated 30.12.2013, aforesaid, is bad for non application of mind and as such the said order is liable to be set aside. 21. Controverting the said contention, the complaint i.e. the private respondent, by filing an affidavit-in-opposition and annexing a computer generated communication (Annexure 1), has submitted that though the petitioner, namely, Sri Tarun Dev Sarma, claimed that he had resigned from the Company and denied his relationship with the said Company, as per the Annexure-1, Sri Tarun Dev Sarma continued to be the proprietor of the said Company and that he had sent air tickets to the informant (complainant) and others facilitating their visit to Delhi, in connection with the said transaction. 22. It has also been contended by the complainant that, in the Revision Petition No. 921/2011, filed before the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, New Delhi, the petitioner has been shown as the Vice President of the said Company. In view of the above, it is submitted by the complainant that the claim of the petitioner that he had resigned from the said Company in 2007 i.e. prior to the transaction aforesaid is false and misleading. 23. I have heard Mr. N. Dutta, learned Sr. Counsel, assisted by Mr. N.N.B. Choudhury, learned Counsel, appearing for the petitioner in Criminal Petition No. 569/2014 and Mr. D. Chakraborty, learned Counsel, appearing for the petitioner in Criminal Petition No. 97/2015. Also heard Mr. 23. I have heard Mr. N. Dutta, learned Sr. Counsel, assisted by Mr. N.N.B. Choudhury, learned Counsel, appearing for the petitioner in Criminal Petition No. 569/2014 and Mr. D. Chakraborty, learned Counsel, appearing for the petitioner in Criminal Petition No. 97/2015. Also heard Mr. K. Munir, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State respondent and Mr. M.U. Ahmed, learned Counsel, appearing for the private respondent, i.e. the complainant aforesaid. I have also perused the materials, on-record, including the sale agreements, executed by the parties in connection with the purchase of the said machine. 24. Mr. N. Dutta, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the dispute, between the parties has arisen out of a commercial transaction relating to purchase and supply of a printing machine and that both the parties had executed two agreements, on 09.05.2013, in connection with the said transaction. In view of the nature of the said dispute, Mr. Dutta, learned Sr. Counsel has submitted that as the dispute relates to delivery of a machine in damaged condition, the same is purely a civil dispute. 25. Mr. Dutta, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner, referring to the various clauses, mentioned in the said agreement, has submitted that both the parties agreed that, in the event of any difference or dispute or controversy or claim in respect of the said sale, the same should be resolved by mutual conciliation and in the event of failure in such conciliation, the dispute would be settled by sole arbitrator to be appointed by first party i.e. seller. The learned Sr. Counsel, referring to the said agreements, has submitted that as Rs. 10 Lakhs, being the price of the first consignment i.e. large Format Inject Printer Machine, was fully paid and the petitioner's Company had delivered the same, which was carried by the transporter, engaged by the private respondent. 26. The learned Sr. Counsel, for the petitioner, has also submitted that, as per the said agreements, the conditions of supply of the machines were ex-factory delivery only and the cartage, handling and forwarding charges of the machine were to be paid by the purchaser directly to the concerned agency and that the seller's liability was to deliver the machine ex factory after pre-delivery inspection of the printer and that the first party can't be held responsible for any transit damage. 27. 27. It is also submitted that, the machine, as alleged by the complainant, got damaged during the transit and as such, the Company was not liable for the same. It is also contended that the complainant, as per the agreement, was liable to pay an amount of Rs. 21 Lakhs, being the price of the second consignment and taxes within 15 (fifteen) days of delivery of the first consignment. 28. It is also submitted that, due to failure, on the part of the complainant, to pay the second installment of Rs. 20 Lakh in connection with the supply of the second part of the machine, the complaint, as per terms of the agreement, referred the matter to conciliation and as the complainant failed to respond to the said conciliation proceeding, the Company referred the matter to arbitrator by appointing an arbitrator and that the award, given by the arbitrator, which is binding on the complainant, is pending for execution in the Court of law. 29. It is also submitted that the execution proceeding in respect of the said arbitration award, dated 16.07.2014, was filed before the learned Sr. Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controversy, Rohini, for execution (Case No. 2946/2014) and the same, on being transferred, is pending before the learned District Judge, Kamrup (M), Guwahati and that the complainant filed a money suit, being Money Suit No. 135/2014, under Section 173 of the Indian Contract Act, against the petitioner, the petitioner's Company and others for realization of money of damage and compensation in connection with purchase of the said machine and that an objection, under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (as amended upto date) has been filed in the said suit, stating, therein, that in view of existence of arbitration clause, the suit is not maintainable. 30. The learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioners has also submitted that though the machine was delivered the allegations, made in the complaint, relate to non delivery of the machine in good and proper condition. According to the complainant also, the machine, supplied to him, was found in damaged/broken condition and the petitioners, despite receiving payment of Rs. 30 Lakhs, foiled to deliver the machine in good condition and that the complainant was compelled to pay transaction cost and sale tax, which was contrary to the verbal agreement. With regard to the said allegation, the learned Sr. 30 Lakhs, foiled to deliver the machine in good condition and that the complainant was compelled to pay transaction cost and sale tax, which was contrary to the verbal agreement. With regard to the said allegation, the learned Sr. Counsel has submitted that the petitioners' liability was to the extent of ex-factory delivery and that, as per the agreement, it was the liability of the purchaser to bear the transport charge and sale tax etc. and as such the said allegations are contrary to the written agreement. 31. The learned Sr. Counsel has further submitted that, considering the nature of the allegations, the dispute is entirely a civil dispute and the same being covered by the arbitration clause, the complainant, instead of unnecessarily dragging the petitioners to a criminal proceeding, ought to have participated in the conciliation proceeding as well as the arbitration proceeding, initiated by the Company, in terms of the agreement. Therefore, it is submitted that no ingredients of committing any criminal offence has been made out against the petitioners and as such, the continuance with the criminal proceeding would be abuse of process of the Court resulting unnecessary harassment to the petitioners. 32. Mr. N. Dutta, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner, referring to the provision of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and the impugned order, dated 30.12.2013, has submitted that the learned Magistrate committed gross error and illegality by sending the complaint to Police for registering a case and investigate into the matter, without recording any reason warranting investigation by Police. Therefore, it is contended that the impugned order can not be maintained in the eye of law. In view of the above, the learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner has prayed for quashing the F.I.R. and setting aside the impugned order, dated 30.12.2013. 33. Mr. D. Chakraborty, learned Counsel for the petitioner, in Criminal Petition No. 97/2015, adopting the argument, advanced by Mr. N. Dutta, learned Sr. Counsel, has submitted that the role of the petitioner, in Criminal Petition No. 97/2015, i.e. the accused No. 1 was very limited i.e. only to the extent of introducing the complainant with the petitioner's Company in connection with purchase of the said machine. It is also submitted that the petitioner neither received any money from the complainant nor promised to supply the machine, relating to the said transaction. It is also submitted that the petitioner neither received any money from the complainant nor promised to supply the machine, relating to the said transaction. It is also submitted that the said petitioner, who had no fault, on his part, in sending the machine in the alleged way, was unnecessarily harassed, arrested and detained in custody, thereby curtailing his liberty. In view of the above, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has prayed for quashing the F.I.R. aforesaid. 34. Mr. N. Dutta, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the following decisions:- i. Hari Prasad Chamariya Vs. Bishun Kumar Surekha reported in (1973) 2 SCC 823 . ii. State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. reported in 1992 (Supp) 1 SCC 335. iii. V.Y. Jose & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. reported in (2009) 3 SCC 78 . iv. Devendra & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in (2009) 7 SCC 495 . v. Harshendra Kumar D. Vs. Rebatilata Koley & Ors. reported in (2011) 3 SCC 351 . vi. Joseph Salvaraj A. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in (2011) 7 SCC 59 . vii. Ramdev Food Production Private Limited Vs. State of Gujarat. viii. Mrs. Priyanka Srivastava & Anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. reported in SC, Criminal Appeal No. 781/2012. ix. Shri Manoranjan Halder Vs. M/s. Machfab Engineering Industries Represented by its partner Shri Bhawarlal Agarwal reported in 1983 (2) GLR 110. x. Managing Director Cum Chairman, D.L.F. Power Ltd., Gurgaon & Ors. Vs. Amiya Kanti Dhar Choudhury reported in 2011 (5) GKT 408. xi. Pran Jyoti Bhuyan Vs. State of Assam & Ann reported in 2014 (1) GLT 887. 35. Mr. M.U. Ahmed, learned Counsel, appearing for the private respondent (i.e. complainant), referring to the allegations, made in the complaint, has submitted that the petitioners, with dishonest intention, induced the complainant to enter into an agreement for purchasing the printing machine and that, despite receiving full payment for the said machine, they had sent the machine by loading it in a truck with back load and that the same was brought to the petitioner in broken condition by the Driver and the Handyman of the truck, for which, the complainant refused to accept the same. 36. 36. It is also submitted that the petitioners, more particularly, accused No. 3, who was the proprietor of the said Company, even after assuring the complainant to deliver the machine on payment of Rs. 5 Lakhs, as advance, with the condition that the remaining amount would be paid within 9 (nine) months, with dishonest intention, refused to deliver the machine without full payment and the charges towards transportation, sale tax and thus, compelled the complainant to pay an amount of Rs. 30 Lakhs in addition to transportation cost and sale tax. 37. It has also been argued that the accused, without the consent of the complainant, prepared the road challan, by forging his signature and thus, committed the offence of forgery. 38. The learned Counsel has submitted that the petitioners, with dishonest and fraudulent intention, induced the complainant to enter into the said agreements and after taking the full payment of Rs. 30 Lakhs, as the price of the machines, cheated the complainant by sending a damaged/broken machine and thus caused loss to the complainant. The learned Counsel, for the complainant i.e. the private respondent has also submitted that there are sufficient materials to show the existence of the ingredients of the offences, under Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 468 IPC, against the petitioners. 39. The learned Counsel for the private respondent has contended that the decision in the case of Mrs. Priyanka (Supra) will not be applicable to this case, because the decision in the said case was rendered in March, 2015 i.e. before filing of the present complaint (Complaint was filed on 30.12.2013) and that, the learned Magistrate committed no error by sending the complaint to Police, in exercise of his power under Section 156(3). 40. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel for the private respondent has relied on the following decisions:- i. U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Uday Narain Pandey reported in (2006) 1 SCC 479 . ii. Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 . iii. Asit Bhattacharjee Vs. Hanuman Prasad Ojha & Ors. reported in (2007) 5 SCC 786 . iv. State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors. reported in AIR 1991 SC 604 (1). v. Sneh Gupta Vs. Devi Sarup & Ors. reported in (2009) 6 SCC 194 . vi. State of Orissa & Anr. iii. Asit Bhattacharjee Vs. Hanuman Prasad Ojha & Ors. reported in (2007) 5 SCC 786 . iv. State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors. reported in AIR 1991 SC 604 (1). v. Sneh Gupta Vs. Devi Sarup & Ors. reported in (2009) 6 SCC 194 . vi. State of Orissa & Anr. Saroj Kumar Sahoo reported in (2005) 13 SCC 540 . vii. Union of India & Anr. Vs. W.N. Chadha reported in 1993 Supp (4) SCC 260. viii. Srinivas Gundluri & Ors. Vs. Sepco Electric power Construction Corporation & Ors. reported in (2010) 8 SCC 206 . ix. Kurukshetra University and Anr. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. reported in (1997) 4 SCC 451 . x. Sakiri Vasu Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. reported in (2008) 2 SCC 409 . xi. N. Soundaram Vs. P.K. Pounraj & Anr. reported in (2014) 10 SCC 616 . xii. Hamida Vs. Rashid @ Rasheed & Ors. reported in (2008) 1 SCC 474 . xiii. S.M. Mansoor Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in (2000) 10 SCC 391 . xiv. Ram Dhan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., reported in (2012) 5 SCC 536 . xv. K.D. Sarma Vs. Steel Authority of India Limited & Ors., reported in (2008) 12 SCC 481. xvi. Haryana Financial Corporation & Anr. Vs. Jagdamba Oil & Anr., reported in (2002) 3 SCC 496 . xvii. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan Vs. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke & Ors., reported in (2015) 3 SCC 123 . 41. Having heard the learned Counsel, appearing for both the parties, I have carefully perused the complaint, the agreements and the materials, on-record. There is no dispute that for purchasing the printing machine from the Company of the petitioner, the complainant, accompanied by the accused person Nos. 1 and 2, visited the Company's office at Delhi and settled the transaction regarding purchase of the machine, by executing two agreements. 42. According to the complainant, though the accused person No. 3 agreed to supply the machine on payment of Rs. 5 lakhs, as advance, even after receiving the said amount, the Company refused to supply the machine for about 2 (two) months and on being approached by the complainant, they demanded full payment of Rs. 30 Lakhs in addition to the carrying charge and sale tax etc. for which, the complainant had to pay the said amount. 43. 5 lakhs, as advance, even after receiving the said amount, the Company refused to supply the machine for about 2 (two) months and on being approached by the complainant, they demanded full payment of Rs. 30 Lakhs in addition to the carrying charge and sale tax etc. for which, the complainant had to pay the said amount. 43. The complainant's case is that, despite receiving the full payment, the accused No. 3 sent the machine in a truck by improperly loading the same, as a result of which the machine got damaged and as such he refused to take delivery of the same. 44. The crux of the allegation, made by the complainant, is that the petitioner violated the terms and conditions of the transaction by failing to deliver the machine in good and proper condition and thereby caused wrongful loss to the complainant. It has also been alleged that an amount of Rs. 4,70,000/- was misappropriated and the signature of the complainant was forged in preparing the road challan. 45. The case has been registered against the petitioners for the offences under Sections 120B, 406, 420, 468, 34 IPC. According to the petitioners, no ingredients of the said offences has been disclosed from the allegations, made against the petitioners and as such, in order to prevent abuse of process and protect the petitioners form unnecessary harassment, the F.I.R. aforesaid is liable to be quashed. 46. The second line of argument, advanced, on behalf of the petitioners, is that the learned Judicial Magistrate, on receipt of the complaint, failed to apply his mind with regard to the necessity for investigation by Police and thus, committed error by directing the Police to register a case, and investigate into the case, in infringement of the statutory provision, prescribed by Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. 47. The law regarding quashment of F.I.R./complaint/proceeding has been settled in a catena of decisions. As held in the case of Madhabrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia Vs. Sambhajirao Chandojirao Angra reported in (1998) 1 SCC 692, when a prosecution, at initial stage, is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations, as made, prima-facie establish the offence. As held in the case of Madhabrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia Vs. Sambhajirao Chandojirao Angra reported in (1998) 1 SCC 692, when a prosecution, at initial stage, is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations, as made, prima-facie establish the offence. If it is found that the chances of ultimate conviction is bleak and if no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, then the Court taking into consideration the special facts of a case also can quash the proceeding even at an early stage. 48. The Supreme Court, in the case of Bhajanlal (Supra), has laid down the following guidelines with regard to the exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. "(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirely do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within at he purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 49. In the case of Harshendra Kumar D. (Supra), the Supreme Court, laying down the principles of looking into the documents produced by the petitioner (defence) in a quashing proceeding under section 482 CR.P.C. has observed that although it is not permissible to consider the defence of the accused or embark upon an enquiry in respect of merits of the acquisitions, in appropriate case, if on the face of the documents, which are beyond suspicion or document placed by the accused and showing that the accusations cannot stand then in such cases for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the matter at the prima facie stage. 50. In the case of Suresh Gupta Vs. Devi Sarup & Ors., reported in (2009) 6 SCC 194 the Supreme Court observed that while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the High Court has a limited role to play and cannot enter into the disputed question of fact. 51. In the case of State of Orissa and another (Supra), the Supreme Court, held that while exercising the jurisdiction u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. the role of the trial court should not be played and that the High Court should not try to appreciate the evidence to conclude whether the materials are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. The Supreme Court referred to the following categories of cases summarized in the case of R.P. Kapur Vs. The Supreme Court referred to the following categories of cases summarized in the case of R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ) for exercising the powers to quash the proceedings. "9. In R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab this Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings:- (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirely do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. (SRC p. 393)". 52. In the case of W.N. Chadha (Supra), the Supreme Court observed that the accused has no locus standi at the stage of investigation to question the manner in which the evidence is to be collected. It has also been observed that the accused can challenge the admissibility and reliability of the evidence at the stage of trial. 53. In the case of Kurukshetra University (Supra), the Supreme Court held that the High Court, in exercise of its powers u/s. 482 Cr.P.C., cannot quash the F.I.R. without notice to the complainant and that this power is to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. 54. In the case of N. Sundaran (Supra), the Supreme Court observed that High Court will refrain from giving a prima facie direction unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. The Supreme Court also observed that if the allegations made in the complaint do not make out an offence then any quashing of the proceeding u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. would be justified. 55. In the case of Hamida (Supra), the Supreme Court observed that High Court should not entertain petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at an interlocutory stage. 56. In the case of Sanjay Singh Ram Rao Chavan (Supra), the Supreme Court held that the process of criminal court should not be permitted to be used as a weapon of harassment. It has also been held that unmerited and undeserved prosecution is infringement of the guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 57. In the case of Rajiv Thapar & Ors. It has also been held that unmerited and undeserved prosecution is infringement of the guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 57. In the case of Rajiv Thapar & Ors. Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 330 , the Supreme Court, while laying down the principle of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., observed that High Court is to exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash a criminal proceeding for preventing abuse of process of the Court and secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court has delineated the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.: "30.1. Step one: Whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? "30.2. Step two: Whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges leveled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? "30.3. Step three: Whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? "30.4. Step four: Whether the proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?" 58. In view of the above settled position of law, power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised, very sparingly that too, for preventing abuse of process and secure ends of justice. 59. In view of the above, in the present case, we are required to examine, if the allegations made in the complaint, (which has been treated as F.I.R.) disclose a prima-facie case, under Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 468 IPC, warranting continuance with the present criminal proceeding? We are also required to examine as to whether the allegations have been made without any basis and with mela fide intention with a view to wreck vengeance due to private and personal grudge? 60. We are also required to examine as to whether the allegations have been made without any basis and with mela fide intention with a view to wreck vengeance due to private and personal grudge? 60. In the case of Hariprasad Chamariya (Supra), it has been held that absence of allegation of dishonest or fraudulent intention, at the time of the initial transaction will not constitute the offence under section 420 IPC. It was also held that breach of contractual liability will not create criminal liability. 61. In the case of V.Y. Jose (Supra), the Supreme Court observed that although breach of contract per se would not bar a criminal proceeding, a matter which essentially involves dispute of a civil nature should not be allowed to be subject matter of a criminal offence. It has also been held that to attract the offence under section 415 Cr.P.C. it must be shown that there existed the fraudulent or dishonest intention from the very beginning of the formation of contract and in the absence of such culpable intention at the time of making initial contract no offence under Section 420 IPC can be said to have been made out. 62. It has also been observed, in the said case, that a dispute of civil nature should not be allowed to be subject matter of a criminal proceeding and the superior Courts should not allow abuse of process of Courts. Failure on the part of the accused person to keep his promise, in the absence of any dishonest intention, can not constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC. To constitute an offence of cheating, existence of the ingredients namely, fraudulent or dishonest intention at the initial stage of making the promise i.e. from the beginning of the transaction or contract is a must. 63. In the case of Devendra (Supra), the Supreme Court, while quashing a proceeding under Section 420 and 467 IPC, reiterated the principles of quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and held that to constitute an offence under section 420 IPC, the ingredients of Section 415 IPC i.e. misrepresentation must be there from the very beginning of contract. 64. In the case of Joseph Salvaraj A. (Supra), the Supreme Court observed that to constitute the offence under Section 420 IPC dishonest intention must exist at the beginning, which is sine-quo-non to hold a person guilty of committing the said offence. 65. 64. In the case of Joseph Salvaraj A. (Supra), the Supreme Court observed that to constitute the offence under Section 420 IPC dishonest intention must exist at the beginning, which is sine-quo-non to hold a person guilty of committing the said offence. 65. In the case of Manoranjan Haider (Supra), the Supreme Court held that in order to constitute the offence u/s. 420 IPC intention to cheat must be there with the accused at the time of initial transaction and that in the event of existence of intention to pay against delivery of goods, subsequent failure to pay will not convert the transaction into a case of cheating. As held in the said case there must be circumstance, showing in clear way, that the accused had such a dishonest intention at the initial stage. In the event of absence of such intention at the beginning, subsequent breach of contract will be a matter of purely civil nature. 66. In the case of Managing Director-cum-Chairman, DLF Power Ltd. (Supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court held that failure to pay arrear rent for hiring a diesel generating set and refusal to return the generating set, in the absence of intention to deceive the complainant, does not constitute an offence u/s. 420 IPC, inasmuch as the dispute would be a pure breach of contract creating civil liability and not criminal liability. 67. In the case of Pranjyoti Bhuyan (Supra) a learned Single Judge of this Court held that to constitute the offence u/s. 420 IPC dishonest or fraudulent intention must exist at the beginning of the transaction. 68. From the above cited decisions and the principles laid down therein, it is clear that, to establish an offence under Section 415 IPC, punishable under Section 420 IPC, it must be shown that the accused had the dishonest and fraudulent intention at the initial stage of making purpose of transaction. 69. 68. From the above cited decisions and the principles laid down therein, it is clear that, to establish an offence under Section 415 IPC, punishable under Section 420 IPC, it must be shown that the accused had the dishonest and fraudulent intention at the initial stage of making purpose of transaction. 69. Admittedly, as revealed from the complaint, the accused No. 1 and the complainant, who had good relation in connection with their business and on being advised by the petitioner No. 1, the complainant decided to purchase a printing machine from the accused No. 3 and they approached the accused No. 3, in his Company's office, at New Delhi and settled the terms and conditions towards the supply and purchase of the said machine and accordingly, two agreements were executed by the parties, laying down the terms and conditions in connection with the purchase of the said machine. 70. According to the complainant, though the accused No. 3 initially agreed to supply the machine on payment of Rs. 5 Lakhs only, he, subsequently, insisted for full payment and accordingly on payment of Rs. 30 Lakhs, the said machine was sent in a truck, which reached the complainant in damaged condition. Hence, the crux of the dispute is that the machine sent by the accused No. 3, was found by the complainant in damaged condition. 71. From the averment, made in the complaint, it transpires that the role of the accused No. 1 ended after reaching the settlement towards supply and purchase of the said machine. It is revealed that the accused No. 1 had accompanied the informant i.e. the purchaser, to the office of the accused No. 3 at Delhi and he advised the complainant to purchase the machine with a view to earn more profit. There is nothing, on-record, to find that both the petitioners (i.e. accused Nos. 1 and 3) at the time of the initial transaction, had any fraudulent or dishonest intention to cheat the complainant. It was a plain business transaction based on agreed terms and conditions as agreed by both the parties. 72. It is not the case that the accused No. 3 i.e. the seller, despite receiving the payment, refused or did not supply the machine or that he had sent some other machine than the machine for which the payment was made. It was a plain business transaction based on agreed terms and conditions as agreed by both the parties. 72. It is not the case that the accused No. 3 i.e. the seller, despite receiving the payment, refused or did not supply the machine or that he had sent some other machine than the machine for which the payment was made. In fact, the machine was delivered, but the same was found in damaged condition. The allegation made in the F.I.R. does not reveal that the said seller had any intention to cheat the complainant by sending a damaged or broken machine. Fact remains that the machine was carried by the transporter, engaged by the complainant, from the premises of the accused No. 3 at New Delhi. There is allegation of improper loading of the machine. 73. Now, the question is whether the accused No. 3, with dishonest intention to deceive the complainant, by sending a damaged or broken machine had entered into the contract and if in pursuance of such dishonest intention had sent a broken/damaged machine. There is no averment in the complaint that a broken or damaged machine was delivered by the accused No. 3 and that the same was loaded in the truck for transportation in broken condition. 74. From the averment, made in the paragraph 8 of the complaint aforesaid, it is found that the complainant had approached the transport Company of Mr. R.K. Singh and paid an amount of Rs. 87,000/- towards transportation of the said machine to Guwahati and said transporter had brought the machine to Guwahati. 75. In the said complaint, it has been specifically stated: "it is unfortunate that the said transport company sent a machine loading in a truck, which was loaded 6 to 8 ft. outside the back of the truck and it reached Guwahati after 20 to 22 days". 76. From the above statement, it appears that the transporter, which is not a party to the present proceeding, had carried the machine by improperly loading it in a truck and that the machine got damaged due to such improper loading. 77. That apart, as indicated in the sale agreement, dated 09.05.2013, the entire cost of the machine was required to be paid in advance. Therefore, the receipt of the full price of the machine, in advance, by the petitioner, is not contrary to the terms of the agreement. 77. That apart, as indicated in the sale agreement, dated 09.05.2013, the entire cost of the machine was required to be paid in advance. Therefore, the receipt of the full price of the machine, in advance, by the petitioner, is not contrary to the terms of the agreement. As per terms of the agreement (Clause-5), the seller's liability was to make delivery of the machine from his factory and the seller was not liable for any transit damage from the factory of seller to the site of the customer. 78. From the averments, made in the complaint, it is found that the damage in respect of the machine was caused due to improper loading by the transporter. If the machine was already in the damaged condition in the factory of the seller, the transporter would not have loaded and carried the same to Guwahati. Therefore, it is found that in view of the ex-factory, the process of delivery of the machine, so far it relates to the accused No. 3, was completed and there ended his liability. 79. From the above, it can be gathered that the machine got damaged in the transit. Therefore, the allegations, made in the complaint, do not disclose that there was any dishonest or fraudulent intention, on the part of the petitioners, at the beginning of the said contract. Hence, the ingredients of the offence under Section 420 IPC are found to be missing in the present case. Therefore, there can be no criminal proceeding under Section 420 IPC against the present petitioners. 80. With regard to the allegation of misappropriation, it is stated that the money was paid to accused No. 3 towards the supply of the said machine. 81. As agreed to by the accused No. 3, the machine was, in fact was delivered and the transporter, engaged by the complainant, had brought the machine to the complainant. However, the same was found to be in damaged condition. As discussed earlier, there is nothing to show that the petitioners had delivered a broken machine. Therefore, it can not be concluded that the petitioner, who received the said money, as price of the machine, had misappropriated the same by sending a broken or damaged machine. There is no whisper regarding misappropriation of money by accused No. 1. That apart, the complaint does not reveal that he was entrusted with any money or property. Therefore, it can not be concluded that the petitioner, who received the said money, as price of the machine, had misappropriated the same by sending a broken or damaged machine. There is no whisper regarding misappropriation of money by accused No. 1. That apart, the complaint does not reveal that he was entrusted with any money or property. In the complaint, it has been averred that an amount of Rs. 14,70,000/- was sent through RTGS to Mahalaxmi Traders and the accused, after receiving the amount from Mahalaxmi Traders, had given Rs. 10,00,000/- to accused No. 3 and he misappropriated the rest amount i.e. Rs. 4,70,000/- and prepared road challan by forging the signature of the complainant. 82. A careful reading of the said statement does not indicate as to who had received the said amount from Mahalaxmi Traders and who had misappropriated the remaining amount after paying Rs. 10 Lakhs to accused No. 3. The statement, that Rs. 10 Lakh was paid to the accuse No. 3, indicates that the petitioner i.e. accused No. 3 did not misappropriate the said money. Further, there is no averment that the accused No. 1 i.e. the petitioner in Criminal Petition No. 97/2015 had either received or handled any amount with regard to the said transaction. Hence, it can't be concluded that there is specific allegation of misappropriation of money by the present petitioners. 83. With regard to the allegation of forgery i.e. the offence under Section 468 IPC, the complainant stated that road challan was prepared by forging his signature. But he failed to specifically mention as to who had forged his signature. Sections 463 and 464 IPC define forgery and making a false document as follows: "463. Forgery.-[Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury], to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery. 464. 464. Making a false document- [A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record- (a) makes, signs seals or executes a document or part of a document; (b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record; (c) affixes any [electronic signature] on any electronic record; (d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity of the [electronic signature]; With the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of document, electronic record or [electronic signature] was made, signed, sealed executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or Secondly.-Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document or an electronic record in any material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with [electronic signature] either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or Thirdly.-Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an electronic record or to affix his [electronic signature] on any electronic record knowing that such person by reason of unsoundless of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practiced upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or electronic record or the nature of the alteration]." 84. As agreed to by both the parties, it was the liability of the accused No. 3 to make ex-factory delivery of the machine and the machine, on being delivered, was carried by the transporter, aforesaid. There is nothing, on-record, to find that the alleged road challan, if any, was prepared by the petitioner with intent to cause any damage or injury to the complainant. 85. In Clause-5 of the said agreement, it was clearly mentioned that the seller would not be responsible for any transit damage from the factory of the seller to the site of the consumer. It was also agreed upon by both the parties that it was the responsibility of the purchaser to pay for transit, insurance, if so desired, and to deliver to the seller, the C-Forms, if applicable. It was also agreed upon by both the parties that it was the responsibility of the purchaser to pay for transit, insurance, if so desired, and to deliver to the seller, the C-Forms, if applicable. It was further provided, in the said agreement, that loading of the machine from the factory of the seller in lorry, tempo, as the case may be, would be made after preparing delivery inspection by both the parties and that the price of the machine was excluded from all applicable taxes. 86. In view of the above, to constitute an offence of forgery, dishonest intention to cause damage or injury etc. must exist. That apart, in order to have a person guilty of the offence under Section 468 IPC, it must be shown that the forgery was committed for the purpose of cheating. In the present case, as discussed earlier, there is no ingredient of cheating. Therefore, in the attending facts and circumstances, a proceeding under Sections 420 and 468 IPC is not maintainable. It has already been found that the complainant failed to make out a case under Section 406 IPC. 87. In the said agreement, it was also provided that the cartage, handling, forwarding charges and taxes in respect of the said printer should be paid by the purchaser directly to the concerned agency and that the liability of the seller would be ex-factory delivery. Therefore, the claim for payment, towards the cartage charge was not unlawful. 88. In the light of the above discussions, considering the attending facts and circumstances of this case, it is clearly found that the seller had made the ex-factory delivery of the machine and the same was carried by the transporter, engaged by the complainant. 89. Further, as per terms of the said agreement, both the parties agreed that, in case, any difference, dispute or controversy of claim under the sale agreement, the dispute would be referred to a Conciliator and in the event of failure to resolve the dispute, the same would be settled by sole arbitrator, to be appointed by the seller. From the record, it appears that, due to non participation of the buyer i.e. the complainant in the conciliation proceeding, the matter was referred to sole arbitrator, who gave the award. 90. The learned Sr. From the record, it appears that, due to non participation of the buyer i.e. the complainant in the conciliation proceeding, the matter was referred to sole arbitrator, who gave the award. 90. The learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner, referring to the arbitrator's award, has submitted that the said award, given by the arbitrator, was placed before the Court of the learned Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controversy, Rohini, New Delhi, for execution and the same, on being forwarded to the Court of the learned District Judge, Kamrup (M), Guwahati, for execution, is pending for disposal. 91. The learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner, referring to the Title Suit No. 135/2014, instituted by the complainant, under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, for realization of money as damage and compensation from the said Company and the petitioners, has submitted that, in the said civil suit, the Company i.e. the seller has filed objection under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (as amended upto date). 92. The existence of conciliation and arbitration clause in the agreement, the petitioners' contention regarding giving award by the arbitrator, the filing of the suit by the complainant and the filing of the written objection by the respondent i.e. Company have not been denied by the private respondent (complainant). 93. Hence, there is no difficulty in understanding that, in the event of any dispute, difference or controversy or claim with regard to the said transaction, the dispute was liable to be resolved by appointment of sole arbitrator, to be appointed by the first party to the agreement i.e. the seller Company. 94. Therefore, in view of existence of the said provision, for resolution of the dispute, arising out of the said transaction, the complainant ought to have participated in the said arbitration proceeding instead of dragging the petitioners to a criminal trial. 95. The entire facts and circumstances of this case do not indicate that there was any dishonest or fraudulent intention, at the time of initiation of contract. 96. In view of what has been discussed above, I have no hesitation in holding that the dispute, raised in the said complaint, is purely a dispute of civil nature and the said dispute is covered by the arbitration clause, provided by the agreements, executed by the parties, at the time of initiation of the transaction. 97. 96. In view of what has been discussed above, I have no hesitation in holding that the dispute, raised in the said complaint, is purely a dispute of civil nature and the said dispute is covered by the arbitration clause, provided by the agreements, executed by the parties, at the time of initiation of the transaction. 97. In my considered opinion, the allegations, made in the complaint, in the attending facts and circumstances of the case at hand, do not disclose the ingredients of the offences under Section 420/406/468 IPC. Hence, there is no prima-facie case for proceeding with a criminal trial. 98. With regard to the impugned order, dated 30.12.2013, the learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner, referring to the decision, held in the case of Priyanka (Supra), has submitted that the impugned order suffers from non application of mind and the learned Magistrate ought not to have sent the complaint to Police for investigation, without complying with the statutory requirement. 99. In the case of Priyanka (Supra), the Supreme Court, referring to a catena of decisions, including the decision, held in the case of Debendra Palli Lakshminarayana Reddy Vs. Narayana Reddy, reported in (1976) 3 SCC 252 , and in the case of Anil Kumar Vs. M.K. Aiyappa, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 705 , observed that the exercise of power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. warrants application of judicial mind and that the litigant, at his own whim, can't invoke the authority of the Magistrate. While laying down the principles and the procedures to be followed, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the Supreme Court observed that there has to be prior application under Section 154(1) and 154(3) in filing a petition under Section 156(3) and the application under Section 156(3) is to be supported by an affidavit. 100. In the case of Ramdev Food Products Private Limited (Supra), the Supreme Court referring to the decisions held in various cases including the cases of Lalita Kumari (2014) 2 SCCX 1 and Anil Kumar (2013) 10 SCC 705 has observed that a magistrate exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has to apply his mind before referring the matter to the police for investigation. In Anil Kumar the Supreme Court observed: "11. The scope of Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. In Anil Kumar the Supreme Court observed: "11. The scope of Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. This Court is Maksud Saiyed case [ (2008) 5 SCC 668 ] examined the requirement of the application of mind by the Magistrate before exercising jurisdiction Under Section 156(3) and held that where jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200. Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind, in such a case, the Special Judge/Magistrate cannot refer the matter under Section 156(3) against a public servant without a valid sanction. The application of mind by the Magistrate should be reflected in the order. The mere statement that he has gone through the complaint, documents and heard the complaint, as such, as reflected in the order, will not be sufficient. After going through the complaint, documents and hearing the complainant, what weighed with the Magistrate to order investigation under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure, should be reflected in the order, though a detailed expression of his views is neither required nor warranted. We have already extracted the order passed by the learned Special Judge which, in our view, has stated no reasons for ordering investigation." 101. In the case of Priyanka Srivastava (Supra), while laying down the scope of exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the Supreme Court has held that this power is not be exercised in a routine manner and that the duty cast on Magistrate, while exercising power under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be marginalized. Referring to the decision held in the case of Anil Kumar (Supra) and Dilwar Singh Vs. State of Delhi (2007) 12 SCC 496, the Supreme Court observed that direction under 156(3) Cr.P.C. can be made only after application of mind. It has also been observed that a litigant at his whims cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate and that a principled and really aggrieved citizen with clear hands must have free accesses to invoke the said power. In the said case the Supreme Court also held that the application under section 156(3) should be accompanied by an affidavit and that there has to be prior applications under Section 154(1) and 154(3) Cr.P.C. while filing a petition under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. 102. In the case of Lalita Kumari Vs. Govt. In the said case the Supreme Court also held that the application under section 156(3) should be accompanied by an affidavit and that there has to be prior applications under Section 154(1) and 154(3) Cr.P.C. while filing a petition under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. 102. In the case of Lalita Kumari Vs. Govt. of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court, while holding that the registration of F.I.R. is mandatory under section 154 Cr.P.C., if the information discloses commission of cognizable offence, observed that preliminary enquiry is to be made in cases where cognizable offence is not disclosed. It was also observed that in matrimonial dispute/family dispute, commercial offence, medical negligent cases, corruption or cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example over 3 months in reporting the matter without satisfactory explanation for the delay, a preliminary enquiry is necessary. 103. Referring to the case of Asit Bhattacharjee (Supra) the learned counsel for the private respondent has submitted that in the said case the complaint was sent to police by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kolkata by exercising power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and that was found to be correct approach of law. In view of the above, the learned Counsel for the private respondent has contended that the learned Magistrate committed no error by sending the complaint to Police for registering a case. 104. As held in the case of Priyaka, while exercising power u/s. 156(3) the Magistrate has to apply his mind and he must come to a finding regarding the necessity of passing order under 156(3). There can be no dispute that, while passing an order or making direction under Section 156(3) the Magistrate has to apply his mind and his such order should be supported by reasons. Admittedly, in the present case, the Magistrate did not record any reason for sending the complaint to police. 105. In the case of Haryana Vs. Ch. Bhajanlal (Supra), the Supreme Court observed that a complaint cannot be thrown overboard on the mere unsubstantiated plea of mala fides. It has also been observed that under the provision of section 157(1) Cr.P.C., Police officer entering into an investigation has to draw his satisfaction on the materials placed before him at that stage i.e. first information and the documents, if any, enclosed. It has also been observed that under the provision of section 157(1) Cr.P.C., Police officer entering into an investigation has to draw his satisfaction on the materials placed before him at that stage i.e. first information and the documents, if any, enclosed. In the said case, as indicated earlier, Supreme Court laid down the guidelines for exercising quashing power u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. 106. The learned Counsel for the private respondent has submitted that the decision, rendered in the case of Priyanka (Supra) being reported in March, 2015, is not applicable to the present case in as much as the complaint was filed in 2013 i.e. prior to the decision in the above cited case. 107. Referring to the decision, held in the case of S.M. Mansoor (Supra), the learned Counsel for the private respondent has also submitted that the decision, rendered in the case of Priyanka (Supra) can't be binding as law. 108. As held in the case of Uday Narayan Pandey (Supra), a judgment rendered merely having regard to the fact situation can't be a declaration of law within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. 109. There is no dispute that the judgment in Mrs. Priyanka (Supra) was delivered after registration of the present case. In the said case, the Supreme Court has interpreted the application of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Hence, the decision rendered therein is not on fact situation only. The Supreme Court has laid down the scope of application of the statutory provision. Therefore, the decision laid down therein has no binding effect. By the said judgment, the Supreme Court has interpreted the provision prescribed by Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The law regarding power to exercise jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is already there in the Code. The provision, prescribed by Section 156(3) can't be read in isolation. The same has to be read along with the provisions prescribed by Sections 154 and 155 Cr.P.C. The decision held in the case of Sakiri Basu (Supra) makes it abundantly clear that prior compliance of the provision, prescribed by Section 154(1) and 154(3) Cr.P.C. is necessary. The provision, prescribed by Section 156(3) can't be read in isolation. The same has to be read along with the provisions prescribed by Sections 154 and 155 Cr.P.C. The decision held in the case of Sakiri Basu (Supra) makes it abundantly clear that prior compliance of the provision, prescribed by Section 154(1) and 154(3) Cr.P.C. is necessary. A careful reading of the said statutory provision indicates that before invoking the power under Section 156(3), the party has to take resort to the provisions prescribed by Section 154 and 155 Cr.P.C. A Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint under Section 156(3) can't act as a post office and just forward the complaint to the Police for investigation. Any direction or order made by a Judicial Officer, in discharge of judicial work, must be a reasoned order. Therefore, as held by the Supreme Court, in the case of Priyanka, a Magistrate exercising power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has to apply his mind and record reasons justifying the need to send the complaint to Police for investigation. It is also the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain as to whether the complainant has taken resort to the provisions prescribed by Section 154(1) and 154(3) Cr.P.C. 110. In the case of Srinivas Gundhari (Supra), the Supreme Court observed that while sending a complaint in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. the Magistrate after reading the complaint has to come to the findings that it discloses a cognizable offence. 111. In the case of Sakiri Vasu (Supra), the Supreme Court held that an aggrieved person, if his F.I.R. is not registered by police u/s. 154 Cr.P.C., may approach the Supdt. of police u/s. 154(3) CR.P.C. and even if the F.I.R. is not registered than he can file application u/s.156(3) Cr.P.C. and in that case the Magistrate can direct proper investigation. The decision in this case was rendered much prior to the filing of the present complaint. 112. of police u/s. 154(3) CR.P.C. and even if the F.I.R. is not registered than he can file application u/s.156(3) Cr.P.C. and in that case the Magistrate can direct proper investigation. The decision in this case was rendered much prior to the filing of the present complaint. 112. In view of the decision, held in the case of Sakiri Vasu (Supra), the complainant, before invoking the Magistrate's power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., ought to have taken steps under Section 154(1) and 154(3) Cr.P.C. The learned Magistrate also before passing an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. ought to have ascertained as to whether the complaint had approached the authorities under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) Cr.P.C. A plain reading of the impugned order transpires that there was non compliance of the statutory provisions, prescribed by Sections 154(1), 154(3) Cr.P.C. It is also found that no reason has been recorded, indicating the necessity for issuing direction for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. 113. The learned Magistrate, while directing investigation by the impugned order, simply recorded as follows: "30.12.13 Case record is received on transfer for disposal. Complainant is present. Heard. Perused C/R. The facts alleged in complaint require due investigation. Hence, considering prayer for complainant, this case is sent to O.C., Jalukbari P.S. with direction to register a case under appropriate sections of law, for due investigation and for submission of F/F at earliest." 114. The said words i.e. 'heard', 'perused' do not indicate that the learned Magistrate applied his mind to arrive at a decision that the investigation by Police was necessary. That apart, there is nothing to find that the provisions of Section 154(3) and 154(4) Cr.P.C. were complied with prior to filing the said application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. 115. As discussed above, the impugned order, passed by the learned Magistrate is found to be without reason. A judicial order without reason is no order in the eye of law. 116. Relying on the decision held in the case of Ram Dhan (Supra), the learned Counsel for the private respondent has submitted that as the accused No. 3 i.e. the petitioner in Criminal Petition No. 569/2014 has tried to suppress the fact that he was the Proprietor of the said Company, by stating that he resigned from the Company prior to the transaction in this case, the said petitioner is not entitled to any relief. In the above referred case, the Supreme Court held that if the petitioner is found guilty of suppression of fact the petition is liable to be dismissed only on this ground. The petitioner, referring to the Form 32 has contended that he resigned from the Company w.e.f. 01.10.2007. The respondent, by filing an affidavit-in-opposition has referred the certain computer generated papers wherein the accused No. 3 has been shown as the contact person-cum-proprietor of the said company. Whether the said petitioner was the proprietor of the said company or not, is a question of fact to be decided on the basis of evidence. In the present case, the basic question for determination is not the question relating to the proprietorship of the said Company. The question to be determined by this Court is as to whether there is good ground for proceeding with the present criminal proceeding. Hence, it can't be concluded, at this stage, that the accused No. 3 is guilty of suppression of fact. I find no force in the contention, raised by the learned Counsel for the private respondent. 117. In the light of the above, considering entire aspect of the matter, I have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order, dated 30.12.2013, passed by the learned Magistrate, is not maintainable, in the eye of law and as such the same is liable to be set aside. 118. In view of what has been discussed above, I find sufficient merit in this petition requiring interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., for the purpose of preventing abuse of process of Courts of law and protecting the petitioners from being unnecessarily harassed. 119. Accordingly, the criminal petitions are allowed. The F.I.R. aforesaid and the impugned order, dated 30.12.2013, so far it relates to the present petitioners, are set aside and quashed. Registry shall send copy of this judgment to all the District & Sessions Judges under the jurisdiction of this Courts who shall circulate copies of the same to all the judicial officers under their jurisdiction, for guidance.