ORDER : 1. This writ petition has been filed by three petitioners, namely, Mor Mukat Singh, Uday Bhan Singh and Vijay Singh, who are sons of Shri Soor Singh, challenging order dated 02.01.1987 (Annexure-10), orders dated 25.11.1980 (Annexure8), 04.05.1994 (Annexure-11) and 27.09.1994 (Annexure-12) of the Board of Revenue, with further prayer that the suit filed by them against defendant-respondents no.3 to 9, for ejectment, recovery of possession and compensation, be decreed. 2. Aforementioned suit for ejectment was filed by plaintiff-petitioners on 13.07.1953 by the petitioners and their mother Ratan Kanwar, on the basis of right claimed by them under Section 136 of the Jaipur State Land Grants Tenures Act and Section 93 of the Jaipur Tenancy Act. Section 93 of the Jaipur Tenancy Act enabled a tenant ejected or prevented from obtaining possession of his holding or any part thereof, otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force, to sue the person so ejecting him or keeping him out of possession. Reliance was placed on Section 136 of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Act of 1947'), which provided that in a suit for possession brought by a tenant in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 93 of the Jaipur Tenancy Act, the landholder and every other person, who had wrongfully ejected him or had taken over possession after such ejectment, must be joined as defendants in the suit. 3. The case set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint was that they were “Chhut Bhaias”, (family of younger brother (and his descendants) of Thikanedar) of Thikana Gotor. Their father had died in the year 1949 when they were still minor. Their mother had taken defendant no.1 Ram Sukha, as 'sajhi in kasht' for Samvat 2007, according to which permission of cultivation was given to defendant no.1 Ram Sukha on understanding of sharing the crop between the petitioners and him. In doing so, their mother supplied him bullocks and implements for the purpose of cultivation. Defendant no.1 Ram Sukha later tried to take undue advantage of minority of the plaintiffs and used the land for himself and also included defendants no.4 and 5, namely, Chhotiya and Ram Chandra, in the cultivation. In doing so, their mother supplied him bullocks and implements for the purpose of cultivation. Defendant no.1 Ram Sukha later tried to take undue advantage of minority of the plaintiffs and used the land for himself and also included defendants no.4 and 5, namely, Chhotiya and Ram Chandra, in the cultivation. Defendants no.2 and 3 were the sons of Ram Sukha and defendant no.6 Bhim Singh, was main 'jagirdar', who had been made a defendant because of the provisions of Section 136 of the Act of 1947. When the plaintiffs came to know of inclusion of Chhotiya and Ram Chandra in Ashadh of Samvat 2009, they immediately asked these persons not to cultivate the land. They also withdrew the bullocks and implements given to Ram Sukha for use in cultivation as per the agreement with their mother. Defendants no.1 to 5 tried to take possession of the land by tying their cattle thereon, owing to which, a dispute arose between the parties. Criminal case was also registered. Defendants took wrongful possession of the land in Samvat 2009 and cultivated it. The prayer for ejectment of defendants, restoration of possession and compensation was also made. 4. Defendant Ram Sukha contested the suit stating that the well on the land has been constructed by his forefathers and that their family had been cultivating the land for a very long time. The Assistant Collector, Sawaimadhopur, after framing issues and recording the evidence of the parties, decreed the suit and judgment and decree has been confirmed in appeal by the Additional Commissioner on 31.05.1958. The Additional Commissioner stated that there was ample evidence on record to show that after the death of the father of plaintiffs, defendant Ram Sukha was made 'sajhedar' in Samvat 2007. Defendant Ram Sukha had admitted this in his statement recorded on 19.05.1953 before the Assistant Settlement Officer that after death of father of plaintiffs, he cultivated the land in dispute on 'sajha' and had paid 'seer' (share in the crop) to plaintiff-petitioner Mor Mukat Singh for two years. The 'sajha' was extinguished because he had no bullocks etc. The Additional Commissioner took the statement to mean that the 'sajha' of the defendants was extinguished in Samvat 2009 and later they forcibly ejected the plaintiffs and cultivated the land in dispute. The 'sajha' was extinguished because he had no bullocks etc. The Additional Commissioner took the statement to mean that the 'sajha' of the defendants was extinguished in Samvat 2009 and later they forcibly ejected the plaintiffs and cultivated the land in dispute. It was held that defendant Ram Sukha could not be called a co-tenant but merely a 'sajhedar' and, according to 1050 R.R.D. 170, a 'sajhedar' admitted by a tenant without the written consent of the Zamindar, could not acquire co-tenancy rights and it was open to the tenant to terminate the relationship and eject him as a trespasser. 5. Aforesaid judgment of Additional Commissioner was challenged by sons of defendant Ram Sukha in second appeal before the Board of Revenue, as in the meantime defendant Ram Sukha had died, and they were made the defendants no.4 to 6 in the suit. The division bench of the Board of Revenue, while allowing the second appeal vide judgment dated 09.01.1960, held that the lower courts had erred in interpreting the statement made by defendant Ram Sukha before the Assistant Settlement Officer. He had only stated that the 'sajhedari' came to an end after two years because bullocks and implements were not supplied by the plaintiffs. The Board of Revenue further said that the defendants-appellants (sons of Ram Sukha) continued to cultivate the land as tenants and pay the rent to the respondents and were in possession on the date the Rajasthan Tenancy Act came into force and thus they could not be regarded as trespassers and could not be evicted. Plaintiff-petitioners then preferred review petition before the Board of Revenue. Since one of two members deciding main second appeal, had retired, the review petition was heard by remaining lone member, who held that there was no finding in the judgment of second appeal as to how the defendant had been able to establish the relationship of tenant with the plaintiffs, and that the judgment had been based on a re-appreciation of evidence, which could not be the function of the second appellate court, and accordingly allowed the review petition vide judgment dated 03.12.1962. The defendants preferred special appeal against the judgment passed in the review petition. The objection was taken by the plaintiffs that since the sole remaining member of the division bench, had actually sat as a division bench, special appeal would not be maintainable. The objection was overruled. The defendants preferred special appeal against the judgment passed in the review petition. The objection was taken by the plaintiffs that since the sole remaining member of the division bench, had actually sat as a division bench, special appeal would not be maintainable. The objection was overruled. The division bench, vide judgment dated 30.06.1966, set aside the order passed in the review petition holding that the order traveled beyond the scope of Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC. 6. The plaintiff-petitioners filed Writ Petition before this court challenging the order dated 30.06.1966 passed by the division bench of the Board of Revenue in the Special Appeal contending that the judgment is without jurisdiction. This court, vide judgment dated 01.11.1974, allowed the writ petition holding that judgment in review petition even though was rendered by surviving single member of the Board of Revenue, it is to be treated as that of division bench and no appeal there against lay further to division bench. The judgment of the division bench dated 30.06.1966 was set aside and the judgment dated 03.12.1962 in review petition was restored. In those facts, the Second Appeal No.9/1959, originally filed before the Board of Revenue by the defendants, stood restored, which was allowed by the Board of Revenue vide judgment dated 25.11.1980, whereby the judgment and decree passed by the court below was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur, with direction that he shall summon the annual registers of the relevant period and take a fresh decision on the point whether the plaintiffs are entitled to file the suit. It was also said that in the event of the plaintiffs establishing their right to file the suit, the entitlement of the defendants to be regarded as tenants after Samvat 2009 will come under scrutiny, and the Revenue Appellate Authority should, in the interest of justice, allow production of additional evidence by both the parties under order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC, and dispose of the matter giving top priority. 7. As a result of remand order of the Board of Revenue, the appeal filed by the defendant Ram Sukha before the Revenue appellate Authority was restored, which, by order dated 02.01.1987, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree dated 31.05.1956, passed by the Assistant Collector, Sawaimadhopur, and dismissed the suit. 7. As a result of remand order of the Board of Revenue, the appeal filed by the defendant Ram Sukha before the Revenue appellate Authority was restored, which, by order dated 02.01.1987, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree dated 31.05.1956, passed by the Assistant Collector, Sawaimadhopur, and dismissed the suit. Plaintiff-petitioners then again approached the Board of Revenue challenging the judgment of the Revenue Appellate Authority dated 02.01.1987. The Board of Revenue, vide its judgment dated 04.05.1994, dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff-petitioners then again filed review petition before the Board of Revenue, which, vide order dated 27.09.1994, dismissed the review petition. It is thereafter that the plaintiff-petitioners have approached this court by filing this writ petition, with the prayer referred to above. 8. This writ petition was earlier dismissed by a learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 06.04.1996 in limine. The said judgment dated 06.04.1996 was upheld by the division bench of this court vide judgment dated 21.11.2007 in Special Appeal (Writ) No.1107/1996. The plaintiff-petitioners than approached the Supreme Court by way of Petition to Special Leave. On leave being granted, the case was registered as Civil Appeal No.5987/2013. The Supreme Court vide order dated 24.07.2013 allowed the Civil Appeal No.5987/2013 and set aside the judgment passed by the division bench of this court and that of the single bench, and remanded the matter back to this court for its disposal afresh. This is how the matter has been placed before this bench for decision. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 10. Shri Sanjay Mehrishi, learned counsel for plaintiff-petitioners, assailed the judgment passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority and the Board of Revenue, and argued that the Revenue Appellate Authority erred in law in allowing the appeal filed by the defendants vide judgment dated 02.01.1987 and dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff-petitioners. The Revenue Appellate Authority rightly noted that two questions arose for adjudication before it; first whether the disputed land is 'khudkasht' land of plaintiff-petitioners and second, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to obtain possession by ejecting the defendants. The Revenue Appellate Authority rightly noted that two questions arose for adjudication before it; first whether the disputed land is 'khudkasht' land of plaintiff-petitioners and second, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to obtain possession by ejecting the defendants. The issue with regard to land being 'khudkasht' of the petitioners was rightly decided in their favour by the Revenue Appellate Authority holding that settlement 'jamabandi' from Samvat 2009-2013 and revenue 'jamabandi' upto Samvat 2017 indicated the names of the petitioners as 'khudkasht' but erred in law in recording a contrary finding on second issue by holding that since the defendants were cultivator and not a trespasser and therefore the suit for ejectment under Section 93 of the Jaipur Tenancy Act was not maintainable against them. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that once it was held that the land is 'khudkasht' land of the plaintiff-petitioners, they would acquire tenancy rights in terms of Section 10 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 and Section 15 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. Learned Revenue Appellate Authority has accepted possession of the defendant-respondents on the basis of 'pantinama (Exhibit-A1), a partnership deed. Perusal of aforesaid 'pantinama' clearly shows that this was only for a period of two years and after expiry of that period, the possession of the defendants became unauthorized and they became trespassers. Learned Revenue Appellate Authority wrongly held that they were sub-tenants of the land in question and not trespassers. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that Section 15 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 does not confer any 'khatedari' rights on subtenants as 'khudkasht'. Their suit would be governed by Section 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. Proviso first to Section 19 excludes cases where the land is held by persons mentioned in Section 46, which allows tenants such as a minor or a widow etc. to induct sub-tenants, and cultivation of the land through such sub-tenants would be taken as their own cultivation. Khatedari rights therefore could not accrue to the defendants. The Board of Revenue has also grossly erred in law in affirming the findings recorded by the Revenue Appellate Authority on both the issues. The Board of Revenue rightly held that the findings of the Revenue Appellate Authority treating the plaintiffs as 'khudkasht', could not be challenged by defendants because they did not file any cross-objections. The Board of Revenue has also grossly erred in law in affirming the findings recorded by the Revenue Appellate Authority on both the issues. The Board of Revenue rightly held that the findings of the Revenue Appellate Authority treating the plaintiffs as 'khudkasht', could not be challenged by defendants because they did not file any cross-objections. The Board of Revenue has erred in law in holding that since name of the defendant was never recorded in the revenue record of Samvat 2009-2012, as cultivator and that the defendant paid the land revenue to the plaintiffs, therefore, they could not be evicted. All these findings are wholly perverse. 12. Shri Sanjay Mehrishi, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the petitioners filed the suit for ejectment, recovery of possession and compensation in the year 1953 i.e. Samvat 2010 itself. The possession of the defendants during pendency of the suit would be illegal and would not accrue any right to them, which was yet to be determined in the suit. In the meantime, the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 came into force. Although, Section 15 thereof conferred khatedari rights on the persons actually cultivating the land as on 15.10.1955 but that could not give or confer any right on the defendants in this case because of ongoing litigation. The defendants in any case were put in land as 'pantidar' for a period of two years, which is clear from the 'pantinama' (Exhibit-A1). Learned counsel for the petitioner, relying on judgments of the Board of Revenue in RRD 1985 page 247 (f) and RRD 1990 page 456 and that of this court in RRD 1986 page 19, argued that partner in cultivation does not acquire tenancy rights against a khatedar as per law enunciated by this court and the Board of Revenue in the aforesaid cases. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners, relying on judgment of reported in RRD 1987 page 190, argued that 'khasra girdawari' cannot be considered as annual register and annual register would be 'jamabandi'. Reliance is also placed on the judgment reported in RRD 1981 page 441 (e) to argue that khatedari rights cannot accrue in the lands of minors. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners, relying on judgment of reported in RRD 1987 page 190, argued that 'khasra girdawari' cannot be considered as annual register and annual register would be 'jamabandi'. Reliance is also placed on the judgment reported in RRD 1981 page 441 (e) to argue that khatedari rights cannot accrue in the lands of minors. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on judgments reported in RRD 1988 page 214 and RRD 1987 page 466 (a) and argued that a person who cannot show in what capacity he entered upon or cultivated disputed land, shall be deemed to be a trespasser qua khatedar tenant. 14. Per contra, Shri Pawan Pareek, learned counsel for the respondents, opposed the writ petition and argued that the findings recorded by the Revenue Appellate Authority and the Board of Revenue are perfectly just and proper. The Revenue appellate Authority has rightly held in its order dated 02.01.1987 that the status of the defendants in the land in dispute was not that of the 'pantidar' in cultivation but was that of 'krishak' (cultivator). Reliance in this connection is placed on 'khasra girdawari' of Samvat 2009, in column 16 of which name of defendant Ram Sukha was entered as such. Chhitar and Kalu Meena have stated before the trial court that this land was held by Ram Sukha and before him his predecessors-in-title. The Revenue appellate Authority has held the defendants to be the sub-tenants on the premise of their long possession and rightly held that they cannot be treated as trespassers. The Board of Revenue did not commit any error in agreeing with the view taken by the Revenue appellate Authority. Learned counsel submitted that the defendants in any case were in possession of the disputed land as on the date the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 came into force, which is evident from 'khasra girdawari' of Samvat 2009-2012 and therefore by virtue of Section 15 of the Act of 1955, they would acquire the khatedari rights. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the plaintiff in the plaint (Annexure-1) stated that they were 'chhutbhaias' and their father died in 1949 and that they gave the land in dispute to the defendants on 'panti' in Samvat 2007. This fact has been taken note of by the Sub Divisional Officer in the very first para of its judgment dated 31.05.1956. This fact has been taken note of by the Sub Divisional Officer in the very first para of its judgment dated 31.05.1956. The plaintiffs had admitted this fact whereas the defendants in their written statement filed on 15.01.1954 have maintained that their status was that of 'maurasi kashtkar' and that construction of well on the land was made by their grandfather. Ram Sukha used to pay land revenue to 'thikanedar'. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents, relying on the judgment in Ganesh Vs. Ishri Singh – 1952 RLW (Supplement Reports) 54, argued that the petitioners do not come under the definition of tenants and therefore they are not entitled to get the protection given to tenants under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. Submission of learned counsel for respondents is that petitioners cannot be considered as 'jagirdar' and therefore they cannot be held entitled to any protection given in the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952. Learned counsel for the respondents in this behalf relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bir Singh and Others Vs. Pyare Singh and Others – RRD July, 2000 page 278 and argued that the Supreme Court in that case held that if 'Jamindar' is not in occupation of 'khudkasht' land on the date of vesting of the estate, then such land vests in the State and he is not entitled to claim khatedari rights in the land and is not the entitled to claim any right of possession and consequently not entitled to maintain a suit for recovery of possession of the land from any other person. This view has also been taken by this court in Shri Kishori Vs. Board of Revenue for Rajasthan and Others – 2011 (4) WLC (Raj.) 366, that a biswedar not in actual possession of the land at the time of passing of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, cannot be declared a khatedar and therefore muafidar of biswedar also cannot be declared as khatedar. Reliance in this connection is also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Buddha Vs. Amilal – RRD 1991 page 274, which is also to the same effect. 16. Learned counsel for the respondents has also relied on the judgment of this Court in Abdul Hamid Khan and Another Vs. Reliance in this connection is also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Buddha Vs. Amilal – RRD 1991 page 274, which is also to the same effect. 16. Learned counsel for the respondents has also relied on the judgment of this Court in Abdul Hamid Khan and Another Vs. Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer and Others – 2006 (2) RRT 802, wherein it was held that when the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 came into force, plaintiff was in the cultivatory possession of the land and therefore he is entitled to be declared as khatedar. In this regard, learned counsel for the respondents also relied on the judgment of this court in Suraj Mal Vs. The State – RRD 1959 page 173, wherein it was held that 'kasht-girdawari' is relevant document under Section 35 of the Evidence Act and no formal proof is required by producing the officer who prepared it. There would arise a presumption with regard to correctness of entries thereof. 17. I have given my anxious consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. 18. The Revenue Appellate Authority has recorded a finding of fact that in column no.4 of 'jamabandi' of Samvat 2009-22 the disputed land is registered in the name of Mor Mukat Singh and Man Singh and in the revenue 'jamabandi' of Samvat 2014-17 also, it is entered in their names. In column no.5 of 'khasra girdawari' of Samvat 2009 entry of name of Ram Sukha is made, and the period whereof is said to be four years. In the 'khasra girdawari' of Samvat 2015-18, they were recorded as 'makbooja havaledar' and the respondents Ranglal and Sheokaran were recorded as sub-tenants. In the 'khasra girdawari' of Samvat 2020-24 also Ram Sukha is recorded as khatedar of the disputed land and in 'jamabandi' of the later period, Ranglal etc. have been recorded as khatedar. The Revenue Appellate Authority thus held that the land in dispute was the land of 'khudkasht' of the petitioners but declined to grant relief of ejectment of the respondent. In doing so, it has relied on 'pantinama' (Exhibit-A1) and observed that the respondents were paying land revenue to the predecessor-in-title of the petitioners. They were therefore farmer in cultivation of the land and not trespassers. Their eviction cannot be sought by recourse of Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. In doing so, it has relied on 'pantinama' (Exhibit-A1) and observed that the respondents were paying land revenue to the predecessor-in-title of the petitioners. They were therefore farmer in cultivation of the land and not trespassers. Their eviction cannot be sought by recourse of Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. The 'pantinama' contains the condition that the respondents shall be required to give to the petitioner the agriculture produce in kind. The Revenue Appellate Authority thus noted that the petitioners miserably failed to prove that they were cultivating the land in dispute. 19. Since Ram Sukha, who was 'sajhedar' (partner in cultivation) did not himself pay the land revenue. The 'pantinama did not prove the condition on which land was given to the respondents on the basis of sharing of crop. Learned Revenue Appellate Authority therefore concluded that the respondents were not 'pantidar' but actual tiller of the land in dispute. In 'jamabandi' of Samvat 2030-35 names of Ranglal, Sheokaran, Revdya, all sons of Ram Sukha Gurjar, have been shown as equal co-sharers. Similarly in the 'jamabandi' of Samvat 2034-36, also their names have been recorded in the column of farmer. In column no.16 of the 'khasra girdawari' of Samvat 2009, again a note has been mentioned that Ram Sukha was cultivating this land since long time and this land belongs to his ancestors. In latter part, it is mentioned that Ram Sukha S/o Bhima Gurjar was cultivating the land from the time he was only four years old. Chhitara and Kalu Patel, in their statements, also mentioned that the land was being cultivated by forefathers of Ram Sukha. In 'khasra girdawari' of Samvat 2015-18, Ram Sukha was recorded as sub-tenant and so also in Samvat 2020-24. Witness Rama S/o Ganesh, aged 60 years, also gave a statement that he is owner of the land adjacent to the disputed land. He saw Ram Sukha cultivating the disputed land and thereafter the disputed land was being cultivated by his sons. He has been seeing them cultivate the disputed land for last fifty years. Witness Kalu S/o Hardeva also made a similar statement that the land was being cultivated by Ranglal and his brothers and father Ram Sukha. He saw Ram Sukha cultivating the disputed land and thereafter the disputed land was being cultivated by his sons. He has been seeing them cultivate the disputed land for last fifty years. Witness Kalu S/o Hardeva also made a similar statement that the land was being cultivated by Ranglal and his brothers and father Ram Sukha. In view of the above, the possession of the defendant-respondents has to be accepted especially when the suit filed by the plaintiff-petitioners for recovery of possession and therefore also the plaintiff-petitioners admit the possession of the defendant-respondents and prayed for recovery thereof. 20. Even if latter part of 'khasra girdawari' and 'jamabandi' are ignored, the fact remains that the Rajasthan Tenancy Act came into force on 15.10.1955, which period is corresponding to Samvat 2012. It is evident from 'khasra girdawari' of Samvat 2009-2012 noted by both the Revenue Appellate Authority and the Board of Revenue that the predecessors-in-title of the respondents are shown as the actual farmers during that period. Besides, when the Rajasthan Zamindari and Biswedari Abolition Act, 1959 was made applicable with effect from 01.11.1959 and by virtue of Section 4 thereof, all the rights and titles of biswedars vested in the State, admittedly, on that date, the petitioners were not in possession over the disputed land, which is evident from the 'jamabandi'/'khasra girdawari', elaborately taken note of herein above. 21. Examined thus from either angle, the petitioners were not being in actual cultivatory possession, when the land vested in the State, they would not get any right and the respondents/their predecessors-in-title, being in actual cultivatory possession of the land on 15.10.1955, the date when the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 came into force, they would therefore acquire 'khatedari' rights by virtue of Section 15 of the Act of 1955. 22. The Supreme Court in Bir Singh, supra, held that if Jamindar is not in occupation of 'khudkasht' land on the date of vesting of the estate, when such land vests in the State, he is not entitled to claim khatedari rights in the land and is not the entitled to claim any right of possession and consequently not entitled to maintain a suit for recovery of possession of the land from any other person. This view has also been taken by this court in Shri Kishori, supra, that a biswedar not in actual possession of the land at the time of passing of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, cannot be declared a khatedar and therefore muafidar of biswedar also cannot be declared as khatedar. 23. The Supreme Court in Buddha, supra, had the occasion to consider somewhat identical question, where the appellant was biswedar in respect of some agricultural lands. By two mortgage deeds, different parcels of lands were mortgaged by appellant in favour of predecessors of respondent. The Rajasthan Act of 1959 came into force on 01.11.1959. The State Government, by notification, appointed November 15, 1959 as the date for abolition and acquisition of all settled Zamindari and Biswedari estates throughout Rajasthan and vesting of such estates in the State Government. Under Section 29(1) of the Act, as from the date of vesting of an estate, the Zamindar or Biswedar thereof became a 'malik' of any 'khudkasht' land in his occupation on such date and as a 'malik', he became entitled to all the rights conferred and all the liabilities imposed, on a khatedar tenant by or under The Rajasthan tenancy Act, 1955. The appellant in that case filed a suit for redemption of the aforesaid mortgages against defendant-respondent in the court of Munsiff Magistrate. The defendant contested the suit and pleaded that on the abolition of Biswedari, the rights, title and interest in the lands in question, stood transferred and vested in the State of Rajasthan and the appellant did not have the right to redeem the mortgage. It was also pleaded that on the date of the creation of mortgage the appellant was not in possession of the lands and that the defendant was in possession of the lands as 'kashtkar' since before the mortgage. The Supreme Court held that the appellant had come forward with specific case in the plaint that the defendant was in possession of the lands in dispute as a mortgages from the date of the two mortgages. In other words, the appellant was not in possession/occupation of the said lands on the date of vesting of the estate of the appellant under the Act. The appellants therefore cannot claim 'khatedari' rights in respect of the lands in dispute. 24. The Supreme Court in Suraj Ahir and Others Vs. In other words, the appellant was not in possession/occupation of the said lands on the date of vesting of the estate of the appellant under the Act. The appellants therefore cannot claim 'khatedari' rights in respect of the lands in dispute. 24. The Supreme Court in Suraj Ahir and Others Vs. Prithinath Singh and Others – AIR 1963 SC 454 , dealt with a case where suit for recovery of possession of the disputed lands and mesne profits was filed by plaintiffs against defendants as the family of the defendants did not have any 'raiyati' interest in the disputed lands except 'rehan' interest under the rehan deed dated 03.07.1906 and that, subsequent to the redemption of that deed, they had no right to remain in possession and occupation of the disputed lands. Plaintiffs alleged that it was an agricultural land, which was mortgaged with the defendants. The mortgage was redeemed but the mortgagee continued in possession even after date of vesting of land in the State following promulgation of Bihar Land Reforms Act. Suit for possession was filed by the mortgagor proprietor. It was held that he had no subsisting right to recover the possession. 25. A division bench of this court in Mala Vs. Board of Revenue – Writ Petition No.185/1953, decided vide judgment dated 01.02.1956, in reference to the revenue laws of the former Jaipur State, which were then in force, held that 'khasra girdawari' was an annual register, and the law raised a presumption that the entries made therein were true. A coordinate bench of this court in Suraj Mal, supra, held that the girdawari is relevant under Section 35 of the Evidence Act and no formal proof is required by production of the Officer who prepared it. A presumption would arise as to correctness of the document. 26. Judgment of division bench of this court cited by learned counsel for petitioner in Nanda Vs. Nounda – RRD 1985 page 247, to the effect that 'sajhedar' (partner in cultivation), could not acquire tenancy rights as against a khatedar, cannot be said to lay down a good law in view of authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court in Bir Singh and Others Vs. Pyare Singh, Budha Vs. Amilal and Suraj Ahir and Others Vs. Prithinath Singh and Others, supra. The judgment of this court in Ramchandra Vs. Pyare Singh, Budha Vs. Amilal and Suraj Ahir and Others Vs. Prithinath Singh and Others, supra. The judgment of this court in Ramchandra Vs. Board of Revenue – 1986 RRD 546, wherein reliance was placed on the division bench judgment of this court in Nanda Vs. Nounda, supra, also therefore cannot be said to lay a good law. Similarly therefore the judgment in Gokul Vs. Mst. Dhapu 1990 RRD 456, which holds that share the crop is different from creating sub-tenancy on payment of rent, cannot be of any use to the plaintiff-petitioners. All these judgments would not apply to the facts of the present case where the plaintiff-petitioners were not in actual cultivatory possession of the land in dispute when the land vested in the State, and therefore they would not get any 'khatedari' right and the respondents/their predecessors-in-title, being in actual cultivatory possession of the land on 15.10.1955, the date when the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 came into force, would acquire khatedari rights by virtue of Section 15 of the Act of 1955. The land in dispute cannot be considered as the land of 'khudkasht' and the plaintiff-petitioners do not acquire any right of tenant. 27. One important fact, which was taken note of by the Sub Divisional officer but was lost sight of by the Revenue Appellate Authority and the Board of Revenue is that plaintiff-petitioners themselves did not claim to be 'zamindar' or 'thikanedar'. Their assertion in first para of the plaint that they were “Chhut Bhaias” (family of younger brother (and his descendants) of Thikanedar) of Thikana Gotor, or insignificant younger generation of Thikana Gotor. This fact has been taken note of by the learned Sub Divisional Officer in the opening of the judgment dated 31.05.1956. The full bench decision of the Board of Revenue in Ganesh Vs. Ishri Singh, supra, while considering the question as to “Chhut Bhaias” who receives the land for maintenance from the 'jagirdar' coming under the definition of a tenant and entitled to protection under the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, held that the “chhut-bhaias” of a State grantee was clearly a sub-grantee and the subgrantee is not a tenant. The definition of tenant given in the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947 is virtually the same as given in the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949. The definition of tenant given in the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947 is virtually the same as given in the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949. The sub-grantee holds the land with all the rights of state grantee so far as the rights of landlord are concerned. He can let out the land to tenants without any restriction of subletting or of any other kind and the restrictions imposed upon a khatedar tenant do not apply to him. But by mere reason of fact of 'khudkasht', the sub-tenant does not become a tenant. It was therefore held that “Chhut Bhaias”, who holds the land of 'jagirdar', does not come under the definition of tenant in the Ordinance and he is therefore not entitled to the protections as a tenant. 28. In view of above discussion, this court does not find any error or infirmity in the orders passed by the Board of Revenue and the Revenue Appellate Authority. 29. Consequently, writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.