ORDER : R.S. Chauhan, J. 1. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 29.04.2014, (Annexure-W), whereby, one Mr. Umashankar has been appointed as an enquiry officer for holding departmental enquiry against petitioner. The petitioner is also aggrieved by the order dated 30.04.2015, (Annexure-X), whereby he has been placed under suspension. 2. Briefly the facts of the case are that on 16.02.1989, the petitioner was initially appointed as Senior lecturer in Sri Devaraj Urs Medical College, Tamaka. Subsequently, by another order dated 01.12.1989, he was again appointed as Senior Lecturer. Considering his experience, hard work and seniority, by order dated 18.03.1992, the petitioner was promoted as Assistant Professor. Subsequently, on 02.06.1994, he was promoted as Associate Professor. By order dated 28.03.1998, he was promoted as Associate Professor in the O.B.G. department. By order dated 02.03.2000, he was placed in-charge of the OBG department. Subsequently, by order dated 10.09.2013, the petitioner was promoted as Vice Principal (Additional Charge) of Sri Devaraj Urs Academy of Higher Education and Research. Considering his integrity, honesty, hard work and knowledge, by order dated 27.02.2015 he was appointed as a Member of the Board of Management of the Academy for a term of three years. 3. However, on 09.03.2015, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner alleging certain irregularities committed by him. He was directed to give a reply thereto. On 11.03.2015, the petitioner requested the respondent - management for copies of certain documents. On 16.03.2015 the management directed him to come to the chamber of the Registrar on 17.03.15, and to examine the said documents. On 17.03.15, the petitioner submitted another representation requesting that he may be permitted to examine the documents. Consequently, on 20.03.15 the petitioner was permitted to examine the documents. The petitioner discovered that the documents were voluminous. Therefore, he requested that certified copies of the document should be issued to him in order to enable him to reply to the show cause notice. 4. On 04.04.2015, another notice was served by the Management informing the petitioner that the notice was in continuation of the original show cause notice dated 09.3.2015. Along with the notice, the Management supplied articles of charges, statement of imputation, list of documents and list of witness. Again the petitioner requested that certified copies of the document should be given to him. Along with the notice, the Management supplied articles of charges, statement of imputation, list of documents and list of witness. Again the petitioner requested that certified copies of the document should be given to him. However, by letter dated 17.04.2015, the Management informed the petitioner that copy of the documents have been already supplied to him. Subsequently, by proceedings dated 29.4.2015, the respondent-Management decided to hold a domestic enquiry against the petitioner; the Management appointed one Mr. Umashankar as the Enquiry Officer. By order dated 30.04.2015, the petitioner was placed under suspension. Hence this petition before this court. 5. Mr. Veeranna G. Tigadi, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised the following contentions before this court: firstly, that the appointment of Mr. Umashankar as an enquiry officer is patently in violation of By-law 67 of the Service By-Laws of Sri Devaraj Urs Academy of Higher Education and Research ('the By-Laws', for short). According to By-Law 67 of the By-Laws, the enquiry is to be conducted by a committee consisting of the Vice-chancellor, the Dean Faculty of Medicine, the Principal of the respective Institution or unit, and the Registrar. Therefore, the By-Laws do not contemplate the appointment of a single enquiry officer. Infact, the By-Laws permit only a multi-member committee to enquire into the allegations of misconduct against a delinquent officer. Secondly, since the very appointment of the enquiry officer is an illegal one, therefore the suspension order dated 30.04.2015 is unsustainable. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner can be suspended only if the departmental enquiry is carried out by a committee formed under By-Law 67 of the By-Laws. Thus both the orders deserve to be set aside. 6. On the other hand, Mr. M.T. Nanaiah, the learned Senior counsel for the respondents, has pleaded that part-III of the By-Laws contain the enquiry procedure in general, and By-Law 67 contains the provision with regard to the Constitution of the Disciplinary Committee in particular. According to By-Law 66(2)(c), of the By-Laws, the procedure established under the By-Laws may be dispensed with, if there is difficulty in observing these By-Laws, especially, if the observations of the By-Laws would lead to injustice to an employee. Secondly, according to Bye-Law 67 of the By-Laws, the Committee shall consist of the Vice-chancellor, the Dean-Faculty of Medicine, and the Principal of respective Institution or Unit, and the Registrar. Secondly, according to Bye-Law 67 of the By-Laws, the Committee shall consist of the Vice-chancellor, the Dean-Faculty of Medicine, and the Principal of respective Institution or Unit, and the Registrar. However, in the contemplated departmental enquiry against the petitioner, the Principal of the institution, where the petitioner was working, is arrayed as the star witness of the department. Therefore, to permit the Principal to be a witness against the petitioner, and yet to be a member of the Disciplinary Committee would obviously cause an injustice to the petitioner. In such circumstances, the respondents had no other option to fall back on By-Law 66(2)(C) of the By-Laws-i.e. to dispense with the procedure established under the By-Laws. Thirdly, according to a note dated 28.04.2015 a decision was taken that since practical difficulty would arise in having the Principal both as a witness and as a member of the Disciplinary Committee, and since bias may be caused to the petitioner, it was decided that enquiry should be entrusted to an impartial and independent person. The said decision was subsequently approved by the Vice-Chancellor. Therefore, the Management was justified in appointing Mr. Umashankar as an independent and impartial enquiry officer. Fourthly, as far as the suspension order is concerned, By-Law 71 of the By-Laws grants ample power to the Vice-chancellor to place a member of the staff under suspension, when a departmental enquiry is contemplated. Since a departmental enquiry was not only contemplated, but with the appointment of an enquiry officer, the enquiry had also commenced, the respondents were justified in suspending the petitioner. Lastly, since the Management was of the opinion that continuation of the petitioner in the institute may create obstacle in the smooth functioning of departmental enquiry, or it may lead to tampering with the witness/evidence, it was thought prudent to suspend the petitioner's service. Thus, according to the learned Senior counsel ample cogent reasons have been given in the order dated 30.4.2015 for suspending the petitioner. 7. In rejoinder, the learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that the decision to dispense with the procedure established under the By-Laws could not have been taken by the Vice-chancellor; infact, the said decision has to be taken by the Management. 8. On this stand, Mr. M.T. Nanaiah, the learned Senior Counsel, has pleaded that there is no bar which prevents the Vice-chancellor from taking the said decision. 8. On this stand, Mr. M.T. Nanaiah, the learned Senior Counsel, has pleaded that there is no bar which prevents the Vice-chancellor from taking the said decision. Since a bar does not exist in the By-Laws, the same cannot be read into By-Law 67 of By-Laws. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned orders, and considered the documents submitted with the writ petition. 10. It is, indeed, trite to state that the Management is required to act as model employer while dealing with its employees. Even if difficulties have arisen between the Management and the employee, even if the Management is of the opinion that certain mis-conducts have been committed by an employee, even then the Management is required by the By-Laws to be fair, just and reasonable with its employees. An act of the Management which is arbitrary, unfair or unjust, such an act would be an anathema to the concept of equality enshrined in Art 14 of the Constitution of India. 11. By-Law 66 of the By-Laws is as under: "66. Enquiry Procedure: (1) No penalty shall be imposed except after following the procedure as laid down in the additional Schedule to these By-Laws. (2) Notwithstanding anything said in para (1) above the procedure specified in this By-Law may be dispensed with: (a) if the facts on the basis of which action is to be taken have been established in a court of law, or (b) where the employee has absconded, or it is impracticable to communicate with him for any reason, or (c) where there is difficulty in observing these By-Laws - so as not to cause injustice to the employee. (3) In every case where all or any of the requirements of the Para are dispensed with, the reasons there for shall be recorded in writing." 12. By-Law 67 of the By-Laws is as under: "67. Disciplinary Committee: (1) The Academy shall constitute a Committee to be called the Disciplinary Committee for enquiring in to complaints of misconduct against employees of The Academy and to pass a verdict of "Guilty or "Not Guilty" in respect of each Charge. (2) The Committee shall consist of the following members: i. The Vice-Chancellor - Chairman ii. The Dean, Faculty of Medicine - Member iii. The Principal of the respective Institution or Unit - Member iv. (2) The Committee shall consist of the following members: i. The Vice-Chancellor - Chairman ii. The Dean, Faculty of Medicine - Member iii. The Principal of the respective Institution or Unit - Member iv. The Registrar - Member secretary (3) The Committee shall not pass an order of indictment except after delivering a memo of charges and giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing, to the delinquent. (4) The Committee shall file its report recommending the Penalty to be imposed, in each case." 13. A bare perusal of this provisions clearly reveal that an enquiry can be held under By-law 67 by a Disciplinary Committee consisting of the Vice-Chancellor, the Dean, Faculty of Medicine, the Principal of respective Institution or Unit, and the Registrar. However, By-law 66(2)(C) of the By-laws clearly stipulates that not withstanding anything contained in para-1 of By-law 66, the above procedures specified in this By-law may be dispensed with, where there is a difficulty in observing these By-laws so as not to cause injustice to an employee. Thus, By-law 66(2)(C) of the By-laws bestows a discretionary power to dispense with the constitution of disciplinary committee, if the constitution of the Disciplinary Committee under By-law 67 of the By-laws would lead an injustice to an employee. 14. Admittedly, in the present case, the Principal of the Institute, where the petitioner is working, has been arrayed as a witness in the departmental enquiry. Needless to say, a person cannot be permitted to be a witness and a judge simultaneously. If he were permitted to be so, it would be against the Principle of Natural Justice as there is a grave possibility of bias. Therefore practical difficulty has arisen before the respondents. For on the one hand, they are required to keep the Principal as a member of the Disciplinary Committee and yet on the other hand, the same Principal is expected to be a witness in the departmental enquiry. Such a scenario would obviously cause grave injustice to the petitioner - an employee of the Management. Considering the difficult position faced by the Management, the respondents were totally justified in falling back upon the exception clause containing in By-Law 66(2)(c) of the By-Laws. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner is unjustified in claiming that the departmental enquiry can only be carried out by a multi-member Committee constituted under By-Law 67 of the By-Law. Considering the difficult position faced by the Management, the respondents were totally justified in falling back upon the exception clause containing in By-Law 66(2)(c) of the By-Laws. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner is unjustified in claiming that the departmental enquiry can only be carried out by a multi-member Committee constituted under By-Law 67 of the By-Law. Needless to say, By-Law 66(2)(C) of the By-Laws is an exception to By-Law 67 of the By-Laws. It is in the logic of things for the law has anticipated that practical difficulties may arise, if a departmental enquiry is to be carried out under By-Law 67 of the By-Laws. 15. A bare perusal of the note dated 28.04.15 further reveals that this practical difficulty was discussed by the respondents. In order to be fair to the petitioner, a decision was taken that a multi-member committee should not be constituted for holding the departmental enquiry. Infact, an impartial and independent person should be appointed as an enquiry officer. Since the appointment of Mr. Umashankar, as an enquiry officer, was in consonance of By-Law 66(2)(c) of the By-Laws, and said appointment cannot be faulted. 16. Although, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the decision to dispense with the procedure established by the By-Laws cannot be taken by the Vice-chancellor, but the said contention is clearly unacceptable. The learned counsel has not been able to show any bar contained in the By-Laws which would prevent or prohibit the Vice-chancellor from approving the decision to do away with the constitution of the Disciplinary Committee under By-Law 67 of the By-Laws. Since a bar is not contained in the By-Laws, the same cannot be read by this court. To read a bar which is non-existent is to amend the By-Laws. But the judiciary has no power to legislate. Therefore, the approval granted by the Vice-chancellor is a valid one. Hence, this court does not find any illegality or perversity in appointment of Mr. Umashankar as the enquiry officer. 17. Learned counsel has also contended that the committee cannot delegate its power to the Vice-chancellor, therefore, the Vice-chancellor does not has power to dispense with the procedure established under the By-Laws. Even this contention raised by the learned counsel is misplaced. Umashankar as the enquiry officer. 17. Learned counsel has also contended that the committee cannot delegate its power to the Vice-chancellor, therefore, the Vice-chancellor does not has power to dispense with the procedure established under the By-Laws. Even this contention raised by the learned counsel is misplaced. For, By-Law 66 is silent on the point, as to who has to take the decision that the procedure established under the By-Law should be dispensed with. Even By-Law 67 of the By-Laws does not bestow this power to decide upon the Disciplinary Committee. As mentioned above, there is no bar, therefore, the question of delegating power to decide whether the procedure should be dispensed with or not by the committee to the Vice-chancellor would not even arise. 18. As far as suspension order dated 30.04.2015 is concerned, said suspension order is in consonance with By-Law 71. By-Law 71 is as under: "According to this provision, the Vice-Chancellor can suspend an employee if there is prima facie case for not permitting him to continue working in his post in the interest of the Academy where:- a disciplinary proceedings against him contemplated or pending." 19. According to the impugned order dated 30.04.2015, it was clearly felt that if the petitioner were to continue working on his post, he may tamper with the witness, or may prolong the disciplinary enquiry. In either case, it would create certain difficulties in the smooth and fair holding of the enquiry. Therefore, a decision was taken that since the enquiry has already commenced, the petitioner be kept under suspension. The reason given in the order dated 30.04.2015 cannot be faulted. After all, the aim of the departmental enquiry is to discover the truth. Therefore, a likelihood that evidence may be tampered with, or a likelihood that departmental enquiry may be stretched beyond reasonable time, both these possibilities have to be firmly dealt with. Therefore, this court does not find any illegality in the order dated 30.04.2015. 20. For the reasons stated above, this court does not find any merit in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed. Learned counsel for the State is granted two weeks time to file memo of appearance.