JUDGMENT N.Kotiswar Singh, J. 1. The present Cril. petition has been filed by the petitioners under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing FIR No. 3(4)12 Chingai P.S. registered under Sections 379/403/409/420/34 IPC dated 14.4.2012. The issue of immediate concern in this petition is whether the present petition seeking quashing of the aforesaid FIR case without impleading the complainant is maintainable or not. 2. It has been stated that petitioner No. 1 is the Headman of Chingai village in the Ukhrul District and the petitioners no. 2, 3 and 4 are the villagers of the said village. According to the petitioners, on the basis of certain complaint filed by one Shri R.Yaolei of the same village against the petitioner nos. 1 and 2 alleging misappropriation of funds relating to implementation of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (in short MGNREGS) in Chingai village, before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ukhrul, the learned Judicial Magistrate referred the matter to the Officer-in-charge, Chingai police station for investigation. Thereupon an FIR being No. 3(4)12 Chingai Police Station under Sections 379/403/409/420/34 IPC dated 14.04.2012 was registered against the petitioners No. 1 and 2. The two petitioners surrendered before the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ukhrul on 5.5.2012 in connection with the said FIR for grant of bail which was allowed by the learned Judicial Magistrate vide order dated 5.5.2012. The petitioners contended as regards the allegation of misappropriation of funds, that there is an alternative forum of Ombudsman available under the NREG Act. Hence, the act of the complainant to approach the learned Judicial Magistrate bypassing the alternative remedy available is not maintainable. Accordingly, the petitioners have approached this Court by filing this Cril. Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the said FIR. 3. The State respondents have filed an affidavit opposing the petition. It has been stated that the aforesaid FIR case was later kept in abeyance by the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ukhrul on the ground that the complainant had not approached the alternative forum of Ombudsman provided under the NREG Act. Thereafter, a complaint was filed before the district Ombudsman by the same complainant, which found that the funds had been misappropriated by the two petitioners no. 1 and 2 and accordingly, registered two cases. Thereafter, a complaint was filed before the district Ombudsman by the same complainant, which found that the funds had been misappropriated by the two petitioners no. 1 and 2 and accordingly, registered two cases. It seems that the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ukhrul later discharged the accused persons by an order dated 7.6.2012, against which a revision was preferred before the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Manipur East by filing Cril. Revision Case No. 11 of 2012 which was allowed, the result being that the FIR No. 3(4)12 Chingai P.S. under Sections 379/403/409/420/34 IPC dated 14.4.2012 stood revived. According to the respondents, there is no bar in proceeding with two parrel proceedings as the matter relates to serious charge of misappropriation of large public fund and there is no merit in the petition. 4. When this matter was taken up for hearing, it was noted by this Court that the complainant, Shri R.Yaolei who had filed the complaint before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ukhrul has not been impleaded as a respondent and doubted the maintainability of the petition. When it was suggested to the petitioners that they would be at liberty to implead him as a respondent in this petition, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that it is not required under law and declined to implead the complainant as a respondent unless so directed by the Court. Accordingly, the issue of maintainability of this criminal petition has come up for consideration. Accordingly, the Court would now proceed to deal with the issue of maintainability of this petition for quashing an FIR without impleading the complainant. 5. Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that when the Court is called upon to exercise the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing an FIR, as there is no specific provision in the Criminal Procedure Code to give notice to the informant, the petitioner is not required to implead the complainant nor the Court required to give any notice to the informant before quashing the FIR, if the Court is satisfied that there are materials to do so. Mr. Mr. Mahendra, submits that this is for the reason that the State represents the entire society including the informant and has assumed all the responsibility of the society including the informant/victim for punishing a wrong doer, whether the wrong committed is against a particular individual or the society at large. Mr. Mahendra, submits that when an accused approaches the Court seeking quashing of FIR, it is for the prosecution or the Investigating Officer or the State to inform the complainant of any such proceeding. Mr. Mahendra submits that as far as the accused is concerned, he is not responsible for informing the complainant as he is not concerned with the interest of the informant and as the accused is interested only with his interest, in safeguarding his interest. He submits that once an FIR is registered against the accused, it is the accused who stand charged of such crime and is thus solely concerned with safeguarding his own interest and the State takes the responsibility on behalf of the society including the informant. Mr. Mahendra submits that in a criminal proceeding, it is the accused versus the State and the State represents the society at large including the complainant. It has been submitted that in order to safeguard his interest, if the accused has challenged the complaint or the FIR before a Court, and has impleaded the State Government as respondent, that is sufficient and there is no more obligation on the part of the accused to implead any other party including the informant by relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s J.K. International Vs. State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others, AIR 2001 SC 1142 . 6. Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel for the petitioner, has also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thakur Ram and others Vs. State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others, AIR 2001 SC 1142 . 6. Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel for the petitioner, has also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thakur Ram and others Vs. The State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 911 contending that in a case which is proceeded on a police report, a private party has no locus standi for in criminal law it is the State which is the custodian of the social interests of the community at large and so it is for the State to take all the steps necessary for bringing the person who has acted against the social interests of the community to book and accordingly, since the State has been made party in this proceeding there is no further need to implead the complainant who is a private party. 7. It has been further submitted that a criminal case comes to an end when the Final Report is filed instead of the charge-sheet by the I.O. of the case after completion of the investigation and is accepted by the concerned Court. However, when the charge-sheet is filed, at the stage of consideration of the charge-sheet, if the accused is discharged, no notice is required to be given to the informant at that stage either by the accused or by the concerned Court. He submits that similarly a criminal case also comes to an end if the FIR is quashed by the High Court in which event, no notice is required to be given to the informant. 8. Mr. Mahendra also submits that as regards the requirements of giving notice to the informant under sub-section (2) of Section 157 Cr.P.C. when the Investigating Officer of the case decides not to investigate the case on the ground of insufficiency of materials and before acceptance of the Final Report by the concerned Court under Section 173(2)(i) Cr.P.C, it is so because of the specific provisions in the Cr.P.C. He, therefore, contends that notice is required to be given to the accused/complainant only where the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically requires to do so. However, in the case of petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing an FIR or complaint, since there is no such requirement or conditions stipulated in the said provision, giving of notice to the complainant/informant is not necessary. 9. Mr. However, in the case of petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing an FIR or complaint, since there is no such requirement or conditions stipulated in the said provision, giving of notice to the complainant/informant is not necessary. 9. Mr. Y. Ashang, learned P.P. appearing for the State respondents, on the other hand, has submitted relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mosiruddin Munshi vs Mohd. Siraj & others, (2008) 8 SCC 434 that quashing of criminal proceeding without impleading the complainant under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is impermissible. Hence, the present Cril. petition filed by the petitioners seeking quashing of the FIR without impleading the complainant, namely, R. Yaolei is not maintainable and accordingly, the same is liable to be dismissed. 10. As we proceed to deal with the issue, we may briefly refer the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Under the Code, a criminal proceeding can be set into motion by filing of a complaint by the complainant before the police station under Section 154 Cr.P.C. on the basis of which investigation would be initiated as provided under section 157 if it discloses non-cognisable offence. The other process for initiation of criminal proceeding can be on the basis of a complaint made to the Magistrate and after the Magistrate takes cognisance of the offence as provided under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. Thus, in both the processes, the complainant plays a pivotal role in the matter of initiation of a criminal investigation or proceeding. Where such criminal proceeding is initiated at the instance of the complaint made by the complainant before the police station, a copy of the information has to be given free of cost to the informant as provided under Section 154 (2) Cr.P.C. On the basis of information so received, if the Investigating Officer decides not to enter on an investigation on the premise that there is no sufficient grounds for doing so, the officer shall forthwith notify the informant the fact that he will not investigate the case or cause it to be investigated. The section also provides that, on completion of investigation so undertaken, while forwarding a report to the Magistrate empowering to take cognisance of the offence, the officer also shall communicate the action taken by him to the person, by whom the information relating to the commission of offence was first given as provided under Section 173(2)(ii) of the Cr.P.C. Thus, the importance of the informant has been duly acknowledged in the Criminal Procedure Code by keeping him informed of the various crucial stages of the criminal process as provided under Sections 154, 157 and 173 as mentioned above. Apart from the aforesaid provisions, we may also refer to Section 301 of the Cr.P.C. which provides for any private person to instruct a pleader to prosecute any person in any Court. the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case shall conduct the prosecution, and the pleader so instructed shall act therein under the directions of the Public Prosecutor and may with the permission of the Court submit written arguments after the evidence is closed in the case. That such "private person" would also include the informant who has been given an opportunity to assist the Prosecution in the trial. The reason is not difficult to fathom. Under the normal criminal jurisdiction, the State takes the overall responsibilities to investigate and to prosecute the violators of law where the crime has been committed against any individual or the community or otherwise and not to leave the burden/responsibility to the victim or complainant to bring the offender to justice. It is based on the principle that any crime committed against an individual is also a crime against the society at large. However, merely because of the aforesaid principle, the aggrieved complainant has not been totally sidelined in the criminal justice system but he has been taken into confidence at every crucial stage of the investigation and trial and in some cases allowed to intervene also, as in the manner provided under Section 301 of the Cr.P.C. Some High Courts in this country has also allowed intervention by the informant at the time of consideration of bail applications and also to move application for cancellation of bail under Section 439 (2) of the Cr.P.C.(In Re, Renu Singh, 1995(1) Crimes 863 (Cal-DB), Upendra Kumar Sahoo Vs Giridhari Sahu, 1996(4) Crimes 331 (Ori)). This scheme to keep the aggrieved complainant abreast of the developments in the progress of the investigation is to ensure that the interest and cause of the aggrieved person/victim/complainant is being taken duly care of by the State and to give an opportunity to the victim/complainant to approach the appropriate authority if the victim/complainant feels that the criminal processes have not been properly carried out. Therefore, if a complainant has been given information at crucial stages of the criminal process and even allowed to intervene at some stages, it is inconceivable that the complainant should not be informed of any process initiated by the accused seeking termination of the criminal process whether by approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., though these constitutional and statutory provisions do not specifically provide for giving notice to the complainant. It is now too well settled that principle of natural justice requires that if any action is sought to be taken against a person which adversely affects his rights, such person is entitled to be heard before any adverse order is passed. In this context it cannot be said that, the criminal proceeding initiated at the behest of the complainant, if it is terminated at the instance of the accused without hearing the complainant, cannot adversely affect the right of the complainant. Therefore, whether Article 226 to the Constitution or Section 482 of Cr.P.C. contains any specific provision for giving notice to the complainant or not, if any accused seeks to quash a criminal proceeding or FIR, the complainant ought to be notified and be heard before any such quashment of FIR/criminal proceeding is ordered. Therefore, this Court is of the firm view that if any accused approaches this Court by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C., the complainant/informant will be a necessary party and without giving a notice to him or hearing him, no such criminal proceeding/FIR could be quashed. Any such petition filed without making the informant/complainant a respondent party would suffer from the defect of non-joinder of necessary party and hence, not maintainable. 11. The rights of the victims/complainants have been acknowledged in most of the criminal justice systems all over the world by involving them at various stages of the criminal proceedings. Any such petition filed without making the informant/complainant a respondent party would suffer from the defect of non-joinder of necessary party and hence, not maintainable. 11. The rights of the victims/complainants have been acknowledged in most of the criminal justice systems all over the world by involving them at various stages of the criminal proceedings. As regards India, as already discussed above, the provisions of Sections 154(2), 173(2),439(2),301(2), etc. are specific provisions where the victims/complainants are taken into confidence with necessary information or allowing them to participate in the criminal proceedings. The criminal jurisprudence in other countries also have made similar provisions. In America, the Congress acknowledged rights of the victims and enacted the Crime Victims' Rights Act in 2004 which grants victims the following 8(eight) rights: 1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused. 2) The right to reasonable, accurate and timely notice of any public Court proceeding or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused. 3) The right not to be excluded from any such public Court proceeding, unless the Court after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at the proceeding. 4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the District Court involving release, plea, sentencing or any parole proceeding. 5) The reasonable right to confer with the Attorney for the Government in the case. 6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law. 7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay. 8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victims' dignity and privacy. The European Parliament and Council of the European Union adopted certain Directions on 25th October, 2012, for establishing minimum standard of rights, support and protection of victims of crime, to ensure that the victims of crime receive appropriate information, support and protection and are able to participate in the criminal proceeding. By these Directions articulated in a number of Articles the member States are under obligation to ensure that the rights of the victims are recognised and are treated in a respectful, sensitive, tailored, professional and non-discriminatory manner in all contacts with victim support or restorative justice services or a competent authority operating within the context of criminal proceedings. By these Directions articulated in a number of Articles the member States are under obligation to ensure that the rights of the victims are recognised and are treated in a respectful, sensitive, tailored, professional and non-discriminatory manner in all contacts with victim support or restorative justice services or a competent authority operating within the context of criminal proceedings. Article 4 thereof provides that member States shall ensure the victims are offered information without unnecessary delay from the first contact with the competent authority. Chapter 3 of the said Directive also provides various rights of participation in criminal proceeding including right to be heard, right of the victim to review the decision of the authority not to prosecute etc. Various others rights of the victims have been enumerated in the said directive. These victim oriented rights can be traced to Articles 4 and 5 of the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power which read as follows:- "4. Victims should be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity. They are entitled to access to the mechanism of justice and to prompt redress, as provided for by national legislation, for the harm that they have suffered. 5. Judicial and administrative mechanisms should be established and strengthen where necessary to enable victims to obtain redress through formal or informal procedures that are expeditious, fair, inexpensive and accessible. Victims should be informed of their rights in seeking redress through such mechanisms." It is well settled that while interpreting statues, it is permissible to refer to international covenants, unless there are specific provisions in the domestic laws which are contrary to these. Hence, in elucidating the victim's rights, this Court has made reference to the laws applicable in other countries and international instruments. 12. It may be also noted that Article 21 of the Constitution of India under which right to fair and speedy trial, which has been held to be a fundamental right, is not confined only to the accused but also to the victim, who is equally interested in the fair and speedy trial leading to the punishment of the offenders. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rattiram vs. State of M.P., (2012) 4 SCC 516 held that right to speedy trial is not an exclusive right of the accused but also extends to the victim. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rattiram vs. State of M.P., (2012) 4 SCC 516 held that right to speedy trial is not an exclusive right of the accused but also extends to the victim. In para No.60 of the judgment in Rattiram (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as below:- "60. While delineating on the facets of speedy trial, it cannot be regarded as an exclusive right of the accused. The right of a victim has been given recognition in Mangal Singh and Anr. v. Kishan Singh (2009) 17 SCC 303 : (2011) 1 SCC(Cri) 1019: AIR 2009 SC 1535 , wherein it has been observed thus: - "Any inordinate delay in conclusion of a criminal trial undoubtedly has highly deleterious effect on the society generally and particularly on the two sides of the case. But it will be a grave mistake to assume that delay in trial does not cause acute suffering and anguish to the victim of the offence. In many cases the victim may suffer even more than the accused. There is, therefore no reason to give all the benefits on account of the delay in trial to the accused and to completely deny all justice to the victim of the offence." 13. Therefore, viewed from the above perspective, irrespective of the procedures enumerated in the Code of Criminal Procedure, right to speedy trial being a facet of Article 21 to the Constitution of India, since any proceeding challenging the criminal proceeding/FIR would delay the criminal trial, any victim or the complainant would certainly have a right to challenge any such proceeding which could cause delay in the criminal proceeding. In that event, the victim or the complainant has to be informed of any such proceeding failure of which, would run contrary to the spirit and mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 14. In view of the above emerging trend in the criminal jurisprudence, it would be of no avail to contend that the victims will not have any right to be heard in any proceeding initiated by the accused or any person for quashing of the criminal proceeding/FIR initiated at the instance of the complainant/victim. 14. In view of the above emerging trend in the criminal jurisprudence, it would be of no avail to contend that the victims will not have any right to be heard in any proceeding initiated by the accused or any person for quashing of the criminal proceeding/FIR initiated at the instance of the complainant/victim. If it is held that victim/complainant has a right to be heard, it obviously will be the responsibility of the accused or the petitioner who is seeking quashing of criminal proceeding/FIR to implead the complainant as a party to inform him of such proceeding and not leave it to the Court to do so. The aforesaid principle would be rendered nugatory if it is left to the victim and the complainant himself to approach the Court on his own for the simple reason that it may not be possible for a victim in all cases to become aware of any such proceedings initiated by the accused for quashing of the criminal proceeding/FIR. It cannot be left to mere chance or providence for the complainant to become aware of the existence of any such proceeding seeking quashing of the complaint/FIR/criminal proceeding, so as to approach to implead himself in such proceeding. Therefore, the only reasonable legal position would be that he who seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court for quashing of criminal proceeding/FIR must implead the complainant as a respondent to afford him the opportunity of contesting the said claim, keeping in tune with the rights of the victim/complainant as discussed above. 15. The conclusion arrived at by this Court is fortified by the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the cases of Bharat Amratlal Kothari & Anr. vs. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi & ors., (2010) 1 SCC 234 ; State of Bihar & anr. vs. P.P.Sharma, IAS & anr., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 and Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Satya Pal and ors. vs. State of U.P. and ors., 2000 Cr.L.J. 569. In Bharat Amratlal Kothari & Anr. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in para 25 as follows : "25. vs. P.P.Sharma, IAS & anr., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 and Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Satya Pal and ors. vs. State of U.P. and ors., 2000 Cr.L.J. 569. In Bharat Amratlal Kothari & Anr. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in para 25 as follows : "25. Also, the grievance made by the appellant 1 in ground I of the memorandum of Special Leave to Appeal that by overstepping its jurisdiction and giving a go-bye to the regular trial, the High Court has quashed criminal proceedings without hearing the appellant 1/complainant cannot be ignored by this Court in view of peculiar facts of the case. The learned Single Judge has quashed the complaint of the appellant 1 contrary to the well settled principles governing quashing of a complaint. Quashing of the complaint in part should not have been ordered after convicting the respondents 1 to 6 for the offence punishable under Section 11(1)(d) of the Act and, therefore, for all these reasons, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside." (emphasis added) 16. Similarly, in State of Bihar vs. P.P. Sharma (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows :- "55. It is a settled law that the person against whom mala fides or bias was imputed should be impleaded eo-nominee as a party respondent to the proceedings and given an opportunity to meet those allegations. In his/her absence no enquiry into those allegation would be made. Otherwise it itself is violative of the principles of natural justice as it amounts to condemning a person without an opportunity. Admittedly, both R.K. Singh and G.N. Sharma were not impleaded. On this ground alone the High Court should have stopped enquiry into the allegation of mala fides or bias alleged against them.................................................." (emphasis added) In the aforesaid case of P.P. Sharma (supra), the Patna High Court had quashed the FIR and criminal proceeding against the accused without hearing the informant, Sri R.K.Singh and also the Investigating Officer, G.N.Sharma against whom certain malafide were alleged. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that such quashment of the FIR without impleading the informant is illegal. 17. The judgment cited by Mr.Y.Ashang, learned P.P., Mosiruddin Munshi (supra) also supports this view. 18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that such quashment of the FIR without impleading the informant is illegal. 17. The judgment cited by Mr.Y.Ashang, learned P.P., Mosiruddin Munshi (supra) also supports this view. 18. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Satpal (supra) held that where an accused seeks quashing of the FIR regarding cognizable offence by invoking writ jurisdiction, the informant should be made a party to be afforded an opportunity of hearing before the final order. This Court is of the view that as far as this principle of law is concerned, it will be the same even if the petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 19. Now, this Court will proceed to deal with the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 20. In Thakur Ram vs. State of Bihar (supra) relied on by the petitioners, the issue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not whether the complainant or the informant needs to be given notice or informed before quashment in criminal proceeding, rather, the issue was whether a private party can invoke jurisdiction under Section 435 Cr.P.C. of the Code of Criminal Procedure (5 of 1898) (which is akin to Section 397 of the Cr.P.C., 1973) in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed that the jurisdiction under Section 435 is wide and criminal law is not to be used as an instrument of wrecking private vengeance by an aggrieved party against the person who according to that party, had caused injury to it. It was further observed that barring a few exceptions, in criminal matters the party who is treated as the aggrieved party is the State which is the custodian of the social interests of the community at large and so it is for the State to take all the steps necessary for bringing the person who has acted against the social interests of the community to book. This principle in any way, does not decide the issue before this Court as to whether before quashment of FIR, the complainant/informant needs to be impleaded and heard, or not. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that said judgment of Thakur Ram (supra) does not assist the petitioners' case. 21. This principle in any way, does not decide the issue before this Court as to whether before quashment of FIR, the complainant/informant needs to be impleaded and heard, or not. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that said judgment of Thakur Ram (supra) does not assist the petitioners' case. 21. As regards the case of J.K. International (supra), the appellant therein filed the complaint before the Court alleging that the respondents had committed offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating on the basis of which an FIR was registered. The respondents moved the High Court for quashing the FIR in which the appellant was allowed to be impleaded. However, the said writ petition was withdrawn. After the investigation was over, charge sheet was filed against the respondents for offences under Section 402,406 and 120(b) of the IPC. At that stage, the respondents filed a petition before the High Court seeking quashing of the criminal proceeding pursuant to the said charge sheet. In the said writ petition, the appellant/complainant was not made a party. Thereafter, a petition was filed for impleading the appellant/complainant a party which was rejected by the High Court. In that context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows in para no. 8: "8. But the situation here is different, as the accused approached the High Court for quashing the criminal proceedings initiated by the appellant. It may not be that the complainant should have been made a party by the accused himself in the petition for quashing the criminal proceedings, as the accused has no such obligation when the case was charge-sheeted by the police. It is predominantly the concern of the State to continue the prosecution. But when the complainant wishes to be heard when the criminal proceedings are sought to be quashed, it would be a negation of justice to him if he is foreclosed from being heard even after he makes a request to the Court in that behalf. What is the advantage of the Court in telling him that he would not be heard at all even at the risk of the criminal proceedings initiated by him being quashed. What is the advantage of the Court in telling him that he would not be heard at all even at the risk of the criminal proceedings initiated by him being quashed. It is no solace to him to be told that if the criminal proceedings are quashed he may have the right to challenge it before the higher forums." The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that at that stage of filing of charge-sheet it was predominantly the concern of the State to continue the prosecution and hence the accused has no obligation to implead the complainant a party. However, the Supreme Court went on to observe that the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure would show that an aggrieved person is not altogether to be eclipsed from the scenario when the criminal court takes cognisance of the offences based on the report submitted by the police and the reality cannot be overlooked that the genesis in almost all cases is the grievance of one or more individual that they are wronged by committing offences against them and followed the earlier decision rendered in Bhagwat Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police and another ( AIR 1985 SC 1285 ), in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that on consideration of the report made by the Officer-in-charge of a police station under sub-section (2) (i) of Section 173, if the Magistrate is not inclined to take cognisance of the offence and issue process, the informant must be given an opportunity of being heard so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take cognisance of the offence and issue process. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that though it is predominantly the concern of the State to continue the prosecution, however, if the complainant wishes to be heard when the criminal proceedings are sought to be quashed, it would be a negation of justice to him to deny such hearing. Therefore, the ratio of the decision as far as the issue involved in the said case is concerned, is that, in any proceeding seeking quashing of criminal proceeding initiated at the behest of the complainant, the complainant cannot be denied hearing if he wants to be heard. However, in the present case, the situation is slightly different. In this case, the complainant has not yet made any application for being heard. He is nowhere in the picture till now. However, in the present case, the situation is slightly different. In this case, the complainant has not yet made any application for being heard. He is nowhere in the picture till now. Yet, the question is, whether the complainant is required to be impleaded and notified for being heard. Accordingly, the decision in J.K. International (supra) does support the case of the petitioners. 22. The contention of Mr. Mahendra relying on the aforesaid observation by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in J.K. International (supra) that it is only when the complainant himself approaches the Court to be impleaded a party respondent, that he could be heard and not otherwise, if accepted, can lead to anomalous situations. There may be a situation where the complainant after filing a complaint and after cognisance had taken thereof and investigation initiated, could be under the bona fide impression that the investigation is being concluded by way of filing of charge sheet. In such a situation, if the said criminal investigation/criminal trial is quashed by the Court without hearing the complainant, the complaint filed by the complainant would be brought to naught without even hearing him. Such a situation cannot be said to be contemplated under the law. The situation, that the criminal justice system which has been invoked and set into motion at the behest of the complainant could be terminated, without hearing the complaint is contrary to the modern trend and development in the criminal jurisprudence. One cannot expect an aggrieved person or the complainant to hover around the precincts of the Court in anticipation of a petition to be filed challenging/seeking quashing of the criminal investigation/trial by the accused. The crucial right of audience of the complainant in a proceeding which may vitally and fatally affect the fate of the complaint cannot be left to the tender mercy or whim of the accused. The informant or the complainant must be notified of any such proceeding, the primary responsibility of which lies with the accused, for it is he who is interested in the termination of the criminal proceeding. Therefore, the aforesaid observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has to be understood in the context of the facts obtaining in the said case, which are different from the present case and hence, not applicable to the present case. HELD: 23. Therefore, the aforesaid observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has to be understood in the context of the facts obtaining in the said case, which are different from the present case and hence, not applicable to the present case. HELD: 23. For the reasons discussed above, this Court holds that the present criminal petition filed by the petitioners without impleading the complainant/informant, that too, inspite of being suggested by this Court, is not maintainable and accordingly, the same is dismissed.