JUDGMENT : U.C. Maheshwari, J. Shri Akhilesh Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants. 2. None for respondent No.1 although served by affixture of notice on his last known address. 3. None for respondent No.2. 4. That the respondent No.2 was proceeded ex parte as stated in the impugned award and the impugned award has been passed by saddling liability to pay the awarded sum jointly and severally, so in such circumstances, keeping in view the provisions of Order 41, Rule 14 (4) CPC, notice against respondent No.2 is hereby dispensed with, if the same has not been served till date. 5. Shri Kamal S. Rochlani, learned counsel for respondent No. 3/Insurer. 6. Heard on IA 2050/2007 appellants' application under section 5 of the Limitation Act read with section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for condoning the delay in filing this appeal as the same is barred by 1483 days as reported by the Registry vide its noting dated 29/1/2007. 7. The averments of the IA have been seriously disputed on behalf of respondent No.3 insurer in its reply. The application is supported with the affidavit of appellant No.2 Sanju, while reply of the insurance company is not supported by any affidavit. 8. Appellants' counsel after taking me through the averments of the application as well as affidavit argued that after passing the impugned award, the appellants ought to have filed appeal before this Court within ninety days the prescribed period of limitation from the date of passing of the impugned award, but appellants 3 and 5 being minor represented through their mother, appellant No.4, who is their next friend, on their behalf no appeal was filed. In continuation, he said that the appellant No.4, mother of appellants No.3 and 5 being an uneducated and illiterate villager for want of knowledge of the legal position could not take appropriate steps to file appeal within the prescribed period of limitation and as soon as she came to know from her local lawyer of Seondha, after obtaining certified copy of the impugned award, this appeal was filed on behalf of herself and the appellants No. 3 and 5 so also on behalf of other appellants who were implicated as applicants before the Claims Tribunal. With these submissions, prayed to treat the aforesaid stated cause to be a sufficient cause as per requirement of section 5 of the Limitation Act and condone the delay by allowing the IA. 9. Aforesaid prayer is opposed by the counsel for respondent No.3 insurer saying that the appellants have failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to condone the day to day delay in filing this appeal. In continuation, he said that it is apparent from the record that this appeal is preferred at very belated stage after near about four years, after expiry of period of limitation. So contrary to the settled proposition by adopting lenient view the cause stated in the application could not be treated to be sufficient cause for condoning the alleged delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. He further said that different yardsticks could not be adopted in the present matter for condoning the alleged delay in filing the appeal. Taking into consideration that present matter is related to the law of social justice, i.e. the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as such the same treatment as of other regular suit and regular appeal should be given to consider the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act and prayed for dismissal of the IA. Alternatively, he said that in case such IA is allowed then in such circumstances, it be observed at this stage that subject to allowing the appeal on adjudication if sum of the award is enhanced, then the appellants shall not be entitled to get any interest on such enhanced sum for the aforesaid period which would be condoned by allowing the IA. In continuation, he said that grounds of illiteracy of the appellants or their residence in a remote areas/villages could not be treated to be sufficient cause to allow the impugned application and prayed for dismissal of the IA. 10. Having heard counsel at length, keeping in view their arguments, I have carefully gone through the application as well as the reply. 11. It is an undisputed fact on record that the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed along with an affidavit while reply has been filed without any affidavit. 10. Having heard counsel at length, keeping in view their arguments, I have carefully gone through the application as well as the reply. 11. It is an undisputed fact on record that the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed along with an affidavit while reply has been filed without any affidavit. So firstly, the application on behalf of the appellants was filed in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the High Court Rules, while, reply has not been filed according to such rules, hence, in the lack of the affidavit such averments of the reply could not be considered. 12. However, even after taking the averments of such reply into consideration along with the averments of the IA, in the available circumstances, according to which on the date of passing of the impugned award, appellants No. 3 and 5 were minor and they were represented through their mother, and the other appellant were also residing with their mother, i.e. appellant No. 2, in such premises, they being uneducated villagers did not aware about the technicalities of law, therefore, only on receiving information from the local lawyer, they came to know about their right to file appeal, then after obtaining certified copy of the impugned award, have filed this appeal along with the aforesaid IA. 13. True it is that in filing appeal there is a delay of near about four years, but it is a settled proposition of law that in the Indian culture it is not expected from uneducated villagers or agriculturists or labour class that they are acquainted with the legal procedure specifically the provision of limitation to file appeal, and, in such premises, their application for condonation of delay could not be thrown away saying that the same has been filed after a long delay. In the aforesaid circumstance, this appeal could not be dismissed only on account of filing at belated stage. 14. Such aspect was considered by the Apex Court long before while considering the matter of substitution of legal representatives on record at very belated stage, i.e. near about six years in the matter of Ram Sumarin v. DDC, AIR 1985 SC 606 , and the application was allowed. 15. 14. Such aspect was considered by the Apex Court long before while considering the matter of substitution of legal representatives on record at very belated stage, i.e. near about six years in the matter of Ram Sumarin v. DDC, AIR 1985 SC 606 , and the application was allowed. 15. Apart from the aforesaid, I am of the considered view that provision of claim under the Motor Vehicles Act has been enacted keeping in view social welfare of the society at large and under section 173 of the aforesaid Act provision for condoning the delay in filing the appeal has also been provided. If such law is enacted for welfare of the society at large, then mere on account of delay in filing the appeal, the appeal of a person like the appellants out of them some of the minors could not be thrown away by dismissing the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. 16. As per settled proposition of law, a case should be decided on merits rather than dismissing it on the ground of limitation. There is also a settled proposition that while dealing with the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court is bound to adopt a lenient view with justice oriented approach. 17. Apart from the aforesaid, long before on arising the occasions, the Apex Court has held that while dealing with the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act the stake of the litigation should also be taken into account and such principle was enunciated by the Apex Court keeping in view that a case should be decided on merits rather than dismissing it on the question of limitation. 18. So in view of the settled proposition of law and for the reasons stated in the IA, I am satisfied that sufficient cause is made out to condone the aforesaid long delay in filing the appeal. Consequently, by allowing the application, entire delay in filing the appeal is hereby condoned. 19. 18. So in view of the settled proposition of law and for the reasons stated in the IA, I am satisfied that sufficient cause is made out to condone the aforesaid long delay in filing the appeal. Consequently, by allowing the application, entire delay in filing the appeal is hereby condoned. 19. So far as objection of the insurer's counsel that subject to decision of this Court if the sum or the award is enhanced in favour of the appellants claimants then in that circumstance the claimants would not be entitled to get interest on such enhanced amount for the period which has been condoned by this Court is concerned, it is observed that such question is left open in the matter for consideration at the time of final hearing of the appeal. 20. Having allowed the aforesaid IA, at the request of the appellants' counsel he is also heard on the question of admission. 21. Admit. 22. In spite of service of notice, no one was appearing on behalf of respondent No.1 on earlier occasion, hence, notice of this admission is not required to such respondent No.1. 23. In view of the above mentioned reason on which notice against respondent No.2 is dispensed with, for the same reason, notice of this admission is also dispensed with against respondent No.2. 24. Counsel for respondent No.3 Insurer has taken notice on behalf of such respondent, hence, no separate notice is required to it. 25. Record of the Claims Tribunal is available with the appeal. So in such premises, firstly the Registry is directed to place this matter in the Lok Adalat scheduled in near future to find out the probability of amicable settlement between the parties and subject to outcome of Lok Adalat, this appeal be placed before the Bench for final hearing in due course.