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2015 DIGILAW 116 (ALL)

Chandra Shekhar Trivedi v. State of Uttar Pradesh

2015-01-17

VISHNU CHANDRA GUPTA

body2015
JUDGMENT The aforesaid two petitions, under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure (In short 'Cr.P.C.'), have been filed by the petitioners with a prayer to quash the proceedings of Case No.414 of 2008, under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC, Police Station Goshainganj, District Lucknow pending in the court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IInd, Lucknow and also the impugned order dated 17.04.2010 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IInd, Lucknow whereby the petitioners of both the cases have been summoned under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC to face trial. 2. Since, in both the petitions common questions of law and facts are involved, therefore, both petitions are being decided by this common judgement. 3. Brief facts for deciding this petition are that opposite party no.2-Sunil Kumar Awasthi filed an application under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. before learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-II, Lucknow against Chandra Shekhar Trivedi (Secretary), Shiv Ratan Singh (President) and Vibhuti Bhushan Pandey (Treasurer), the office bearers of Survodai Seva Sansthan, Gosainganj, Lucknow (In short 'Sansthan'), to lodge FIR against them with the allegations that they are misappropriating the rental income collected from tenants of 65 commercial shops constructed in the campus of Rampal Trivedi Inter College, Gosainganj (In short 'College'). The value of aforesaid shops are in crores and rent collected of the aforesaid shops are nearly Rupees 4 to 5 lac per year. In the revenue records dated 03.05.1972, 26.12.1995 and 24.10.2005, the ownership of aforesaid shops of the College is recorded as of State. The Sansthan have no property of its own. The members of the Management Committee of the college with intend to misappropriate the income of the college established the aforesaid Sansthan, whereas the College has its own Bank Account in the name of Vidhyalaya Vikas Kosh. The income from the property of the college required to be deposited in the Bank Account of the College and the liability for depositing the aforesaid income lies upon the accused persons. Instead of depositing the aforesaid amount in the account of the college maintained in the Bank the accused persons are utilizing the aforesaid rental income by committing forgery in the record. In the aforesaid forgery several departmental officers and officials are involved. Instead of depositing the aforesaid amount in the account of the college maintained in the Bank the accused persons are utilizing the aforesaid rental income by committing forgery in the record. In the aforesaid forgery several departmental officers and officials are involved. It is also alleged by the opposite party no.2 in the application under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. that he had given personally an application for lodging report to S.O., Gosainganj, Lucknow on 14.07.2008. In this regard, he also sent an application to SSP, Lucknow through speed post on 15.07.2008 but inspite of it, report could not be lodged. Thereafter, the opposite party no.2 moved the application under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. before the learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate treated it as a complaint case and proceeded to record the statement of complainant under Section 200, Cr.P.C. and his witnesses under Section 202, Cr.P.C. Thereafter, the learned Magistrate vide order dated 17.04.2010 summoned the petitioners to face trial under Sections 409, 420, 467, 467, 471 IPC. 4. So far as Criminal Misc. Application (U/s 482, Cr.P.C.) No.3505 of 2010 is concerned, this petition was initially filed by six persons, namely, Sohan Lal, Smt. Asha Dwivedi, Rajendra Kumar Srivastava, Rupesh Kumar Dixit, Daya Shankar Tripathi and Shiv Ratan Singh but later on, vide order dated 13.04.2011 passed in Cr.M. Application No.107181 of 2010, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn on behalf of petitioners no.1, 2 and 4 and the name of petitioner no.6 was also deleted from the array of parties on the ground that he has expired. During the pendency of this petition, Vibhuti Bhushan Pandey also passed away. 5. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that before filing the aforesaid application under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C., a first information report was lodged by Director, Secondary Education, Lucknow under Section 7 of U.P. Educational Institutions (Prevention of Dissipation of Assets) Act, 1974 on similar allegations. Thereafter a show cause notice under Section 16 d (2) of Madhyamik Shiksha Sansodhit Adhiniyam was issued to the Manager of the College. After receipt of the notice, the amount realized as rent started depositing in the Bank account of the college. However, in the FIR lodged by the Director of Secondary Education, final report has been submitted by the police. Against the final report, protest petition has been filed by the opposite party and not by department , which is still pending. After receipt of the notice, the amount realized as rent started depositing in the Bank account of the college. However, in the FIR lodged by the Director of Secondary Education, final report has been submitted by the police. Against the final report, protest petition has been filed by the opposite party and not by department , which is still pending. 6. It has further been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that certain litigations are also pending in between the rival groups of Management of the College, which is evident from the order passed by Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The order dated 22.11.1976 passed by Sub-Divisional Magistrate shows that the land of Survodai Inter College situated at Sadarpur Karaura, Koriyani, Chand Sarai, Maghuwa, Mitauli Adampur were recorded in the name of Sarvodai Seva Sansthan, Gosainganj on the application dated 20.07.1976 moved by Rampal Trivedi, Manager, Sarvodai Seva Sansthan, Gosainganj under Section 33/39 of U.P. Land Revenue Act. The order dated 22.11.1976 passed by Sub-Divisional Magistrate was challenged by the opposite party no.2 in Writ Petition No.2270 (M/B) of 2003, which was dismissed vide order dated 30.04.2003 with liberty to the opposite party no.2 to file revision. Thereafter, the opposite party no.2 filed Revision 323 of 2002-03 under Section 219 of U.P. Land Revenue Act, which was also dismissed vide order dated 14.07.2003 passed by learned Additional Commissioner (Judicial), Lucknow Division, Lucknow. The show cause notice issued under Section 16 d (2) was decided by Director of Secondary Education on the basis of material documents and reply of Sansthan vide order dated 26.10.2009 and observed in his order that the opposite party no.2 has no locus to raise such objection. The said order was passed in pursuance of the order dated 18.09.2009 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.4912 of 2009 (Ashok Trivedi Vs. State of U.P. and others). It has further been submitted that the order dated 26.10.2009 passed by Director of Secondary Education contains that the shops were constructed by Sansthan and the amount of rent is being utilized for the welfare of the College. There is no misappropriation of funds. These facts have been concealed by the opposite party no.2 while moving the application under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. 7. There is no misappropriation of funds. These facts have been concealed by the opposite party no.2 while moving the application under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. 7. It has further been argued by the counsel for the petitioners that the statements of the witnesses, namely, Kaushal Kishore Mishra and Hari Nam Singh recorded under Section 202, Cr.P.C. are the retired teachers of the College and belong to the opposite group. It has also been submitted that even if, the allegations made in the application under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. are taken to be true on its face value even then no offence under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC is made out. There is no iota of evidence to show that any document has been forged by the petitioners. 8. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgements of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Narayan Popli Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation; (2003) 3 SCC 641 , Onkar Nath Mishra and others Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and another; (2008) 2 SCC 561 , V.P. Shrivastava Vs. Indian Explosives Limited and others; (2010) 10 SCC 361 , Indian Oil Corporation Vs. NEPC India Limited and others; (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 188, Sardar Singh Vs. State of Haryana; 1977 CRI.L.J. 1158 and S.N. Palanitkar and others Vs. State of Bihar and another; AIR 2001 SC 2960 . 9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party no.2 vehemently opposed the submissions raised by learned counsel for the petitioners and relying upon the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Rashmi Kumar Vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhada; 1996 Law Suit (SC) 2133= (1997)2 SCC 397 submits that while taking cognizance the court is required to consider only the avernments made in the complaint or charge-sheet and not to shift and appreciate the evidence at that stage. If the ingredients of offence are prima faice made out from the avernments, it is sufficient to proceed against the persons who have been summoned to face trial. So, if the avernments made in the complaint and the evidence adduced in support thereof, do not have the necessary ingredients of offence the Court can very well declined to proceed against the accused. Learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 also relied upon the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Hira Lal Vs. So, if the avernments made in the complaint and the evidence adduced in support thereof, do not have the necessary ingredients of offence the Court can very well declined to proceed against the accused. Learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 also relied upon the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Hira Lal Vs. State of U.P. and another; 2008 Cri.L.J 113 (SC) to show that in criminal matters question of locus is not important. Anybody can give information of cognizance offence to set the law in motion. 10. The Apex Court in Ram Narayan Popli's case (Supra) has discussed with regard to constituent of an offence of criminal breach of trust in paragraph 361 as under: "361. To constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust, there must be an entrustment, there must be misappropriation or conversion to one's own use, or use in violation of a legal direction or of any legal contract; and the misappropriation or conversion or disposal must be with a dishonest intention. When a person allows others to misappropriate the money entrusted to him that amounts to a criminal breach of trust as defined by Section 405. The section relatable to property in a positive part and a negative part. The positive part deals with criminal misappropriation or conversion of the property and the negative part consists of dishonestly using or disposing of the property in violation of any direction and of law or any contract touching the discharge of trust." 11. The Apex Court in V.P. Shrivastava's case (Supra) has held with regard to offence under Section 406 IPC in paragraphs 33, 34, and 35 as under: "33. We may now consider whether the allegations in the complaint make out a case of criminal breach of trust, as defined in Section 405 of the IPC, the Section reads as follows: "405. Criminal breach of trust.--Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust". Explanation 1.- A person, being an employer of an establishment whether exempted under section 17 of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or not who deducts the employee's contribution from the wages payable to the employee for credit to a Provident Fund or Family Pension Fund established by any law for the time being in force, shall be deemed to have been entrusted with the amount of the contribution so deducted by him and if he makes default in the payment of such contribution to the said Fund in violation of the said law, shall be deemed to have dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution in violation of a direction of law as aforesaid. Explanation 2.- A person, being an employer, who deducts the employees' contribution from the wages payable to the employee for credit to the Employees' State Insurance Fund held and administered by the Employees' State Insurance Corporation established under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), shall be deemed to have been entrusted with the amount of the contribution so deducted by him and if he makes default in the payment of such contribution to the said Fund in violation of the said Act, shall be deemed to have dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution in violation of a direction of law as aforesaid." 34.According to the Section, a criminal breach of trust involves the following ingredients: "(a) a person should have been entrusted with property, or entrusted with dominion over property; (b) that person should dishonestly misappropriate or convert to his own use that property, or dishonestly use or dispose of that property or wilfully suffer any other person to do so; and (c) that such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made, touching the discharge of such trust." 35. In Onkar Nath Mishra & Ors. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., a Bench of two Judges of this Court, in which one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) was a member, had observed that two distinct parts were involved in the (2008) 2 SCC 561 commission of the offence of criminal breach of trust. In Onkar Nath Mishra & Ors. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., a Bench of two Judges of this Court, in which one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) was a member, had observed that two distinct parts were involved in the (2008) 2 SCC 561 commission of the offence of criminal breach of trust. The first part consists of the creation of an obligation in relation to the property over which dominion or control is acquired by the accused. The second is the misappropriation or dealing with the property dishonestly and contrary to the terms of the obligation created." 12. The Apex Court in Indian Oil Corporation's case (Supra) in paragraph 21, 22 and 23 also consider the provisions of criminal breach of trust under the India Penal Code, which reads as under: "21. We will next consider whether the allegations in the complaint make out a case of criminal breach of trust under section 405 which is extracted below : "405. Criminal breach of trust. Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust". 22. A careful reading of the section shows that a criminal breach of trust involves the following ingredients : (a) a person should have been entrusted with property, or entrusted with dominion over property; (b) that person should dishonestly misappropriate or convert to his own use that property, or dishonestly use or dispose of that property or willfully suffer any other person to do so; (c) that such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made, touching the discharge of such trust. The following are examples (which include the illustrations under section 405) where there is 'entrustment' : (i) An 'Executor' of a will, with reference to the estate of the deceased bequeathed to legatees. The following are examples (which include the illustrations under section 405) where there is 'entrustment' : (i) An 'Executor' of a will, with reference to the estate of the deceased bequeathed to legatees. (ii) A 'Guardian' with reference to a property of a minor or person of unsound mind. (iii) A 'Trustee' holding a property in trust, with reference to the beneficiary. (iv) A 'Warehouse Keeper' with reference to the goods stored by a depositor. (v) A carrier with reference to goods entrusted for transport belonging to the consignor/consignee. (vi) A servant or agent with reference to the property of the master or principal. (vii) A pledgee with reference to the goods pledged by the owner/borrower. (viii) A debtor, with reference to a property held in trust on behalf of the creditor in whose favour he has executed a deed of pledge-cum-trust. (Under such a deed, the owner pledges his movable property, generally vehicle/machinery to the creditor, thereby delivering possession of the movable property to the creditor and the creditor in turn delivers back the pledged movable property to the debtor, to be held in trust and operated by the debtor). 23. In Chellor Mankkal Narayan Ittiravi Nambudiri Vs. State of Travancore, Cochin this Court held: (AIR p.484, para 21) " [T] o constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust, it is essential that the prosecution must prove first of all that the accused was entrusted with some property or with any dominion or power over it. It has to be established further that in respect of the property so entrusted, there was dishonest misappropriation or dishonest conversion or dishonest use or disposal in violation of a direction of law or legal contract, by the accused himself or by someone else which he willingly suffered to do. 13. It follows almost axiomatically from this definition that the ownership or beneficial interest in the property in respect of which criminal breach of trust is alleged to have been committed, must be in some person other than the accused and the latter must hold it on account of some person or in some way for his benefit."" 14. The Apex Court in Sardar Singh's case (Supra) held that mere failure or ommission to return the property by itself is not sufficient to constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust. Something more is required for constitution of the offence. 15. The Apex Court in Sardar Singh's case (Supra) held that mere failure or ommission to return the property by itself is not sufficient to constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust. Something more is required for constitution of the offence. 15. The Apex Court in S.N. Palanitkar's case (Supra) in paragrahs 23 and 24 observed as follows: "23. Many a times, complaints are filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C. by the parties with an oblique motive or for collateral purposes to harass, to wreck vengeance, to pressurize the accused to bring them to their own terms or to enforce the obligations arising out of breach of contract touching commercial transactions instead of approaching civil courts with a view to realize money at the earliest. It is also to be kept in mind that when parties commit a wrongful act constituting a criminal offence satisfying necessary ingredients of an offence, they cannot be allowed to walk away with an impression that no action could be taken against them on criminal side. A wrongful or illegal act such as criminal breach of trust, misappropriation, cheating or defamation may give rise to action both on civil as well as on criminal side when it is clear from the complaint and sworn statements that necessary ingredients of constituting an offence are made out. May be parties are entitled to proceed on civil side only in a given situation in the absence of an act constituting an offence but not to proceed against the accused in a criminal prosecution. Hence before issuing a process a Magistrate has to essentially keep in mind the scheme contained in the provisions of Section 200-203 of Cr.P.C. keeping in mind the position of law stated above and pass an order judiciously and not mechanically or in routine manner. 24. The learned Magistrate, in our view, having regard to the facts stated and the legal position explained above, committed a serious error in issuing the process against the appellants 1 to 6 and 8 for offences under Sections 406,420 and 120-B IPC when the acts alleged against them did not constitute these offences satisfying their ingredients even prima facie. In the light of the material brought on record at that stage process could have been issued only as against the appellant no. 7 that too for an offence under Section 420 IPC only." 16. In the light of the material brought on record at that stage process could have been issued only as against the appellant no. 7 that too for an offence under Section 420 IPC only." 16. A perusal of these authorities make it clear that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. would be exercised sparingly and cautiously but at the same time, the court could not hesitate in passing the order where the court feels that process of law has been mishandled as held by the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal; [1992 Supp (1) 335]. The illustrative categories indicated by the Apex Court are as follows: "(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 17. The Apex Court in Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, (1997) 2 SCC 397 , at page 409 and 410 in para 14 and 16 observed with regard to limitation of exercise of the jurisdiction of High Court while exercising the powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of Constitution of India : "14.--------.It is fairly settled legal position that at the time of taking cognizance of the offence, the Court has to consider only the averments made in the complaint or in the charge-sheet filed under Section 173, as the case may be. It was held in State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla 1996) 8 SCC 164, that it is not open for the Court to sift or appreciate the evidence at that stage with reference to the material and come to the conclusion that no prima facie case is made out for proceeding further in the matter. It is equally settled law that it is open to the Court, before issuing the process, to record the evidence and on consideration of the averments made in the complaint and the evidence thus adduced, it is required to find out whether an offence has been made out. On finding that such an offence has been made out and after taking cognizance thereof, process would be issued to the respondent to take further steps in the matters. If it is a charge-sheet filed under Section 173 of the Code, the facts stated by the prosecution in the charge-sheet, on the basis of the evidence collected during investigation, would disclose the offence for which cognizance would be taken by the court to proceed further in the matter. If it is a charge-sheet filed under Section 173 of the Code, the facts stated by the prosecution in the charge-sheet, on the basis of the evidence collected during investigation, would disclose the offence for which cognizance would be taken by the court to proceed further in the matter. Thus it is not the province of the court at that stage to embark upon and sift the evidence to come to the conclusion whether offence has been made out or not. The learned Judge, therefore, was clearly in error in attempting to sift the evidence with reference to the averments made by the respondent in the counter-affidavit to find out whether or not offence punishable under Section 406 IPC had been made out." "16.------------.It is well-settled legal position that the High Court should sparingly and cautiously exercise the power under Section 482 of the Code to prevent miscarriage of justice. In State of H.P. v. Pirthi Chand (1996) 2 SCC 37 , two of us (K. Ramaswamy and S.B. Majmudar, JJ.) composing the Bench and in State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma (1996) 7 SCC 705 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court, reviewed the entire case-law on the exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code to quash the complaint or the charge-sheet or the first information report and held that the High Court would be loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court would consider whether the exercise of the power would advance the cause of justice or it would tantamount to abuse of the process of the court. Social stability and order require to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind before embarking upon the exercise of the inherent power vested in the court. Same view was taken in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal ,1992(supp)1 SCC 335 and G.L. Didwania v. ITO, (1995 (Supp) 2 SCC 724etc." 18. This Court in Hira Lal V. State of U.P. And anr,2008 Cr.L.J.113, in para7 of the report has held that "7.-----------.The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana V. Ch. Same view was taken in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal ,1992(supp)1 SCC 335 and G.L. Didwania v. ITO, (1995 (Supp) 2 SCC 724etc." 18. This Court in Hira Lal V. State of U.P. And anr,2008 Cr.L.J.113, in para7 of the report has held that "7.-----------.The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana V. Ch. Bhajan Lal and ors, has held that "if an information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an Officer Incharge of the police station satisfying the requirments of section 154(1) Cr.P.C., the said police officer had no option except to enter the substance thereof in prescribed form that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information." In my view,it is hardly material from which sourcethe information relating to the commision of cognizable offence is received by the officer in charge of police station." 19. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 , at page 759 in para28 the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under : "28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused." 20. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused." 20. In Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 , at page 347 in para 29 and 30 the Hob'ble Supreme Court delinated certain steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by the accusedby invoking the powers of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. : "29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far-reaching consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution's/complainant's case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC: 30.1. Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2. Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 30.3. Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused. 21. In the light of the aforesaid legal principals the fact of this case has to be scanned. The pleadings has already been challenged. 22. 21. In the light of the aforesaid legal principals the fact of this case has to be scanned. The pleadings has already been challenged. 22. So far as the genuineness of documents relied upon by the petitioners in support of their claim relating to litigation in respect of land of Sansthan, management of collage and of Education department annexed with their pleading has not been disputed. The correctness of these documents has not been refuted by the complainant. 23. The entire case of the opposite party No.2, who is one of the teacher of collage and alleged by petitioners to be the imposter of rival group of present management of the collage, is based on the allegation that the rent realized from the shops of the College has been deposited in the Bank account of Sansthan instead of in the Bank account of College. It has not been stated anywhere that account and balance sheet prepared by the Sansthan were forged. The balance sheet filed along with counter affidavit dated 18.05.2011 clearly shows that the amount of rent has been deposited in the account of Sansthan. Nothing has been brought on record to demonstrate that any amount of rent of shops has been deposited in the personal accounts of the petitioners. There is no allegation in complaint that any documents has been forged or any forged document was ever used as genuine. Therefore, prima face, case under Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC is not made out. So far as, Section 420 IPC is concerned, there is no iota of evidence of cheating or dishonestly inducing delivery of property or of illegal gain on the part of the petitioners. There is no allegation or evidence of misappropriation of funds nor there is any diversion of funds. None of the petitioner is a government servant, hence offence under Sections 409 IPC is also not made out. 24. It is not in dispute that the college is managed by a Management Committee. The Sansthan is also run through the Management Committee. That management committee of Sansthan and of collage is constituted by similar persons. The committee runs the college. It is also not in dispute that much earlier to filing of this complaint the property was recorded in revenue records in the name of Sansthan vide order dated 22.11.1976 passed by competent revenue authority which has been affirmed by the higher authorities. The committee runs the college. It is also not in dispute that much earlier to filing of this complaint the property was recorded in revenue records in the name of Sansthan vide order dated 22.11.1976 passed by competent revenue authority which has been affirmed by the higher authorities. It is also not in dispute that the FIR earlier lodged by authorities of Education Department on similar facts was not found correct after investigation and final report has been submitted. It is also not in dispute that the Authority of the Educational Department did not file any protest petition disputing the final report submitted by the police. Rather Authorities of the Educational Department considered all these aspects of the matter and after inquiry, it was found that there is no misappropriation of assets or fund of the collage. The fact that property was entered in the name of Sansthan has been concealed by the opposite party no.2. Not only this, another fact has also been concealed that Authorities of the Educational Department did not find any misappropriation of funds in this case after inquiry. It is true that litigation in regard to the Management of institution is sub-judice before the courts of law and the opposite party, who is not presently in power, is involving the present office bearers of the association in criminal cases with a mala fide intention. 25. The documents and material relied upon by the petitioners are such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the complainant and the same would be sufficient to reject and over rule the factual averment contained in the complaint and persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of accusations as false. the The present proceedings is manifestly attended with mala fide and is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite them due to private and personal grudge on the instigation of the persons of Management who were not in power. Moreover, the allegations made in the complaint and the evidence adduced in support thereof, even if taken to be in their face value and accepted in its entirety do not constitute prima facie any criminal offence or make out a case against the accused persons. The present prosecution seems to be a proxy litigation on the pretext of rival group of the present management Committee. The present prosecution seems to be a proxy litigation on the pretext of rival group of the present management Committee. Hence, these proceedings are nothing but an abuse of the process of the court and would not serve the ends of justice, as such the same are liable to be quashed including the order for summoning the petitionersccused persons and all consequential proceedings initiated in pursuance of that order. 26. Hence these petitions are allowed. The proceedings of Case No.414 of 2008, under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC, Police Station Goshainganj, District Lucknow pending in the court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-II, Lucknow and also the impugned order dated 17.04.2010 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-II, Lucknow, whereby the petitioners of both the cases have been summoned to face trial under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC are quashed.