ORDER : The petitioners have called into question the preliminary notification, dated 9.6.2008 (AnnexureB) and the final notification, dated 18.5.2010 (Annexure-C) issued under Section 4(1) and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘the said Act’ for short) respectively. 2. Sri H.M. Dharigond, the learned counsel for the petitioners has urged two grounds. Firstly, he contends that the final notification is not within one year from the date of the issuance of the preliminary notification. Secondly, the award is not passed within two years from the date of the publication of the final notification. 3. Sri Ramesh N.Misale, the learned counsel for the respondent No.5 submits that the final notification, dated 18.5.2010 is well within one year from the date of the last of the publications of the preliminary notification. He submits that the preliminary notification is published in the Gazette, dated 3.7.2008 and that it was displayed in Gram Chavadi on 20.5.2009. He submits that the award is prepared by the Special Land Acquisition Officer (‘SLAO’ for short) on 15.11.2012 itself which is well within two years from the date of the publication of the final notification – 18.5.2010. The Government has granted the approval on 29.11.2012. 4. Sri Ravi V.Hosamani, the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos.1 to 4 makes the submissions akin to those of Sri Misale. 5. The submissions of the learned counsel have received my thoughtful consideration. The first question that falls for my consideration is whether the final notification is within one year from the date of the publication of the preliminary notification. It is not in dispute that the preliminary notification was published on 9.6.2008. The final notification was published on 18.5.2010. An attempt is made by the respondents to establish that the publication of the final notification is within one year from the last of the publications of the preliminary notification. It is their contention that the preliminary notification was put up on the notice board of Gram Chavadi on 20.5.2009, as is evident from AnnexureR5 drawn under the mahazar. I find it difficult to accept this submission, because the next annexure, that is Annexure-R6 (to the fifth respondent’s statement of objections) states that it was notified in the Gram Chavadi on 31.12.2008. The discrepancy in the matter of dates between AnnexuresR5 and R6 has remained unexplained. I find it difficult to accept this submission, because the next annexure, that is Annexure-R6 (to the fifth respondent’s statement of objections) states that it was notified in the Gram Chavadi on 31.12.2008. The discrepancy in the matter of dates between AnnexuresR5 and R6 has remained unexplained. The communication, dated 6.11.2009 (AnnexureR6) further states that the notice is sent to all the interested persons on 31.10.2008 granting time to them to file the objections till 30.11.2008. When the notice displayed in the Gram Chavadi mentions that the objections are to be filed within 30.11.2008, it cannot be contended by the respondents with any rate of success that the notice in Gram Chavadi came to be displayed on 20.5.2009. 6. As the last of the publications was issued on 31.12.2008, the final notification ought to have been issued on or before 31.12.2009. Admittedly, the final notification is published on 18.5.2010. This is a clear violation of the timeline prescribed by proviso to Section 6(1) of the said Act. 7. The second question that arises for my consideration is whether the award is passed within two years from the date of the publication of the final notification. Section 11A of the said Act states that the Deputy Commissioner shall make an award within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration and that if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse. 8. Admittedly the award in the eyes of law is passed on 4.1.2013. It is sought to be contended by the respondents that the SLAO has prepared the award on 15.11.2012 itself and that the Government has approved the same on 29.11.2012 and that the award notice under Section 12(2) dates back to preparation of the award by the SLAO. 9. Such a contention is wholly unacceptable. When the proposed award made by the SLAO is within the statutory period and is communicated to the Government for approval but no approval is granted by the Government within the statutory period, the entire proceedings lapse. Such proposed award cannot be treated as an award. In saying so, I am fortified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in the case of STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS v. RAJIV GUPTA AND ANOTHER reported in (1994) 5 SCC 686 . 10. Such proposed award cannot be treated as an award. In saying so, I am fortified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in the case of STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS v. RAJIV GUPTA AND ANOTHER reported in (1994) 5 SCC 686 . 10. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that if the authorized officer grants approval to the award beyond two years from the date of the publication of the declaration, it does not amount to complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 11A of the said Act. The relevant portions of paragraph No.6 of its decision in the case of Mrs. MARGARIDA GOMES PEREIRA v. STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1998 Bombay 327 is extracted hereinbelow: “6. …………… In the said case, before the Apex Court, the Collector was required to make the award on or before 21-12-1992. He made the proposed award on 20-12-1992 and communicated the same to the Commissioner for his approval. Since his prior approval was not given before the expiry of 21st December 1992, it was held that there is no award made by the Land Acquisition Officer. It was further pointed out by the Apex Court that in the eye of law, the proposed award of the Collector under S.11 of the Act is not the award and since S.11A is mandatory, on expiry of two years from the date of publication of the declaration, the entire proceedings under the Act stood lapsed…………..”. 11. Emphasizing the imperative need to make the award without delay, the Apex Court has this to say in the case of K.KRISHNA REDDY AND OTHERS v. SPECIAL DEPUTY COLLECTOR reported in AIR 1988 SC 2123 = (1988) 4 SCC 163 : “12………..After all money is what money buys. What the claimants could have bought with the compensation in 1977 cannot do in 1988. Perhaps, not even one half of it. It is a common experience that the purchasing power of rupee is dwindling. With rising inflation, the delayed payment may lose all charms and utility of the compensation. In some cases, the delay may be detrimental to the interests of claimants. The Indian agriculturists generally have no avocation. They totally depend upon land. If uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere. They are left high and dry. They have no savings to draw. They have nothing to fall back upon. In some cases, the delay may be detrimental to the interests of claimants. The Indian agriculturists generally have no avocation. They totally depend upon land. If uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere. They are left high and dry. They have no savings to draw. They have nothing to fall back upon. They know no other work. They may even face starvation unless rehabilitated. In all such cases, it is of utmost importance that the award should be made without delay. The enhanced compensation must be determined without loss of time……….” 12. It is also helpful to refer to the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of TUKARAM KANA JOSHI AND OTHERS v. M.I.D.C. AND OTHERS reported in 2012 AIR SCW 6343, wherein it is held that even under valid acquisition proceedings, there is a legal obligation on the part of the authorities to complete such acquisition proceedings at the earliest and to make the payment of the requisite compensation. 13. Thus on both the grounds, the acquisition proceedings are liable to be invalidated. The impugned notifications are quashed in so far as they pertain to the petitioners’ lands. However, it is made clear that the quashing of the impugned notifications would not come in the way of the authorities resorting to the initiation of the land acquisition proceedings afresh, if there is any need for the land for any public purpose. There is nothing like estoppel in the acquisition matters. But nobody can be deprived of his property without following the due process of law. 14. At this juncture, Sri Misale complains of the inordinate delay on the part of the petitioners in approaching this Court. I am not persuaded to reject these petitions on the ground of delay and laches. The acquisition notifications issued in 2008 and 2010 are challenged even before the passing of the award. As held by the Apex Court in the case of RAM CHAND AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in (1994) 1 SCC 44 , in acquisition matters the delay on the part of the petitioners has to be considered along with the inaction on the part of the authorities. The Apex Court has this to say in paragraph No.16 of its judgment: 16. ………….. The Apex Court has this to say in paragraph No.16 of its judgment: 16. ………….. According to us, the question of delay in invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or of this Court under Article 32, has to be considered along with the inaction on the part of the authorities, who had to perform their statutory duties. Can the statutory authority take a plea that although it has not performed its duty within a reasonable time, but it is of no consequence because the person, who has been wronged or deprived of his right, has also not invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court for a suitable writ or direction to grant the relief considered appropriate in the circumstances? The authorities are enjoined by the statute concerned to perform their duties within a reasonable time, and as such they are answerable to the Court why such duties have not been performed by them, which has caused injury to claimants………….” 15. The validity of the respondents’ resistance to these petitions must be tested upon the principles substantially equitable. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. When the illegalities in the acquisition proceedings are so very manifest, the respondents’ defence to these petitions cannot be sustained on the slender ground of delay and laches. 16. These petitions are accordingly allowed. No order as to costs.