Judgment :- 1. The petitioner by this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenges an order dated 20 March 2012 passed by the Additional Municipal Commissioner of the 1st Respondent holding that it is the petitioner's liability to pay property taxes in respect of premises namely, 'Saibaba Shopping Centre situate at Jariwalla Compound Market, D.B.Marg, Mumbai Central' (for short the 'said premises') which were allotted to the petitioner under a Municipal tender/auction, for the purpose of using the same as market. By the impugned order the petitioner is directed to pay property taxes under 1st respondent's notice dated 21 February 2011 and continue to pay property taxes as and when due and payable. 2. Facts: The 1strespondent in the year 1993 issued a tender/auction notice inviting bids for allotment of the said premises admeasuring 17925 sq.feet to be used by the successful bidder for running of a departmental store or super shopping centre or a commercial market. One of the conditions of the tender concerning payment of taxes was condition no.15 which reads thus: 15. “The successful bidder shall pay water charges, electricity charges, telephone bills, minor repairs/maintenance costs etc. The licensee shall pay municipal Assessment, N.A. Assessment taxes.” 3. The petitioner which is a partnership firm participated in the said auction. Being a successful bidder the 1st respondent allotted the said premises to the petitioner. The following agreement dated 6 April 1993 came to be executed between the petitioner and the 1st respondent-Corporation: BRIHANMUMBAI MAHANAGARPALIKA AGREEMENT Shri RAJ BALKRISHNA DADARKAR hereby agree to take up the use and occupancy of vacant space admeasuring 17925 sq.feet situate at Jariwala compound, Near Navjeevan Co-op Housing Society, Bombay Central, Bombay-400 007 the right of occupancy which is sold to me in auction today or Rs.11,05,000/- + Rs.22,1,000 per quarter for the sale of Departmental Store/Super Shopping Centre, or similar commercial complex. I also agree to pay electric or any other charges in respect of this stall/shop/space as will be fixed by the Municipal Electrical Engineer in case I use electric energy from Municipal Mains. The Memorandum of the conditions subject to which the sale is held is read out and explained to me. Dated 6.4.1993 S/d- Signature of Bidder Signed before me Health Inspector 6.4.1993. (Emphasis supplied) 4. The Memorandum of the conditions subject to which the sale is held is read out and explained to me. Dated 6.4.1993 S/d- Signature of Bidder Signed before me Health Inspector 6.4.1993. (Emphasis supplied) 4. The petitioner after taking possession of the said premises from the 1st respondent made allotment of tenements to about 150 commercial licencees. 5. From the correspondence annexed to the petition, it appears that the Corporation had undertaken an exercise to levy property taxes on these premises and in pursuance thereto, bills came to be issued to the petitioner requiring payment to be made by the petitioner. The assessment department of the 1st respondent raised a property tax demand on the petitioner as under: Period Amount 1) 1.4.1999 to 30.9.1999 Rs.14,02,947/- 2) 1.10.1999 to31.3.2000 Rs.14,94,263/- 3) 12.4.1999 to 30.9.1999 Rs 57,14,398/- 4) 1.10.1999 to 31.3.2000 Rs.60,86,340/- 6. For the Assessment year 2000-01 Office of the Assessor and Collector of the 1st respondent issued a special notice dated 21 March 2000 to the petitioner under Section 162 (2) of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act,1888 (for short 'the Act') whereby the rateable value of the said premises allotted to the petitioner was proposed to be fixed at Rs.47,73,600/- NPA. The petitioner was asked to remain present along with counter foils of rent receipts, account books and lease agreement and other documents for the past years relating to the premises in question for the hearing to be held to finalise the rateable value. 7. The Ward Officer (Markets) by his letter dated 27 April 2000 informed the petitioner that the property tax assessment bills are required to be in the name of the Ward Officer (Markets) and the same will be paid by the Market Department of the 1st respondent. It was stated that, the Assistant Assessor and Collector, 'D' Ward, would be informed accordingly as the premises was a municipal property which was developed by the petitioner who was a licencee of the premises. The Assessor and Collector by his letter dated 16 September 2000 also informed the petitioner to give authority in Form AG-34 (attached with intimation notice) to the Ward Officer (Markets), to enable him to attend the hearing in regard to the issues raised by the petitioner in its letter dated 11 April 2000 disputing the assessment and tax liability in respect of the property. It appears that when these bills came to be issued, the Ward Officer (Markets) in the departmental letter addressed to the Ward Officer 'D' Ward inter alia had taken a position (as seen from his letter dated 18 June 1999) that as the market is owned by the 1st respondent but allotted to the petitioner for conducting the same the petitioner was responsible only for payment of monthly stallage charges of ground floor area admeasuring 17925 sq.feet and that the petitioner was not concerned for payment of property taxes and other charges for upper floors of the building. However, this communication was in the context of a permanent water connection and not directly in the context of levy of property taxes payable in respect of the premises. It appears that in view of this stand inter se between the two Departments of the Corporation, property taxes could not be recovered from the petitioner. The petitioner notwithstanding the terms of the contract, on this background insisted that there is no liability on the petitioner to pay the property taxes. 8. The Assessor and Collector of the 1st respondent by his communication dated 22 May 2003 addressed to the petitioner, while making a reference to the letter dated 20 May 2003 of the Assistant Commissioner (Markets), by which the letter dated 27 April 2000 of the Ward Officer (Markets) (supra) was withdrawn, recorded that the liability to pay taxes vests with the petitioner and called upon the petitioner to pay within fifteen days an amount of Rs.1,60,43,791/- towards nine assessment bills for the period 1999 to 2003, failing which action for recovery would be initiated as per the provisions of the Act. 9. By a further communication dated 8 December 2004 the Assistant Assessor and Collector informed the petitioner that after amending the property tax bills on account of deletion of water and sewerage tax for the period 1.4.1999 to 31.3.2005, an amount of Rs.1,15,20,965/- (break up of which was enclosed) had become payable by the petitioner. It was recorded that considering the huge outstanding dues the office of the Assessor and Collector would be compelled to initiate coercive action. It was recorded that considering the huge outstanding dues the office of the Assessor and Collector would be compelled to initiate coercive action. The petitioner by its letter dated 12 February 2005 disputed the payment of the property taxes on the ground that the Ward Officer (Markets) had informed the petitioner that it is the Corporation which would be making the payment of the property taxes. In this letter the petitioner however stated as under: “We agree there was the condition of paying assessment charges in the terms and conditions of BMC of auction but, it was inserted without application of mind as in all other markets BMC is paying assessment charges. Then why we are being singled out? Even MCGM officials have opinion in our favour because that property belongs to BMC and hence the BMC itself pay the assessment charges. In view of the foregoing we earnestly request your good-self to give fresh consideration to this letter. We are confident after doing as you will definitely exempt us from paying this assessment tax.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. The Assessor and Collector however insisted to recover the property taxes from the petitioner. The petitioner therefore approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No.726 of 2011. A Division Bench of this Court after considering the above correspondence which had created an impression that the petitioner would not be liable to make payment of the taxes, as also considering other material which showed the liability to pay taxes under the terms and conditions of the tender would be that of the petitioner, disposed of the writ petition by making the following observations: “In the circumstances, we are satisfied that even though Clause 15 of the Terms and Conditions of Auction suggests that the tax liability is to be borne by the stall owner, such as petitioners, the understanding between the parties has been that the tax liability vests with the Corporation indeed. This is plausible since the Corporation is the owner of the property. Mrs. Gharpure, the learned counsel for the Corporation submitted that the petitioners were given a hearing before rateable value was finalized. This is plausible since the Corporation is the owner of the property. Mrs. Gharpure, the learned counsel for the Corporation submitted that the petitioners were given a hearing before rateable value was finalized. However, we are of the view, having regard to the confusion created by the respondents in this case, it would be appropriate if the Commissioner of the Corporation, either himself or through authorized officer grants a hearing to the petitioners and decide the question of the tax liability. The Commissioner or the authorized officer, as the case may be, shall pass a reasoned order within fifteen days of hearing the petitioners. The petitioners are directed to appear before the Commissioner on 13/2/2012. In the meanwhile, the impugned demand notice is hereby set aside. Rule is made absolute in above terms. No costs.” 11. In pursuance of these orders of the Division Bench the petitioner submitted a representation dated 17 February 2012 to the Joint Municipal Commissioner setting out its case against the demand of property taxes from the petitioner. The Additional Municipal Commissioner after hearing the petitioner passed the impugned order dated 20 March 2012 which is a speaking order interalia holding that the petitioner is liable to pay property taxes for the premises in question and shall continue to pay the same. The order rejects the contention of the petitioner raised on the basis of the letter of the Ward Officer (Markets) dated 27 April 2000, which said that it is the liability of the Corporation to pay property taxes. The Additional Municipal Commissioner held that the conditions of the tender cannot be changed after finalization of the tender. As regards the letter dated 27 April 2000 of the Ward Officer (Markets) on the basis of which the petitioner canvassed that it is the liability of the Corporation to pay the property tax and not of the petitioner, it was observed that the said letter was mistakenly issued by the Ward Officer (Markets) on the premise that property was a municipal property and that the said letter was subsequently revoked. It was observed that there was nothing on record to show that the competent authority had changed the tender conditions. It was observed that there was nothing on record to show that the competent authority had changed the tender conditions. It was observed that the mistake or error on the part of an employee of the Municipal Corporation neither can bind the Corporation which is a statutory body nor such a mistake can be continued in perpetuity. It was observed that when after verification of the terms and conditions of the auction, it was noticed that it was the responsibility of the licencee (petitioner) to pay the property taxes the Assistant Municipal Commissioner (ES) who was the competent authority had taken a decision to revoke the letter dated 27 April 2000 of the Ward Officer (Markets). This decision was also concurred by the Additional Municipal Commissioner. It was observed that the competent authority having revoked the earlier correspondence and the petitioner having been informed of the decision of the competent authority by a communication dated 20 May 2003, the petitioner could not have relied upon the letter dated 27 April 2000 to contend that the property taxes would be payable by the Municipal Corporation. It was also observed that the petitioner was fully aware of clause 15 of the tender documents which stipulated that the property taxes would be paid by the successful bidder and thus the petitioner was responsible for payment of property taxes as the terms and conditions of the tender were binding on the petitioner. 12. By an order dated 10 October 2012 this Petition was admitted. By an interim order the petitioner was directed to deposit in this Court 50% of the tax liability of Rs.2,32,10,345/within a period of eight weeks and on this condition interim relief in terms of prayer clause (b) was granted to the petitioner thereby injuncting the respondents from implementing the impugned order dated 20 March 2012. This interim order was assailed by the petitioners by filing an Appeal (Lodging) No.807 of 2012. The Division Bench of this Court by an order dated 6 February 2014 dismissed the appeal inter alia observing that the discretion exercised by the learned Judge directing the payment of taxes warrants no interference. It was observed that the appellant was licencee in respect of shop premises which belonged to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay. The Division Bench of this Court by an order dated 6 February 2014 dismissed the appeal inter alia observing that the discretion exercised by the learned Judge directing the payment of taxes warrants no interference. It was observed that the appellant was licencee in respect of shop premises which belonged to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay. The Division Bench noted clause 15 of the terms and conditions of the auction under which the liability to pay municipal assessment and NA assessment taxes was of the petitioner. The Division Bench also noted that on a plain reading of clause 15 the Corporation appeared to be entitled to demand property taxes. The Division Bench observed that to uphold the contentions of the appellant would in fact vitiate the entire tender process on the ground that a vital term thereof had been varied in a manner involving financial implications. Learned counsel for the Corporation has submitted that the petitioner has not complied with the interim order dated 10 October 2012 as confirmed in the appeal. 13. To oppose the petition, the respondent-Corporation has filed two counter-affidavits one of Dr.Prithiviraj C.Chavan Dy.Superintendent of Market Department dated 6 September 2012 and another affidavit of Mr.Santosh J.Narvekar Superintendent/Assistant Assessor and Collector, D Ward. The case of the 1st respondent-Corporation is mainly that the petitioner was a beneficiary of an auction held by the Corporation in respect of the land which belongs to Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority as vested in the Municipal Corporation at its disposal. The affidavit states that it is the liability of the petitioner under clause 15 of the terms and conditions of the auction to make payment of municipal taxes. It is pointed out that the letter dated 27 April 2000 issued by the Ward Officer (Markets) was examined in the context of the terms and conditions of the auction and more particularly clause 15 and a decision was taken to withdraw the letter dated 27 April 2000 of the Ward Officer (Markets) and this decision was communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 20 May 2003 of the Assistant Commissioner (Markets) which is not challenged by the petitioner. It is stated that the petitioner has suppressed material facts by not placing on record letter dated 20 May 2003 of the Assistant Commissioner (Markets) wherein the petitioners were informed that the letter dated 27 April 2000 was inadvertently sent by the Ward Officer (Markets) and that the same was a mistake on the part of the employee of the Corporation. It is the stand of the Corporation that such a mistake on the part of the employee of the Corporation is not binding on the Corporation and that the terms and conditions of the auction sale are clear which show that the liability to pay taxes is of the licencee. This affidavit also contains averments to show that there is breach of other terms and conditions of allotment of the said premises on the part of the petitioner which may not be relevant to be considered in the context of the issue being considered in this petition. 14. In the second affidavit of Mr.Santosh Narvekar the stand of the Corporation is more or less the same as in the affidavit of Dr.Prithviraj C.Chavan. This affidavit avers on an additional issue to state that though the premises in question are market premises belonging to the Corporation, the Corporation is justified in the levy of property taxes on the premises payable by the petitioner in view of section 143 of the Act which would not exempt the premises which are utilized for the purposes of profit. The stand of the Corporation in this affidavit is that the market is occupied for profit and thus under section 143 (1) (b) of the Act property tax is leviable on the petitioner. It is further averred that as per provisions of sub-section (1) of section 146 of the Act, property taxes are leviable primarily on the actual occupier of the premises upon which taxes are assessed, even if such an occupier holds such premises immediately from the Government or from the Corporation and thus the petitioner even otherwise becomes liable for payment of tax as demanded by the respondent-Corporation and thus cannot shift its burden on the Corporation. The affidavit has set out the details of the outstanding property taxes payable by the petitioner for the period 1.4.1999 to 31.3.2013 being the amount of Rs.2,32,10,345/-. The affidavit has set out the details of the outstanding property taxes payable by the petitioner for the period 1.4.1999 to 31.3.2013 being the amount of Rs.2,32,10,345/-. It is stated that despite repeated demands, the petitioner has defaulted in making payment of the said taxes and is avoiding its liability to pay taxes. It is further contended that the present petition is not maintainable in view of a remedy of a statutory appeal being available to the petitioner under section 217 of the Act to be filed before the Small Causes Court in which the petitioners can dispute the demand of property taxes. 15. On behalf of the Corporation details of the use of the various stalls along with photographs are placed on record to show that the premises in question are allotted/licensed by the petitioners to various persons who are using the same for commercial purposes. A perusal of these photographs clearly indicate a full-fledged commercial activity of the various allottees of the petitioner which show the vast proportion of such activity. The petitioner however, has not placed on record details pertaining to the commercial use of the said premises namely rent income received from the licencees etc which in fact the1st respondent had demanded from the petitioner for assessment of the property taxes as far back as in the year 2000. 16. On behalf of the petitioner Mr.Nishit R.Jhaveri partner of the petitioner has filed a rejoinder-affidavit dealing with the counter affidavit of Dr.Prithviraj C.Chavan filed on behalf of the Municipal Corporation. The petitioner has not disputed the fact of receipt of the letter dated 20 May 2003 of the Assistant Commissioner (Markets) whereby the letter dated 27 April 2000 issued by the Ward Officer (Markets) came to be withdrawn on the ground that the Ward Officer (Markets) had inadvertently addressed the said letter and it being a mistake the same was not binding on the Municipal Corporation. The Petitioner also does not dispute that the premises are being used by his licencees for commercial purposes. 17. The submissions as made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in assailing the impugned order dated 20 March 2012 passed by the Additional Municipal Commissioner are very limited. The Petitioner also does not dispute that the premises are being used by his licencees for commercial purposes. 17. The submissions as made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in assailing the impugned order dated 20 March 2012 passed by the Additional Municipal Commissioner are very limited. It is firstly urged that the respondents have misconstrued the provisions of section 143 of the Act in demanding property taxes from the petitioner and that under the said provision tax is not payable by the petitioner; secondly it is urged that clause 15 of the terms and conditions of the tender/auction, cannot be read to mean that there is a liability on the petitioner to pay property taxes. It is submitted that Clause 15 cannot be read in isolation and is required to be read in the context of other terms and conditions of the agreement which showed that the market being a municipal market necessarily tax was required to be paid by the Corporation and thus the petitioner had not appeared before the Assessing Officer. It is then urged that in regard to other markets the Corporation is paying the property taxes and thus there is a discrimination against the petitioner. 18. On the other hand, Ms.Mastakar learned counsel for the Corporation has submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has a remedy of approaching the Small Causes Court to dispute the levy of property tax by filing an appeal under section 217 of the Act. Learned counsel for the Corporation has reiterated the submissions as made in the affidavit to point out that the petitioner cannot take shelter under the letter dated 27 April 2000 which was mistakenly and inadvertently addressed by the Ward Officer (Markets) to avoid the liability to pay the property taxes. It is submitted that the petitioner is in occupation of the premises since the year 1993 and since then has avoided payment of property taxes. It is submitted that about 150 units are let out by the petitioners to the sub-licencees who are using the premises for commercial purposes. It is submitted that clause 15 (supra) of the terms and conditions of the auction was unconditionally accepted by the petitioner and thus the petitioner was completely aware about its liability to pay municipal assessment and cannot turn around and dispute the liability. It is submitted that clause 15 (supra) of the terms and conditions of the auction was unconditionally accepted by the petitioner and thus the petitioner was completely aware about its liability to pay municipal assessment and cannot turn around and dispute the liability. It is submitted that the contractual term is binding on the petitioner and cannot be assailed in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 19. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, the issue which falls for consideration in this petition is whether the impugned order dated 20 March 2012 correctly imposes a liability on the petitioner to pay the property tax in respect of the market premises allotted to the petitioner by the Corporation under the auction held in the year 1993. At the outset, it can be noted that the petitioner does not dispute that it is the beneficiary of the auction held by the Corporation under which the petitioner was allotted the premises and was permitted to take possession of the premises admeasuring about 17925 sq.feet. The petitioner was permitted by the Corporation to utilize the premises for commercial purposes and the same are allotted by the petitioner to various persons who are undertaking commercial activity. The petitioner admittedly has accepted the premises on the terms and conditions as set out in tender and more particularly clause 15 by which liability to pay property tax was on the successful bidder. It appears that despite these clear terms and conditions of the tender, the Ward Officer (Markets) had addressed a letter dated 27 April 2000 by which the petitioner was informed that the liability to pay property tax would be that of the Corporation as according to him it was a municipal market. This letter of the Ward Officer (Markets) was examined by the Assistant Commissioner (Markets) after which the petitioner was informed by a letter dated 20 May 2003 that the Ward Officer (Markets) had mistakenly issued letter dated 27 April 2000. The petitioner was informed that as per clause 15 of the terms and conditions of the auction, it was the liability of petitioner to pay the municipal taxes and the petitioner was called upon to make payment of all dues under the assessment. The petitioner was informed that as per clause 15 of the terms and conditions of the auction, it was the liability of petitioner to pay the municipal taxes and the petitioner was called upon to make payment of all dues under the assessment. It was categorically stated that the letter dated 27 April 2000 issued by the Ward Officer (Markets) was inadvertently sent and the same was withdrawn by letter dated 20 May 2003 received by the petitioner. It is the case of the Corporation that the petitioner having duly received the letter dated 20 May 2003 was fully aware of the liability to pay the property tax for the premises in question. On behalf of the Corporation it is contended that the petitioner has suppressed this letter of the Assistant Municipal Commissioner in the writ petition. 20. There is much substance in this contentions as urged on behalf of the Corporation. The petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in seeking discretionary and equitable relief and therefore, it was necessary for the petitioner to approach this Court with full disclosure. The petitioner has clearly suppressed the letter dated 20 May 2003 of the Assistant Commissioner (Markets) by which the petitioner was categorically informed of the mistake on the part of the Ward Officer (Markets) in writing letter dated 27 April 2000. While suppressing this letter from the very inception the petitioners are surprisingly taking a stand on the basis of the letter dated 27 April 2000 which already stood withdrawn as far back as on 20 May 2003. If the petitioner was to disclose this letter dated 20 May 2003 of the Assistant Municipal Commissioner in the writ petition the complexion of the matter would have been different. 21. It is quite clear from the material as placed on record that clause 15 of the tender condition which imposed a liability on the petitioner being a successful bidder was subsisting and binding on the petitioner. The petitioner could not have resiled from the terms and conditions of the tender/auction and more particularly clause 15 and was liable to pay the municipal taxes. The petitioner could not have taken a stand contrary to the said condition to dispute the liability to make payment of the property taxes. The petitioner could not have resiled from the terms and conditions of the tender/auction and more particularly clause 15 and was liable to pay the municipal taxes. The petitioner could not have taken a stand contrary to the said condition to dispute the liability to make payment of the property taxes. Assuming that a confusion was created by letter dated 27 April 2000 issued by the Ward Officer (Markets) that it would be the liability of the Corporation to pay property taxes however the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Ward Officer (Markets) had a legal authority to issue such a letter which would have the effect of revoking/altering the terms and conditions of the tender/auction on which the petitioner was allotted market premises, so as to bind the Municipal Corporation to pay the property taxes. Further, the Assistant Commissioner (Markets) having noticed the letter dated 27 April 2000 as issued by the Ward Officer (Markets) by his communication dated 20 May 2003 withdrew the letter dated 27 April 2000 issued by the Ward Officer (Markets) and called upon the petitioner to pay taxes payable by the petitioner as per the terms and conditions of the tender. This communication of the Assistant Commissioner (Markets) was not challenged by the petitioner. The petitioner has not placed on record any material to show that clause 15 of the terms stood revoked/altered or modified at the hands of any competent authority as per the provisions of the Act. Even otherwise no ground is made out in the petition to substantiate that the Ward Officer (Markets) was authorized by the Municipal Corporation to address a letter dated 27 April 2000 so as to shift the burden of payment of taxes from the petitioner to the Corporation. The contention as raised on behalf of the petitioner on the basis of the letter dated 27 April 2000 of the Ward Officer (Markets) has no merit and is rejected. 22. Coming to the next submission on behalf of the petitioner that provisions of section 143 of the Act are misconstrued by the Corporation to foist the liability of payment of property tax on the petitioner also has no merit. 22. Coming to the next submission on behalf of the petitioner that provisions of section 143 of the Act are misconstrued by the Corporation to foist the liability of payment of property tax on the petitioner also has no merit. Section 143 deals with general tax and reads as under: “143 General tax on what premises to be levied: “(1) The general tax shall be levied in respect of all buildings and lands in Brihan Mumbai except – (a) buildings and lands or portions thereof exclusively occupied for public workshop or for charitable purposes, (b) buildings and lands vesting in Government used solely for public purposes and not used or intended to be used for purposes of profits or in the Corporation in respect of which the said tax if levied would under the provisions hereinafter contained be primarily leviable from the (Government) or the Corporation respectively. (c) such building and lands belonging to any Diplomatic or consular Mission of a foreign State as Government may by general or special order specify in this behalf) (2) The following buildings (and lands or portions thereof) shall not be deemed to be exclusively occupied for public worship or for charitable purposes within the meaning of clause (a) namely – (c) those in which any trade or business is carried on; and those in respect of which rent is derived whether such rent is or is not applied exclusively in religious or charitable purposes. (3) Where any portion of any building or land is exempt from the general tax, by reason of its being exclusively occupied for public workshop or for charitable purpose such portion shall be deemed to be a separate property for the purpose of municipal taxation.” A perusal of clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 143 makes it clear that an exception from payment of general tax is carved out in respect of buildings and lands vesting in the Government or Corporation used solely for public purposes and not used or intended to be used for the purposes of profit. The facts of the present case clearly show that the premises in question are intended to be used for commercial purposes by the petitioner. The Corporation has specifically allotted the premises for commercial use. The facts of the present case clearly show that the premises in question are intended to be used for commercial purposes by the petitioner. The Corporation has specifically allotted the premises for commercial use. The petitioner in turn has allotted the premises to about 150 allottees who are commercially using the respective units as allotted to them by the petitioners. This contention on behalf of the petitioner therefore, is clearly contrary to the provisions of section 143 (1) (b) which would exempt only those buildings and lands vesting in the Government or Corporation and which are not used or intended to be used for the purposes of profit. It is not the petitioner's case that no profit is earned on these premises. Even otherwise the category of the premises being allotted to the petitioners in no manner whatsoever would fall under sub-clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 143. Submission on behalf of the petitioner in this regard therefore, is wholly misconceived and is accordingly rejected. 23. The next contention as urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the Corporation is not levying property taxes on the allottess in respect of other markets and thus there is discrimination against the petitioner. This contention of the petitioner has no merit for the reason that the demand for payment of property taxes on the petitioner in the present case is on the basis of the contract entered between the Corporation and the petitioner. The petitioner is bound by the terms of the said contract. Even otherwise it cannot be the scope of these proceedings to consider the terms and conditions of the allotment of other contracts entered by the Corporation. 24. To counter the submission as made on behalf of the respondents that an efficacious alternative remedy of preferring an appeal under section 217 was available to the petitioner to dispute the liability to pay property tax, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the remedy of appeal is not availed by the petitioner for the reason that the petitioner would be required to pre-deposit the amount of property tax at the time of filing an appeal. This can be no reason not to avail of the statutory remedy. It is thus quite apparent that the whole intention of the petitioner right from inception was to avoid payment of the taxes on one count or the other. This can be no reason not to avail of the statutory remedy. It is thus quite apparent that the whole intention of the petitioner right from inception was to avoid payment of the taxes on one count or the other. This is also clear from the conduct of the petitioner that inspite of the interim orders passed by this Court on 10 October 2012 directing the petitioner to pay 50% of the disputed amount, the petitioner failed to deposit the amount even after the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the said order came to be rejected by the Division Bench of this Court. The intention of the petitioner is clear and that is to enjoy the fruits of premises without the liability to pay taxes. The respondent-Corporation also appears to be quite laxed since the year 1993 in taking timely steps to recover the property taxes when the Officers of the Corporation were aware of the failure to comply with the interim orders and dismissal of the appeal against the same. On a querry as raised by the Court as to why respondent-Corporation has not taken any action to enforce the demand when the petitioner had not deposited the amount in pursuance of the interim order passed on 10 October, 2012, learned counsel for the Corporation is unable to give any reason. Such action on the part of the Officers of the Corporation cannot be justified. The petitioner is commercially exploiting the premises for more than 20 years and has licenced about 150 shops in those premises allotted to it by the 1st respondent. Learned counsel for the Corporation has stated that the premises are situated in prime locality in South Mumbai. If this be the situation, it was more a reason for the Corporation and its Officers to see that interest of the revenue is protected and recover the property taxes. The petitioner having dragged the Corporation into litigation could not be a reason for the Corporation not to proceed in accordance with law to recover taxes. These observations are required to be made apart from the issue being decided as it is very apparent that the petitioner taking advantage of the process of law and obtaining an interim stay on the condition of deposit, by not complying the interim orders, continues to enjoy the property to the prejudice of the public exchequer. 25. These observations are required to be made apart from the issue being decided as it is very apparent that the petitioner taking advantage of the process of law and obtaining an interim stay on the condition of deposit, by not complying the interim orders, continues to enjoy the property to the prejudice of the public exchequer. 25. In view of the above observations, I do not find that there is any illegality in the impugned order dated 20 March 2012 passed by the Additional Municipal Commissioner. Writ Petition is wholly without any merit and is accordingly dismissed with costs.