ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 3936 of 2003 dated 5th August, 2009, whereby, the petition preferred by the appellant (original petitioner) was dismissed by the learned Single Judge and the order of dismissal passed by the respondent authority has been upheld and therefore, the original petitioner has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Factual Matrix. • On 22nd May, 2001, a letter was written by one complainant that this appellant and another Police Constable had received illegal gratification for issuance of the passport. These facts were verified and ultimately, charge-sheet was issued upon this appellant on 20th August, 2001 (Annexure2 to the memo of this L.P.A). • Enquiry Officer was appointed, a detailed enquiry was conducted, witnesses were examined and Enquiry Officer gave report on 16th April, 2002 (Annexure4 to the memo of this L.P.A) and Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion that charges levelled against this appellant-delinquent have been proved. • Against this appellant, criminal charges were also levelled against him under Sections 420, 465, 467 to be read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and as the complainant had turned hostile, order of acquittal was passed on 10th March, 2003. • Before this order of acquittal, on 16th October, 2002 on the basis of the enquiry officer's report and after giving adequate opportunity of being heard, dismissal order was already passed by the disciplinary authority, which was confirmed by the appellate authority vide order dated 29th May, 2004 (Annexure7 to the memo of this L.P.A.). • As this appellant has been acquitted by the trial Court in the criminal proceedings vide order dated 10th March, 2003, writ petition was preferred bearing W.P.(S) No.3936 of 2003 for quashing and setting aside the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. • This writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 5th August, 2009 and hence, the appellant (original petitioner) of the writ petition has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. 3. Arguments canvassed by the counsel for the Appellant (original petitioner). • This writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 5th August, 2009 and hence, the appellant (original petitioner) of the writ petition has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. 3. Arguments canvassed by the counsel for the Appellant (original petitioner). • Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the charges levelled against this appellant on a civil side is exactly matching with the charges levelled against him on a criminal side and as there is order of acquittal by the trial court in the criminal matter dated 10th March, 2003, the order of dismissal deserves to be quashed and set aside. • Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon a decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446 . • Counsel appearing for the appellant further submitted that there is a violation of principles of natural justice because during departmental enquiry, this appellant was in a judicial custody and hence, no adequate opportunity of being heard was given to the appellant. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and hence, the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition deserves to be quashed and set aside. • Counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that the quantum of punishment inflicted upon this appellant is also shockingly disproportionate or is unreasonably excessive and hence also, the judgment and order, delivered by the learned Single Judge, in W.P.(S) No. 3936 of 2003 dated 5th August, 2009 deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Arguments canvassed by the learned counsel for respondents. • It is submitted by the counsel for the respondent-State that no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition preferred by this appellant and in confirming the order of dismissal passed by the respondent dated 16th October, 2002. • The charges levelled against this appellant-delinquent in disciplinary proceedings are different than those of criminal charges levelled against him in the criminal matter. Moreover, in the criminal trial, the complainant has turned hostile, whereas in a departmental proceedings the complainant, namely, Sheela Singh has not turned hostile. This is a major aspects of the matter. The amount was received by this appellant for issuance of the passport. Moreover, in the criminal trial, the complainant has turned hostile, whereas in a departmental proceedings the complainant, namely, Sheela Singh has not turned hostile. This is a major aspects of the matter. The amount was received by this appellant for issuance of the passport. • It is further submitted by the counsel for respondents that in a criminal trial the allegations must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, whereas in a departmental proceedings the standard of the evidences based upon a principle of “preponderance of probabilities”. These matters have been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge. • Counsel for the respondents submitted that this Court is not sitting in an Appeal against the Enquiry Officer's report. Charges levelled against this appellant has been proved as per the Enquiry Officer's report, which is based upon the evidences on record. So far as quantum of punishment is concerned, it is submitted by the counsel for the respondents that looking to the nature of the misconduct the punishment of dismissal cannot be said to be unreasonably excessive or shockingly disproportionate. For issuance of passport, the amount was received by this appellant as an illegal gratification. • Counsel for the respondents has also relied upon the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in: (a) 2006 AIR SCW 1958; (b) AIR 2008 SC 2862 ; (c) AIR 2014 SC 766 & (d) AIR 2015 SC 545 . On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by the counsel for the respondents that very limited is the jurisdiction of the High Court, when an Enquiry Officer has given a report in the departmental proceedings. These guidelines have been stated in paragraph no.13 of the last judgment as stated hereinabove and it is submitted that the aforesaid principles have been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court. 5. Reasons: Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we see no reason to entertain this Letters Patent Appeal, mainly for the following facts and reasons: (i) This appellant was working as Constable in the State of Jharkhand. A complaint was received against this appellant and another Police Constable that they had received Rs.800/for verification of the issuance of the passport. A complaint was received against this appellant and another Police Constable that they had received Rs.800/for verification of the issuance of the passport. (ii) Upon receipt of this complaint, verification was made by the high ranking Administrative Officer and thereafter, charge-sheet was issued upon this appellant dated 20th August, 2001 (Annexure-2 to the memo of this L.P.A). (iii) Thereafter, Enquiry Officer was appointed, departmental enquiry was conducted, witnesses were examined and the Enquiry Officer has arrived at a conclusion that charges levelled against this appellant have been proved. Enquiry Officer's report is dated 16th April, 2002 (Annexure4 to the memo of this L.P.A). (iv) On the basis of the aforesaid Enquiry Officer's report, disciplinary authority passed an order and on 16th October, 2002, this appellant was dismissed from his services. (v) Against which, an appeal was preferred in the departmental proceedings and the appeal was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 29th May, 2004 (Annexure7 to the memo of this L.P.A). (vi) Meanwhile, on a criminal side also, the charges were levelled against him under Sections 420, 465, 467 to be read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code in G.R. No. 1260 of 2001 and in the trial before the criminal court, the original complainant namely, Sheela Singh was declared hostile. Thus, there was an acquittal order passed by the trial Court on a criminal side on 10th March, 2003. Much has been argued upon this acquittal order for quashing of the dismissal order passed by the respondents. Thus, there was an acquittal order passed by the trial Court on a criminal side on 10th March, 2003. Much has been argued upon this acquittal order for quashing of the dismissal order passed by the respondents. We are not in agreement with these arguments canvassed by the counsel for the appellant mainly for the reasons that firstly, the charges levelled against this appellant-delinquent on a civil side as well as on a criminal side are different, secondly, for the reason that Sheela Singh from whom the illegal gratification was demanded had never turned hostile when the departmental proceedings was conducted by the Enquiry Officer whereas, she was declared as a hostile witness when the criminal trial was going on, thirdly, for the reason that on a criminal side the offences must be proved beyond reasonable doubt whereas, in the departmental proceedings charges are to be proved on preponderance of probabilities, fourthly, for the reason that this Court is not sitting in an Appeal against the Enquiry Officer's report dated 16th April, 2002 (Annexure4 to the memo of this L.P.A) and fifthly, for the reason that the departmental appeal which was preferred by this appellant, was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 29th May, 2004 (Annexure7 to the memo of this L.P.A.). (vii) Looking to the Enquiry Officer's report dated 16th April, 2002, which is based upon the evidences on record, it appears that the complainant Sheela Singh from whom Rs.800/was demanded for verification process for issuance of the passport, she has given clear evidence before the Enquiry Officer. She might have turned hostile in the criminal trial, but, that does not mean that charges levelled against this appellant are not proved in the departmental proceedings because standards are different in the departmental proceedings and on a criminal side of proving the charges. No error has been committed by the Enquiry Officer in following the procedure. Enquiry is valid, legal and in consonance with the principles of natural justice. (viii) Disciplinary Authority had passed an order of dismissal dated 16th October, 2002 against which an appeal was preferred by this appellant and the departmental Appellate Authority had also dismissed the appeal vide order dated 29th May, 2004 (Annexure7 to the memo of this L.P.A). Thus, adequate opportunity of being heard was also given to the appellant by the Appellate Authority. Thus, adequate opportunity of being heard was also given to the appellant by the Appellate Authority. (ix) It appears that there is an order of acquittal passed by the trial court on a criminal side vide order dated 10th March, 2003. This appellant is exonerated from the charges levelled against him under Sections 420, 465, 467 to be read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code because the star prosecution witness has declared hostile, but, the facts are different, so far as the departmental proceedings is concerned because the said complainant, namely, Sheela Singh has given clear evidence in the departmental proceedings. (x) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Commr. of Police, Delhi Vs. Narender Singh, as reported in 2006 AIR SCW 1958, in paragraph nos. 12, 13 and 14 as under: “12. It is not in dispute that the standard of proof required in recording a finding of conviction in a criminal case and in a departmental proceeding are distinct and different. Whereas in a criminal case, it is essential to prove a charge beyond all reasonable doubt, in a departmental proceeding preponderance of probability would serve the purpose. [See Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of W.B. and others, (2002) 1 SCC 555 ] 13. It is now well-settled by reason of a catena of decisions of this Court that if an employee has been acquitted of a criminal charge, the same by itself would not be a ground not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him or to drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is passed. 14. In Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore v. S Mani and others [ (2005) 5 SCC 100 ], this Court held: “It is trite that a judgment of acquittal passed in favour of the employees by giving benefit of doubt per se would not be binding upon the employer.....[see Bank of India and another v. Degala Suryanarayana (1999) 5 SCC 762 ; Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (P), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd, Haldia and others (2005) 7 SCC 764 ]. (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decisions, in the departmental proceedings the charges are to be proved on the basis of the preponderance of probabilities and therefore, even though there is an acquittal in the criminal proceedings the charges in the departmental proceedings can be proved by the same witnesses and the punishment can be inflicted upon the delinquent. If the charges on a criminal side and on a civil side by and large are different, but, there may be some charges similar to the criminal charges levelled against him. (xi) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Meghalaya and Ors. Vs. Mecken Singh N. Marak, as reported in AIR 2008 SC 2862 , in paragraph nos. 8 and 9 as under: “8. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and in great detail. This Court has also considered the documents forming part of the instant appeal. The competent authority as well as the first appellate authority have concluded that grave misconduct committed by the respondent is satisfactorily proved. The said finding is upheld by the learned single Judge of the Gauhati High Court while deciding the petition filed by the respondent under Article 226 of the Constitution. On re-appreciation of evidence adduced, during the course of the departmental inquiry initiated against the respondent, the Division Bench has also recorded a finding of fact that the respondent had committed serious misconduct. The said finding is a finding of fact which is not liable to be interfered with in the instant appeal. 9. The next question which falls for consideration is whether the competent authority was justified in removing the respondent from service and whether the Division Bench of the High Court was right in remitting the matter to the Appellate Authority for passing appropriate order of punishment short of removal. The record would indicate that the respondent was a senior police officer. He was instructed by his Commandant to go to Shillong to disburse the pay in a vehicle belonging to the department and along with him another police officer was also deputed for safe carriage of pay to be disbursed to the Bn personel posted at Shillong. Further, the respondent was issued 0.38 bore revolver with 12 rounds. He was instructed by his Commandant to go to Shillong to disburse the pay in a vehicle belonging to the department and along with him another police officer was also deputed for safe carriage of pay to be disbursed to the Bn personel posted at Shillong. Further, the respondent was issued 0.38 bore revolver with 12 rounds. It is an admitted position that the respondent was instructed to come back to Bn headquarters by the vehicle of the department along with other police personnel but the respondent disobeyed the instructions and travelled to Bn headquarters in a bus wherein not only he lost cash of Rs. 17,314/- but also his service revolver with 12 rounds of ammunition. Under the circumstances the question arises whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of removal of the respondent from service and remitting the matter to the appellate authority, namely, the Inspector General of Police to consider the question of imposition of appropriate punishment, short of removal from service, commensurate with the gravity of the proven misconduct of the respondent. A Court or a tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment is not commensurate with the proved charges. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons, The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority unless shocking to the conscience of the Court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. While considering the question of proportionality of sentence imposed on a delinquent at the conclusion of departmental inquiry, the Court should also take into consideration, the mental set up of the delinquent, the type of duty to be performed by him and similar relevant circumstances which go into the decision making process. If the charged employee holds the position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct, in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. The respondent belonged to a disciplined force. He was supposed to carry out instructions given to him by his superior. Not only he flouted the instructions but conducted himself in such a manner that he caused loss of part of pay to be deposited with the exchequer and loss of service revolver with ammunition which could be misused. When a statute gives discretion to the administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. The proved charges clearly established that the respondent, who was a police officer failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and his acts were prejudicial to the exchequer and society. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court, normally the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The High Court in this case, has not only interfered with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority in a routine manner but overstepped its jurisdiction by directing the Appellate Authority to impose any other punishment short of removal. By fettering the discretion of the Appellate Authority to impose appropriate punishment for serious misconducts committed by the respondent, the High Court totally misdirected itself while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226. Judged in this background, the conclusion of the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be regarded as proper at all. By fettering the discretion of the Appellate Authority to impose appropriate punishment for serious misconducts committed by the respondent, the High Court totally misdirected itself while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226. Judged in this background, the conclusion of the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be regarded as proper at all. The High Court has interfered with the punishment imposed by the competent authority in a casual manner and, therefore, the appeal will have to be accepted.” (Emphasis supplied) (xii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Commissioner, KVS & Ors. Vs. J. Hussain, as reported in AIR 2014 SC 766 , in paragraph no. 11 as under: “11. Thus, in our view entering the school premises in working hours i.e. 11.30 a.m. in an inebriated condition and thereafter forcibly entering into the Principal's room would constitute a serious misconduct. Penalty of removal for such a misconduct cannot be treated as disproportionate. It does not seem to be unreasonable and does not shock the conscience of the Court. Though it does not appear to be excessive either, but even if it were to be so, merely because the Court feels that penalty should have been lighter than the one imposed, by itself is not a ground to interfere with the discretion of the disciplinary authorities. The penalty should not only be excessive but disproportionate as well, that too the extent that it shocks the conscience of the Court and the Court is forced to find it as totally unreasonable and arbitrary thereby offending the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is stated at the cost of the repetition that discretion lies with the disciplinary/appellate authority to impose a particular penalty keeping in view the nature and gravity of charge. Once, it is found that the penalty is not shockingly disproportionate, merely because in the opinion of the Court lesser punishment could have been more justified, cannot be a reason to interfere with the said penalty. The High Court has also mentioned in the impugned order that the respondent is a married man with family consisting of number of dependents and is suffering hardship because of the said "economic capital punishment". However, such mitigating circumstances are to be looked into by the departmental authorities. It was not even pleaded before them and is an after effect of the penalty. However, such mitigating circumstances are to be looked into by the departmental authorities. It was not even pleaded before them and is an after effect of the penalty. In all cases dealing with the penalty of removal, dismissal or compulsory retirements, hardship would result. That would not mean that in a given case punishment of removal can be discarded by the Court. That cannot a ground for the Court to interdict with the penalty. This is specifically held by this Court in H.G.E. Trust and Anr. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2006) 1 SCC 430 in the following words : "A person, when dismissed from service, is put to a great hardship but that would not mean that a grave misconduct should go unpunished. Although the doctrine of proportionality may be applicable in such matter, but a punishment of dismissal from service for such a misconduct cannot be said to be unheard of. Maintenance of discipline of an institution is equally important. Keeping the aforementioned principles in view, we may hereinafter notice a few recent decisions of this Court." (Emphasis supplied) (xiii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others Vs. P. Gunasekaran, as reported in AIR 2015 SC 545 , in paragraph no. 13 as under: “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge no. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. (Emphasis supplied) (xiv) In view of the aforesaid decisions, the quantum of punishment inflicted upon this appellant cannot be labelled as shockingly disproportionate nor it can be labelled as unreasonably excessive. If this appellant, who works in a disciplinary force-Constable and if he demands illegal gratification for performing duties i.e. verification of certain facts stated in the passport application then the punishment of dismissal inflicted upon him vide order dated 16th October, 2002 (Annexure5 to the memo of this L.P.A.) is absolutely in consonance with the nature of the misconduct and it cannot be said as unreasonably excessive punishment. Detailed guidelines have been given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as stated hereinabove in AIR 2015 SC 545 in paragraph no.13 thereof. Looking to these observations, very limited is the scope of judicial review when the departmental proceedings have been initiated against the delinquent. As stated hereinabove, no error has been committed in holding the departmental proceedings and the report given by the Enquiry Officer is based upon evidences on record. Sheela Singh from whom the money was demanded had never turned hostile in the departmental proceedings, whereas, she was declared hostile in the criminal proceedings and therefore, no benefit can be given of the order of acquittal to this appellant, even otherwise also, there are differences in the charges levelled against this appellant in civil side as well as in a criminal side. These aspects of the matter have been properly been appreciated by the learned Single Judge and hence, we see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition, preferred by this appellant. (xv) Counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decision, as stated hereinabove, but the facts of this case are entirely different because in a departmental proceedings the star witness has not declared hostile whereas, in a criminal matter Sheela Singh was declared as a hostile witness. Moreover, charges on a criminal side are under Sections 420, 465, 467 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, whereas charges levelled against him in the departmental proceedings are different. These facts make the present case different than that of which is cited by the counsel for the appellant and hence, no benefit can be extended, on the basis of the said decision. 6. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition bearing W.P.(S) No. 3936 of 2003 dated 5th August, 2009. There is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal and hence, the same is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed.