JUDGMENT : V.K. MATHUR, J. (CHAIRPERSON) 1. The present Appeal has been preferred by the appellant-Shri Ram Kumar Tiwari against the order dated 17th November, 2014 passed by the learned DRT, Allahabad wherein the Securitization Appeal No. 122/2010 under Section 17 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the 'SARFAESI Act') filed by the appellant was dismissed on the ground of delay. The brief facts of the present case are that the present appellant-Shri Ram Kumar Tiwari and his brothers namely Sri Pawan Kumar and Anjani Kumar are running a sweet shop. The appellant and his brothers purchased a plot measuring 83.60 sq. metres bearing Khasra No. 1313, Hamirpur Road, Naubasta, Kanpur Nagar on 31st May, 2001 for construction of residential house. 2. It has been stated by the appellant that due to financial problems, they could not construct the house on the said plot. Later one Sri Satya Narain Purwar, who was also a businessman had the knowledge of the financial position of the appellant and the brother of Sri Satya Narain Purwar approached the elder brother of the appellant and influenced him for managing the housing loan from the respondent-Allahabad Bank, for which he demanded the original sale deed from the elder brother of the appellant. The appellant is the equal share holder of the property in question. 3. It has been further averred that Shri Satya Narayan Purwar, who is the proprietor of Purwar Shakkar Bhandar applied for a loan of Rs. 5.00 lacs as cash credit limit under the Merchant Credit Scheme and instead of getting the loan sanctioned in favour of the elder brother of the appellant, he himself took the loan under the aforesaid scheme creating the mortgage on the property of the appellant as well as his brothers by playing fraud and the appellant and his two brothers stood as guarantors. It is further stated that after scrutinizing the application, the Bank considered the documents submitted by the borrower Shri Satya Narayan Purwar and sanctioned the loan vide sanction letter dated 7th October, 2014 for a sum of Rs. 5.00 lacs. It is further stated that after scrutinizing the application, the Bank considered the documents submitted by the borrower Shri Satya Narayan Purwar and sanctioned the loan vide sanction letter dated 7th October, 2014 for a sum of Rs. 5.00 lacs. It is further stated that on being sanctioned the credit facility, to secure the loan the appellant and his two brothers not only stood as guarantors but also voluntarily signed, executed and delivered the security documents namely agreement of guarantee dated 7th October, 2004, the letter of mortgagor confirming deposit of title deeds for borrower and guarantor dated 7th October, 2004 to the Bank. The credit declaration forms dated 13th September, 2004 duly signed by the appellant as well as his brothers was also deposited before the Bank. 4. It is further stated that since the borrower Sri Satya Narain Puruar did not pay the loan amount to the respondent-Bank, therefore, the loan account of the borrower was classified as Non-Performing-Assets on 30th September, 2006 and thereafter, the respondent-Bank issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 on 19th December, 2006 for a sum of Rs. 5,43,501/- which includes the interest as on 27th November, 2006 to Purwar Shakkar Bhandar proprietor of which is Shri Satya Narayan Purwar who is the respondent No. 3. Copy of the said notice was sent to Shri Satya Narayan Purwar, Shri Pawan Kumar, Shri Anjani Kumar and Shri Ram Kumar. 5. It has been further stated that the appellant sought information about the illegal financial assistance taken by Shri Satya Narayan Purwar by playing a fraud with the brothers of the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant lodged the First Information Report with the Police Station Naubasta, Kanpur Nagar on 23rd March, 2007 against the borrower Shri Satya Narain Purwar and his son. It is also submitted that before lodging the F.I.R. the borrower Shri Satya Narayan Purwar was continuously giving the assurance to the brothers of the appellant that their housing loan would be sanctioned within a few days in favour of Shri Pawan Kumar Tiwari and Anjani Kumar Tiwari by the respondent Bank, but after receiving the notice by the brother of the appellant who was alleged guarantor in pursuance to the cash credit limit obtained by Shri Satya Narayan Punwar, the appellant came to know about the loan taken by the borrower by mortgaging the property of the appellant. It is also contended that the appellant has never signed any loan documents in pursuance to the loan taken by the borrower Shri Satya Narayan Purwar. 6. It is stated that against the said notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 issued by the respondent-Bank no amount was paid by the borrower Shri Satya Narayan Purwar thereafter, the respondent Bank initiated further proceedings by taking recourse to Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 on 15th May, 2007 for taking symbolic possession of the property in question. 7. Thereafter, the appellant filed the Appeal under Section 17 of the Act on 1st September, 2010 before the learned DRT, Allahabad along with the delay condonation application. Aggrieved by the order dated 17th November, 2014 of the DRT, the appellant has filed the present Appeal under Section 18 of the Act. 8. Heard the learned Counsels for the parties, perused the impugned order and record of the case. 9. Learned Counsel for the appellant reiterated the contentions stated in the Appeal and further submitted that the appellant had lodged a First Information Report against the respondent No. 3-Satya Narayan Purwar and his son under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 506 of IPC on 23rd March, 2007 for the fraud committed by the respondent No. 3. It was submitted that in absence of knowledge of filing the Appeal under Section 17 of the Act, the appellant did not approach the DRT and the appellant approached the present Counsel on 18th August, 2010 on whose advice the appellant filed the Appeal under Section 17 of the Act before the DRT alongwith the delay condonation application. It was further stated that in the interest of justice, the delay in filing the Appeal before the DRT be condoned. 10. Learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance in the case of Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh, IV (2010) SLT 797 : 2010 (28) L.C.D. 1531 (SC), wherein it was held that an attempt should always be made to allow the matter to be contested on merit. In Shital Deen v. State of U.P., 2009 (27) L.C.D. 1380 (All.) it was held that for condonation of delay practical view should be taken and rejection of application for not explaining every day delay not approved. In Shital Deen v. State of U.P., 2009 (27) L.C.D. 1380 (All.) it was held that for condonation of delay practical view should be taken and rejection of application for not explaining every day delay not approved. In Krishna Baldeo v. State of U.P., 2011 (29) L.C.D. 673--illiterate litigant, ill advised by his Counsel, pursuing wrong remedy, held, cannot be made to suffer. 11. Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the learned DRT, Allahabad has rightly rejected the delay condonation application. It was averred that in Writ Petition No. 11469/2007 filed by the appellant against the respondents before the Hon'ble High Court, Allahabad, the appellant had given an undertaking to repay the loan dues in instalments as per the order dated 1st March, 2007 of the Hon'ble High Court. It was also submitted that as per affidavit of the appellant, he had knowledge of execution of sale deed on 31st July, 2008 and the Appeal was filed before the DRT after a delay of two years which has not been explained. It was stated that the Appeal be dismissed with costs. 12. Learned Counsel for the respondent placed reliance in the case of Basawaraj v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, VII (2013) SLT 97 : 111 (2013) CLT 291 (SC) : AIR 2014 SC 746 , wherein it was held that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the Applicant has to explain to the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. No Court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the Legislature. 13. As per the provision of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the application under Section 17 should have been filed within a period of 45 days from the date of measures taken by the secured creditor. The appellant himself has admitted in his affidavit in support of delay condonation application his date of knowledge on 31st July, 2008 on which date the sale deed was executed. The appellant himself has admitted in his affidavit in support of delay condonation application his date of knowledge on 31st July, 2008 on which date the sale deed was executed. The application under Section 17 was filed by the appellant before the DRT on 1st September, 2010 which is after a delay of 2 years 1 month. It is also stated by the appellant in his affidavit that he had the knowledge of fraud prior to initiation of securitization process but he was silent to the subsequent events. 14. There is no dispute that the expression "sufficient cause" should be considered with pragmatism and justice oriented approach, rather than the technical detection of "sufficient cause" for explaining day-to-day delay. 15. The Apex Court in case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, VIII (2013) SLT 95 : (2013) 12 SCC 649 , had laid down the principles regarding condonation of delay which are as under: "xxx (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact; (vi) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play; xxxx (ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go up by in name of liberal approach; xxxx (xvii) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters." 16. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the appellant has admitted the date of his knowledge as 31st July, 2008 which is the date on which the sale deed was executed, but has chosen to file the Appeal under Section 17 of the Act before the DRT on 1st September, 2010 after a delay of 2 years and 1 month for which no sufficient cause has been given and the delay has not been explained. The filing of First Information Report by the appellant on 23rd March, 2007 cannot be treated as sufficient reason to condone the delay in this matter. 17. Therefore, in view of the law laid down in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (supra) and Basawaraj v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (supra) and from the conduct of the appellant, it cannot be said that the appellant was prevented by any just cause to present the Appeal before the DRT within time or that there was any sufficient reasons to file the Appeal after an inordinate delay of two years and one month. The judgments cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant in the facts and circumstances of the present case are distinguishable. 18. Thus, in the present case there are serious laches and negligence on the part of the appellant in presenting the Appeal before the DRT, Allahabad. The delay in the present case cannot be mechanically considered since the inordinate delay has not been properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained. Further, the delay in the aforesaid facts cannot be condoned on sympathetic ground also. 19. Thus, on overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no manifest infirmity or illegality in the impugned order refusing to condone the delay of two years and one month in filing the Appeal before the DRT, Allahabad and dismissing the Appeal. Consequently, the present Appeal filed by the appellant is dismissed. However, taking regard to the nature of the case, the parties to bear their own costs.