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2015 DIGILAW 1177 (GUJ)

Karshanbhai Jesingbhai Diya v. State of Gujarat

2015-11-05

AKIL KURESHI, MOHINDER PAL

body2015
JUDGMENT : AKIL KURESHI, J. 1. The petition raises an interesting issue of the authority of a local MLA to remain present in the meeting of Taluka Panchayat convened for the purpose of electing the President and Vice-President. 2. Issue arises in the following background. 3. The petitioners are elected members of Deodar Taluka Panchayat for which the elections were held in the month of March 2013. The term of the elected body of the Taluka Panchayat is of five years. However, by issuing notification, the State Government has provided for the term of President and Vice-President of two and half years. Thus ordinarily during its lifespan the Taluka Panchayat would hold elections for the position of President and Vice-President twice, once at its first meeting and later on at the end of period of two and half years of the election of the President and Vice-President. In the present case, at the end of first term of the elected President and Vice-President, the Taluka Panchayat had to hold fresh Judgment elections for such positions. A meeting of the Taluka Panchayat for such purpose was convened on 22.9.2015. The petitioner no. 1 filed his nomination for the post of President. The petitioner no. 2 filed his nomination for the post of Vice-President. After scrutiny their nominations were found valid. The meeting was held at 12:00 pm on the appointed date on 22.9.2015. According to the petitioners, all the 17 elected members of the Taluka Panchayat remained present at such meeting. Additionally, local MLA Kesaji Chauhan also remained present. The petitioners objected to his presence during such meeting contending that only elected members can attend the meeting. They put their objections in writing before the Mamlatdar who was in charge of conducting the elections. According to the petitioners some police officials also remained present though not otherwise allowed as per the rules. This was to pressurise the Panchayat members into voting in a particular manner. Since despite objections from the petitioners, the Mamlatdar permitted the presence of local MLA as well as the police officials, eight members of the Taluka Panchayat staged walkout and did not any further participate in the meeting. Remaining nine members participated in the meeting and the Mamlatdar conducted the elections declaring newly added respondent no. 5 as the President and one Smt. Raiben as the Vice-President. Remaining nine members participated in the meeting and the Mamlatdar conducted the elections declaring newly added respondent no. 5 as the President and one Smt. Raiben as the Vice-President. The petitioners have therefore, filed this petition primarily taking up the issue of the authority of a local MLA to participate in the meeting of the Panchayat for the purpose of election to the President and Vice-President. The petitioner has also prayed for a declaration that the election held in the meeting of 22.9.2015 was vitiated. 4. Appearing for the petitioners, learned advocate Shri B.T. Rao drew our attention to the statutory provisions to contend that the presence of local MLA during the meeting of the Taluka Panchayat for election to the President and Vice-President is wholly unauthorised. He submitted that the local MLA would influence the voting pattern during the election. No outside person can be allowed to remain present during such meeting. A distinction must be drawn between any other meeting of the Panchayat and first meeting during which election to the post of resident and Vice-President would be conducted. During such meeting, no other business could be transacted clearly indicating that it is a special meeting to be convened only for this purpose. 5. On the other hand, learned Government Pleader Ms. M.L. Shah opposed the petition contending that section 10(6) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, is amply clear permitting no ambiguity. In clear terms elected member of the assembly is allowed to remain present though not allowed to vote in any Panchayat meeting. The first meeting of the Panchayat or any subsequent meeting for the purpose of holding the election is also meeting of the Pachayat. Legislature does not draw any distinction between an ordinary meeting and meeting for holding election of President and Vice-President of the Taluka Panchayat. 6. Learned counsel Shri Munshaw for the Taluka Panchayat administration submitted that the meeting was conducted as per the rules and regulations and in any case, any objection to the breach of any of the rules can be raised only in an election petition. 7. As noted, the legal issue is with respect to the validity of the presence of a local MLA in the meeting of the Taluka Panchayat convened solely for the purpose of election to the post of President and Vice-President. We would first answer this question in abstract. 7. As noted, the legal issue is with respect to the validity of the presence of a local MLA in the meeting of the Taluka Panchayat convened solely for the purpose of election to the post of President and Vice-President. We would first answer this question in abstract. How our ultimate answer applies to the prayers made by the petitioners for declaring the election invalid would be a subsequent question. 8. Section 10 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, pertains to constitution of Taluka Panchayat. Provisions relevant for our purpose read as under:- “10. Constitution of Taluka Panchayats:- (1) A Taluka Panchayat shall consist of elected members as provided in sub-section (4). (2) The elected members of a Taluka Panchayat shall be elected from amongst the quantified voters of the Taluka. (3) A Taluka Panchayat shall have a president and Vice-President elected by its elected members from amongst themselves. (4)………….. (5)………….. (6) Members of the Gujarat Legislative Assembly elected from any constituency in the Taluka or a part thereof, shall be permanent invitees to such Taluka Panchayat, but such invitees shall not have the right to vote in the meetings of the Taluka Panchayat: Provided that when a person ceases to be a member of the Gujarat Legislative Assembly, he shall cease to be a permanent invitee to the Taluka Panchayat. Explanation – For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that status of a permanent invitee shall not be construed to be that of a member of the Taluka Panchayat referred to in clauses (3) and (4) of Article 243C of the Constitution of India.” 9. Section 63 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, pertains to the first meeting of Panchayat and election of President and Vice-President, relevant portion of which reads as under:- “63. First meeting of Panchayat and election of President and Vice-President:- (1) On the constitution of a Taluka Panchayat or on its reconstitution under section 13 or under any other provisions of this Act there shall be called the first meeting thereof for the election of its President and Vice-President from amongst its elected members. (2) to (4)………….. (5) The first meeting shall be presided over by such officer as the competent authority may by order appoint in that behalf. Such officer shall, have such powers and follow such procedure as may be prescribed but shall not have the right to vote. (2) to (4)………….. (5) The first meeting shall be presided over by such officer as the competent authority may by order appoint in that behalf. Such officer shall, have such powers and follow such procedure as may be prescribed but shall not have the right to vote. (6) No business other than the election of the President and Vice-President shall be transacted at the meeting. (7) If at the election under the section, there is an equality of votes, the result of the election shall be decided by lot drawn in the presence of the presiding officer as he may determine. In the event of a dispute arising as to the validity of an election under the foregoing provisions of this section, the dispute shall be referred within a period of thirty days from the date of the declaration of the result of the election to the competent authority for decision. The decision of the competent authority shall be final and no suit or other proceeding shall lie against it in any court.” 10. Gujarat Taluka and District Panchayats President and Vice-President Election Rule, 1994, contain detailed provisions for conduct of elections of President and Vice-President of Taluka and District Panchayat. It envisages the procedure for the competent authority to fix the date of meeting for holding such election and issuing notice thereof in the prescribed manner. It provides for nomination of candidates, scrutiny of nomination papers and withdrawal of candidature. Rule 9 and 10 pertain to conduct of the elections and read as under:- “9. Election:- (1) If only one candidate has been duly nominated, he shall be declared to have been elected as President. (2) In case of more than one candidate having been duly nominated, the members present at the meeting shall proceed to elect to President. The Presiding Officer shall announce the name of the candidates one by one. The votes of the members shall be taken by show of hands. A member who wishes to give his vote in favour of a candidate shall raise his hand in favour of that candidate. A candidate who secures highest number of votes shall be declared to be elected.” 10. Rules to apply of election of Vice-President. Provision of the for going rules shall mutatis mutandis apply to the election of the Vice-President of a Panchayat.” 11. A candidate who secures highest number of votes shall be declared to be elected.” 10. Rules to apply of election of Vice-President. Provision of the for going rules shall mutatis mutandis apply to the election of the Vice-President of a Panchayat.” 11. From the statutory provisions noted above, it can be seen that under sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993, a Taluka Panchayat is constituted by the member elected as provided in sub-section (4). Such members would be elected by qualified voters of the Taluka. Every Taluka Panchayat would have a President and Vice-President who would be elected by elected members of the Panchayat from amongst themselves. Sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, provides that the members of the Gujarat Legislative Assembly elected from any constituency in the Taluka or a part thereof, shall be permanent invitees to such Taluka Panchayat. The invitees would however, not have the right to vote in the meetings of the Taluka Panchayat. Proviso to sub-section (6) of section 10 provides that upon a person ceasing to be a member of the Legislative Assembly, he shall cease to be a permanent invitee to the Taluka Panchayat. Explanation is added by way of abundant caution to remove doubts and it seeks to clarify that granting of status of a permanent invitee to such a person shall not be construed to be that of a member of the Taluka Panchayat referred to in clauses (3) and (4) of Article 243C of the Constitution of India. 12. The Gujarat Taluka and District Panchayats President and Vice-President Election Rules,1994, as noted, provide for detail procedure for conducting elections of the President and Vice-President of Taluka and District Panchayat. Rule 9 pertains to election. Rule 9(2) provides that in case of more than one candidate having been duly nominated, the members present in the meeting shall proceed to elect the President and the Presiding Officer shall announce the name of he candidates one by one. The votes of the judgment members shall be taken by show of hands. A member who wishes to give his vote in favour of a candidate would raise his hand in favour of that candidate. A candidate securing highest number of votes shall be declared elected. As per Rule 10 similar procedure would be followed in case of election of Vice-President also. 13. A member who wishes to give his vote in favour of a candidate would raise his hand in favour of that candidate. A candidate securing highest number of votes shall be declared elected. As per Rule 10 similar procedure would be followed in case of election of Vice-President also. 13. In terms of sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993, it is clear that a member of the State Legislative Assembly elected from any constituency of the Taluka, would be a permanent invitee to such Taluka Panchayat. He would hold such a position as long as he continues to be a member of the Legislative Assembly and the moment he ceases to e member of the State Legislative Assembly, he would cease to be a permanent invitee to the Taluka Panchayat. This comes with a rider namely, that by being a permanent invitee, he would not have a right to vote in the meeting of the Taluka Panchayat. The legislative intention for framing sub-section (6) of the Section 10 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 is not difficult to discern. As the elected member of the State Legislative Assembly from the same region, he would be acutely concerned with the developmental issues of the area. As an elected representative of the people to the State Legislative Assembly, he would be able to guide the Taluka Panchayat regarding Government's development schemes and also have the wherewithal to take up the developmental issues of the Taluka in the State Assembly or before the Government as the case may be. His presence would therefore, on one hand guide the elected members of the Taluka Panchayat and at the same time facilitate the development of Taluka by taking up the issues with the central authorities. However, as a person who is not elected into the Taluka Panchayat, he does not have a right to vote at any of its meetings. His role is thus confined to being a permanent invitee who may address the Taluka Panchayat but cannot directly influence the final decision of the Taluka Panchayat by voting. 14. If this be the principle for enactment of sub-section (6) of Section 10, the question that would immediately arise is what role can such a member play in the first meeting of the Taluka Panchayat convened solely for the purpose of election of its President and Vice-President. 14. If this be the principle for enactment of sub-section (6) of Section 10, the question that would immediately arise is what role can such a member play in the first meeting of the Taluka Panchayat convened solely for the purpose of election of its President and Vice-President. We may recall under sub-section (6) of Section 63 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, during such meeting, no business other than the election of the President and Vice-President would be transacted. In other words, a meeting which is convened for the purpose of election of President and Vice-President of the Taluka Panchayat would permit other agenda and no business other than the business of election to the said two posts would be transacted. Surely, the presence of a local MLA during the meeting of Taluka Panchayat is not envisaged for the orderly conduct of business of the Taluka Pachayat which is principally the task of the District administration and it could be achieved through necessary Government machinery, if any unruly scenes are anticipated. Any presence of a local MLA during the meeting for election to the post of President and Vice-President of the Taluka Panchayat would be wholly redundant and serve none of the purposes which can be envisaged, for which, the legislature would have enacted sub-section (6) of section 10 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 since during such meeting no business other than the election of the President and Vice-President of the Taluka Panchayat would be transacted. On the other hand, we have noted that under Rules 9 and 10 of Gujarat Taluka and District Panchayats President and Vice-President Election Rules 1994, election to the post of President and Vice-President of Taluka Panchayat would be conducted through raise of hands and not trough secret ballot contrary to what was suggested by the learned Government Pleader. Presence of a local MLA would certainly have the potential to influence voting pattern. On one hand as noted, his presence during such meeting would be wholly superfluous since no business other than that of election of President and Vice-President would be transacted and on the other hand his presence could have every possibility of wielding influence over the persons present and voting and thereby materially altering he course of election result, particularly since such voting would be by show of hands and not by secret ballot. This would rob the election of the element of either being free or fair. 15. It is true that sub-section (6) of Section 10 in this issue is silent and does not make such distinction between a meeting of the Panchayat for the purpose of election of President and Vice-President and any other meeting. Rule of literal interpretation would ordinarily prevent the Court from making any such distinction. However, in our opinion any interpretation to the contrary to what we are suggesting may expose the provisions to vice of unconstitutionality. Sub-section (6) of Section 10 when permits an elected member to remain present in every meeting of the Taluka Panchayat, makes an artificial addition to an elected body constituted through direct election by the people. When an outsider, may be an elected representative to the State Legislative Assembly is allowed to remain present and participate in such meeting barring actual voting, it breaches the fundamental requirement of an elected body transacting its business within the elected members. However, sub-section (6) of Section 10 is hedged with two safeguards. Firstly, the status of permanent invitee of an elected member is to ensure only till he holds the position as a elected member of the Assembly. The moment he ceases to hold such a position, his status as a permanent invitee to the Taluka Panchayat also ceases. This is significant and indicates that his authority to remain present and usefulness as an invitee member are closely connected to his holding the elected position of a member of Legislative Assembly. Second and more important safeguard is that as an invitee, he would have no right to vote thereby insulating the Taluka Panchayat from any outside undue influence in the decision making process. If we recognize the authority of a member of the Legislative Assembly to remain present even at the crucial and sensitive meeting of conducting the election to the post of President and Vice-President, this edifice which immunizes the Taluka Pachayat proceedings from outside influence may break down. The statute may itself be exposed to the vice of being ultra-vires. 16. One of the basic features of any democratic institution is free, fair and periodic elections. Taluka Panchayat as an institution of local self governance is a democratic institution which has been granted constitutional tutus. The statute may itself be exposed to the vice of being ultra-vires. 16. One of the basic features of any democratic institution is free, fair and periodic elections. Taluka Panchayat as an institution of local self governance is a democratic institution which has been granted constitutional tutus. It is of great importance that elections of President and Vice-President of such a body are conducted in free and fair manner living no rise to any possibility of outside influence. Presence of a local MLA during such election would raise serious concerns of outside influence and pressures. Viewed from such a stand point, the provision would be unreasonable and arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional. When faced with such a situation, the Courts often employ the technique of reading down the provision in order to save it from vice of unconstitutionality and t the same time give meaningful construction to the statute framed by the Legislature. The principle of reading down a statutory provision has been discussed by the Supreme Court in number of occasions. We may refer to the observations in case of Delhi Transport Corporation vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Others, 1991 Supp. (1) SCC 600 as under:- “Statutory Construction – 320. Statutory construction raises a presumption that an Act or a provision therein is constitutionally valid unless it appears to ultra-vires or invalid. The legislature, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, has undoubtedly unlimited powers to make law. In fairness to the learned Attorney General, he agrees that the impugned provisions are per se invalid. But he attempted to salvage them by resorting to the doctrine of reading down. Reading a provision down when permissible. 321. The question emerges whether the doctrine of reading down would be applied to avoid a void law vesting with arbitrary power with a naked hire and fire draconian rule. It is difficult to give acceptance to extreme contention raised by Sri Garg and Sri Rama Murthy that the Courts cannot in the process of interpretation of the Statute not make law but leave it to the legislature for necessary amendments. In an appropriate case Judges would articulate the inarticulate major premise and would give life and force to a Statute by reading harmoniously all the provisions ironing out the creases. But the object is to alongate the purpose of the Act. In an appropriate case Judges would articulate the inarticulate major premise and would give life and force to a Statute by reading harmoniously all the provisions ironing out the creases. But the object is to alongate the purpose of the Act. In this regard I respectfully agree with my learned brother, my Lord the Chief Justice, on the principle of statutory construction. The question is whether Legislature intended to confer absolute power or would it be construed in such a way that would supplant the law but not supplement law made by the Legislature. Natural construction. 322. The golden rule of statutory construction is that the words and phrases or sentences should be construed according to the intent of legislature that passed the Act. All the provisions should be read together. If the words of the statutes are in themselves precise and unambiguous, the words, or phrases or sentences themselves alone do, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words or phrases or sentences in their natural and ordinary sense. But if any doubt arises from the terms employed by the legislature, it has always been held a safe means of collecting the intention, to call in aid the ground and cause of making the statute and to have the recourse to the preamble, which is a key to open the minds of the makers of the statute and the mischief's which the Act intend to redress. In determining the meaning of statute the first question to ask always is what is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context. It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intent of the legislature then it is proper to look for some other possible meaning then the court cannot go further. 323. In Craies Statute Law, Seventh Edition in Chapter 5, at page 64 it is stated that where the words of an Act are clear, there is no need for applying any of the principles of interpretation which are merely presumptions in cases of ambiguity in the statute. The safer and more correct course of dealing with the question of construction is to take the words themselves and arrive, if possible, at their meaning without in the first place referring to cases. The safer and more correct course of dealing with the question of construction is to take the words themselves and arrive, if possible, at their meaning without in the first place referring to cases. Where an ambiguity arises to supposed intention of the legislature, one of the statutory constructions, the court propounded is the doctrine of reading down. Lord Reid in Federal Steam Navigation Co. vs. Department of Trade and Industry, (1974) 2 All ER 97 at p. 100 (as also extracted by Cross Statutory Interpretation, Butterworths' Edition, 1976 at page 43 in preposition 3) has stated thus:- "The judge may read in words which he considers to be necessarily implied by words which are already in the statute and he has a limited power to add to, alter or ignore statutory words in order to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd or totally unreasonable, unworkable, or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute." 324. At page 92 of the Cross Statutory Interpretation, the author has stated that the power to add to, alter or ignore statutory words is an extremely limited one. Generally speaking it can only be exercised where there has been a demonstrable mistake on the part of the draftsman or where he consequence of applying the words in their ordinary, or discernible secondary, meaning would be utterly unreasonable. Even then the mistake may be thought to be beyond correction by the court, or the tenor of the statute may be such as to preclude the addition of words to avoid an unreasonable result. Therefore, the Doctrine of Reading Down is an internal aid to construe the word or phrase in statute to give reasonable meaning, but not to detract distort or emasculate the language so as to give the supposed purpose to avoid unconstitutionality. 325. This Court in All Saints High School, Hyderabad vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, (1980) 2 SCR 924 held that:- "This Court has in several cases adopted the principle of reading down the provisions of the Statute. The reading down of a provision of a statute puts into operation the principle that so far as it is reasonably possible to do o, the legislation should be construed as being within its power. The reading down of a provision of a statute puts into operation the principle that so far as it is reasonably possible to do o, the legislation should be construed as being within its power. It has the principle effect that where an Act is expressed in language of a generality which makes it capable, if read literally, of applying to matters beyond the relevant legislative power, the Court would construe it in a more limited sense so as to keep it within the power." Similarly restricted meaning was ascribed by Maxwell in his Interpretation of the Statutes XII Edn. at p. 109 under the caption restriction of operation that sometimes to keep the Act within the limits of its scope and not to disturb the existing law beyond what the object requires, it is construed as operative between certain purposes only even though the language expresses no such circumspection of field of operation. 326. It is, thus, clear that the object of reading down is to keep the operation of the statute within the purpose of the Act and constitutionally valid. In this regard it is equally of necessity to remind ourselves as held by this Court in Minerva Mills' case (1980) 3 SCC 625 that when the effect of Article 31 was asked to be read down so as to save it from unconstitutionality this Court held that it is not permissible to read down the statutory provisions when the avowed purpose is to confer power on an authority without any limitation whatever and that at p. 259D and G it was held that the principle of reading down cannot be used to distort when words of width are used even advertency. In Elliott Ashton Welsh, II vs. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (26 Lawyer's Edition 2nd, 308, Herlan, J. at page 327 held that:- "When the plain thrust of a legislative enactment can only be circumvented by distortion to avert constitutional collision, it can only by exalting form over substance that one can justify veering of the path that has been plainly marked by the Statue. Such a course betrays extreme skepticism as to constitutionality and in this instance reflects a groping to preserve conscientous objector exemption at all costs I cannot subscribe wholly to emasculated construction of a statute to avoid facing constitutional question in purported fidelity to the statutory doctrine of avoiding unnecessary resolution of constitutional issues." 327. In Nalinakhya Bysack vs. Shyam Sunder Haldar, (1953) SCR 533 at 544-45 this Court has refused to rewrite legislation to make up omissions of the Legislature. 328. In Moti Ram Deka's case ( AIR 1964 SC 600 ) when Rule 148(3) and Rule 149(3) of the Railway Establishment Code were sought to be sustained on the principle of reading down, this court held thus: (SCR pp.710-11) "There is one more point which still remains to be considered and that is the point of construction. The learned Addl. Solicitor General argued that in construing the impugned Rule 148(3) as well as Rule 149(3), we ought to take into account the fact that the Rule as amended has been so framed as to avoid conflict with or noncompliance of the provisions of Article 311(2) and so, he suggests that we should adopt that interpretation of the Rule which would be consistent with Article 311(2). The argument is that the termination of services permissible under the impugned rules really proceeds on administrative grouns or considerations of exigencies of service. If, for instance, the post held by a permanent servant is abolished, or the whole of the cadre to which the post belonged is brought to an end and the railway servant's services are terminated inconsequence, that cannot amount to his removal because the termination of his service is not based on any consideration personal to the servant. In support of this argument, the Addl. Solicitor General wants us to test the provision contained in the latter portion of the impugned rules. We are not impressed by this argument. What the latter portion of the impugned Rules provide is that in case a railway servant is dealt with under that portion, no notice need be served on him. The first part of the Rules can reasonably and legitimately take in all cases and may be used even in respect of cases falling under the latter category, provided, of course, notice for the specified period or salary in lieu of such notice is given to the railway servant. The first part of the Rules can reasonably and legitimately take in all cases and may be used even in respect of cases falling under the latter category, provided, of course, notice for the specified period or salary in lieu of such notice is given to the railway servant. There is no doubt that on a fair construction, the impugned Rules authorise the Railway Administration to terminate the services of all the permanent servants to whom the Rues apply merely on giving notice for the specified period or on payment of salary in lieu thereof and that clearly amounts to the removal of the servant in question. Therefore, we are satisfied that the impugned rules are invalid inasmuch as they are inconsistent with the provisions contained in Article 311(2) The termination of the permanent servant's tenure which is authorised by the said Rules is no more and no less than their removal from service, and so, Article 311(2) must come into play in respect of such cases. That being so, the Rule which does not require compliance with the procedure prescribed by Article 311(2) must be struck down as invalid." 17. It is in this context we have viewed provisions contained in sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993. Viewed from such angle, the only possible interpretation is that a local MLA, as elected member of the State Legislature, would be a permanent invitee to the meetings of the Taluka Panchayat but not during the meetings which are convened for the purpose of conducting elections to the post of President and Vice-President of the Taluka Panchayat. 18. Despite such conclusions, we are not inclined to set aside such election in the present case. This is for the following reasons. In terms of Gujarat Taluka and District Panchayats President and Vice-President Election Rules, 1994, election petition is available to any candidate who wishes to challenge such elections. Secondly, the Vice-President is not even been joined as party respondent. In fact, even the President was not joined as respondent. He moved an application for such purpose which was granted. In absence of elected President and Vice-President, declaration that their elections are void cannot be granted. Lastly, the questions also would be whether as alleged by the petitioners the police officials had remained present unauthorisedly and what would be the effect of their presence. He moved an application for such purpose which was granted. In absence of elected President and Vice-President, declaration that their elections are void cannot be granted. Lastly, the questions also would be whether as alleged by the petitioners the police officials had remained present unauthorisedly and what would be the effect of their presence. All these issues can be gone only in an election petition. 19. With above observations, this petition is disposed of.