ORDER : Rohit Arya, J. This writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 19/11/2012 passed by respondent no.2 purportedly in compliance of the order passed by this Court dated 9/11/2012 in Writ Petition No.8207/2012 in the matter of consideration and decision on three applications filed by petitioner before respondent no.2 viz. (a) application under Section 7-A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1952') for impleading and summoning the security agencies/contractors alleged to have provided security service on contract basis to the establishment (petitioner); (b) application under Section 7-A of the Act of 1952 for summoning the enforcement officers for cross-examination on the reports dated 30/7/2003 and 22/5/2012; and (c) application under Section 7-A read with Section 7-C of the Act of 1952 for excluding the period before 1/7/2003 from the subject matter of present enquiry and also for deciding the application dated 22/6/2010. 2. Facts relevant for disposal of this writ petition in nutshell are to the following effect :- Petitioner is a Private Limited Company and working as authorised dealer of Maruti Cars maintaining showroom and a workshop in Gwalior. Respondents have issued a coverage letter dated 25/10/1996 in respect of the petitioner, as number of employees in the establishment have been found to be more than 20 w.e.f.1/9/1996 and accordingly, provident fund code No.10138 has been allotted. According to the petitioner, consequent upon allotment of the code number, petitioner/establishment has been periodically inspected by the enforcement officers for different intervals of period as provided for under Section 13 of the Act of 1952, details whereof are mentioned in para 5.4 of the writ petition. Last inspection and verification of the record was done on 30/7/2003 and pursuant to proceedings under Section 7-A of the Act of 1952, respondent no.2 had determined the dues at Rs. 4,75,346/-. In fact petitioner had already deposited the aforesaid amount, which was duly reported by the enforcement officers. By issuing summons dated 18/2/2010 and 26/2/2010 respondent no. 2/3 directed the petitioner to produce the record for the period between March, 1997 to April, 2009. 4,75,346/-. In fact petitioner had already deposited the aforesaid amount, which was duly reported by the enforcement officers. By issuing summons dated 18/2/2010 and 26/2/2010 respondent no. 2/3 directed the petitioner to produce the record for the period between March, 1997 to April, 2009. In the reply submitted on 9/3/2010 petitioner contended that the enquiry for the period from March, 1997 to June, 2003 pursuant to the aforesaid summons cannot be conducted for the reasons, namely, (i) dues determined at that point of time were already paid and (ii) in the light of the provisions as contained in Section 7-C of the Act of 1952 the assessment completed and liabilities determined and paid cannot be reopened as the same is barred by time being beyond the period of five years from the date of the order passed on 30/7/2003 by respondent no.2. It is further contended that various dates were fixed by the enforcement officers and on 22/5/2012 a report was submitted. Huge imaginary and highly inflated dues of Rs. 5,08,86,002/- was worked out against the petitioner. The report was based on non-existing facts and purely on assumptions. The enforcement officers were unmindful of the provisions contained in Section 7-C of the Act of 1952 and included even the aforesaid period from March, 1997 to June, 2003 while determining the liability. Besides liability for Security Guards alleged to have been employed by the petitioner from March, 1997 to April, 2009 has also been included in respect of which no facts were on record. Under such circumstances, the petitioner has filed the aforementioned three applications before the authority for consideration. No reply was furnished to the aforesaid three applications by the enforcement officers, although several opportunities were afforded viz.20/6/2012, 4/7/2012, 18/7/2012, 8/8/2012, 29/8/2012, 14/9/2012 and 5/10/2012. Eventually though it was given to understand to the petitioner that reply was allegedly filed by the enforcement officers, but neither the enforcement officer served the copy of the reply nor respondent no.2 nor during the course of hearing the Presiding Officer supplied the copy thereof to the petitioner though demanded and abruptly on 2/11/2012 itself Presiding Officer/respondent no.2 closed the case for orders without deciding applications filed by the petitioner (supra). 3. 3. Complaining gross violation of principles of natural justice and being subjected to typical hostility and depravity the petitioner preferred a writ petition No.8702/2012 before this Court, which stood decided and disposed of by order dated 9/11/2012, as referred above, directing respondent no.2 to decide aforesaid three applications filed by the petitioner in accordance with law. Learned counsel submits that on 19/11/2012 petitioner had appeared before respondent no.2 and also filed written arguments with photocopy of the judgments relied by him. Neither the enforcement officer nor any other representative of the department was present before respondent no.2 on 19/11/2012. Respondent no.2 adopted a queer method unknown to the principles of natural justice, concept of fair play and sanctions of rule of law inasmuch as respondent no.2 in a hot haste and hurried manner prepared the order-sheet purportedly deciding the aforesaid applications without dealing with merits of the contentions raised therein and judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the petitioner in the matter of object and scope of enquiry under Section 7-A of the Act of 1952. Respondent no.2 though is obliged to conduct the proceedings in a quasi judicial manner and also bearing in mind the direction issued by this Court (supra), but unmindful of his legal obligation the impugned evasive order has been passed reserving an opportunity to the enforcement officer to file his written reply on the contentions advanced by the petitioner on next date of hearing, though at the same time he has rejected applications in a self styled manner. It is submitted that the procedure adopted by respondent no.2 is absolutely illegal, contrary to provisions of Section 7-A (1) (b), (2) and (3) of the Act of 1952 and judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Food Corporation of India v. Provident Fund Commissioner and Others, (1990) 1 SCC 68 para 7, 8 and 9, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, (2008) 3 SCC 247 para 21, 23 and 26 to 30, Himachal Pradesh State Forest Corporation v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, (2008) 5 SCC 756 para 5, Khem Chand v. Union of India and others, AIR 1958 SC 300 para 19, M/s. Lakshmi Type Foundary and others v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, 2013 LLR 1 Delhi High Court and Navnit Motors Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and another, 2013 LLR 7 Bombay High Court. 4. 4. Per contra, in the counter affidavit filed by respondents it is contended that petitioner at the fag end of the enquiry had preferred the aforesaid three applications. The authority has dealt with the aforesaid applications by way of impugned order in a fair and just manner. The authority has already taken a decision that the enquiry proceedings concluded or dropped upto 30/7/2003 is to be excluded and dues, if any, are to be assessed only for the remaining period. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the respondents are taking into consideration the period from March, 1997 to June, 2003 pursuant to the summons issued in the year 2010. Hence, no grievance can be made in that behalf. The petitioner has been given ample opportunity, hence, no complaint as regards alleged violation of principles of natural justice can be made challenging the impugned order. With the aforesaid submissions, it is prayed that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. Heard counsel for the parties. As evident from the order impugned and the counter affidavit submitted by respondents before this Court, petitioner's complaint as regards inclusion of the period from March, 1997 to June, 2003 beyond the period of limitation, as provided for under Section 7-C of the Act of 1952, stands redressed, as such aforesaid period has been excluded from the purview of enquiry in question. Hence, no further indulgence in that behalf is warranted. 6. However, petitioner's grievance in the context of remaining two applications; for impleading and summoning the security agencies/contractors alleged to have provided security service on contract basis to the petitioner and for summoning the enforcement officer for cross-examination on the reports dated 30/7/2003 and 22/5/2012 are required to be addressed in the light of provisions under Section 7-A of the Act of 1952 and proposition of law settled by the Supreme Court. By now it is well settled that :- (a). the jurisdiction of respondent no.2 in the matter of determination of amount due from the employers under Section 7-A of the Act of 1952 is of the nature of a quasi judicial authority; (b). By now it is well settled that :- (a). the jurisdiction of respondent no.2 in the matter of determination of amount due from the employers under Section 7-A of the Act of 1952 is of the nature of a quasi judicial authority; (b). the officer conducting the enquiry has the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure trying the suit in the matters of- (i) enforcing attendance of any person or examining him on oath, (ii) requiring discovery and production of documents, (iii) taking evidence on affidavit and (iv) issuing commissions for examination of witnesses and such enquiry is deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193, 228 and for the purpose of Section 196 of IPC; and, (c). the employer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of representing his case before any order is passed under Section 7-A of the Act of 1952. 7. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Food Corporation of India (supra) while considering the nature of enquiry by the competent authority in the context of provisions contained under Section 7-A of the Act of 1952 has observed as under:- "9. It will be seen from the above provisions that the Commissioner is authorised to enforce attendance in person and also to examine any person on oath. He has the power requiring the discovery and production of documents. This power was given to the Commissioner to decide not abstract questions of law, but only to determine actual concrete differences in payment of contribution and other dues by identifying the workmen. The Commissioner should exercise all his powers to collect all evidence and collate all material before coming to proper conclusion. That is the legal duty of the Commissioner. It would be failure to exercise the jurisdiction particularly when a party to the proceedings requests for summoning evidence from a particular person." 8. The Commissioner should exercise all his powers to collect all evidence and collate all material before coming to proper conclusion. That is the legal duty of the Commissioner. It would be failure to exercise the jurisdiction particularly when a party to the proceedings requests for summoning evidence from a particular person." 8. In the case of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court relying on the aforesaid decision and that of ESI Corporation v. Harrisons, 1998 SCC (L&S) 1174 has ruled that the competent authority while fastening the liability of dues upon the principal employer must afford him an opportunity as regards alleged employees shown to have been engaged by the contractors and for that purpose such contractors may be allowed to be impleaded as party for adjudication of the matter in controversy. Further in the case of Himachal Pradesh State Forest Corporation (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that the liability of the amount due upon the principal employer can be fastened only in respect of those employees who are identifiable and whose entitlement can be proved on the evidence. No adverse inference can be drawn against the principal employer if the old records are reportedly not available with the employer at the inordinate belated stage of enquiry. Similar reiteration of laws have been made by Delhi High Court and Bombay High Court in the aforesaid judgments. 9. In his application, petitioner while referring to the definition of 'employees' in Section 2 (f), 'wages' in 2 (b), 'member' in 2 (j) has averred that while raising the demand of Rs. 4,26,42,915/- in the report dated 22/5/2012 no enquiry whatsoever as regards identity of any beneficiary/employee has been done, no material was placed on record to justify the aforesaid demand for the alleged number of employees in the report, no proper calculation has also been done in the context of meaning attributed to the word "wages" and "contribution", besides the fact that the aforesaid report includes the period which is beyond limitation. The enforcement officer has also not made available to the petitioner the documents collected by him from various departments viz. Income Tax Department, Registrar of Companies etc. to justify raising of demand. The enforcement officer has also not made available to the petitioner the documents collected by him from various departments viz. Income Tax Department, Registrar of Companies etc. to justify raising of demand. The enforcement officer has prepared the report with apparent bias as establishment having different code numbers in different jurisdiction were also covered in the enquiry to raise the impugned formidable demand against the petitioner. Under such circumstances, the petitioner has prayed that he may be given an opportunity to cross-examine the enforcement officers, namely, M.K. Chaudhary, who submitted the report on 30/7/2003, and Mukesh Saraswat and Yash Babu Chaurasiya, who submitted the report on 22/5/2012, so that petitioner may prepare a reasonable defence against the arbitrary demand raised in the aforesaid reports by the enforcement officers without any factual basis. There is no averment in the counter affidavit as regards the merits of the contentions raised in this application, whereupon decision on merits of the authority was solicited by the petitioner. The authority while passing the impugned order, it appears that, has not referred to any reply furnished by the enforcement officers to the aforesaid applications (copy whereof was not supplied to the petitioner) and rejected the contentions raised by the petitioner in his above discussed two applications. The contention of the petitioner that the establishment is neither in possession of any list of security persons/workers allegedly engaged for the period nor does he have any knowledge of such security agencies/contractors alleged to have been engaged by him as imputed by the enforcement officers. Under such circumstances, it was prayed that the Presiding Officer may call upon such security agencies/contractors to produce the relevant documents and further such security agencies/contractors who are alleged to have provided security personnel for the period 2003-04 to 2008-09 and be ordered to be impleaded as party to the present proceeding. However, the said prayer has been rejected by the Presiding Officer on the premise that it is the responsibility of the principal employer to ensure that all the employees either engaged directly or through the contractor or by contractor for the principal employer's work are provided all the benefits available to them under the Act of 1952 and rules thereunder. However, the said prayer has been rejected by the Presiding Officer on the premise that it is the responsibility of the principal employer to ensure that all the employees either engaged directly or through the contractor or by contractor for the principal employer's work are provided all the benefits available to them under the Act of 1952 and rules thereunder. It is unavoidable for the principal employer to furnish details of such employees, hence, principal employer cannot be excused for the reason that he does not have the list of employees, who worked for it through contractor. 10. In the opinion of this Court the respondent no.2, i.e. Presiding Officer, has not acted fairly and in accordance with law. If the petitioner had expressed that he did not engage any security agency or contractor for deployment of security personnel during the period from the year 2003-04 to 2008-09, the Presiding Officer was obliged to implead such security agencies/contractors in the proceedings for the purpose of determination of liability, if any, in respect of employees/security personnel allegedly deployed in the establishment and thereafter on identification of such employees in the enquiry such liability, if any, could be determined. The Presiding Officer cannot accept the report of the enforcement officers in the matter of liability of dues raised against the principal employer unless facts whereupon such liability of dues is raised are verified in the process of enquiry affording reasonable opportunity to the employer. True it is that upon such determination of facts, if the contract employees are found to have been engaged, the liability of payment of dues may be fastened upon the principal employer, which in turn may be recoverable from the contractors, but without determination of the fact of engagement of contract employees, no demand of dues can be raised against the principal employer. Hence, in the opinion of this Court, respondent no.2 was not justified having not considered the application in right earnest and in the light of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred above. 11. Another objection raised by the petitioner is related to non-supply of documents obtained by the enforcement officers from Income Tax Department, Registrar of Companies and ESIC on various dates and made basis for raising the demand of amount due against the petitioner. 11. Another objection raised by the petitioner is related to non-supply of documents obtained by the enforcement officers from Income Tax Department, Registrar of Companies and ESIC on various dates and made basis for raising the demand of amount due against the petitioner. It was contended that before the documents so procured are acted upon, petitioner ought to have been given an opportunity to reply to the same. This prayer has been turned down in the impugned order on the premise that the petitioner has failed and refused to furnish the required documents and, therefore, such documents procured from various departments can always be used to work out the dues in respect of the employees working in the establishment. In the opinion of this Court, the approach adopted by the Presiding Officer is not in conformity with the concept of justice, equity and good conscience in the matter of a quasi judicial enquiry being conducted. The cardinal principle of rules of natural justice is that no one should be condemned unheard, which in its fold encompasses the requirement of supply of documents to the delinquent which are likely to be acted upon by the enquiry officer to the detriment of the delinquent. Therefore, if the enforcement officer has relied upon the documents procured from various departments in respect of petitioner/establishment, the same is required to be confronted to the petitioner before any finding is arrived at against him in the matter of raising of demand of the amount due in the enquiry under Section 7-A of the Act of 1952. Hence, the conclusion of the Presiding Officer/respondent no.2 in that context is unsustainable in the eyes of law. 12. The petitioner's contention to cross-examine the enforcement officers, namely, M.K. Chaudhary and Mukesh Saraswat & Yash Babu Chaurasiya, who submitted reports dated 30/7/2003 and 22/5/2012 respectively, to make effective defence by proving the incorrectness of the report submitted by them has been rejected by the Presiding Officer on the premise that the scrutiny of those facts and figures shall be done at the end of the proceedings, hence, cross-examination of such enforcement officers is not relevant. In the opinion of this Court, the reasons of the Presiding Officer to justify rejection of the demand of the petitioner as aforesaid is fallacious. In the opinion of this Court, the reasons of the Presiding Officer to justify rejection of the demand of the petitioner as aforesaid is fallacious. As the report submitted by the enforcement officers has provided the basis for enquiry for determination of liability of dues on the petitioner and as the contents thereof are based on facts and figures used by the enforcement officers, the petitioner deserves an opportunity to cross examine such enforcement officers to prepare his defence as regards veracity, reliability and admissibility of such materials used by the enforcement officers while arriving at the liability raised against the petitioner. The justification given by the Presiding Officer for such denial of opportunity on the premise that the objection raised by the establishment in black and white must be replied to by the enforcement officers in black and white, in the opinion of this Court, runs counter to the basic principle of fair play and concept of rule of law in a quasi judicial enquiry held by the prescribed authority. The concluding paragraph of the impugned order, which runs as under:- "Both the parties i.e. the Department and the establishment are directed accordingly. Moreover, as none of the Enforcement Officers appearing on behalf of the Department is present today, the proceeding is adjourned to 07/12/2012 at 11:00 A.M. with a direction to the team of Enforcement Officers commissioned in the case to file its written reply in the light of the above mentioned decisions and the written argument submitted by the establishment, today. The establishment is also free to file its comments if any." Reflects a novel method adopted by respondent no.2 while rendering his decision on the applications filed by petitioner in purported compliance of the order passed by this Court on 19/11/2012. He has decided applications without reply and reserved liberty to respondents/enforcement officers and their team to file reply to the contentions advanced by the petitioner based on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the opinion of this Court, respondent no.2 has dealt with the applications filed by the petitioner in slip shod manner unmindful of procedural laws holding the field. 13. This Court, therefore, holds that order passed by the coordinate Bench on 9/11/2012 in Writ Petition No.8207/2012 has not been complied with in right earnest. 14. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 19/11/2012 is set aside. 13. This Court, therefore, holds that order passed by the coordinate Bench on 9/11/2012 in Writ Petition No.8207/2012 has not been complied with in right earnest. 14. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 19/11/2012 is set aside. The matter is remanded back to respondent no.2 to decide petitioner's two applications viz. (a) application under Section 7-A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1952') for impleading and summoning the security agencies/contractors alleged to have provided security service on contract basis to the establishment (petitioner) and (b) application under Section 7-A of the Act of 1952 for summoning the enforcement officers for cross-examination on the reports dated 30/7/2003 and 22/5/2012, in accordance with law on merits bearing in mind the meaning attributed to the principle of natural justice in various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred above and thereafter hold a fair and impartial enquiry as a quasi judicial authority in conformity with the mandatory requirements of the provisions contained under Section 7-A of the Act of 1952. 15. With the aforesaid, writ petition stands allowed to the aforesaid extent.