JUDGMENT 1. - Appellants have preferred this first appeal challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 23rd of April, 2015 passed by learned District Judge, Jaisalmer (learned trial Court), whereby the learned trial Court has rejected their claim for compensation under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1885 (for short, Act) as barred by limitation. While submitting their claim before the learned trial Court, appellants also made endeavour for seeking condonation of delay and an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is filed but that effort also proved abortive inasmuch as learned trial Court considered it to be redundant by observing that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable in original proceedings. 2. Succinctly stated, the facts of the case are that first appellants husband and second appellants father Pradeep Bhai Patel was a vehicle driver, who on the fateful day of 11th September 2008 was plying Bus No.GJ-18-U-9938 carrying passengers from Ahmedabad to Rajasthan. In the night of 14th September, 2008, the bus reached Ramdevra Nagori Dharamshala where all the passengers alighted from bus and entered inside Dharamshala. Pradeep Bhai Patel and the Conductor of the bus for taking their luggage had gone on the rooftop of the bus and when Pradeep Bhai Patel was on roof, a naked electricity wire touched his hand and due to high voltage current flowing in the live wire he was electrocuted and immediately fell down from the bus. Upon falling of Pradeep Bhai Patel, Bus Conductor Ramesh Bhai and other passengers rushed to Pokaran Hospital where he was declared dead by the doctors. Taking into account the unnatural death of Pradeep Bhai Patel, SHO, Police Station, Pokaran made endeavour to inquire and report on suicide of the deceased under Section 174 Cr.P.C. In the report under Section 174 Cr.P.C., it was found that cause of death of Pradeep Bhai Patel was electrocution and the wire in which current was flowing was loosely knitted having easy access for the human being. Therefore, while attributing negligence on the part of the respondent department, the appellants submitted claim under the Act and quantified compensation to the tune of Rs. 22,68,000/-. Alongwith the suit/plaint, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is also filed for condonation of delay. 3. Therefore, while attributing negligence on the part of the respondent department, the appellants submitted claim under the Act and quantified compensation to the tune of Rs. 22,68,000/-. Alongwith the suit/plaint, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is also filed for condonation of delay. 3. The respondent submitted their written statement wherein a specific objection is raised that the suit filed by the appellants is barred by limitation as the same has been filed after expiry of two years, which is beyond the prescribed period of limitation for filing claim under Section 1A of the Act. Joining issue with the appellants on merits, the respondent completely repudiated the allegation of negligence on the part of department and submitted that the cause of electrocution was own negligence of the deceased inasmuch as he stopped the bus under L.T. Line. It is also submitted in the return that on the roof of the bus some iron articles were there and when those iron articles touched the live wire, current flown which resulted into the calamity. With all these pleadings, the respondent prayed for rejection of the claim. 4. The learned trial Court, on the basis of pleadings of rival parties, framed three issues for determination. In support of the claim, first appellant herself appeared in the witness box and examined two other witnesses, viz., AW1 Moolji Bhai and AW2 Kanti Bhai. That apart, 10 documents were exhibited. To counter the evidence of the appellants, on behalf of respondent, witness NAW Hanumana Ram, Assistant Engineer, appeared in the witness box and testified on oath. Respondent also produced Photo Ex.A/1. 5. After conclusion of the evidence of rival parties, the learned trial Court heard final arguments and decided Issue No.1 & 2 simultaneously. While considering Issue No.1 & 2 in conjunction with the evidence tendered by rival parties, the learned trial Court recorded a definite finding that in a claim under Section 1A of the Act, period of limitation is two years as per Article 82 of the Limitation Act, and since the suit has been filed after expiry of the period of limitation, the same is barred by limitation and therefore merits rejection. The learned trial Court also made endeavour to examine the averments contained in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act submitted by appellants for condonation of delay. The learned trial Court also made endeavour to examine the averments contained in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act submitted by appellants for condonation of delay. While considering the aforesaid application, the learned trial Court recorded a clear and unequivocal finding that Section 5 is not applicable in original proceedings and consequently the said application is redundant. While treating the suit to be barred by limitation, the learned trial Court also decided Issue No.3 against the appellants and eventually dismissed the claim. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. L.D. Khatri submits that the learned trial Court has committed serious error of law and fact in applying Article 82 of the Limitation Act whereas for such claims Article 113 of the Limitation Act is applicable. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the claim of the appellants was founded on tortuous act of the respondent and therefore taking into account the principles of strict liability, provisions of Article 113 of the Limitation Act are attracted, and by not applying the said Article, the learned Court below has acted dehors the law making the impugned order vulnerable. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on following judgments: Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [ (1994) 4 SCC 1 ] Kerala State Electricity Board & Anr. v. K.V. Bhaskaran Nair & Ors. (AIR 2003 Kerala 57) State of Andhra Pradesh v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy & Ors. ( AIR 2000 SC 2083 ). 7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants, perused the impugned judgment and also examined the averments contained in the suit/claim as well as application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which is brought to my notice during the course of hearing by the learned counsel for the appellants. 8. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment in conjunction with the averments contained in the suit/claim-petition as well as application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, there remains no quarrel that appellants have taken shelter of Section 1A of the Act for claiming the compensation. The entire pleadings in the plaint as well as application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act are in terms of a claim under Section 1A of the Act. The entire pleadings in the plaint as well as application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act are in terms of a claim under Section 1A of the Act. In that background, the appellants cannot be permitted to disown the averments contained in the plaint as well as application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to project an improved version that their claim was under common law of torts and not under Section 1A of the Act. The legal position is no more resintegra that for claiming compensation under Section 1A of the Act, period of limitation is prescribed under Article 82 of the Limitation Act. Article 82 reads as under: 82. By executors, administrators or representatives under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (13 of 1855) Two year The date of the death of the person killed. 9. When for a claim under Section 1A of the Act there is a specific provision prescribing limitation of two years, it is obviously not possible to resort to residuary clause envisaged under Article 113 of the Limitation Act. The residuary clause under Section 113 of the Limitation Act is applicable vis-a-vis suits for which no period is prescribed. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants, that Article 113 of the Limitation Act is applicable, is misplaced and cannot be sustained. The legal precedents, on which the learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance, are examined by me but taking into account the factual scenario in the instant case and the pleadings of the appellants in their plaint as well as application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, these legal precedents are clearly distinguishable. Well it is true that for negligence of the respondent on account of their total apathy to take utmost care for the safety of the citizens, respondent can be castigated for their tortuous act and can also be sued to recover damages, but then the Act is also enacted on the common law of torts providing remedy to the victims of fatal accident or to the legal heirs of a victim in the event of death. The entire pleadings in the plaint are in terms of a claim under Section 1A of the Act and the plaint is not founded on the general principles of law of torts, therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants, that claim of the appellants be treated as a claim under the general law of torts by applying principles of strict liability, cannot be countenanced. 10. Although in first appeals normally the Courts are summoning the record of the trial Court but looking to the peculiar facts of the case and considering the amended provisions under Order 41, Rule 11 CPC, it is not necessary to call for the record of the learned Court. Reliance in this behalf can be placed on U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Sheo Narain Kushwaha & Ors. [ (2011) 6 SCC 456 ] , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court while interpreting the amended Rule 11(1) of Order 41 CPC, has held that dismissal of first appeal in limine is permissible but has put a rider that it is required to be dismissed by a reasoned order. The Apex Court made following observations in Para 7, 9 & 10: 7. It is evident from sub-rule (1) that an appellate court can dismiss an appeal after a preliminary hearing without calling for the records of the trial court and without issuing notice to the respondent, if it is satisfied that the appeal has no merit. Sub-rule (1) does not however state that such dismissal can be without assigning any reasons. 9. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 11 does not enable the High Court to dismiss first appeals by oneline orders to the effect that "appeal is dismissed" or by non-speaking orders. The order of the High Court dismissing the first appeal should be sufficiently reasoned to disclose the application of mind to the grounds of appeal and make out that the High Court was resorting to dismissal in limine as it found the appeal either to be vexatious or wholly without merit. Order 41, Rule 11 of the Code, while relieving the High Court from the obligation to write a "judgment", does not dispense with the obligation to assign reasons in brief, when summarily dismissing the appeal. 10. Order 41, Rule 11 of the Code, while relieving the High Court from the obligation to write a "judgment", does not dispense with the obligation to assign reasons in brief, when summarily dismissing the appeal. 10. Unless the order is reasoned, there will be no way of knowing whether the appellate court has examined the appeal before deciding that it did not deserve admission. As a limited right to appeal to the Supreme Court is available against the appellate judgments of the High Court, unless there are reasons in the order of dismissal, it will not be possible for the Supreme Court to examine whether the High Court has rightly rejected the appeal. The appellant who has filed the first appeal in pursuance of a statutory right to file such appeal, paying necessary court fee, can legitimately expect re-appreciation of the evidence and redetermination of the questions raised, unless the statute providing for the appeal provides otherwise. 11. One more redeeming feature is that alongwith the plaint appellants have tendered fixed court fee as per proviso to Section 21 of the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1961 (for short, Act of 1961) and has not paid ad valorem court fee counted on the amount claimed. Section 21 of the Act of 1961 reads as under: 21. Suits for money:- In a suit for money (including a suit for damages or compensation, or arrears of maintenance, of annuities, or of other sums payable periodically), fee shall be computed on the amount claimed: [Provided that in an action or suit for damages under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (Central Act 13 of 1855) a fixed fee of rupees ten shall be payable on the plaint or the memorandum of appeal.] 12. In this view of the matter, very framework of the suit clearly indicates that it was a suit for damages under the Act and not a suit for damages under general law of torts. It is an admitted fact that cause of action accrued to the appellants on 15th September 2008 and the suit was filed after expiry of two years, i.e., beyond the period of limitation, and as such, in my considered opinion, learned trial Court has not committed any error in rejecting the suit by the impugned judgment and decree treating it to be barred by limitation. As regards applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is trite that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable in case of original proceedings and therefore the conclusion of the learned trial Court in this behalf is also just and proper.The upshot of the above discussion is that the instant appeal is bereft of any merit, and the same is, therefore, dismissed summarily.Appeal dismissed. *******