JUDGMENT A.K. Rath, J. 1. This review petition has been preferred by the Federation of Indian Mineral Industries seeking review of the judgment and order dated 2.4.2014 passed in Federation of Indian Mineral Industries, New Delhi and another vs. State of Odisha & others and a batch, whereby this Court upheld the Memo No. 8620/SM dated 5th December, 2012 issued by the Principal Secretary to Government of Odisha, Steel and Mines Department and disposed of the writ petitions with certain directions. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the Principal Secretary to Government of Odisha, Steel and Mines Department issued a memo No.8620/SM dated 5th December, 2012 directing that at least 50% of the iron ore lumps and 50% of the fines won from the mines in any month, but not put to captive use by the lessees, shall be sold to the stand alone mineral based industries located in the State, limited to the requirement of such user industries, in an equitable manner, on payment of the prevailing fair market price by the user industries to the mining lessees. The reason for the above direction as mentioned in the impugned order is that the State based iron ore industries are facing acute shortage of iron ore, seriously affecting the production. Few of them are facing closure and others are experiencing low utilization of their existing capacity. There is likelihood of adverse socio-economic consequences of unemployment, loss of wages and impact on investment climate and industrialization process in the State. Therefore, it became necessary, in the greater public interest, to take measures to make adequate raw material available to the State based industries so as to maintain the pace of industrial growth and avoid adverse socio economic consequences. 3. The exercise of power purports to be under Rule 27(1)(m) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as “the MCR) which provides that the State Government shall at all times have the right of preemption of the minerals won from the land in respect of which the lease has been granted, on payment of fair market price. 4. The petitioner has filed the writ petition being WP(C) No.20774 of 2013 challenging, inter alia, the said memo. Several other writ petitions were also filed. Pursuant to issuance of notice, a counter affidavit was filed by the opposite parties. 4. The petitioner has filed the writ petition being WP(C) No.20774 of 2013 challenging, inter alia, the said memo. Several other writ petitions were also filed. Pursuant to issuance of notice, a counter affidavit was filed by the opposite parties. After hearing the matter at length, this Court held that the impugned memo is within the competence of the State under Rule 27(1)(m) of the MCR and is not an additional condition of lease which is beyond the scope of Rule 27(3) of MCR, though accompanied by a curable procedural deficiency for want of procedure for exercise of right by the State itself and fixation of price and quantity of the minerals in respect of which right of pre-emption is exercised. The impugned order is neither beyond the scope of competence of the State nor violates the right of lessee under Article 19(1)(g) or Article 301 of the Constitution of India. It was further held that the content of right under Rule 27(1)(m) is sui generic. There is no compulsion to read any fetter on transferability of benefit of exercise of such right. Fettering the said right on comparison with a customary right will defeat the object thereof. The State has to be left free to exercise its statutory right to promote public interest subject to well known limitation on exercise of power by a public authority in dealing with the public property in accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution. While the right of pre-emption must be exercised by the State, benefit of such right can be transferred, in absence of any prohibition. In doing so, there is no violation of any law. This being essentially a matter of procedure, can be cured by laying down appropriate mechanism and validity of impugned memo can be upheld subject to the requirement of procedure being followed. The State must work out an appropriate mechanism to determine price and quantum so that there is compliance of procedure of law even when the State has the right. Since exercise of right of purchase has to be by the State while delivery may be taken and price paid by its nominee, the State must work out such mechanism failing which enforcement of the impugned memo may not be permissible. Since exercise of right of purchase has to be by the State while delivery may be taken and price paid by its nominee, the State must work out such mechanism failing which enforcement of the impugned memo may not be permissible. Having held so, this Court summed of the conclusion as follows: “(i) Ownership of mineral is vested in the State and it has statutory preferential right to purchase the mined mineral against fair market price at the time of preemption; (ii) Right of preemption must be exercised by the State itself and price fixed by it but benefit of such right can be transferred in its discretion; (iii) Impugned memo lacks procedural mechanism by which State directly exercises its right by fixing price, quantum of mineral to be purchased and beneficiary thereof but this deficiency can be cured by mechanism being laid down which is mandatory for validity of exercise of preemption right.” It was held that the impugned memo was in valid exercise of right of preemption under Rule 27(1)(m) of MCR subject to the State evolving a mechanism to give notice to the lessees of quantum of mineral to be purchased and the price thereof, ensuring taking delivery and payment of price within reasonable time. Such mechanism may be notified within three months. In absence thereof, on expiry of period mentioned above, the impugned memo will cease to operate. 5. The aforesaid judgment has been sought to be reviewed on the following grounds: “(1) The State Government has no right to regulate sale of major minerals. The State Government, save and except in respect of the matters and in the manner prescribed in the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as “the MMDR Act”) cannot exercise any other power relating to “regulation and development” of mines and development of minerals as the State is denuded of its legislative powers and consequently, its executive power by reason of the said Parliamentary declaration. Under the scheme of the MMDR Act, the State Government exercises its power only as a ‘delegate’ of the Parliament in respect of matters provided thereunder. (2) Under the Scheme of the MMDR Act and Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, the State Government does not exercise any plenary legislative or executive power. Under the scheme of the MMDR Act, the State Government exercises its power only as a ‘delegate’ of the Parliament in respect of matters provided thereunder. (2) Under the Scheme of the MMDR Act and Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, the State Government does not exercise any plenary legislative or executive power. Even in matters of minor minerals, in respect of which the State Government enjoys much wider power as provided in Section 15 of the MMDR Act, the Supreme Court has held that the State Government has no power to regulate or control ‘sale’ of minerals once they are extracted. Thus the State has no power to ‘channelize’ the sale of iron ore. (3) The State Government has no power to regulate much less introduce “channelization of sale of iron ore” (which is a major mineral) post excavation and extraction of the minerals. The impugned Memo No.8620/SM dated 5th December, 2012 by which the State Government seeks to ‘channelize’ sale of iron ore is thus patently illegal and without jurisdiction. The impugned memo also suffers from ‘vagueness’ as while restricting the sale of iron ore extracted from the mines located within the State to the extent of 50% of the actual produce from such mines, it mandates the mine owners to ‘sell’ (the impugned memo provides that the minerals “shall be sold”) to stand alone mineral based industries situated in the State “limited to the requirement of such user industries” without specifying the actual requirement of each of such stand alone mineral based industries and their capacity to utilize a particular quantity of such mineral. The impugned memo further mandates that 50% of such iron ore shall be sold “in an equitable manner” without spelling out how an individual mine owner could secure compulsory sale of 50% of its production in an “equitable manner”. (4) Even though the decisions cited by the petitioner have been noticed by this Court in Paragraph-7 of the judgment, however, the same appears to have escaped the kind attention of this Court in the judgment as the law laid down therein has not been considered, which needs to be considered and the judgment be reviewed suitably.” 6. Pursuant to issuance of notice a counter affidavit has been filed by the opposite parties 1 and 2 stating therein that there is no error apparent on the face of the record warranting review of the judgment. Pursuant to issuance of notice a counter affidavit has been filed by the opposite parties 1 and 2 stating therein that there is no error apparent on the face of the record warranting review of the judgment. Further, the State Government is in the process of evolving a procedural mechanism for exercise of its right of preemption under Rule 27(1)(m) of MCR. 7. Heard Mr.A.K.Ganguli, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner and Mr.S.P.Mishra, learned Advocate General for the State. 8. Mr. Ganguli, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the judgment omitted to take into consideration the vital contentions of the petitioner urged during the course of argument. In such circumstances, the only remedy available to the petitioner is to seek review of the judgment. The memo proclaimed that there is acute shortage of raw material (iron ore) belied by several documents on record and also escaped the attention of the Court. He further submitted that the State Government has no power to regulate much less to channelize sale of iron ore (a major mineral) and thereby control production of iron ore. He further submitted that the Supreme Court in a series of decisions held that after the enactment of the MMDR Act, in terms of Entry 54 of List-I of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, the legislative power of the State under Entry 23 of List-II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India read with Article 246 stands denuded by virtue of the declaration contained in Section 2 of the MMDR Act. The so called channelization is nothing but an attempt by the State Government to regulate the production and sale of iron ore. He further submitted that since the executive power of the State under Article 162 of the Constitution of India is coextensive with the legislative power, the State, by reason of the MMDR Act, is also denuded of its executive power in respect of matters covered by the MMDR Act and the Rules framed thereunder being MCR. The State, in the matter of regulation of mines and minerals, exercises power as the delegatee of the Parliament and that too, only to the extent provided under the MMDR Act and the MCR. The State, in the matter of regulation of mines and minerals, exercises power as the delegatee of the Parliament and that too, only to the extent provided under the MMDR Act and the MCR. He further submitted that Section 15 of the Act delegates powers in favour of the State to make rules for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith. The State Government even in exercise of rule making power conferred on it by virtue of Section 15 of the MMDR Act cannot make rules for regulating the sale of minerals after they are extracted. He further submitted that no provision exits in the MMDR Act and the MCR empowering the State Government to undertake ‘canalization’ or ‘channelization’ of the sale of major minerals like iron ore much less to the extent of 50% of the production of iron ore by every mining lessee within the State. Canalization/channelization of sale of iron ore by the State Government is thus patently illegal and without any authority of law. The State Government knowing fully well that it lacks power to canalize/channelize the sale of mineral already won and produced by the mining lessees within the State has chosen to secure the said objective by invoking its so-called right of pre-emption under Rule 27(1)(m) of MCR read with Covenant 21 in Part VII of Form K. The memo to the extent seeks to exercise so-called right of pre-emption by the State, is nothing but a blatant attempt to regulate and/or canalize/channelize the sale of iron ore, a major mineral, in respect of which it has no powers. In fact, even in respect of minor minerals, it has no such power to regulate sale of minerals post-extraction of the minerals by the mining lessees. He further submitted that regulation of mines and minerals vests exclusively under the control of Union. State has no jurisdiction to channelize sale of iron ore. Minerals are national wealth. No State can claim exclusive right to use such minerals. He further submitted that the aforesaid submissions addressed by the petitioner escaped the attention of the Court while delivering the judgment. State has no jurisdiction to channelize sale of iron ore. Minerals are national wealth. No State can claim exclusive right to use such minerals. He further submitted that the aforesaid submissions addressed by the petitioner escaped the attention of the Court while delivering the judgment. He further submitted that the judgment under review is bereft of any discussion/consideration with respect to the aforesaid submissions of the petitioner and hence the review petition is the only remedy left to the petitioner. He further submitted that the memo proclaimed that there is acute shortage of raw material (iron ore) belied by several documents on record escaped the attention of the Court and hence not considered. According to Mr. Ganguli, learned Senior Advocate, the State did not conduct any study before issuing the memo and proceeded on the assumption that there is acute shortage of raw material, i.e. iron ore. Though the judgment under review noticed the contention of the petitioner, no findings have been rendered thereon and in fact it was side stepped. The judgment under review omitted to consider that the entire foundation of the memo is flawed and is evident from the documents and material on record, none of which have been taken into consideration in the judgment. He further submitted that the letter dated 5th January, 2013 issued by the opposite party no.3 admitting the fact that the State based industries are not in a position to utilize even 50% of the minerals produced with the State. The data available with IBM demonstrated that the State of Orissa is the largest iron producing State in India and there is/was no shortage of iron ore for consumption by the local industries. The State Government in its counter affidavit not only did not deny the averments made in the writ petition but also reconfirmed the factual position asserted by the petitioner. The State Government merely sought to justify the memo by asserting that the State Government had made a policy decision for ensuring availability of raw material for the industries which has been set up in the State. He further submitted that along with the counter affidavit, a number of representations made on behalf of the local industries received by the State Government were filed. He further submitted that along with the counter affidavit, a number of representations made on behalf of the local industries received by the State Government were filed. The representations show that the there was no shortage of iron ore within the State of Orissa and the only objective of the representationist was somehow to control the price of iron ore. He further submitted that the iron ore is a national wealth. No State can claim exclusive right of usage of the same. No State, merely because it is producing a particular mineral, can formulate a policy for exclusive usage of such mineral disregarding the mandate of Section 2 of the MMDR Act. The petitioner in this regard had cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Association of Natural Gas and Others vs. Union of India and others, (2004) 4 SCC 489 , which held as under: “42. So also the people of the entire country has a stake in the natural gas and its benefit has to be shared by the whole country. There should be just and reasonable use of natural gas for national development. If one State alone is allowed to extract and use natural gas, then other States will be deprived of its equitable share.” 9. Mr. Ganguli, learned Senior Advocate further submitted that the petitioner has also referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Sandur Manganese and Iron Ore Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka, (2010) 13 SCC 1 . Though the Court noticed the decisions cited by the petitioner in the judgment, the same appears to have escaped attention of the Court while delivering the judgment which does not at all deal with the said contentions of the petitioner. This also constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record and hence, the judgment deserves to be suitably reviewed. He further submitted that the covenants in the statutory lease deed (Form K) though urged and referred to during the course of arguments, escaped the attention of the Court. This also constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record and hence, the judgment deserves to be suitably reviewed. He further submitted that the covenants in the statutory lease deed (Form K) though urged and referred to during the course of arguments, escaped the attention of the Court. He further submitted that the judgment under review does not consider the mandate of Section 2 of the MMDR Act and also the stipulations contained in Covenant 1 of Part II and Covenant 21 of Part VII of Form-K of MCR, though attention of the Court was drawn to the said provisions during the course of the oral arguments and also reiterated in the written submissions. Though the judgment has partly considered the stipulations contained in Covenant 21 of Part VII of Form-K, however, the stipulations in Covenant 1 of Part II of Form K has completely escaped the attention of the Court while delivering the judgment. To buttress his submission, he cited the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of State of Tamil Nadu vs. M.P.P. Kavery Chetty, (1995) 2 SCC 402 ; Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. & others, (2003) 2 SCC 111 ; Registrar, Osmania University, Hyderabad and another vs. K. Jyoti Lakshmi, (2000) 9 SCC 177 ; Shankar K Mandal & others vs. State of Bihar and others, (2003) 9 SCC 519 ; Rajender Singh vs. Lt. Governor, Andaman & Nicobar Islands and others, (2005) 13 SCC 289 ; Association of Natural Gas and others vs. Union of India and others, (2004) 4 SCC 489 ; Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka & others, (2010) 13 SCC 1 ; Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. vs. Union of India and others, (2012) 11 SCC 1 ; State of West Bengal vs. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241 ; Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai vs. Bharat Bijlee Limited, (2011) 12 SCC 172; S. Nagaraj & others vs. State of Karnataka & another, (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 595; Commissioner of Sales Tax, J&K & others vs. Pine Chemicals Ltd. & others, (1995) 1 SCC 58 ; M.M. Thomas vs. State of Kerala & another (2000) 1 SCC 666 ; Board of Control for Cricket in India & another vs. Netaji Cricket Club & others, (2005) 4 SCC 741 ; Green View Tea & Industries vs. Collector, Golaghat, Assam & another, (2004) 4 SCC 122 ; Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd. & another vs. Union of India and others, (2001) 1 SCC 91 ; Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. vs. State of Bihar and others, (1990) 4 SCC 557 ; Glass Chatons Importers & Users’ Association vs. Union of India, 1962 1 SCR 862 ; M/s. Daruka & Co. vs. Union of India and others, (1973) 2 SCC 617 ; Distributors (Baroda) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India and others, (1986) 1 SCC 43 ; Hotel Balaji and others vs. State of A.P. and others, 1993 Supp. (4) SCC 536. 10. Per contra, Mr. S.P.Mishra, learned Advocate General, submitted that each and every points taken by the petitioner in the writ petition and the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner were taken into consideration. The present review is in the guise of the appeal to rehear the matter afresh. He further submitted that since there is no error apparent on the face of the record, the application for review is a ruse. 11. The jurisdiction and scope of review is no more res integra. After survey of the earlier decisions, the Supreme Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati and others, AIR 2013 SC 3301 held as follows: “15. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII, Rule 1 of CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction. Summary of the Principles: 16. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction. Summary of the Principles: 16. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: (A) When the review will be maintainable:- (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & others, (1955) 1 SCR 520 : AIR 1954 SC 526 , to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & others, JT 2013 (8) SC 275: 2013 AIR SCW 2905. (B) When the review will not be maintainable:- (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 12. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 12. On the anvil of the decision cited supra, we have given our anxious 13. So far as ground no.1 is concerned, this Court after due consideration to the issue involved. consideration in paragraph-11 of the judgment held that the impugned memo is within the competence of the State under Rule 27(1)(m) of the MCR and is not an additional condition of lease which is beyond the scope of Rule 27(3) of MCR, but there is curable procedural deficiency for want of procedure for exercise of right by the State itself and fixation of price and quantity of the minerals in respect of which right of pre-emption is exercised. The impugned order is neither beyond the scope of competence of the State nor violates the right of lessee under Article 19(1)(g) or under Article 301 of the Constitution of India. Again in paragraph-20, it is held that the State is exercising right under the MMDR Act and MCR only and not by an administrative order unbacked by a valid law. This being the undoubted position of law, there could be no violation of Articles 19(1)(g) or 301. The lessee is acting as per statutory obligation under the covenant of lease as per the Act or Parliament to which Article 304 does not apply. Moreover, there is no challenge to the MMDR Act or MCR. The memo cannot be read as being beyond the scope of Rule 27(1)(m) and is not an additional condition. 14. So far as ground no.2 is concerned, the same has been answered in paragraph-12 of the judgment. This Court held that the MMDR Act and MCR do not affect the ownership of mines and minerals which is vested in the State. The right of lessees flows only from the lease. The lessees do not have a fundamental right to claim right of mining the minerals which are vested in the State. It is undisputed that Rule 27(1)(m) expressly reserves the right of the State to purchase minerals by way of preemption at a fair market price prevailing at the time of pre-emption. The lessees do not have a fundamental right to claim right of mining the minerals which are vested in the State. It is undisputed that Rule 27(1)(m) expressly reserves the right of the State to purchase minerals by way of preemption at a fair market price prevailing at the time of pre-emption. While this right of the State cannot be fettered, it is mandatory to lay down procedure for exercise of the right so as to ensure that exercise of the right is by the State itself and not by a third party either in substance or in form. In paragraph-17 also it is held that no decision has been brought to our notice to the effect that after the preemption right is crystallized, benefit or interest thereunder cannot be transferred. In any case, the content of right under Rule 27(1)(m) is sui generic. There is no compulsion to read any fetter on transferability of benefit of exercise of such right. Fettering the said right on comparison with a customary right will defeat the object thereof. The State has to be left free to exercise its statutory right to promote public interest subject to well known limitation on exercise of power by a public authority in dealing with the public property in accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution. In paragraph-20 it is held that the State is exercising right under the MMDR Act and MCR only and not by an administrative order unbacked by a valid law. This being the undoubted position of law, there could be no violation of Articles 19(1)(g) or 301. The lessee is acting as per statutory obligation under the covenant of lease as per the Act of Parliament to which Article 304 does not apply. Moreover, there is no challenge to the MMDR Act or MCR. The memo cannot be read as being beyond the scope of Rule 27(1)(m) and is not an additional condition. 15. With regard to ground no.3, the same has been answered in paragraphs 11, 12 and 17, which have been quoted in extenso in the preceding paragraphs. Further, in paragraph-18 it is held that having regard to the nature of preemption right in the present context, while right of preemption must be exercised by the State, benefit of such right can be transferred, in absence of any prohibition. In doing so, there is no violation of any law. Further, in paragraph-18 it is held that having regard to the nature of preemption right in the present context, while right of preemption must be exercised by the State, benefit of such right can be transferred, in absence of any prohibition. In doing so, there is no violation of any law. Objection of Central Government is also to transfer of exercise of right and not to transfer of benefits of the right. In this view of the matter, only sustainable criticism against the impugned memo is that preferential right of purchase should be exercised by State in the first instance and the State must give notice to the lessee indicating the price and quantum of mineral sought to be purchased in exercise of preemption right but in the impugned memo this procedure is not clearly laid down. This being essentially a matter of procedure, can be cured by laying down appropriate mechanism and validity of impugned memo can be upheld subject to the requirement of procedure being followed. The State must work out an appropriate mechanism to determine price and quantum so that there is compliance of procedure of law even when the State has the right. Since exercise of right of purchase has to be by the State while delivery may be taken and price paid by its nominee, the State must work out such mechanism failing which enforcement of the impugned memo may not be permissible. 16. In the written note of submission it is stated that though some of the judgments in this regard relied upon at the time of hearing have been noticed at paragraph-7 of the judgment, the law laid down therein has not been considered. The same is not correct. The decisions cited by the petitioner have been noted in paragraph-7 of the judgment. The paragraph-11 starts with “After due consideration, we are of the view.” That means all the points urged by the petitioner and the decisions cited by the petitioner were taken into consideration while rendering the judgment. The same is not correct. The decisions cited by the petitioner have been noted in paragraph-7 of the judgment. The paragraph-11 starts with “After due consideration, we are of the view.” That means all the points urged by the petitioner and the decisions cited by the petitioner were taken into consideration while rendering the judgment. Further the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhoop Alleged son of Sheo v. Matadin Bhardwaj (dead) by LRs (1991) 2 SCC 128 that preemption right cannot be transferred to a third party has been considered at length in paragraphs 14 to 18 of the judgment by holding that no decision has been brought to our notice to the effect that after the preemption right is crystallized, benefit or interest thereunder cannot be transferred. In any case, the content of right under Rule 27(1)(m) is sui generic. 17. Let us now consider the decisions cited by Mr.Ganguli at the time of hearing of the review petition. 18. In M.P.P. Kavery Chetty (supra), the validity of Rules 8-D and 19-B and a part of Rule 19-A of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 was challenged before the Madras High Court. The same was struck down as unconstitutional, whereafter the State of Tamil Nadu filed special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The apex Court held that valid differentia exists between State Government companies and Corporations on the one hand and private miners on the other and that it bears close nexus to the object of the said Act. With the object of conserving a rare and precious mineral and ensuring its exploitation in the best possible manner, it is open to the State Government, the rule-making authority in respect of minor minerals under Section 15 of the said Act, to keep mining operations in granite of the kind specified in the amended Rule 19-A, so far as is possible, in its own hands, and to do this by giving preference in the grant of quarrying leases for such granite to State Government Companies or Corporations. The said decision has no application to the facts and circumstances of the case. 19. In Bhavnagar University (supra), a submission was advanced by the learned counsel that the High Court had failed to take into consideration the various contentions. The said decision has no application to the facts and circumstances of the case. 19. In Bhavnagar University (supra), a submission was advanced by the learned counsel that the High Court had failed to take into consideration the various contentions. The Supreme Court held that in such a contingency the remedy for the appellants would lie in filing the appropriate application for review before the High Court. The same view was also taken note of in K. Jyoti Lakshmi (supra). 20. But then, in the instant case, every points urged by the petitioner had been considered at great length. Thus the said decision is distinguishable. 21. In Association of Natural Gas (supra) and Sandur Manganese and Iron Ore Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court held that the State has no legislative competence to enact provisions relating to natural gas and liquefied natural gas and therefore to that extent the Act is ultra vires the Constitution. According to Mr.Ganguli, the State has no legislative competence to issue the impugned memo. The said decision was also referred to in the judgment and this Court held that the impugned memo is within the competence of the State under Rule 27(1)(m) of the MCR. 22. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited (supra) has also been considered by this Court. 23. In State of West Bengal (supra), a suit was filed by the State of West Bengal against the Union of India before the Supreme Court for a declaration that Parliament is not competent to make a law authorising the Union Government to acquire land and rights in or over land, which are vested in a State, and that the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act (XX of 1957) enacted by the Parliament, and particularly Sections 4 and 7 thereof, were ultra vires the legislative competence of Parliament, as also for an injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding under the provisions of those sections of the Act in respect of the coal-bearing lands vested in the plaintiff. The following issues arose for consideration. “1. Whether Parliament has legislative competence to enact a law for compulsory acquisition by the Union of land and other properties vested in or owned by the State as alleged in para 8 of the plaint? 2. The following issues arose for consideration. “1. Whether Parliament has legislative competence to enact a law for compulsory acquisition by the Union of land and other properties vested in or owned by the State as alleged in para 8 of the plaint? 2. Whether the State of West Bengal is a sovereign authority as alleged in para 8 of the plaint? 3. Whether assuming that the State of West Bengal is a sovereign authority, Parliament is entitled to enact a law for compulsory acquisition of its lands and properties? 4. Whether the Act or any of its provisions are ultra vires the legislative competence of Parliament? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any relief and if so, what relief?” The Supreme Court recorded the following findings on the issues. Issue 1 – In the affirmative. Issue 2 – Not such as to disentitle the Union Parliament to exercise its legislative power under Entry 42 List III. Issue 3 – Answer covered by answer on issue 2. Issue 4 – In the negative. Issue 5 – In the negative. The said decision has no application in the facts and circumstances of the case. 24. The ratio decided in Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd. (supra) has also no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Interpreting the provision of the MMDR Act, the Supreme Court held that levying royalty on minerals is within legislative competence of Parliament. 25. In Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. (supra), the question arose before the Supreme Court was whether the State of Bihar had legal authority to execute leases in favour of the respondents for collection of slurry on payment of royalty to it. The said decision is also distinguishable. 26. In Glass Chatons Importers and Users’ Association (supra) interpretation of the provisions of Section 3 of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947 and Para 6(h) of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955 was the subject-matter of consideration. The Supreme Court held that they do not contravene Article 31 of the Constitution as no question of acquisition of any right arises by the refusal of a licence. In M/s. Daruka & Co. (supra), the notice issued by the Controller of Imports and Exports under the provisions of Imports and Exports Act, 1947 was impugned. Thus both the decisions are distinguishable. 27. In M/s. Daruka & Co. (supra), the notice issued by the Controller of Imports and Exports under the provisions of Imports and Exports Act, 1947 was impugned. Thus both the decisions are distinguishable. 27. The decisions of the Supreme Court in S. Nagaraj (supra), Commissioner of Sales Tax, J & K (supra), M.M. Thomas (supra), Board of Control for Cricket in India (supra) and Green View Tea & Industries (supra) deal with scope of review. There is no quarrel over the enunciation of law laid down by the Supreme Court. To reiterate in Kamlesh Verma (supra) the Supreme Court has succinctly stated the principles, which have been quoted in the preceding paragraph. 28. Mr. Ganguli laid much emphasis on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Distributors (Baroda) Pvt. Ltd. (supra). Deriving comfort and strength from the wise and inspiring words of Justice Bronson in Pierce vs. Delameter A.M.Y. at page 18 that "a Judge ought to be wise enough to know that he is fallible therefore everready to learn : great and honest enough to discard all mere pride of opinion and follow truth wherever it may lead : and courageous enough to acknowledge his errors", the Supreme Court in Distributors (Baroda) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) opined that to perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of judicial conscience. But then what is the error apparent on the face of the record? 29. Before parting with this case, we may refer with profit the immortal words of Justice Krishna Iyer in Sow Chandra Kanta and another vs. Sheik Habib, AIR 1975 SC 1500 . “A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition through different counsel of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. The very strict need for compliance with these factors is the rationale behind the insistence of counsel's certificate which should not be a routine affair or a habitual step. A mere repetition through different counsel of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. The very strict need for compliance with these factors is the rationale behind the insistence of counsel's certificate which should not be a routine affair or a habitual step. It is neither fairness to the court which decided nor awareness of the precious public time lost what with a huge back-log of dockets waiting in the queue for disposal, for counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment of review and fight over again the same battle which has been fought and lost. The Bench and the Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation of judicial time for maximum use. We regret to say that this case is typical of the unfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat performance with the review label as passport. Nothing which we did not hear then has been heard now, except a couple of rulings on points earlier put forward. May be, as counsel now urges and then pressed, our order refusing special leave was capable of a different course. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.” 30. Judged on the touchstone of the judicially recognized grounds of review, we are of the unhesitant opinion that present is not a case warranting reconsideration of the judgment and order dated 2.4.2014 under scrutiny. Not only the contentions raised on behalf of the review applicant in the writ proceedings had been attended to and dealt with, resultant conclusions were recorded as well. It is a trite law that mere plausibility of different deductions in the same factual and legal setting would not proprio vigore warrant a review the decision rendered. Such an eventuality per se does not tantamount to an error on the face of the record or attest an acknowledged vitiating infirmity to justify review of a judicial verdict. The review jurisdiction is not akin to one of appeal. Having regard to the legally prescribed constrictions of the scope of review, in our comprehension, the present petition lacks in merit and is accordingly dismissed.