JUDGMENT : 1. The instant writ petition has been preferred seeking the following relief: 1. by an writ, order or direction, the respondents may kindly be directed to screen the candidature of the petitioners under Rule 6 of the Rules of 1998 within the stipulated period and to regularize them as such and they be given all consequential benefits; 2. by an writ, order or direction, in the alternative and in addition thereto, the petitioners further prayed that the impugned orders dated 9.5.2002 and 17.7.2003 may kindly be quashed and set aside; 3. by any writ, order or direction, the respondents may be directed to consider the candidature of the petitioner in response to public advertisement dated 18.8.2008 and to give them preference as they hare having rich experiences; 4. any other appropriate writ, order or direction, which this Hon’ble Court may deem just and proper in the circumstances of the case, may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner. 5. the writ petition may kindly be allowed with costs throughout.” 2. Succinctly stated the facts necessary for disposal of the writ petition are that the Central Government, vide its communication dated 14.3.1995 sanctioned initiation of 10 child development projects in the State of Rajasthan. In turn, the State Government, issued a circular dated 1.11.1995 (Annex.1) sanctioning 10 child development projects all over the State of Rajasthan. The project was sanctioned after seeking due concurrence from the Finance Department. One of the projects was proposed for Panchayat Samiti Bhopalgarh. An advertisement dated 17.6.1996 (Annex.2) was issued by the District Women Development Organisation, Jodhpur inviting applications from eligible candidates for recruitment on temporary project based posts viz. Child Development Project Officer, Assistant Child Development Project Officer, Supervisors in Panchayat Samiti, Bhopalgarh. The petitioners No.1 to 4 herein further claim that being armed with the requisite qualification and eligibility for the post of Supervisor, they applied for the said post and after due selection process conducted by the selection committee, they were selected and offered appointment on the post of Supervisor on purely contractual basis for a period of six months at a salary of Rs.2000/-per month vide office orders dated 8.7.1996, 9.9.1996 and 16.12.1996 issued by the Project Director, District Women Development Agency, Jodhpur. The advertisement specifically stipulates that the posts were temporary and upon the project coming to an end, the services shall come to an automatic end and that the field of work would be at Bhopalgarh. 3. It may be noted at the outset that the writ petition was originally preferred by six petitioners including one Babu Singh Chouhan. When the matter was being heard finally, learned counsel sought to withdraw the writ petition to the extent of the petitioner No.5 Babu Singh Chouhan for pursuing other appropriate legal remedy. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed to the extent of Babu Singh Chouhan by order dated 26.11.2014. The petitioner No.6 claims to have applied for the post of Assistant Child Development Project Officer which was advertised at a later date and was given contractual appointment on the said post by the Coordinator cum Project Director, Children Development Project, Jodhpur vide order dated 1.10.2001. It is averred in the writ petition that the petitioners continued to discharge the duties entrusted to them and also underwent various training programmes conducted by the State Government/its agencies so as to perform their duties more efficiently. 4. It is further claimed that, the State Government, vide order dated 6.1.1998 sanctioned regular pay scales for the employees of various Child Development Projects in the State of Rajasthan. Thereafter, the government also issued an order to provide revised pay scales for the different posts available in the Child Development Projects on 22.5.1999. 5. The petitioners claim that the project, as a matter of fact was an organisation of the State government. It was given façade of a society. Ultimately and despite the above development, a decision was taken on 3.5.2002 directing termination of services of the petitioners as a consequence of the project being taken over by the State of Rajasthan w.e.f. 1.6.2002 under the recommendation of the Collector cum Officiating Chairman, District Women Development Agency, Jodhpur. In pursuance of the said decision, a final order dated 9.5.2002 (Annex.10) was issued by the Coordinator cum Project Director, District Women Development Agency, Jodhpur Child Development Project, Division Bhopalgarh, terminating the services of the petitioners. 6. The petitioners No.1 to 5 filed a writ petition before this Court being DBCWP No.1651/2002 and the petitioner No.6 filed a writ petition being SBCWP No.1763/2002 against the termination of their services. 6. The petitioners No.1 to 5 filed a writ petition before this Court being DBCWP No.1651/2002 and the petitioner No.6 filed a writ petition being SBCWP No.1763/2002 against the termination of their services. This Court passed interim orders in favour of the petitioners on 29.5.2002 and 7.6.2002 respectively restraining the respondents from discontinuing the services of the respective petitioners. While passing the interim orders, the right of the respective petitioner to continue in service was made subject to the final outcome of the writ petition. The said interim order was challenged by State of Rajasthan before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing Civil Appeal Nos.5142/2003 and 5148/2003. The Hon'ble Apex Court whilst deciding the appeals by its order dated 21.7.2003 held that the High Court should not have given such direction at the threshold of the proceedings itself and the relief of the nature which if at all could only have been given at the time of final hearing and disposal of the writ petition. It was further directed that the main writ petition Nos.1731, 1732 and 1651 of 2002 be disposed of expeditiously and till then, the status quo brought about by the interim orders granted by the Supreme Court was directed to be maintained. The petitioners claim that the order passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court was interpreted by the concerned officials in such a fashion that they were allowed to continue on their respective posts. 7. During pendency of the S.L.P., another order dated 17.7.2003 (Annex.12) was passed by the respondents purporting to terminate the services of the petitioners and other similarly situated persons. The petitioners claim that they were given an assurance that they shall be allowed to continue on the post because the project was likely to be revived very shortly and thus they did not challenge the said order. The writ petitions preferred by the petitioners before this Court in the year 2002 were ultimately withdrawn in the year 2009 with liberty to file fresh petitions. 8. Now the petitioners have again approached this Court by way of the instant writ petition assailing the validity and correctness of the order dated 17.7.2003 (Annex.12). The writ petitions preferred by the petitioners before this Court in the year 2002 were ultimately withdrawn in the year 2009 with liberty to file fresh petitions. 8. Now the petitioners have again approached this Court by way of the instant writ petition assailing the validity and correctness of the order dated 17.7.2003 (Annex.12). It is averred in the petition that during the pendency of the litigation, the respondents made numerous unsuccessful attempts to fill up the posts on which the petitioners were working by issuing various advertisements in furtherance of the vacancies occurring upon creation of these posts in the new pay scales in cadre of Women and Child Development. The petitioners claim that they too applied in pursuance of the advertisements but did not receive any response of the respondents. 9. The petitioners have approached this Court with a prayer that subsequent to their initial appointments on the posts of Supervisors (petitioners No.1 to 4) and petitioner No.6 as Assistant Child Development Project Officer, the State government has promulgated the Rajasthan Women and Child Development (State and Subordinate) Service Rules, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules of 1998’). It is averred in the writ petition that the method of recruitment is provided in Rule 6 and as per Rule 6(3)(iii) of the Rules, the persons earlier appointed to the posts included in Schedule-I and II on adhoc or officiating or urgent temporary basis and who have been continuously holding such posts for at least one year on the date of commencement of these rules are entitled to be screened by the committee for adjudging their suitability on the posts held by them provided they possess the requisite qualifications prescribed in the rules either for direct recruitment or promotion or the prescribed qualifications on the basis of which such persons were selected for adhoc/officiating/urgent temporary appointment. It is claimed in the writ petition that upon coming into force of the Rules of 1998, and more particularly Rule 6(3)(iii) thereof, that the petitioners who were appointed in the project on adhoc basis against the posts prescribed in the Schedule I and II of the Rules became entitled to be taken up for screening after having worked on their respective posts for a period much in excess of one year. 10. The State Government has filed a reply claiming that the writ petition is not maintainable. 10. The State Government has filed a reply claiming that the writ petition is not maintainable. Much stress has been laid on the nature of appointment of the petitioners which was on purely contractual basis and was specifically limited to the project for which the petitioners were contractually appointed. The services of the petitioners were co-terminus with the project and no sooner the project came to an end, and was taken over by the State Government under a policy decision dated 3.5.2002, the employer of the petitioners ceased to exist and therefore, they have no right to remain or continue in service and claim regularisation. It is stated that the petitioners were appointed on contractual basis for a consolidated remuneration. Thus it is evident that the services of the petitioners came to an automatic end in the year 2002 with the expiry of contract and they have no right to remain in services of the respondents thereafter. A further objection has been raised that the orders in question came to be passed way-back in the year 2002/2003 and much water has flown in the interregnum and thus also, the petitioners are not entitled to the relief claimed for. 11. Shri M.R.Singhvi learned Sr.Counsel vehemently contended on behalf of the petitioners that the act of the respondents in not considering the petitioners for being screened under Rule 6(3)(iii) of the Rules is highly arbitrary and unreasonable. He submitted that the petitioners worked against their respective posts after being given contractual appointment in the year 1996 for an uninterrupted period of six years. The project in which the petitioners were appointed did not come to an end but was rather taken over by the State Government and a specific set of rules was framed in 1998 prescribing new pay scales for these very posts and providing for mode of appointment. As per Rule 6(3)(iii) of the Rules of 1998, the petitioners became entitled to be considered for screening against the respective posts they were holding. He submitted that though the appointment of the petitioners was cloaked as a contractual appointment but as a matter of fact it was nothing but a regular appointment after due selection by the Coordinator cum Project Director, who was acting as an extension of the State Government. He submitted that though the appointment of the petitioners was cloaked as a contractual appointment but as a matter of fact it was nothing but a regular appointment after due selection by the Coordinator cum Project Director, who was acting as an extension of the State Government. He further urged that it is not in dispute that the vacancies of qualified and experienced persons for the posts on which the petitioners were appointed were subsequently advertised by the Women and Child Development Department of the State of Rajasthan under the Rules of 1998 but the efforts to fill the same proved unfruitful. Thus the petitioners having worked and having gained experience by working on their respective posts for a long period of six years were entitled to be considered for being screened and appointed against the said vacancies. Learned counsel referred to the order dated 8.5.2014 passed by this Court wherein this Court virtually decided the issue that the ultimate employer of the petitioners was the State of Rajasthan and not the agency. By the said order, the Court directed the respondent department to consider the candidature of the petitioners for screening and regularisation in light of the Rule 6(3)(iii) of the Rules of 1998 as the petitioners offered to forego the back wages. Thereafter, when the matter was taken up by this Court on 30.7.2014, this Court was informed that the State Government proposed to challenge the order dated 8.5.2014 before the Hon'ble Division Bench and that is why the cases of the petitioners were not taken up for screening. However, learned counsel referred to the order dated 7.7.2014, which was filed by the respondents at a later date with the I.A.No.3736/2014 and as per which, the petitioners’ cases were taken up for screening purposes and were rejected on the ground that they were not initially appointed on adhoc or temporary basis and thus, were not entitled to be appointed on the respective posts in reference to Rule 6(3)(iii). Learned counsel attacked the legality and correctness of the order dated 7.7.2014 and submitted that the Division Bench Judgment dated 21.1.2013 which was relied upon by the authority in the case of Rajasthan Subordinate Employees' Union & Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. Learned counsel attacked the legality and correctness of the order dated 7.7.2014 and submitted that the Division Bench Judgment dated 21.1.2013 which was relied upon by the authority in the case of Rajasthan Subordinate Employees' Union & Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (DBCWP No.6600/1992) has no application to the case at hand because the said case was of Prachetas, who claimed absorption in the Women and Child Welfare Department whereas there is no designated post of Prachetas in the Rules of 1998. Learned counsel further submitted that the Hon'ble Division Bench also observed that the respective petitioners in the said case could not satisfy the court that they fulfilled the requisite eligibility criterion under the Rules so as to be considered for appointment to the post of Prachetas. As per him, in light of the order dated 8.5.2014 and otherwise as well, the eligibility of the petitioners to be considered for appointment against the scheduled posts sanctioned under the Rules of 1998 is undisputed. He, therefore, prayed that the order dated 7.7.2014 be quashed and the petitioners be directed to be appointed on the respective posts which were held by them at the time of their initial appointment with all notional consequential benefits. He submitted that the petitioners are ready to forego the back-wages if they are offered appointments even now. 12. Per contra, Shri Sajjan Singh learned counsel appearing on behalf of Shri P.S.Bhati, AAG, for the State, vehemently opposed the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. He contended that the petitioners were given temporary project based appointments on purely contractual basis looking to the exigencies and the requirement arising from the launching of an experimental project of child development at the Panchayat Samiti Bhopalgarh. The advertisement issued by the District Women Development Board and the appointment orders issued to the petitioners clearly stipulate that the posts being advertised were co-terminus with the project and would come to an end automatically upon the culmination of the project. He submitted that as soon as the project came to an end, the services of the petitioners who were working on purely temporary basis came to an automatic end and they are not entitled to be continued in service thereafter. He submitted that as soon as the project came to an end, the services of the petitioners who were working on purely temporary basis came to an automatic end and they are not entitled to be continued in service thereafter. He relied on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 and urged that the writ petitions are meritless and deserve to be rejected. He argued that the petitioners were appointed on purely contractual basis and thus, they do not have any right to seek regularisation of their services on the strength of the rules promulgated at a later date. Strong reliance was placed by Shri Sajjan Singh on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Md.Abdul Kadir & Anr. Vs. Director General of Police, Assam & Ors. Reported in (2009)6 SCC 611 and it was contended that the prayer made by the petitioners to be considered for screening is highly belated and totally contrary to the proposition of law propounded in Md.Abdul Kadir’s judgment (supra) and therefore also, the writ petition deserves rejection. However, the contention advanced by the petitioners’ counsel that the posts created upon coming into force of the Rules of 1998 have not yet been filled was not controverted 13. Heard and considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material available on record and also the case law cited at the bar. 14. It is not in dispute that the petitioners were appointed on purely temporary/contractual basis in pursuance of an advertisement issued by the District Women Development Organisation which is an organisation of the State Government as already concluded by this Court while considering the matter on 8.5.2014. The fact that the petitioners fulfill the requisite eligibility criterion for the respective posts created under the Rules of 1998 is also not in dispute. The interim order dated 8.5.2014 passed by this Court has a material bearing on the case because, though initially the State expressed its intent to challenge the said order but later on, the endeavor to challenge the said order was given up. The interim order dated 8.5.2014 passed by this Court has a material bearing on the case because, though initially the State expressed its intent to challenge the said order but later on, the endeavor to challenge the said order was given up. The order dated 8.5.2014 is reproduced hereinunder for the sake of inconvenience:- “In both the writ petitions, petitioners are claiming regularization on their respective post under rule 6 of the Rajasthan Women and Child Development (State and Subordinate) Service Rules, 1998. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that initially the Child and Women Development Department, government of Rajasthan issued sanctioned Child development projects in various panchayat samitis of the State including Bhopalgarh, Jodhpur vide order (Annex.1) dated 01.11.1995. In pursuance of above sanction, an order (Annex.R/1) filed along with reply was issued on 31.07.1996 by the respondent department whereby, the work of child and women development was assigned to District Women Development Agency and the said agency issued an advertisement (Annex.2) for providing appointment on the post of Supervisor on contract basis to the petitioners. All the petitioners except Babu Singh Chouhan and Hanumana Ram were appointed as Supervisor on temporary basis for six months which is after selection by the selection committee which is evident from the orders placed on record as Annex.3 (cumulatively). Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that all the petitioners were provided appointment in the month of July, 1996 and they were allowed to continue on their respective post but abruptly services of all the petitioners were terminated w.e.f. 01.06.2002. Against the said termination order, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1651/2002 and 1731/2002 were preferred by the petitioner before the Division Bench of this Court in which an interim order was passed on 29.05.02 whereby, it was specifically ordered that services of persons named in Annex.9 shall not be terminated until further orders. The order passed by the Division Bench of this Court on 29.05.02 was challenged by the respondent department before Hon'ble Supreme Court by way of filing S.L.P. No. 22811/2002 in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed an order on 21.07.2003 whereby matter was remanded to the High Court for deciding the writ petition itself but in the order, it was specifically observed that status quo brought about by the interim order granted by the Court shall continue. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that just four days before passing of the order by Hon'ble Supreme Court, the services of petitioners were terminated vide order dated 17.07.03, the said order was challenged by the petitioner in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1651/2002 and 1731/2002 but the writ petitions were withdrawn with liberty to file fresh on 20.01.2009. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that above writ petitions were withdrawn with liberty to file fresh on the ground that case of petitioners were not considered in accordance with Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India in which a specific provision was incorporated to consider the cases of those employees working on adhoc or officiating or urgent temporary basis in the department on their respective post from last one year. The Rules were framed in the year 1998 at that time petitioners were working on their respective posts. While attacking upon the action taken by the respondents to terminate the services, it is submitted that petitioners were entitled to be screened by the Screening committee for the purpose of regularization as per the Rules framed in the year 1998 but without considering their candidature for the purpose of regularization straightaway their services were terminated on the ground that appointments were made by the agency on contract basis. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that when a conscious decision was taken for framing rules and in the rules, it is specifically provided that all those persons who worked for last more than one year on urgent temporary, adhoc basis will be screened by the screening committee for the purpose of regularization then respondents were under obligation to consider the case of petitioners for the purpose of regularization but without consideration under Rule 6 of the Rule of 1998, the services of petitioners were terminated. It is informed by the counsel for the petitioners that petitioners are not in service since 2003 but they are claiming right of regularization under the Rules of 1998 because in the year 1998, they were in service. It is also submitted that if respondents will consider their case for regularization and found that they are entitled for regularization, then petitioners are ready to forego their back wages. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that appointments were given by the agency, therefore, petitioners cannot claim regularization as per Rules of 1998. It is also submitted that if respondents will consider their case for regularization and found that they are entitled for regularization, then petitioners are ready to forego their back wages. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that appointments were given by the agency, therefore, petitioners cannot claim regularization as per Rules of 1998. The rules of 1998 were promulgated for regulating the service conditions of employees working in the Child and Development Department, petitioners were appointed by the agency, therefore, they are not entitled for any relief as prayed by them for regularization. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, it emerges from the facts that petitioners are litigating their claim since 2002 and in this writ petition, their claim is that respondents are under obligation to consider their case for regularization in view of Rule 6 (3) Clause 3 but without considering their candidature, straightaway terminated their services solely on the ground that appointments were made through agency. Prima facie I am of the opinion that as per Annex.R/1 in fact, the finance was sanctioned by the Child and Women Development and the work of Women and child development was assigned to the agency meaning thereby, the ultimate employer was State of Rajasthan, therefore, whatever appointment was made by the agency as per sanction issued by the Government is required to be treated appointment by the State Government and not by the agency. In view of above, before adjudicating the controversy finally, I deem it appropriate to grant one opportunity to the respondent Department to consider the candidature of petitioners for regularization in the light of Rule 6(3) Clause 3 of the rules of 1998 because petitioners are ready to forego their back wages. In view of above facts, the respondent department is directed to consider the case of petitioners for the purpose of regularization in the light of Rule 6(3) Clause 3 of the Rules of 1998 while treating these petitioners appointed as per sanction of the Government in the year 1998 and final decision may be submitted before this Court on 15.07.2014. It is expected from the State Government that the prayer of petitioner to forego back wages will be considered objectively. List the matter on 15.07.2014.” 15. It is expected from the State Government that the prayer of petitioner to forego back wages will be considered objectively. List the matter on 15.07.2014.” 15. Though, if the matter is plainly examined in light of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Md.Abdul Kadir (supra) cited by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, ex-facie, the claim of the petitioners for regularization in the cadre would have no legs to stand in light of the principles enunciated in the aforesaid judgment. But there are certain peculiar circumstances, which make the present case distinguishable on facts. The Hon'ble Apex Court, whilst dealing with Md.Abdul Kadir’s case was seized of a controversy wherein relief of regularization was sought by the adhoc appointees in a particular project having undergone officiations of decades. The Hon'ble Supreme Court turned down the prayer that the Court should come to the aid of such persons and direct their regularization for the reason that the direction so sought would be a direct intervention in the policy decision of the State/Union. 16. From the facts which have been noted hereinabove, it is evident that much water has flown in this case during the pendency of the litigation. The State Government itself has admittedly taken over the project in which the petitioners’ services were utilized on temporary basis and has framed Recruitment Rules of 1998 with the creation of post in the schedule and framing a specific provision for regularization against the sanctioned post of such persons who were working on adhoc/officiating basis under the original project. It cannot be gainsaid that the scheme of Child and Women Development has come to stay. This Court, by order dated 8.5.2014 has virtually decided the issue regarding the nature of the petitioners’ initial appointments by holding that the employment of the petitioners by the agencies was as a matter of fact an employment by the State and the agencies were merely a front for the State. This Court, by order dated 8.5.2014 has virtually decided the issue regarding the nature of the petitioners’ initial appointments by holding that the employment of the petitioners by the agencies was as a matter of fact an employment by the State and the agencies were merely a front for the State. Thus, even though to some extent and superficially, the judgment rendered in Abdul Kadir’s case (supra) does touch the controversy involved in the case at hand but if the matter is examined minutely, there are major factual distinctions specially the subsequent developments i.e. the sanctioning of the posts and the merger of the project in the State Government and thus, the writ petition cannot be thrown out on the basis of the above judgment. As such, giving due respect to the principle of law enunciated by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Abdul Kadir (supra), it has to be held that the case in hand significantly and materially distinguishable on facts and thus, has to be decided on its own merits and on the basis of the facts available on record. 17. In pursuance of the order dated 8.5.2014, the petitioners' cases were taken up for screening and thereafter, were rejected by order dated 7.7.2014 on the ground that their original appointments did not fall within the categories of temporary/adhoc, officiating or urgent temporary appointments and thus, they were not entitled to be regularized under the Rules of 1998. It is relevant to mention here that the rules for recruitment of Supervisors and Assistant Child Development Project Officer in the Women and Child Development Department were promulgated for the first time in the year 1998 and before that, there were no service rules prescribing the conditions of recruitment of persons against the said posts. As a matter of fact, the substantive posts were sanctioned for the first time upon coming into force of these rules. 18. Posts of Women Supervisors and Assistant Child Development Project Officer in the Department were included in the schedule appended to the Rules. The requirement of these posts arose for the first time when the Central Government gave directions to the State Government and sanctioned the initiation of Child Development Projects on experimental basis in 10 Panchayat Samities in the State. The fact that the Child Development Programme, which was initiated on an experimental basis continues unabated is not disputed. The requirement of these posts arose for the first time when the Central Government gave directions to the State Government and sanctioned the initiation of Child Development Projects on experimental basis in 10 Panchayat Samities in the State. The fact that the Child Development Programme, which was initiated on an experimental basis continues unabated is not disputed. Service Rules of 1998 have been framed for giving effective operational strength to this programme. Thus, definitely the petitioners' appointment has to be taken to be an adhoc/urgent temporary appointment as referred to in Rule 6(3)(iii) of the Rules. By the order dated 6.1.1998 (Annex.7), number of the temporary posts sanctioned for the integrated children development schemes initiated on 4.11.1996 was increased. The relevant portion of the said order is quoted herein-below for the sake of convenience:- ^^fo"k;kUrxZr foHkkxh; Lohd`fr Øekad 62178 fnukad 4-11-1996 ds }kjk vkbZ lh Mh ,l ;kstukUrxZr lh ,l ,l en ds ,oa Lohd`fr Øekad 62429 fnukad 4-11-1996 ds }kjk vk;kstuk en esa lapkfyr ifj;kstukvksa ¼Lohd`fr Øekad 65005 fnukad 21-11-1996 ds }kjk lh ,l ,l en esa LFkkukarfjr½ ds vLFkkbZ inksa dh vfHko`f) fnukad 1-3-1997 rd dh xbZ FkhA o"kZ 1997&98 gsrq fuEu fooj.kkuqlkj Lohd`r vLFkk;h inksa dh vfHko`f) fnukad 1-3-1997 ls 28-2-1998 rd djus dh Lohd`fr ,rn~}kjk iznku dh tkrh gSA** 19. Woman Supervisor is one of the post mentioned in the said order/circular. The State Government in its reply could not have and has rightly not denied the contents of the said document. Though, the initial appointment of the petitioners was for a period of six months only but the fact remains that the services of the petitioners were continuously and incessantly utilized till the year 2002. As per the initial appointment order, the posts were co-terminus with the project and were to be eclipsed upon the project coming to an end. Though, the initial appointment of the petitioners was for a period of six months only but the fact remains that the services of the petitioners were continuously and incessantly utilized till the year 2002. As per the initial appointment order, the posts were co-terminus with the project and were to be eclipsed upon the project coming to an end. It is undisputed that the project which was initiated in the year 1996 on experimental basis, never culminated but rather, in the year 2002 was taken over by the State Government vide order dated 3.5.2002 (Annex.9), which has a very material bearing for deciding the controversy involved in the instant writ petition and is reproduced herein-below for the sake of convenience:- ^^jktLFkku ljdkj efgyk ,oa cky fodkl foHkkx Øekad % i-11 ¼3½ 32@eks@eckfo@96@41480 t;iqj fnukad 3-5-2002 vkns’k foHkkx ds iwoZ vkns’k Øekad ,Q 11¼3½32@eks@eckfo@96@44941 fnukad 31-7-1996 esa of.kZr 'krksaZ ds vuqlkj ijh{k.kkRed cky fodkl ifj;kstuk] Hkksikyx<+] tks/kiqj dk leLr iz’kklfud ,oa foRrh; dk;Z lapkyu gsrq fnukad 1-4- 2002 ls 31 -5-2002 rd 2 ekg dh vof/k ds fy, vfHko`f) ftyk efgyk fodkl vfHkdj.k] tks/kiqj dks iznku dh tkrh gSA ftyk efgyk fodkl vfHkdj.k] tks/kiqj dh ifj;kstuk lapkyu gsrq vuqnku fuEuys[kk 'kh"kZ ls ogu fd;k tk;sxk %& ekax la[;k 33 2236&iks"k.k 02&iks"kd Hkkstu rFkk lqis; dk fooj.k 101 & fo’ks"k iks"k.k dk;ZØe ¼001½ & efgyk ,oa cky fodkl foHkkx ds ek/;e }kjk ¼02½ & ,dhd`r cky fodkl ;kstuk ¼lh ,l ,l½ ekax la[;k & 33 2236&iks"k.k 02&iks"kd Hkkstu rFkk lqis; dk forj.k 101 & fo’ks"k iks"k.k dk;ZØe ¼001½ & efgyk ,oa cky fodkl foHkkx ds ek/;e ls ¼01½ & iks"kkgkj ds’k izksxzke@¼vk;kstuk O;;½ ¼05½ & iz/kkuea=h xzkeksn; ;kstuk ¼vk;kstuk O;;½ ekax la[;k &51 2236&iks"k.k 02&iks"kd Hkkstu rFkk lqis; dk forj.k 789 & vuqtkfr gsrq fof’k"B la?kVd ;kstuk ¼001½ & efgyk ,oa cky fodkl foHkkx ds ek/;e }kjk ¼01½ & iks"kkgkj ds’k izksxzke@vk;kstuk O;; ¼02½ & iz/kkuea=h xzkeksn; ;kstuk&vkkstuk O;; ftyk dysDVj ,oa insu v/;{k] ftyk efgyk fodkl vfHkdj.k] tks/kiqj dh vuq’kalk ij cky fodkl ifj;kstuk] Hkksikyx<+ dk lapkyu fnukad 1-6-2002 ls jkT; {ks= esa ¼foHkkxh; {ks=½ vf/kxzghr fd;k tkrk gS A ,lMh & ’kklu milfpo ,oa funs’kd efgyk ,oa cky fodkl foHkkx] jktLFkku t;iqj** 20. From a plain reading of the said order, it is evident, that the Child Development Programme of the Panchayat Samiti Bhopalgarh under which the petitioners were initially employed in the year 1996 was acquired and merged in the Woman and Child Development Department, State of Rajasthan and is a flagship programme of the Government. 21. It is further evident that no rules for recruitment on the post of a Woman Supervisor or on Assistant Child Development Project Officer in the Women and Children Development Department were in existence prior to coming into force of the Rules of 1998. In the Schedules I and II of the Rules of 1998, the posts of Supervisors and Assistant Child Development Project Officer were sanctioned. Rule 6 was framed in the rules providing for the mode of recruitment against the sanctioned posts. Rule 6(3)(iii) on which much stress is laid by the learned counsel for the petitioners has a material bearing and is quoted hereinbelow for the sake of ready reference:- “6. Methods of Recruitment.-(1)… (2) … (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules, the recruitment, promotion, seniority and confirmation etc. of a person who joins the Army/Airforce/Navy during an emergency shall be regulated by such orders and instructions as may be issued by the Government from time to time, provided that these are regulated mutatis mutandis according to the instructions issued on the subject by the Government of India: Provided that:- (i) … (ii) … (iii) the persons not covered under rule 5, who were appointed to the posts included in Schedule-I and II on adhoc or officiating or urgent temporary basis and who have been continuously holding such posts for at least one year on the date of commencement of these Rules shall be screened by a Committee referred to in Rule 27 for adjudging their suitability on the posts held, provided they possessed the requisite qualifications prescribed in the rules either for direct recruitment or promotion or the prescribed qualifications on the basis of which such persons were selected for adhoc/officiating/urgent temporary appointment. This provision shall be subject to the following conditions viz:- (a) A person appointed on adhoc basis shall not be entitled to screening for a post higher than that to which he was initially appointed, if a person senior to him on a lower post who fulfilled qualifications prescribed for the post was either not given such adhoc appointment or is not entitled to screening under this rule. Seniority for this purpose shall be determined according to length of continuous service on a post; (b) The Committee appointed under these Rules for adjudging suitability by screening either as an exception to general methods of recruitment or as initial constitution of Service, may ex-gratia recommend, if any of the employees with more than three years of Service on a post for which he is to be screened is not adjudged suitable and if thereafter has no right to be appointed on a lower post, or such lower post being offered to him/her by absorption and thereupon such an employee shall be treated as surplus employee under the provisions of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Absorption of Surplus Personnel) Rules, 1969 and such employee may be absorbed on the lower post on the recommendations of the Committee subject to such conditions as may be laid down by it. Note:-The provision of screening under proviso (iii) of Rule 6 has been intended to be the first step and after exhausting the vacancies required for screened persons irrespective of direct recruitment and promotion quota shall be applied.” 22. As it is manifest that there existed no prescribed procedure or rules for appointment to the posts of Women Supervisor or Assistant Child Development Project Officer before coming into force of the Rules of 1998, the adhoc/officiating or urgent temporary posts referred to in Rule 6(3)(iii) could only be those posts, which were advertised by the State Government at the time of inception of the Child Development Projects under the scheme sanctioned by the Central Government. It is hardly of any consequence that the petitioners were given appointment orders under the mask of contractual appointments. The fact remains that the appointments were adhoc/temporary appointments made for filling up the posts accruing due to urgent requirement. It is hardly of any consequence that the petitioners were given appointment orders under the mask of contractual appointments. The fact remains that the appointments were adhoc/temporary appointments made for filling up the posts accruing due to urgent requirement. As a consequence, by the effect of Rule 6(3)(iii) of the Rules, such persons who were appointed on adhoc/temporary basis on the posts included in Schedule I and II (the petitioners being covered by post of Supervisor and Assistant Child Development Project Officer mentioned in Schedule) would be entitled to be considered for screening upon having worked on their respective posts for nearly six years continuously from their initial appointment. The reasoning given by the committee constituted under the Directorate of Child and Women Development Department in its order dated 7.7.2014 for rejecting the candidature of the petitioners is totally baseless. The relevant portion of the order dated 7.7.2014 is quoted herein-below for the sake convenience:- ^^;gka ;g Hkh mYys[kuh; gS fd ftyk efgyk fodkl vfHkdj.k ds dfeZdksa }kjk ,d vU; nk;j ;kfpdk esa Mh-ch- flfoy fjV ihVh’ku uacj 6600@1992 esa fnukad 21-1-2013 dks ekuuh; jktLFkku mPp U;k;ky; ihB t;iqj }kjk fuEu izdkj fu.kZ; ikfjr fd;k x;k gSA** ‘It is not disputed that the petitioners were appointed purely on contractual basis on the recommendations made by the placement agencies and their appointments were not made under the Rules. The petitioners have also failed to point out that they were even eligible under the Rules for being considered for appointment to the post of “Prachetas”. Under the circumstances, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the respondents have violated the fundamental rights of the petitioners or meted out any discriminatory treatment from amongst the persons similarly situated. The Division Bench at the principal seat, Jodhpur has also considered the similar issues as have been raised in the present petitions, and dismissed the prayer seeking regularisation of the petitioners on the post of “Prachetas”. In view of the above, we do not find any substance in the present petitions and hold that the petitioners are not entitled. All the four petitions being bereft of merits, deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. In view of the above, we do not find any substance in the present petitions and hold that the petitioners are not entitled. All the four petitions being bereft of merits, deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. Copy of this judgment be placed in the other three petitions.” ^^mi;qZDr fu.kZ; esa Hkh ekuuh; U;k;ky; us ftyk efgyk fodkl vfHkdj.k esa fu;qDr dkfeZdksa dks fu;ferhdj.k ds ;ksX; ugha ekuk gSA mi;qZDr fu;eksa ds lanHkZ esa ;kfpdkdrkZvksa ds izdj.k dks fopkfjr fd;k x;kA pwafd budh fu;qfDr;k¡a iw.kZr% vuqcU/k ,oa lesfdr osru ij vk/kkfjr gSA jktLFkku efgyk ,oa cky fodkl ¼jkT; ,oa v/khuLFk½ lsok fu;e 1998 dh vuqlwph 1 ,oa 2 esa i;Zos{kd dk in gh 'kkflr gksrk gS fdUrq dfu"B fyfid] okgu pkyd ,oa prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh dk in mDr fu;eksa esa 'kkflr ugha gksrk gSA mDr fu;eksa ds fu;e 6 ds ijUrqd 3 esa of.kZrkuqlkj mijksDRk lHkh dh fu;qfDr;ka rnFkZ@ LFkkukiUu@vtsZUV vLFkk;h dh ifjf/k esa ugha vkus ds dkj.k ;kfpdkdrkZ dh lsok,sa fu;ferhdj.k gsrq vfHk’kalk ugha dh tkrh gSA** 23. The committee relied upon a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Rajasthan Subordinate Employees' Union (supra) for rejecting the candidature of the petitioners. The said judgment is totally distinguishable on facts because the Hon'ble Division Bench discarded the case of the concerned petitioners for screening on the ground that they failed to establish that they were eligible under the rules for being considered for appointment to the post of Prachetas. It is not in dispute that the petitioners herein were/are qualified and eligible for being appointed on the post of Supervisor (petitioners No.1 to 4) and Assistant Child Development Project Officer (petitioner No.6). Such petitioners who were not covered under the Schedule I or II have already withdrawn their petitions with the liberty to seek other appropriate legal remedy but the remaining persons who were appointed on adhoc/temporary basis on the post of Supervisors and Assistant Child Development Project Officer definitely have a right to stake a claim of being screened as being eligible and entitled for being absorbed against the posts in terms of Rule 6(3)(iii). The rejection of the petitioners claim on the ground that their services were neither adhoc nor officiating nor urgent temporary, is totally illegal and arbitrary. The rejection of the petitioners claim on the ground that their services were neither adhoc nor officiating nor urgent temporary, is totally illegal and arbitrary. The learned counsel for the respondents has failed to point out from any Rules of recruitment, the source from where the adhoc/officiating or urgent temporary incumbents would become available for laying a claim of regularization on the basis of Rule 6(3)(iii). The State’s counsel also did not dispute that the posts are still lying vacant. 24. The objection of belated challenge to the arbitrary action of the respondents is also not of much consequence as the petitioners were prosecuting with due diligence their earlier writ petitions which were withdrawn in the year 2009 with liberty to file fresh petitions. Thereafter, during pendency of the instant writ petition, the order dated 7.7.2014 came to be passed and the petitioners have challenged the validity thereof. 25. Consequently, the writ petition deserve to be and is hereby allowed. The order dated 7.7.2014 which has been placed on record with the I.A.No.3736/2014 rejecting the petitioners' case for being screened under Rule 6(3)(iii) of the Rules of 1998 on the ground that they were not appointed on adhoc/officiating/urgent temporary basis, is quashed and set aside. The order (Annex.10) dated 9.5.2002 and the order (Annex.12) dated 17.7.2003 are also quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to take up the cases of the petitioners for screening in accordance with Rule 6(3)(iii) of the Rules of 1998 treating their original appointments to be adhoc/urgent temporary appointments within a period of four weeks from the date of this order. The petitioners have already conceded at the outset that they shall not claim back-wages for the period which they have not worked and accordingly, if the petitioners are given appointment, they shall not be entitled to back-wages. However, the petitioners shall be entitled to notional benefits. 26. No order as to costs.