JUDGMENT 1. - These writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners aggrieved against orders dated 23.01.2015 passed by the trial court, whereby, the applications filed by the respective petitioners under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment in the written statements have been rejected by the trial court. 2. The plaintiff-respondent Chaudhary Ishardas Dharmshala Trust, Raisinghnagar ('the Trust') filed suits for eviction against the petitioners under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ('the Act'); it was, inter alia, claimed in the suits that the tenancy of the petitioners have been terminated by issuance of notices under Section 106 of the Act and as the possession of the suits premises has not been handed over, the plaintiff-Trust was entitled for possession of the suits premises. 3. The petitioners filed written statements and denied the averments made in the plaints, inter alia, disputing the contents of the notices and its validity. 4. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed issues and the parties led their evidence. 5. From the averments made in the petitions it appears that during the pendency of the suits, the Sub District Collector, Raisinghnagar ('the Collector') inquired into the complaints made against the Trust and passed an order dated 05.08.2015 and, inter alia, ordered for resumption of land under the provisions of Section 80(1) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 and further ordered that the Trust would stand resumed and be handed over to the Municipal Board, Raisinghnagar; the Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Raisinghnagar was directed to take possession from the President of the Trust - Tarsemlal and do the needful. 6. Based on the order dated 05.08.2014 (Annexure-3) passed by the Collector, the petitioners filed applications under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment in the written statements by inserting para 23. 7. The applications were replied to by the plaintiff-Trust and were opposed. 8. After hearing the parties, the trial court by its impugned orders dated 23.01.2015 dismissed the applications filed by the petitioners, inter alia, on coming to the conclusion that by order dated 05.08.2014 the controversy involved in the suits was not affected, the order does not dissolve the Trust; applications of the same intent were also filed on 30.10.2014, which were rejected on 28.11.2014 and the same issue has been re-agitated only with a view to delay the proceedings. 9. 9. The trial court while deciding the applications, inter alia, examined the validity of the order dated 05.08.2014 and prima facie found that the same was apparently not legal and also noticed that the order has been challenged before the High Court and there was an interim stay and, consequently, dismissed the applications with a cost of Rs. 1,000/-. 10. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that the trial court was not justified in rejecting the applications filed by the petitioners and the effect of passing of the order dated 05.08.2014 was required to be judged for the purpose of determination of real question in controversy between the parties; it was submitted that by the order dated 02.08.2014 the Trust cease to have any interest in the suits property and only because the order dated 05.08.2014 has been stayed in the writ petition filed by the Trust, the same by itself cannot wipe out the effect of order dated 05.08.2014; it was submitted that the previous order dated 28.11.2014 was passed by the trial court on applications filed by the petitioners based on the fact that despite passing of the order dated 05.08.2014, as the Municipal Board has not got itself impleaded as party, the suits were not maintainable, which applications were rejected based on the fact that on account of interim order granted by the High Court, the order has not become effective; it was submitted that the order dated 05.08.2014, which has come into existence during the pendency of the present writ petitions, has the effect of taking away the right of the plaintiff to maintain/continue with the suits and, therefore, the amendment deserves to be permitted; it was further pointed out that in another suit filed by the Trust against another tenant, the trial court by order dated 07.04.2015 (Annexure-7) has accepted similar amendment. 11. Reliance was placed on the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association : (1992) 3 SCC 1 , Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal & Ors. v. K.K. Modi & Ors. : (2006) 4 SCC 385 , Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. : (2001) 8 SCC 97 , Sajjan Kumar v. Ram Kishan : (2005) 13 SCC 89 , Surender Kumar Sharma v. Makhan Singh : (2009) 10 SCC 626 and Abdul Rehman & Anr. v. Mohd. Ruldu & Ors. v. K.K. Modi & Ors. : (2006) 4 SCC 385 , Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. : (2001) 8 SCC 97 , Sajjan Kumar v. Ram Kishan : (2005) 13 SCC 89 , Surender Kumar Sharma v. Makhan Singh : (2009) 10 SCC 626 and Abdul Rehman & Anr. v. Mohd. Ruldu & Ors. : (2012) 11 SCC 341 . 12. Vehemently opposing the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners, learned counsel for the respondent-Trust submitted that the applications filed by the petitioners were mere abuse of process of the Court and, therefore, the same deserve to be dismissed with heavy costs; it was submitted that similar applications were filed by the petitioners on 30.10.2014, which were rejected by the trial court on 28.11.2014 and where after the present applications have been filed seeking to raise the same issue all over again; it was submitted that it is well settled principle of law that principle of res judicata is applicable not only in separate subsequent proceedings but also applies in subsequent stage of the same proceedings and, therefore, the applications were not maintainable; it was further submitted that the order dated 05.08.2014 was ex facie without jurisdiction and the same already stands stayed by this Court in writ petition filed by the plaintiff-Trust and, therefore, the order dated 05.08.2014 cannot be relied on by the petitioners for any purpose whatsoever; it was submitted that the applications have been filed by the petitioners merely with a view to delay the pending proceedings, inasmuch as, the same is pending for final arguments since 2007; regarding the order passed in similar suit filed by the Trust against another tenant, it was submitted that in the said suit even the issues had not been framed and, therefore, the application was accepted by the trial court; it was further submitted that the suits filed by the petitioners irrespective of passing of the order dated 05.08.2014 were ultimately upheld, the Municipal Board would be entitled to execute the decree and recover possession, the petitioners cannot be permitted to take advantage of passing of the order dated 05.08.2014 so as to delay the proceedings. 13. Reliance was placed on LR's of Pratap Mal v. Smt. Prem Bai & Ors. : 2001 WLC (Raj.) UC 321 , Ram Babu v. Ramavtar Gupta : 2014 Raj. 13. Reliance was placed on LR's of Pratap Mal v. Smt. Prem Bai & Ors. : 2001 WLC (Raj.) UC 321 , Ram Babu v. Ramavtar Gupta : 2014 Raj. CANDID 1486 , Sudhir Kumar Wadhwa v. IVth Additional District & Sessions Judge, Shahjahanpur & Ors. : 1997 (1) CCC 223 (Allahabad) , Rakesh Bala Aneja v. Sushil Bajaj Ors. : 2012 (4) CCC 117 (Allahabad) , Kamaljit Singh v. Sarabjit Singh : 2014 (Suppl.) CCC 607 (SC) , Rajbahadur Yadav & Ors. v. Rizvi Estates & Hotels Pvt. Ltd. : 2014 (Suppl.) CCC 613 (Bombay) and Romesh Kumar alias Mesha v. Rama Kumari alias Rama Kundra V. 2010 (3) CCC 875 (P&H) . 14. I have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material placed on record. 15. v. Rizvi Estates & Hotels Pvt. Ltd. : 2014 (Suppl.) CCC 613 (Bombay) and Romesh Kumar alias Mesha v. Rama Kumari alias Rama Kundra V. 2010 (3) CCC 875 (P&H) . 14. I have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material placed on record. 15. At the outset it may be noticed that the order dated 05.08.2014 came to be passed by the Collector during the pendency of the suits; the Collector by his order, inter alia, for the reasons indicated in the order came to the following conclusion:- " uxjikfydk jk;flaguxj ds cksMZ ds izLrko la[;k 17 fnukad 19-3-1964 rFkk izLrko la[;k 22 fnukad 26-5-1964 esa loZlEefr ls fy;s x;s fu.kZ; ,oa 'krksZa dh ikyuk Jh bZ'kjnkl }kjk ugha djus] dzsrk bZ'kjnkl }kjk/keZ'kkyk V~LV dk jftLV~s'ku ugha djkus rFkk pkS/kjh bZ'kjnkl/keZ'kkyk dks uxjikfydk jk;flaguxj }kjk lu~ 1963] 1964 rFkk 1965 esa dqy 12694 oxZQhV Hkwfe dk fd;k fodz; jktLFkku uxjikfydk vf/kfu;e] 1959 dh/kkjk 80 ( 1 ) ds vUrxZr ewyr% voS/k ik;k x;k gS] ftl dkj.k pkS0 bZ'kjnkl/keZ'kkyk dks lu~ 1963] lu~ 1964] lu~ 1965 esa fodz; dh xbZ dqy 12694 oxZQhV Hkwfe jktLFkku uxjikfydk vf/kfu;e] 1959 dh/kkjk 80 ( 1 ) ds vUrxZr okfil uxjikfydk esa fufgr gks xbZ rFkk uxjikfydk dh lEifRr gS Jh bZ'kjnkl }kjk ;g/keZ'kkyk vius O;fDrxr mi;ksx gsrq ugha cukbZ xbZ FkhA Jh bZ'kjnkl ykvkSykn QkSr gks x;s gSaA vr% vc ;g/keZ'kkyk lkoZtfud lEifRr gSA vr% pkS/kjh bZ'kjnkl/keZ'kkyk jk;flaguxj dks lkoZtfud fgr esa vf/kxzg.k dj uxjikfydk dks lEHkyk;s tkus ds vkns'k fn;s tkrs gSaA vf/k'kk"kh vf/kdkjh uxjikfydk jk;flaguxj dks ikcUn fd;k tkrk gS fd pkS/kjh bZ'kjnkl/keZ'kkyk jk;flaguxj ds Hkou ,oa nqdkuksa ij rjlse yky ,oa blds ifjokj ds lnL;ksa }kjk fd;s x;s vfrdze.k dks rqjUr gVkdj vius dCts esa ysosaA pkS/kjh bZ'kjnkl/keZ'kkyk dh nqdkuksa ls izkIr vk; ls bl lkoZtfud/keZ'kkyk dk j[k j[kko djs] j[k j[kko gsrq j[ks x;s vLFkkbZ deZpkfj;ksa dk osru Hkqxrku djsa] pwafd 'kgj esa ,d gh lkoZtfud/keZ'kkyk gS vr% xjhc ifjokjksa ds fookg lekjksg gsrq bls cqd djus rFkk ;kf=;ksa dks Bgjus gsrq dejk nsus ds fy;s eSustj fu;qDr djsA " 16. The effect of the above order, if the same was finally sustained in the pending writ petitions before this Court, would be the cessation of the Trust's ownership of the suits property and the same would result in cessation of lessor's/landlord's interest in the suits property and, the consequence thereof, would be that for maintaining the suits the principal requirement of the party evicting having a good and present title to the property would come to an end; the mere fact that a portion of order dated 05.08.2014 has been stayed by this Court in the writ petitions filed by the petitioners, by itself cannot wipe out the effect of the order dated 05.08.2014 and in fact the same merely remains suspended. 17. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. (supra), inter alia, observed and held as under:- "While considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order. Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date of the passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of the passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence. This means that if an order passed by the Appellate Authority is quashed and the matter is remanded, the result would be that the appeal which had been disposed of by the said order of the Appellate Authority would be restored and it can be said to be pending before the Appellate Authority after the quashing of the order of the Appellate Authority. The same cannot be said with regard to an order staying the operation of the order of the Appellate Authority because in spite of the said order, the order of the Appellate Authority continues to exist in law and so long as it exists, it cannot be said that the appeal which has been disposed of by the said order has not been disposed of and is still pending." 18. So far as validity of the order dated 05.08.2014 is concerned, which the trial court while deciding the applications under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC has prima facie doubted and was vehemently submitted by learned counsel for the respondent Trust, is wholly without jurisdiction and bad in law, the settled position of law regarding grant of amendments has been noticed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal (supra), wherein, it was, inter alia, laid down that the Court should not go into correctness or falsity of the case in the amendment, nor record a finding on merits of amendment at the stage of considering the prayer for amendment and it was observed as under:- "18. As discussed above, the real controversy test is the basic or cardinal test and it is the primary duty of the court to decide whether such an amendment is necessary to decide the real dispute between the parties. If it is, the amendment will be allowed; if it is not, the amendment will be refused. On the contrary, the learned Judges of the High Court without deciding whether such an amendment is necessary have expressed certain opinions and entered into a discussion on merits of the amendment. In cases like this, the court should also take notice of subsequent events in order to shorten the litigation, to preserve and safeguard the rights of both the parties and to subserve the ends of justice. It is settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the rule of amendment is essentially a rule of justice, equity and good conscience and the power of amendment should be exercised in the larger interest of doing full and complete justice to the parties before the court. 19. While considering whether an application for amendment should or should not be allowed, the court should not go into the correctness or falsity of the case in the amendment. Likewise, it should not record a finding on the merits of the amendment and the merits of the amendment sought to be incorporated by way of amendment are not to be adjudged at the stage of allowing the prayer for amendment. This cardinal principle has not been followed by the High Court in the instant case." 19. Likewise, it should not record a finding on the merits of the amendment and the merits of the amendment sought to be incorporated by way of amendment are not to be adjudged at the stage of allowing the prayer for amendment. This cardinal principle has not been followed by the High Court in the instant case." 19. As such, the entire exercise taken up by the trial court and sought to be emphasised by the respondent Trust is essentially premature at this stage; the only parameter, regarding which, the applications need to be considered is as to whether the amendment was necessary for determining the real question and controversy between the parties. 20. As noticed hereinbefore, the fact that the party evicting must have a good and present title to the property is a sine qua non for the purpose of maintaining a suit for eviction/possession, the amendment sought by the petitioners in view of the order dated 05.08.2014 passed by the Collector goes to the root of the matter and is necessary for determining the real question and controversy between the parties and the trial court was not justified in dismissing the applications on the purported ground of the order dated 05.08.2014 having no effect on the merits of the pending suits. 21. So far as the arguments raised by learned counsel for the respondent Trust on account of rejection of applications dated 30.10.2014 filed by the petitioners are concerned, a bare look at the applications (Annexure-R/1) would reveal that the applications were filed questioning the right of the Trust to continue with the suits in view of the order dated 05.08.2014 and the fact that Municipal Board was not impleaded as a party to the suits. The trial court by its order dated 28.11.2014 rejected the applications on the ground that as the petitioners have admitted the landlord tenant relationship and the order has been stayed by the High Court, the order passed by the Collector was not final and effective. 22. The trial court by its order dated 28.11.2014 rejected the applications on the ground that as the petitioners have admitted the landlord tenant relationship and the order has been stayed by the High Court, the order passed by the Collector was not final and effective. 22. It would be seen that the applications were not for the purpose of seeking amendment in the written statements and the trial court while deciding the applications had not adjudicated the aspect as raised in the applications and simply on the ground of admission of tenant landlord relationship and the fact that the order dated 05.08.2014 had been stayed in the writ petition filed by the Trust had rejected the applications. 23. For the purpose of applying the principles of res judicata at subsequent stage of the same suit, it is necessary that the issue sought to be raised at the subsequent stage must have been raised at the preliminary stage itself and the Court should have adjudicated the issue on merits at the earlier stage, which apparently is not the case as noticed hereinbefore, inasmuch as, neither the applications were of similar nature nor adjudication by the Court has anything to do with the subject matter as raised in the applications under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC. 24. The judgments relied on by learned counsel for the respondent Trust have apparently no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the case of LR's of Pratap Mal (supra) the amendment was sought based on the Will and this Court on coming to the conclusion that the Will having nothing to do with relief of eviction on the ground of bona fide necessity, held that the amendment on the basis of such document was not necessary for decision of real controversy in the suits. However, in the present case, as noticed hereinbefore, the amendment sought is necessary for decision of real controversy in the suits. 25. In the case of Ram Babu (supra) the matter pertained to application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC and the same was rejected on account of appellant failing to indicate due diligence regarding the document, which is not the circumstance in the present case. 26. 25. In the case of Ram Babu (supra) the matter pertained to application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC and the same was rejected on account of appellant failing to indicate due diligence regarding the document, which is not the circumstance in the present case. 26. The law laid down in the cases of Sudhir Kumar Wadhwa (supra) and Rakesh Bala Aneja (supra) regarding res judicata at each stage of the suit, as already noticed hereinbefore, has no application to the circumstances of the present case. 27. The judgment in the case of Kamaljit Singh (supra) has also no application to the present case as present is not the case of denial of title of landlord and only pertains to the fact that the landlord has no personal interest in the suit property and has right to continue with the suit. 28. The principle laid down in the case of Rajbahadur Yadav (supra) regarding right of subsequent purchaser to execute the decree and recover possession in respect of a property purchased by him, regarding which, decree had already been passed is essentially premature at this stage. 29. The judgment in the case of Romesh Kumar (supra) also has no application to the facts of the present case. 30. The submissions made by learned counsel for the respondent Trust that even if amendment is granted based on the order dated 05.08.2014 and during the pendency of the suits the order dated 05.08.2014 is set aside in the pending writ petitions, the entire exercise would be in futility. 31. Suffice it to notice that the fact as to the fate of the order dated 05.08.2014 is in the realm of uncertainty today, however, in case the order dated 05.08.2014 is set aside, the consequences would follow, inasmuch as, the petitioners would not be entitled to further rely on the order dated 05.08.2014 and/or the amendment permitted/issue framed, if any. 32. In view of the above discussion, the writ petitions filed by the petitioners are allowed. The orders dated 23.01.2015 passed by the trial court cannot be sustained and the same are, therefore, set aside. The applications filed by the petitioners under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC (Annexure-4) seeking to insert additional plea based on order dated 05.08.2014 is allowed. The amended written statements be filed within a period of fourteen days from the date of this order. The applications filed by the petitioners under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC (Annexure-4) seeking to insert additional plea based on order dated 05.08.2014 is allowed. The amended written statements be filed within a period of fourteen days from the date of this order. In view of the fact that the suits are pending since 2003, the trial court is directed to expeditiously deal with the suits.Petitions allowed. *******