ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S)No. 2348 of 2010 dated 12th February, 2015 whereby, the petition preferred by this appellant (original petitioner) was dismissed and hence, the original petitioner has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. Learned Single Judge has not interfered with the order of dismissal passed by the respondents by way of disciplinary action taken against this appellant for the charges levelled against him, which are at Annexure3 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that after issuing the chargesheet Enquiry Officer gave his report and thereafter, the disciplinary authority passed an order of dismissal of this appellant dated 6th March, 1999. Departmental appeal preferred by this appellant was also dismissed on 6th October, 1999. Charges levelled against this appellant (original petitioner)-delinquent was about financial irregularities for which criminal action was also initiated and this appellant was ultimately, honourably acquitted in G.R. No. 854 of 1992 vide order dated 30th July, 2008 (Annexure7 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal) and therefore, representation was made by this appellant for his reinstatement and for quashing and setting aside the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as by the Appellate Authority and as the same was not done by the respondents, a writ petition was preferred by this Court being W.P.(S) No 2348 of 2010, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 12th February, 2015 and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred mainly on the ground that once there is an acquittal from the criminal charges and if in the departmental proceedings charges are similar in nature the respondents cannot terminate the services of this appellant. Moreover, looking to the Enquiry Officer's report, charges nos. 5, 6 and 7 were not proved whereas, the disciplinary authority has not agreed with the report given by the Enquiry Officer. For this authority notice should have been issued by the disciplinary authority, specific reasons should have been assigned by the disciplinary authority otherwise, the disciplinary authority cannot disagree with the report given by the Enquiry Officer. 3. It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellant that more than one punishment have been inflicted upon this appellant viz. For this authority notice should have been issued by the disciplinary authority, specific reasons should have been assigned by the disciplinary authority otherwise, the disciplinary authority cannot disagree with the report given by the Enquiry Officer. 3. It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellant that more than one punishment have been inflicted upon this appellant viz. removal from service, not to treat the period of suspension as 'on duty' and there is no such punishment prescribed under the Rules applicable to the State Bank of India. It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellate that even otherwise also, the punishment inflicted upon this appellant is shockingly disproportionate or is unreasonably excessive. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and hence, the judgment and order, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No 2348 of 2010 dated 12th February, 2015 deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Counsel for the respondents submitted that no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition preferred by this appellant. It is also submitted by the counsel for the respondents-Bank that the charges levelled against this appellant (original petitioner)delinquent in the departmental proceedings and on the criminal side are not the same. Moreover, the standard of evidence in a departmental proceedings is based upon principle “preponderance of probabilities” whereas, on a criminal side the charges are to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 5. Counsel for the respondents further submitted that serious are the misconducts committed by this appellant which are financial irregularities and that have been proved as per the Enquiry Officer's report except charge no. 5, 6 & 7 and looking to the nature of charges which are proved during the departmental proceedings, disciplinary authority has imposed punishment of removal from services and also treated the period of suspension as 'not on duty'. This appellant was working as Branch Manager with the State Bank of India. In fact, he was a protector of the interests of the State Bank of India and if a protector commits several financial irregularities the quantum of punishment inflicted upon him cannot said to be shockingly disproportionate and no unreasonable excessive punishment. This appellant was working as Branch Manager with the State Bank of India. In fact, he was a protector of the interests of the State Bank of India and if a protector commits several financial irregularities the quantum of punishment inflicted upon him cannot said to be shockingly disproportionate and no unreasonable excessive punishment. These aspects of the matter have been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while deciding the writ petition filed by the appellant (original petitioner) and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court. Reasons : 6. Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we see no reason to entertain this Letters Patent Appeal mainly for the following facts and reasons: (i) This appellant is an original petitioner, who was working as Branch Manager of the State Bank of India at Singhrawan Branch at Chouparan, District Hazaribagh and his duty was to protect the rights and interests of the State Bank of India. (ii) This appellant (original petitioner) was suspended on 17th July, 1992 and thereafter, chargesheet was issued upon him dated 3rd June, 1994 which is at Annexure3 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal. There were several charges levelled against him of financial irregularities. (iii) Enquiry Officer was appointed, adequate opportunity of being heard was given to this appellant and the Enquiry Officer gave his report dated 24th March, 1998 and it has been stated therein that the charge nos.1, 2, 3 & 4 are proved, charge nos. 5, 6 & 7 are not proved and few of the charges are partly proved. Looking to this report the disciplinary authority after giving adequate opportunity of being heard to this appellant passed an order on 6th March, 1999 and imposed punishment of removal of this appellant and the period of suspension was stated as 'not on duty' against which, the departmental appeal was preferred by this appellant which was also dismissed by the departmental appellate authority vide order dated 6th October, 1999. (iv) Simultaneously, F.I.R. was also lodged against this appellant and was resulted into a criminal case being G.R. No. 854 of 1992 under Sections 409, 420, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code. The acquittal order was passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh vide order dated 30th July, 2008. (iv) Simultaneously, F.I.R. was also lodged against this appellant and was resulted into a criminal case being G.R. No. 854 of 1992 under Sections 409, 420, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code. The acquittal order was passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh vide order dated 30th July, 2008. This appellant was acquitted from the charges levelled against him and therefore, representation was made by this appellant for his reinstatement into the services which was denied and therefore, writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2348 of 2010 instituted which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 12th February, 2015 and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner. (v) It appears from the facts of the case that there is vast difference between the departmental charges levelled against this appellant and the criminal charges levelled against him looking to Annexure3 which is departmental proceeding charge and Annexure2, which is F.I.R. Moreover, it appears that after giving adequate opportunity of being heard to the appellant, the Enquiry Officer has arrived on a conclusion that charges nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 are proved, charge nos. 5, 6 and 7 are not proved and few charges are partly proved. There is no illegality committed by the Enquiry Officer in holding the departmental proceedings. Disciplinary Authority has also given adequate opportunity of being heard and passed an order on 6th March, 1999. (vi) Looking to the nature of charges levelled against this appellant and the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer on the basis of the evidence on record, it appears that the charges were serious in nature against this appellant i.e. about several financial irregularities. The order of punishment is of removal from the services and period of suspension is stated as 'not on duty' also cannot said to be unreasonably excessive and it cannot said to be shockingly disproportionate. Appellant was a Branch Manager of the State Bank of India. He has to protect the interests of the bank instead of that he worked against the interests of the bank and therefore, quantum of punishment cannot said to be unreasonably excessive. Period of suspension is rightly treated as 'not on duty' because this appellant cannot be given premium of his own wrong. He has to protect the interests of the bank instead of that he worked against the interests of the bank and therefore, quantum of punishment cannot said to be unreasonably excessive. Period of suspension is rightly treated as 'not on duty' because this appellant cannot be given premium of his own wrong. (vii) So far as criminal case bearing G.R. No. 854 of 1992 is concerned, prosecution examined five witnesses out of which 1 to 4 have turned hostile and though P.W.5 has given clear evidence in favour of the prosecution, there is an order of acquittal. Be as it may, the fact remains that on a criminal side the charges are to be proved beyond reasonable doubt whereas, in the departmental proceedings the charges are to be proved on “preponderance of probabilities”. The charges levelled against the appellant-delinquent, looking to the Enquiry Officer's report, they are proved except charge nos. 5, 6 and 7 and charge no. 7, 8 and 11 are partly proved. There are gross financial irregularities. Fake NSC has retained as collateral security whereas, the loan was given without any collateral security. As a Branch Manager this appellant should know very well that no loan can be without proper verification of collateral securities. He has acted against the interests of the bank in several loan transactions. These charges have been proved looking to the Enquiry Officer's report, whereas, as stated hereinabove, on a criminal side, there were charges of forgery etc. These charges have not been proved because prosecution witnesses nos. 1 to 4 have turned hostile. There may be a “brotherhood” in favour of this appellant of which we are not concerned. Charges on criminal side and on civil side (i.e. in departmental proceedings) are entirely different. This appellant might not have done any forgery, but, there is dereliction in performance of his duty. He has not verified the loan papers. Without proper verification of papers of collateral security loan amount was sanctioned. Thus on criminal side and on civil side charges are entirely different. Gross financial irregularity is a major charge on civil side. (viii) It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 , in paragraph no.13 as under: “13. Thus on criminal side and on civil side charges are entirely different. Gross financial irregularity is a major charge on civil side. (viii) It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 , in paragraph no.13 as under: “13. As we shall presently see, there is a consensus of judicial opinion amongst the High Courts whose decisions we do not intend to refer to in this case, and the various pronouncements of this Court, which shall be copiously referred to, on the basic principle that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously with a little exception. As we understand, the basis for this proposition is that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas. Whereas in the departmental proceedings, where a charge relating to misconduct is being investigated, the factors operating in the mind of the disciplinary authority may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent or the other staff, the standard of proof required in those proceedings is also different than that required in a criminal case. While in the departmental proceedings the standard of proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities, in a criminal case, the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The little exception may be where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common without there being a variance.” (Emphasis supplied) (ix) It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. & Others, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 764 , in paragraph no.11 as under: “11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.” (Emphasis supplied) (x) It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Pathrella v. Oriental Bank of Commerce, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 572 , in paragraphs no. 11 and 22 as under: “11. In our view, the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are fallacious. This Court has taken the view consistently that acquittal in a criminal case would be no bar for drawing up a disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent officer. It is well-settled principle of law that the yardstick and standard of proof in a criminal case is different from the disciplinary proceeding. This Court has taken the view consistently that acquittal in a criminal case would be no bar for drawing up a disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent officer. It is well-settled principle of law that the yardstick and standard of proof in a criminal case is different from the disciplinary proceeding. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is a proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. 22. In the present case the appellant acted beyond his authority in breach of the Bank’s regulation. Regulation 3(1) of the Bank’s Regulations required that every officer of the Bank at all times takes all possible steps to protect the interest of the Bank and discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and do nothing which will be unbecoming of a bank officer. It is a case of loss of confidence in the officer by the bank. In such a situation, it would be a futile exercise of judicial review to embark upon the decision of the disciplinary authority removing the officer from service, preceded by an enquiry, and to direct the bank to take back the officer in whom the bank has lost confidence, unless the decision to remove the officer is tainted with mala fides, or in violation of principles of natural justice and prejudice to the officer is made out. No such case is made out in the present case. (Emphasis supplied) (xi) It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Southern Railway Officers Association and Another v. Union of India and others, reported in (2009) 9 SCC 24 , in paragraph no. 37 as under: 37. Acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The High Court did not say that the said fact had not been taken into consideration. The revisional authority did so. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent official had been acquitted of the criminal charge. (Emphasis supplied) (xii) It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation .v. M.G. Vittal Rao, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 442 , in paragraphs no. 11, 13 and 24 as under: 11. (Emphasis supplied) (xii) It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation .v. M.G. Vittal Rao, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 442 , in paragraphs no. 11, 13 and 24 as under: 11. The question of considering reinstatement after decision of acquittal or discharge by a competent criminal court arises only and only if the dismissal from services was based on conviction by the criminal court in view of the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) [sic Article 311(2) second proviso (a)] of the Constitution of India, or analogous provisions in the statutory rules applicable in a case. In a case where enquiry has been held independently of the criminal proceedings, acquittal in a criminal court is of no help. The law is otherwise. Even if a person stood acquitted by a criminal court, domestic enquiry can be held, the reason being that the standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry and that in a criminal case are altogether different. In a criminal case, standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt while in a domestic enquiry it is the preponderance of probabilities that constitutes the test to be applied. 13. In State of Karnataka v. T. Venkataramanappa, this Court held that acquittal in a criminal case cannot be held to be a bar to hold departmental enquiry for the same misconduct for the reason that in a criminal trial, standard of proof is different as the case is to be proved beyond reasonable doubt but in the departmental proceeding, such a strict proof of misconduct is not required. 24. Thus, there can be no doubt regarding the settled legal proposition that as the standard of proof in both the proceedings is quite different, and the termination is not based on mere conviction of an employee in a criminal case, the acquittal of the employee in a criminal case cannot be the basis of taking away the effect of departmental proceedings. Nor can such an action of the department be termed as double jeopardy. The judgment of this Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony does not lay down the law of universal application. Facts, charges and nature of evidence, etc. involved in an individual case would determine as to whether decision of acquittal would have any bearing on the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry. The judgment of this Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony does not lay down the law of universal application. Facts, charges and nature of evidence, etc. involved in an individual case would determine as to whether decision of acquittal would have any bearing on the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry. (Emphasis supplied) (xiii) It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another v. S. Samuthiram, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 , in paragraphs no. 24 to 28 as under: 24. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame”, “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 25. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India it was held that even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor which is as follows: (Raghava case, SLR p. 47, para 8) “8. … ‘The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term “honourably acquitted”.’” (Robert Stuart case, ILR pp. 188-89) 26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so. 27. We have also come across cases where the service rules provide that on registration of a criminal case, an employee can be kept under suspension and on acquittal by the criminal court, he be reinstated. In such cases, the reinstatement is automatic. 27. We have also come across cases where the service rules provide that on registration of a criminal case, an employee can be kept under suspension and on acquittal by the criminal court, he be reinstated. In such cases, the reinstatement is automatic. There may be cases where the service rules provide that in spite of domestic enquiry, if the criminal court acquits an employee honourably, he could be reinstated. In other words, the issue whether an employee has to be reinstated in service or not depends upon the question whether the service rules contain any such provision for reinstatement and not as a matter of right. Such provisions are absent in the Tamil Nadu Service Rules. 28. In view of the abovementioned circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment imposed in the departmental proceedings as against the respondent, in its limited jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (Emphasis supplied) 7. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2348 of 2010 vide order dated 12th February, 2015. We see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition. There is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal and hence, the same is hereby, dismissed. LPA dismissed.