JUDGMENT : Anant S. Dave, J. The appellant is the original petitioner, who filed writ petition being Special Civil Application No. 9868 of 2008, challenging the orders passed by the respondent No. 3 dated 17.12.2004 by which the petitioner came to be dismissed from the services of the respondent bank, came to be confirmed in Appeal vide order dated 31.3.2005 by the respondent No. 2 and finally, by the respondent No. 1 in Revision Application by an order dated 17.10.2007, with basic prayer before the learned Single Judge in above writ petition was to issue a writ of mandamus, certiorari or appropriate writ or direction for quashing and setting aside impugned orders passed by the respondents as arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the statutory Rules and Regulations of Bank of Baroda Employee's (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976. Certain facts with regard to filing of this Letters Patent Appeal are as under: 2. In the year 2001, when the petitioner was serving as a Chief Manager of the respondent bank at GIDC, Phase III at Vapi Branch, Gujarat, on 8.8.2001, he came to be served with the charge-sheet under Sub-Regulation 6(3) of Discipline and Appeal Regulations of 1976, for the charge of gross misconduct inasmuch as the petitioner demanded illegal gratification of Rs. 25,000/- from Shri Harishkumar Jaishankar Raval, Proprietor of M/s. Raval Earthmovers at Vapi and accepted the same amount on 6.1.2001 in his office chambers for releasing the original documents of his property which were held as collateral securities to Bank of Baroda, Pardi Branch, Pardi, Dist. Valsad. The article of charge specifically was for failure on the part of the petitioner to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and committing the act of unbecoming of an bank officer in terms of Regulation 3 read with Regulation 24 of Bank of Baroda Employee's (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976. The above Memorandum of Article contained statements of allegations accompanied with it. The charge was served on 7.1.2001 and the petitioner was put under suspension on 8.1.2001. 3. That on appointment of Inquiry Officer by the respondent bank, at the end of departmental inquiry, the petitioner came to be exonerated of the charges and inquiry report dated 31.3.2003 was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority. The charge was served on 7.1.2001 and the petitioner was put under suspension on 8.1.2001. 3. That on appointment of Inquiry Officer by the respondent bank, at the end of departmental inquiry, the petitioner came to be exonerated of the charges and inquiry report dated 31.3.2003 was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority. However, the Disciplinary Authority found that reasoning of exoneration of the petitioner in departmental inquiry were contrary to the record and therefore, by giving reasons for disagreement, the Disciplinary Authority, on 23.10.2004 passed an order of disagreement with the findings of the Inquiry Authority. As the order of disagreement dated 23.10.2004 with show cause notice served upon the petitioner with a direction to make his submission either in writing within 7 days of receipt of the order or in-person to the Authority and failure on the part of the petitioner to make submission with regard to the order dated 23.10.2014 of disagreement with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, would result into consequences that would follow. 4. On 2.11.2004, the submissions were made by the petitioner against the reasons/order of the disagreement dated 23.10.2004 received by him and finally in exercise of powers conferred upon the Disciplinary Authority under Regulation 5 read with Regulation 4 and 7(3) and other Regulations of Bank of Baroda Employee's (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976, the Disciplinary Authority after referring the allegations in proof, findings of the Inquiry, order of disagreement, reply/submission made by the petitioner, finally, dismissed the petitioner from the services of the bank, incurring disqualification for future employment by order dated 17.10.2004. 5. In terms of Regulation 17 of Bank of Baroda Employee's (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976, the provisions of Appeal being available within 45 days from the receipt of order of dismissal, the petitioner preferred an Appeal before the Appellate Authority raising various grounds to which Appeal also came to be dismissed on 31.3.2005 by the Appellate Authority respondent No. 2 herein. 6. 6. Again under Regulation 18 of the very Regulations, 1976, the provisions for filing review application was available and accordingly, an application to review the orders passed by the Authorities, the appeal was preferred before the Chairman and Managing Director and Review Authority, respondent No. 1 herein again contending illegality in passing the order impugned, but finally, above Review Application came to be dismissed on 17.10.2007 by the respondent No. 1 and accordingly, writ petition was preferred being Special Civil Application No. 9868 of 2008. 7. Above writ petition came to be dismissed in limine by order dated 12.9.2008 by the learned Single Judge, justifying and upholding legal and valid all three orders by the respondent Nos. 3, 2 and 1 having found no ground for interference in exercise of power under Section 226 of the Constitution of India. 7.1 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the order as above passed in writ petition by the learned Single Judge, this Letters Patent Appeal is preferred under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, on the grounds raised in the appeal as well as contended by the learned advocate appearing for the appellant. 8. Learned advocate Mr. Dipen Desai appearing for the appellant submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is contrary to the evidence on record. He also submitted that the appellant came to be dismissed from service without there being any material on record which establishes the guilt of the appellant. He also submitted that while passing the order impugned, the learned Single Judge has not properly appreciated that the Inquiry Officer has submitted the inquiry report after considering the material available during the inquiry and it is held that the charges levelled against the appellant are not proved. The learned Single Judge while passing the impugned order, has not considered that the Inquiry Officer has rightly found the charges not proved as there was no evidence against the appellant about the charge of illegal gratification. He further submitted that learned Single Judge ought to have considered that the Disciplinary Authority has not given proper reasons for disagreeing with the inquiry report and only on conjectures and surmises, the Disciplinary Authority found the charges to have been proved against the appellant without considering the evidence on record. He further submitted that learned Single Judge ought to have considered that the Disciplinary Authority has not given proper reasons for disagreeing with the inquiry report and only on conjectures and surmises, the Disciplinary Authority found the charges to have been proved against the appellant without considering the evidence on record. He also submitted that except MW 3 Shri Anilkumar Joshi, no other independent management witness has supported the case of the Department and on overall appreciation of the deposition of said witness, it clearly appears that the appellant was innocent and he ought not have been inflicted with the punishment. He further submitted that the appellant himself had by way of a written order instructed his subordinate officer i.e. MW 3 to release the security and that fact has not been considered by the learned Single Judge while passing the order. He also submitted that learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated that after so-called oral instructions from the appellant, the MW 3 did not speak the said aspect to any other staff member of the respondent bank and he did not meet the appellant or the complainant, which is not believable. He also submitted that the story put forward by the complainant was absolutely not believable and in absence of any cogent evidence, the department committed illegality and acted in a very highhanded manner in imposing punishment to the appellant. He also submitted that there was no evidence to prove the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification and mere presence of the file and envelope inside the file on the table of the appellant does not amount to acceptance of illegal gratification. He also submitted that even on the presumption and assumption, no charge can be proved during the course of departmental inquiry and without any evidence, the appellant is inflicted penalty of dismissal, that fact was not considered by the learned Single Judge while passing of the impugned order. He also submitted that even the CBI also filed Special Case No. 14 of 2001, wherein also, after appreciating the evidence, the learned Special Judge (CBI) Court No. 4 acquitted the appellant for the charges under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and therefore, it can be said that the charges are not proved against the appellant. Lastly, he prayed to allow present Letters Patent Appeal by quashing and setting aside the order impugned passed by the learned Single Judge. 9. During the pendency of the Letters Patent Appeal, in CBI, Special Case No. 14 of 2001 filed by the CBI against the petitioner arising out of the charge farmed for having committed an offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, by judgment and order dated 22.5.2013 rendered by learned Special Judge(CBI), Court No. 4. It was held that the demand, voluntarily acceptance and conscious recovery was not proved beyond reasonable doubt in light of acceptable materials in form of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution. The accused/petitioner of this case was entitled to get benefit of doubt and came to be acquitted for the charges directed against him. Above judgment was basis of representation submitted by the petitioner to the respondent authority for dues payment of financial entitlement which came to be negativeted by communication dated 10.9.2013 and these facts are brought on record in Civil Application No. 11186 of 2013. 10. Learned advocate Mr. Dipen Desai for the appellant has relied on the following decisions : (1) (1999)3 SCC 695, Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and anr. In support of his argument that the appellant having been acquitted by the competent Criminal Court namely CBI Court, respondent No.3 is duty bound to reinstate him in service since charges levelled against the appellant in departmental inquiry and charge framed by the Special Court namely CBI Court, were almost identical and had genesis in extent of subject appeal. (2) 2006(8) GLH 533, G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and anr. The proposition that when the Criminal Court has acquitted the delinquent of the charges after a detailed trial, penalty of dismissal in pursuance of departmental proceedings based on same set of evidences and witnesses for the same charge should not be allowed to stand. (3) 2007(9) SCC 755 , Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. The proposition that when the Criminal Court has acquitted the delinquent of the charges after a detailed trial, penalty of dismissal in pursuance of departmental proceedings based on same set of evidences and witnesses for the same charge should not be allowed to stand. (3) 2007(9) SCC 755 , Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. Ltd. v. N. Balakrishnan By relying on paras 21 and 22 of the above decision by which concept about an honourable acquittal in Criminal Case, itself may not be held to be determinative in respect of order of punishment meted out to the delinquent officer by considering certain parameters and principles viewed in light of facts and circumstances of each case. (4) (2009) 2 SCC 570 , Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and Ors. In support of the arguments that the departmental inquiry is in nature of quasi judicial proceedings and standard of strict proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal trial may not be available but at the same time duty is cast upon the departmental authority to follow the principle of natural justice and further the manner in which evidence available to be appreciated and even in the case of documentary evidence it is to be proved by examining witnesses. (5) As such we are not on power of Disciplinary Authority to hold departmental proceedings, while criminal proceedings are pending, but at the same time, reliance was placed by the learned advocate Mr. Dipen Desai for the petitioner on the case of S. Bhaskar Reddy and another v. Superintendent of Police and anr. reported in 2015(2) SCC 365 , where undisputed fact remained about appellant namely Armed Reserve Constables were honourably acquitted by the trial Court for the same charges and dismissal order came to be set aside. 11. Learned advocate Mr. Dipen Desai for the petitioner on the case of S. Bhaskar Reddy and another v. Superintendent of Police and anr. reported in 2015(2) SCC 365 , where undisputed fact remained about appellant namely Armed Reserve Constables were honourably acquitted by the trial Court for the same charges and dismissal order came to be set aside. 11. Learned advocate Mr. Darshan Parikh for the respondent bank, while relying on relevant Conduct Regulations 1976 and Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1976 framed by respondent bank under power conferred by Section 19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1970, relied for the purpose of breach of conduct rules and imposition of penalty of dismissal in context of nature of misconduct, which stood proved in departmental proceedings and submitted that acquittal of appellant by Special Court, CBI has no bearing whatsoever mainly on the ground that such acquittal of the appellant is based on appreciation of evidence on record which was either not established and it established remained not proved and further the appellant was given benefit of doubt and it cannot be termed as honourable acquittal. Otherwise also according to learned advocate for the respondent bank, the standard and parameters of proof for criminal trial and departmental proceedings are different and proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal trial is no more base of establishing the misconduct of delinquent in departmental proceedings where criteria of preponderance of probability is to be accepted and for which no authority as such if necessary. 12. However, learned advocate for the respondent bank has taken us to the article of charges supported by statement in detail and loopholes in findings of the Inquiry Officer for which reasons of disagreement were given by the Disciplinary Authority which remained final upto Appellate and the Reviewing Authority. Accordingly, the order impugned in this appeal, learned Single Judge has considered the scope of interference by High Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against final outcome of departmental proceedings held in accordance with Rues and Regulations framed in this regard, do not warrant any interference and appeal deserves to be rejected. In support of submission and proposition of law various decisions are relied on which are as under : (1) AIR 1982 SC 673 , J.D. Jain v. the Management of State Bank of India and anr. In support of submission and proposition of law various decisions are relied on which are as under : (1) AIR 1982 SC 673 , J.D. Jain v. the Management of State Bank of India and anr. In support of his submission where the High Court interfering with the order of the Tribunal which quashed and set aside the discharge of bank employee under a domestic inquiry and it was held that strict rule of evidence which is not applicable in domestic inquiry. (2) AIR 1984 SC 626 , Corporation of the City of Nagpur and anr. v. Ramchandra G. Modak and Ors. For the proposition of law that power of authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor its discretion in any fettered even if accused is acquitted in criminal trial. (3) (1996) 9 SCC 69 , Disciplinary Authority-Cum-Regional Manager and Ors. v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik In case where bank officer was dismissed for acting beyond his authority in allowing advance and overdrawal, which was not possible to be recovered and upon a challenge, the Apex Court found that misconduct was of such a nature and contrary to regulation of bank which mandated to maintain good conduct and discipline. The order passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside order of dismissal passed by the bank was interfered with and even a plea of lesser punishment by the learned counsel for the delinquent came to be rejected. (4) 1997(4) SCC 565 , Tara Chand Vyas v. Chairman & Disciplinary Authority Emphasizing misconduct especially in the case of employees of bank, disciplinary measures to be taken even in large context to eradicate corruption in public office and bank and penalty is imposed at end of departmental proceedings and charges are proved hardly any scope is left to interfere with such order of punishment. (5) AIR 2003 SC 1796 , Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and Ors. About the bank employee, who was responsible for any unauthorized withdrawal from customer account, at the end of departmental proceedings came to be dismissed from the services and Apex Court in para 16 of the above decision reiterated difference between disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings and the standard of proof, mode of inquiry etc. About the bank employee, who was responsible for any unauthorized withdrawal from customer account, at the end of departmental proceedings came to be dismissed from the services and Apex Court in para 16 of the above decision reiterated difference between disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings and the standard of proof, mode of inquiry etc. whereby it was held that the bank employee deals with public money and the nature of work demands vigilance with the inbuilt requirement to act carefully and any carelessness invited action. (6) (2005) 3 SCC 254 , Div. Controller, KSRTC v. A.T. Mane No place for misplaced sympathy or generosity in a case of employee found to have misappropriated the fund and Judicial Forums are not to interfere with quantum of punishment. (7) Unreported decision in the case of Special Civil Application Nos. 2093 and 2094 of 2007 in the case of Panchmahal Vadodara Gramin Bank and Ors. v. D.M. Parmar Whereby judgment of the Division Bench confirming the judgment of learned Single Judge whereby the appellant bank was directed to reinstate the bank employee in service came to be interfered with by the Apex Court and order came to be quashed and set aside. (7) 2010 (11) SCC 233 , General Manager (P), Punjab & Sind Bank and Ors. v. Daya Singh In the case of gross misconduct namely misappropriation and defalcation by bank employee and pursuance to the departmental proceedings penalty of dismissal came to be imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and interference of the High Court holding findings of inquiry officer as perverse found to be unsustainable by the Apex Court and laid down parameters of judicial review in matter arising out of disciplinary proceeding in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (8) AIR 2014 SC 405 , State of W.B. and Ors. v. Sankar Ghosh. In support of his submission that in case of acquittal, which is not honourable dismissal from services, cannot be said to be unjustified and when the regulations do not provide for automatic reinstatement upon an acquittal of an employee, no order could be passed. 13. That the writ petition came to be dismissed in limine, it has become imperative to produce both the above charges against the appellant, which are as under : Articles of Charge "In terms of Sub-Regulation 6(3) of Bank of Baroda Officer Employees' (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976. 13. That the writ petition came to be dismissed in limine, it has become imperative to produce both the above charges against the appellant, which are as under : Articles of Charge "In terms of Sub-Regulation 6(3) of Bank of Baroda Officer Employees' (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976. Shri Nareshkumar Sumanlal Desai while working as Chief Manager, Bank of Baroda, GIDC, IIIrd Phase Branch, Vapi, during the month of January, 2001, committed gross misconduct inasmuch as he demanded an illegal gratification of Rs. 25,000/- from Shri Harish Jayashankar Rawal, Proprietor of M/s. Rawal Earth Movers, J-12, Panchratna Complex, Char Rasta, GIDC, Vapi and accepted the same from Shri Harish Jayashankar Rawal on 06.01.2001 in his office chamber for releasing original documents of his property at 209, Sanidhya co.op. Housing Society, Chanod, Vapi which were held as collateral security to Bank of Baroda, Pardi Branch, Pardi, Dist. Valsad, on behalf of Bank of Baroda, GIDC, IIIrd Phase Branch, Vapi. Thus, he failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and did an act unbecoming of a bank officer and contravened Regulations(3) read with of the regulation 24, Bank of Baroda Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976. The allegation upon which the aforesaid Articles of Charge are based are set out an Annexure II." Statement of Allegations "In terms of Sub Regulation 6(3) of Bank of Baroda Officer Employees' (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976. The allegations upon which the Articles of Charge against Mr. N.S. Desai, as set out in Annexure I are based, are as under: Shri Nareshkumar Sumanlal Desai was posted as Chief Manager at Bank of Baroda, GIDC, IIIrd Phase Br., Vapi and was performing his duty during the month of January, 2001. That Shri Nareshkumar Sumanlal Desai was controlling the entire operation of the branch which included Administration, operations and Credit (Sanction of new advances, review of old sanctioned limits and recovery of overdues). That Shri Harish J. Rawal, Proprietor of M/s. Rawal Earthmovers, J-12, Panchratna Complex, Char Rasta, GIDC, Vapi, had availed two Demand Loans amounting to Rs. 5 Lacs and Rs. 9.10 Lacs from Bank of Baroda, GIDC IIIrd Phase Br., Vapi, on 21.3.1997 and 21.2.1998 respectively for which the Bank of Baroda, Pardi br., Pardi, Dist. Valsad was holding the Title Deeds of his property at 209, Sanidhya Coop. 5 Lacs and Rs. 9.10 Lacs from Bank of Baroda, GIDC IIIrd Phase Br., Vapi, on 21.3.1997 and 21.2.1998 respectively for which the Bank of Baroda, Pardi br., Pardi, Dist. Valsad was holding the Title Deeds of his property at 209, Sanidhya Coop. Housing Society, Chanod, Vapi as collateral security on behalf of Bank of Baroda, GIDC, IIIrd Phase branch, Vapi. That on liquidation of the loans Shri Harish J. Rawal moved an application in the Bank of Baroda, GIDC, IIIrd Phase branch, Vapi, on 29.6.2000 for issuance of No Dues Certificates and releasing original Title Deeds of his property. That Shri Nareshkumar Sumanlal Desai on receipt of the application issued the No Dues Certificates to Shri Harish J. Rawal the same day but withheld the authorisation letter of Bank of Baroda, Pardi br., Pardi, Dist. Valsad, authorising Shri Harish J. Rawal, for collecting the Title Deeds of his property. That Shri N.R. Patel, PI, CBI, on 6.1.2001, arranged two independent witnesses viz., Shri Kaushik B. Naik, Asstt. Administrative Officer, National Insurance Company Ltd., Vapi and Shri Banabhai R. Patel, Inspector of Income Tax, Income Tax Office, Vapi and completed all necessary legal formalities to lay a trap against Shri Nareshkumar Sumanlal Desai such as a demonstration of phenolphthalein powder and its reaction with sodium carbonate, application of phenolphthalein powder on GC notes of Rs. 25,000/- instructions to complainant, shadow witness, another witness and members of trap party etc. Shri Harish J. Rawal, complainant and Shri Kaushik B. Naik, went to the Bank of Baroda, GIDC IIIrd Phase Branch, Vapi, and met Shri Nareshkumar Sumanlal Desai in his chamber. Shri Desai reiterated his demand of illegal gratification but as the conversation progressed got apprehensive of the presence of Shri Naik (Shadow witness) and on the pretext of asking the complainant to bring his file, he started dispensing with the money matter. After their departure, Shri Nareshkumar Sumanlal Desai telephoned Shri Harish J. Rawal at his office and asked him to come alone and thereafter, when Shri Harish J. Rawal again went to the Chamber of Shri Nareshkumar Sumanal Desai alone, he was asked to bring the currency notes in an envelope kept in the file. The envelope treated with phenolphthalein powder containing the GC notes totalling Rs. The envelope treated with phenolphthalein powder containing the GC notes totalling Rs. 25000/- kept in the middle of the file was thereafter kept on the table of Shri Nareshkumar Sumanlal Desai in his chamber by Shri Harish J. Rawal. Whereas Shri Nareshkumar Sumanlal Desai demanded and accepted Rs. 25,000/- from Shri Harish J. Rawal for releasing original documents of his mortgaged property at 209, Sanidhya Coop. Hsg. Society, Chanod, Vapi. The tainted envelope containing the currency notes kept in the middle of the file was recovered from Shri Desai in presence of Panch witnesses. The wash of left and right hand fingers of Shri Nareshkumar Sumanlal in solution of sodium carbonate gave positive results to corroborate the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by Shri Desai. The documents and statement of Witnesses exist to show that Shri Nareshkumar Sumanlal Desai had demanded and accepted an illegal gratification of Rs. 25000/- from the complainant for releasing his property papers. That Shri Nareshkumar Sumanlal Desai had withheld the letter of authorisation to Bank of Baroda, Pardi br., Pardi, Dist. Valsad, authorising Shri Harish J. Rawal to collect the Title Deeds of his property despite the fact that Shri Rawal had settled his loan account with Bank of Baroda, GIDC IIIrd Phase branch, Vapi, on 29.6.2000. That an unaccounted cash of Rs. 3,39,370/- was recovered from the residence of Shri Nareshkumar Sumanlal Desai and further Rs. 49,000/- from the bank locker maintained in his name for which he could not offer any proper justification." The CBI Court has framed the following charge at Exhibit 28 against the appellant: "1. That you had demanded and accepted the amount of Rs. 25,000/- as illegal gratification on 06.01.2001 from the complainant for release of original document of his property which was mortgaged with the bank. 2. Thereby, you have committed an offence punishable under Section 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 3. I, thereby, direct that you be tried on the said charge." 14. 25,000/- as illegal gratification on 06.01.2001 from the complainant for release of original document of his property which was mortgaged with the bank. 2. Thereby, you have committed an offence punishable under Section 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 3. I, thereby, direct that you be tried on the said charge." 14. Even on perusal of article of charge served upon the appellant is about failure on his part to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and committing an act of unbecoming of bank officer in contravention of Regulation (3) read with Regulation 24 of Bank of Baroda Officers Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 (in short "Conduct Regulations, 1976") along with above article of charge Annexure 2 contains statements of allegations in terms of Sub-Regulation (3) of Bank of Baroda Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (in short D&A Regulation, 1976"). Above statement of allegation, if peruse in details mentioned about the nature of demand, purpose of such demand, acceptable thereof, conduct of delinquent, while charge framed by CBI Court is exclusively under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(2) read Sections 13(1)(d) of the Act, 1988. 15. The Inquiry Officer no doubt exonerated the delinquent of the charge in the departmental inquiry by not believing the management witness including complainant, but reasons for disagreement and order passed thereon by the Disciplinary Authority for which it is empowered, has taken into consideration manifold aspects of the incident in question for which cogent and convincing reasons are assigned. Even the submissions made by the delinquent upon the order of disagreement with the reasons served upon him, were not considered and thereafter, it was held that the charges against the delinquent came to be proved of demanding illegal gratification of Rs. 25,000/- and this is committing breach of Conduct Regulations, 1976 and penalty of dismissal from the service of bank acquiring disqualification for future employment came to be passed. 25,000/- and this is committing breach of Conduct Regulations, 1976 and penalty of dismissal from the service of bank acquiring disqualification for future employment came to be passed. Since the above reasons and order of disagreement and imposition of punishment of dismissal came to be confirmed by the Appellate Authority in Appeal preferred under the Regulation 17 of D&A Regulations, 1976 and also by the Revisional Authority under Regulation 19 of D&A Regulations and finally, the learned Single Judge, we are inclined to refer the reasoning of disagreement, submissions made by the delinquent and ultimate conclusion of the Disciplinary Authority which are reproduced herein below : "Disciplinary Authority's Views/Observations : Shri Desai has submitted that IA had not found him guilty of demanding illegal gratification. Ordinarily, demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is a stealthy operation. In such cases, it is only by linking a chain of suspect acts that a definite probability of commission of the offence can be arrived at. He attempts to draw his innocence from the act of his Sr. Manager (Credit), who, despite his written instructions, did not release the title deeds to Shri Rawal. To further his claim of no wrong doing, Shri Desai refers to the inquiry proceedings where, as told to him by his Sr. Manager (Credit), Shri Rawal was not in a hurry to collect the title deeds. He questions the correctness of the inference drawn about his guilt from his reaction to the act of Shri Rawal flinging the file onto his desk. Shri Desai calls his (re)action as necessitated by 'customer satisfaction'. Finally, he tries to assert his virtuousness by assailing Shri Rawal's spite against him, probably for refusing a second loan. The order of Disagreement builds the sequence of events drawing out the circumstantial conclusion of guilt of Shri Desai. Sr. Manager (Credit) and MW.3, while admitting the written instructions of Shri Desai to release the title deeds, had also stated in the inquiry that he withheld its release under the subsequent oral instructions of Shri Desai. This was confirmed by MW 1, Shri Harish Rawal the borrower, who on clearing the loans and demanding release of his appears, was told by Sr. Manager (Credit) that title deeds were not being released as instructed by Shri Desai. This was confirmed by MW 1, Shri Harish Rawal the borrower, who on clearing the loans and demanding release of his appears, was told by Sr. Manager (Credit) that title deeds were not being released as instructed by Shri Desai. As against the weight of these evidences of the two separate witnesses, is the uncorroborated self evidence of Shri Desai that he was informed by MW 3 that Shri Rawal was not in a hurry to collect the title deeds. The defence could neither obtained MW 3' corroboration in the cross-examination nor negate the evidence of MW 1 and MW 3. Another link in the chain of probabilities of circumstances in the fact that the title deed was not released even after the transfer of MW 3 from the branch on 30.12.2000, giving credence to the suspension that Shri Desai had a personal motive to hold back release of title deed. If as claimed by Shri Desai, it was MW 3, who was responsible for not releasing the title deed, it is suspect why Shri Desai did not ensure release of the title deed at least after the transfer of MW 3. Adding to the series of suspect circumstances is the deposition of MW 1 that whenever he met MW 3 regarding release of his title deeds, he was directed to meet Shri N.S. Desai. The suspicion gets stronger on the fact that till CBI trapped Shri Desai, the title deeds were not released to Shri Rawal. By his own deposition, Shri Desai was aware that the title deeds were not released. Shri Desai's muted and patronising reaction to Shri Rawal's reported unwelcome entry into his cabin and the unruly act of throwing the file (containing the envelope) onto his desk and Shri Desai taking the file and meekly calling out to the retreating Shri Rawal that he (Shri Desai) was ready to accompany him (Shri Rawal) to Pardi Branch whenever he (Shri Rawal) wanted the document amply evidenced that he was aware that the title deed was not released and further implied that it was held back at his instance with ulterior motive to obtain undue pecuniary gain. Shri Desai was the Chief Manager of the Branch. He had the power to influence the actions of his subordinate employees. To release or not to release the title deeds came under his authority. Shri Desai was the Chief Manager of the Branch. He had the power to influence the actions of his subordinate employees. To release or not to release the title deeds came under his authority. He had the motive not to release the title deed. Shri Desai's submission against the order of disagreement have not brought out anything material to impact the findings of guilt of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. Therefore, I hold the following charges are proved against Shri Desai. (1) He demanded illegal gratification of Rs. 25,000/-. (2) He failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and deed an act unbecoming of a Bank Officer and contravened Regulations(3) read with the Regulation 24 of Bank of Baroda Officer Employee's (Conduct) Regulations, 1976. Considering the case in its totality, I am therefore of the opinion that ends of justice would be met in this case if the penalty of "Dismissal from Bank's Service which shall be a disqualification for future employment" is imposed on Shri N.S. Desai." 16. Even the Appellate Authority again considered the grounds of Appeal in detail by assigning reasons and enough pain was taken by the Revisional Authority as both these Authorities have passed reasoned orders dealing with each and every submissions of the delinquent employee, we find no breach of rule of procedure of conducting departmental inquiry and concerned Disciplinary Authority has power not to accept findings and conclusion of Inquiry Officer and to assign reasons for disagreement, learned Single Judge in exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, adverted to settled position of law namely scope of writ Court to interfere with the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority empowered to do so. As we are in agreement with the reasoning on which findings and conclusion are drawn by the Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority, Revisional Authority and learned Single Judge, acquittal of delinquent/appellant herein by CBI Court in absence of sufficient evidence and failure on part of prosecution to establish guilt of the accused/appellant beyond reasonable doubt and giving him benefit of doubt and acquitting of the charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has no consequence. That submission of learned advocate Mr. That submission of learned advocate Mr. Dipen Desai for the appellant about failure of prosecution to prove demand, acceptance and recovery before the CBI Court shall have to be considered in light of established and concluded misconduct of the appellant in the departmental inquiry and it was to the extent of breach of Regulation 3 read with 24 of the Conduct Regulations, 1976, of failure to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and committing an act of unbecoming of a bank officer. Since the parameters in departmental inquiry for establishing misconduct of delinquent are based on preponderance of probability while that in Criminal trial is of guilt of the accused will have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and chain probability has been established. By deposition of MW 3 and the complainant in the departmental inquiry along with nature of conduct and reaction after accepting the file which contained the cover of amount of illegal gratification by the delinquent are sufficient enough to attract the punishment of dismissal keeping in mind law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred to and relied on by the learned advocate for the respondent bank, particularly, in the case of Tarachand Vyas (Supra), Lalit Popli (Supra) and Disciplinary Authority-Cum-Regional Manager and others v. Nikunj Bihari Patnaik (Supra). 17. Besides, the learned Single Judge, while passing the order impugned in this Appeal, observed as under : "12. The Hon'ble Apex Court has in its pronouncement made the position more than clear and it leaves very little scope for interference. Th Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate reported in 2005(2) SCC 489 has observed, quoting the earlier judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Regional Manager, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Sohan Lal reported in 2004(8) SCC 218 as under: "...In our opinion, the High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and did not correct the erroneous order of the Labour Court, which if allowed to stand, would certainly result in a miscarriage of justice.” Further, it has also been quoted, "it has been held that it is not the normal jurisdiction of the superior courts to interfere with the quantum of sentence unless it is wholly disproportionate to the misconduct proved. Such is not the case herein. Such is not the case herein. In the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the past conduct of the respondent, as also his conduct during the domestic inquiry proceedings, we cannot say that the quantum of punishment imposed upon the respondent was wholly disproportionate to his act of misconduct or otherwise arbitrary.” 13. Therefore, in view of the above observations and also in light of the facts discussed here in above in the present case referring to the charges and the reasons for the disagreement by the disciplinary authority in detail, it cannot be said that the impugned decision is any way arbitrary or in violation of the rules of natural justice and it does not call or any interference with regard to either the findings or with the quantum of punishment as it cannot be said to be harsh or perverse." 18. Thus, this Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent challenging the order of learned Single Judge fails inasmuch as no error of law much less on facts appearing ons record either in order passed by the Disciplinary Authority or confirming by the Appeal and Revision and finally by the learned Single Judge and it is rightly held that the scope of exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is circumscribed by parameters laid down by the Apex Court in judgments so referred by the learned Single Judge to which we are in agreement with and in absence of merits, the Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.