JUDGMENT : Anupinder Singh Grewal, J. The petitioner is seeking quashing of adverse remarks pertaining to the period 1.1.1996 to 18.4.1996, which were communicated to him on 16.2.1999. The petitioner, who was a member of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service was posted as Special Judge, SC/ST (Removal of Atrocity) Court, Jhalawar. He was served with a letter dated 16.2.1999 whereby the adverse remarks in his Annual Confidential Report for the year 1996 were communicated to him. The adverse remarks read as under:- "Integrity doubtful" He is not fair and impartial in dealing with the public and Bar. Integrity Certificate with-held (1.1.1996 to 18.4.1996)." 2. He represented against these adverse remarks by filing a detailed representation on 4.3.1999. The representation was rejected, which was communicated to him vide order dated 31.1.2000 (Annexure-7). 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that these adverse remarks deserve to be expunged as they were similar in nature to the remarks recorded in his Annual Confidential Report for the years 1994 and 1995, which were expunged. He has further submitted that all the three adverse Annual Confidential Reports of 1994, 1995 and 1996 were recorded by the same Reporting Officer, who was inimical and biased against the petitioner. He has also submitted that petitioner's representation against the adverse remarks recorded for the year 1996 was not put up before the same Committee which had expunged the adverse remarks recorded in 1994 and 1995. These remarks were similar in nature and in case they had been put up before the same Committee, then they would also have been expunged. He has also contended that there was delay in recording the Annual Confidential Report for the year 1996 and hence the adverse remarks should be excluded from consideration in his service record. He has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Registrar General, Patna High Court v. Pandey Gajendra Prasad [ AIR 2012 SC 2319 ]. 4. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the representation of the petitioner against the adverse remarks recorded for the year 1996 was also considered by the same Committee which had expunged the earlier remarks, and it was only after its due consideration, the representation being without any merit was rejected. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. A perusal of the record, which has been furnished to us by the counsel for respondent during the course of hearing, reveals that the adverse remarks in the Annual Confidential Report for the year 1994 were conveyed to the petitioner on 22.1.1997 and he had represented there against on 1.7.1997, while the adverse remarks in the Annual Confidential Report for the year 1995 were conveyed to him on 5.8.1997 and he had represented to the competent authority on 12.5.1998. Both these representations were dealt with by the Committee of the High Court on 24.4.1999 whereon the adverse remarks were expunged. The adverse remarks in Annual Confidential Report in question, which is of the year 1996, were conveyed to the petitioner on 16.2.1999 and he had represented there against on 4.3.1999. This representation was considered and rejected by the Committee on 18.11.1999. 7. It is also borne out from the record that the same Committee comprising the then Chief Justice and two other Judges of the High Court which had expunged the earlier remarks, had rejected the representation against the adverse remarks recorded in the year 1996. Needless to state that when a representation is submitted, it does take some time before it is processed and put up to the Committee for its consideration. In any case, as the constitution of the Committee was entirely the same, there is absolutely no basis in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that if the representation had been put up for consideration along with the earlier representations, it would also have been accepted. Before rejecting the representation, the comments of the Reporting Officer, the then District & Sessions Judge, Baran, were called for. It, thus, cannot be said that there was non application of mind, or the matter had been dealt with unfairly to prejudice the case of the petitioner. 8. Insofar as the allegations of mala fide against Shri Chatra Ram Jat, then District & Sessions Judge, Baran, who had recorded the adverse remarks are concerned, they cannot be considered as he has not been impleaded as party. It is also trite that allegations of mala fide are more easily made than made out. 9. 8. Insofar as the allegations of mala fide against Shri Chatra Ram Jat, then District & Sessions Judge, Baran, who had recorded the adverse remarks are concerned, they cannot be considered as he has not been impleaded as party. It is also trite that allegations of mala fide are more easily made than made out. 9. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was delay in recording the Annual Confidential Report for the year 1996, does not merit acceptance, as it is apparent from the record that this Annual Confidential Report for the year 1996 was recorded on 4.5.1998. Even the earlier Annual Confidential Reports for the years 1994 and 1995 were recorded on 27.10.1995 and 30.10.1996, respectively which indicates that the Annual Confidential Reports were being recorded after some time. The judgment in the case of Registrar General, Patna High Court v. Pandey Gajendra Prasad (supra) does not lay down as a matter of absolute proposition that the Annual Confidential Reports which are recorded after one year, are not to be considered. It has been held in this judgment that there is a need for urgent reform to bring about uniformity in recording Annual Confidential Reports and they should be recorded promptly with due diligence and caution. This judgment being of the year 2012 would not be applicable to the instant case which pertains to the Annual Confidential Report recorded in 1998. The petitioner has not brought to our notice any rule or guideline prescribing period of limitation for recording Annual Confidential Report. Even if period for recording Annual Confidential Report is provided, it would be directory and not mandatory. Reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of G. Mohanasundaram v. R. Nanthagopal reported as (2014) 13 SCC 172 wherein provision of recording Annual Confidential Report within ninety days of demitting office was held to be directory. 10. We are also conscious of the fact that the scope for judicial review in administrative action is extremely limited and confined to the manner in which the decision is taken and not the decision making process. Even if another view is possible on the same factual matrix, this court will not interfere as it does not exercise appellate jurisdiction. 10. We are also conscious of the fact that the scope for judicial review in administrative action is extremely limited and confined to the manner in which the decision is taken and not the decision making process. Even if another view is possible on the same factual matrix, this court will not interfere as it does not exercise appellate jurisdiction. We draw support from the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Kumar v. State of Haryana, reported as (2013) 16 SCC 293 wherein it was held : "24. The matter can be looked into from another angle as well. In those cases where Courts are concerned with the judicial review of the administrative action, the parameters within which administrative action can be reviewed by the courts are well settled. No doubt, the scope of judicial review is limited and the courts do not go into the merits of the decision taken by the administrative authorities but are concerned with the decision making process. Interference with the order of the administrative authority is permissible when it is found to be irrational, unreasonable or there is procedural impropriety. However, where reasonable conduct is expected, the criterion of reasonableness is not subjective but objective; albeit the onus of establishment of unreasonableness rests upon the person challenging the validity of the acts. It is also trite that while exercising limited power of judicial review on the grounds mentioned above, the court can examine whether administrative decisions in exercise of powers, even if conferred in subjective terms are made in good faith and on relevant considerations. The courts inquire whether a reasonable man could have come to the decision in question without misdirecting himself on the law or facts in a material respect. (See: M.A.Rasheed v. State of Kerala; (1974) 2 SCC 687 -pp.690-91, para-10.)" In the case of Rajendra Singh Verma (Dead) Through LRs v. Lieutenant Governor (NCT of Delhi), reported as (2011) 10 SCC 1 , while dealing with interference of courts in recording of Annual Confidential Report, it was held : "147. Writing the confidential report is primarily and essentially an administrative function. Normally tribunals/Courts are loath to interfere in cases of complaints against adverse remarks and to substitute their own judgment for that of the reporting or reviewing officers. Writing the confidential report is primarily and essentially an administrative function. Normally tribunals/Courts are loath to interfere in cases of complaints against adverse remarks and to substitute their own judgment for that of the reporting or reviewing officers. It is because these officers alone are best suited to judge the qualities of officials working under them and about their competence in the performance of official duties entrusted to them. Despite fear of abuse of power by prejudiced superior officers in certain cases, the service record contained in the confidential reports, by and large, reflects the real personality of the officer." 11. In view of the above, the action of the respondent in rejecting the representation against the adverse remarks recorded in the Annual Confidential Report for the year 1996, cannot be faulted. Consequently, the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. Petitions Dismissed.