Judgment :- R. Sudhakar, J. 1. The Revenue has filed this appeal assailing the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal 'D' Bench, Chennai, dated 19.04.2006 made in I.T.A.No.1088/Mds/2004 for the the assessment year 1999-2000 and the same was admitted on the following questions of law: i. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Tribunal is right in law in deleting the additions under Section 69B of the Income-tax Act made towards the cost of construction based on the report of valuation officer? ii. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Tribunal was right in not following the judgment reported in 276 ITR 563 (Del) and 197 CTR (Delhi) 78 wherein it had been held that assessment is said to have become final and conclusive only when it is decided by the Tribunal which is the last fact finding authority?” 2. The facts in a nutshell are as under: The appellant/assessee constructed a Kalyana Mandapam and admitted the total cost of construction at Rs.64,16,880/-. The Assessing Officer referred the matter to the District Valuation Officer, Chennai and the value reported was Rs.182,89,000/- The assessee's objections to the valuation report were considered by the Assessing Officer and thereafter, the assessment order was passed. Accordingly, a sum of Rs.66,38,880/- was added to the total income of the assessee in the assessment year 1999-2000 and the assessment was completed. 3. The assessee appealed to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), who, by following the decision in the case of Smt.Amiya Bala Paul V. CIT reported in ITR 407 allowed the appeal holding that the Assessing Officer had no power to refer to the valuation on the cost of construction of the property. 4. Calling in question the said order, the Revenue filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue and confirmed the order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The operative portion of the said order reads as under: “5. We have heard the rival contentions and perused the relevant records. The Ld. D.R. Submitted that the insertion of Section 142A with retrospective effect has nullified by the impact of the aforesaid Apex Court decision in the case of Amiya Bala Paul (supra). As such the order of the Ld. CIT(A) is liable to be set aside. We have heard the rival contentions and perused the relevant records. The Ld. D.R. Submitted that the insertion of Section 142A with retrospective effect has nullified by the impact of the aforesaid Apex Court decision in the case of Amiya Bala Paul (supra). As such the order of the Ld. CIT(A) is liable to be set aside. On the other hand, the Ld. Counsel for the assessee brought to our attention the decision of Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in CIT Vs. Krishnan Lal Dua 277 ITR 477 for the proposition that Section 142A of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, was added to the Act with effect from November 15, 1972, by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004. A reading of the provision shows that while the estimate of value of the property etc., made by the Valuation Officer has been treated as relevant for the purpose of making assessment, by virtue of the proviso appearing below sub-section (3), the same has been made inapplicable in respect of an assessment made on or before September, 30, 2004, where such assessment had become final and conclusive except where reassessment is required to be made under Section 153A. 6. Considering through the prism of the aforesiad citation, we find that the assessment in this case had become final on 27.3.2002. It was not the assessee's case that the said order was liable to be revised and reassessment was required to be made under Section 153A of the I.T. Act. Therefore, drawing support from the aforesaid High Court decision, we hold that Section 142A could not be pressed into service for sustaining the addition made by the A.O. On the basis of valuation report prepared by the Valuation Officer. 7. In the result, we uphold the orders of the ld. CIT(A) and decide the issue against the Revenue.” 5. Impugning the said order, the Revenue has preferred this appeal on the questions of law, referred supra. 6. We have heard Mr.T.R.Senthil Kumar, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Revenue and Mr.R.Vijayaraghavan, learned Counsel appearing for the assessee and perused the orders passed by the Tribunal and the authorities below. 7. CIT(A) and decide the issue against the Revenue.” 5. Impugning the said order, the Revenue has preferred this appeal on the questions of law, referred supra. 6. We have heard Mr.T.R.Senthil Kumar, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Revenue and Mr.R.Vijayaraghavan, learned Counsel appearing for the assessee and perused the orders passed by the Tribunal and the authorities below. 7. Even though this appeal was admitted on the questions of law referred supra, the learned counsel on either side fairly concede that the core issue to be determined in this appeal is “Whether the Assessing Officer is entitled to resort to Section 69B of the Act and consequently, refer the matter to the Departmental Valuation Officer, when books of account were not rejected?” 8. The main plea taken by the learned counsel for the assessee is that the onus probandi lies on the Assessing Officer to establish that the assessee has understated or concealed the actual cost of construction and without discharging the onus, the Assessing Officer is not empowered to rely upon the valuation given by the Departmental Valuation Officer, when the books of account were never rejected. 9. The learned Standing Counsel for the Revenue is not disputing the fact that the books of account furnished by the assessee were never rejected by the Department. 10. In the case on hand, it is beyond any cavil that the books of account furnished by the assessee were never rejected. No explanation was called for from the assessee stating that there was concealment or understatement of amount in the books of account. The initial burden cast on the department to prove that there was understatement or concealment of income has not been discharged and, therefore, the Assessing Officer is not empowered to refer the matter to the Departmental Valuation Officer or rely on such report. 11. The above said view of this Court is fortified by the following decisions: (i) In Sargam Cinemas v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2010) 328 ITR 513 (SC), the Supreme Court has held as under: “In the present case, we find that the Tribunal decided the matter rightly in favour of the assessee inasmuch as the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the assessing authority could not have referred the matter to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) without the books of account being rejected. In the present case, a categorical finding is recorded by the Tribunal that the books were never rejected. This aspect has not been considered by the High Court. In the circumstances, reliance placed on the report of the DVO was misconceived.” (emphasis supplied) (ii) Following the above decision of the Supreme Court, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bajrang Lal Bansal, (2011) 335 ITR 572 (Delhi) has held as under: “The primary burden to prove understatement or concealment of income was on the Revenue and it was only when such burden was discharged that it would be permissible to rely upon the valuation given by the District Valuation Officer. The opinion of the District Valuation Officer, per se, was not an information and could not be relied upon without the books of account being rejected which had not been done in the assessee's case. Moreover, there was no evidence found as a result of the search to suggest that the assessee had made any payment over and above the consideration mentioned in the return of the assessee.” (emphasis supplied) (iii) In K.K.Seshaiyer v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2000) 246 ITR 351, a Division Bench of this Court held as under: “When the actual cost of construction was duly recorded by the assessee and that cost also was set out in the agreement with the contractor, specifying the rates, and which rates had been accepted by the Tribunal, and there was no finding that the building was larger than the assessee had claimed or had better quality of construction or fixtures than the assessee had recorded in his books, the opinion of the valuer could not be straightaway substituted for the actual cost that was recorded in the assessee’s books. The Tribunal had not found that the books maintained by the assessee were not credible. Therefore, the Tribunal was not right in not accepting the valuation of house property submitted by the assessee.” 12. In view of the findings recorded above and law enunciated in the decisions referred supra, this appeal deserves to be dismissed. 13. It is to be noted that in an identical circumstance, following the above-said decisions, this Court decided the issue in favour of the assessee in T.C.(A)No.1117 of 2006 dated 10.2.2015. 14. In view of the findings recorded above and law enunciated in the decisions referred supra, this appeal deserves to be dismissed. 13. It is to be noted that in an identical circumstance, following the above-said decisions, this Court decided the issue in favour of the assessee in T.C.(A)No.1117 of 2006 dated 10.2.2015. 14. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed by answering the question of law formulated by this Court in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.