ORDER 1. Regard being had to the similitude in the controversy involved in the present cases, all the writ petitions were analogously heard and by a common order, they are being disposed of by this Court. Facts of Writ Petition No.3502/2015 are narrated hereunder. 2. Petitioners before this Court have filed this present petition for issuance an appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondents to permit the petitioners to appear in D.Ed. Second Year Examination. 3. Facts of the case reveal that the petitioners have taken admission in the year 2011-12 in the “Diploma in Education Course” and they have successfully passed first year in the year 2012 and their mark-sheets are on record. It is pertinent to note that the petitioners have passed the first year in second attempt, meaning thereby, after qualifying the left out papers in the supplementary examination. The petitioners were granted admission in the second year examination in respect of D.Ed. and the D.Ed. Course is of 2 years. The petitioners were orally stopped for appearing in the second year examination and, therefore, they came up before this Court by filing the present writ petitions. 4. Learned counsel has drawn attention of this Court towards the Regulations framed by the Madhyamik Shiksha Mandal, Madhya pradesh, Bhopal in respect of Diploma in Education Course and Regulation Nos.6 and 9 of the Regulations read as under : ^^6- l= 2000&2001 ls Mh-,M- ds izFke o"kZ ds Nk=ksa dks ijh{kk mÙkh.kZ djus gsrq vc dsoy fujarj nks volj ¼eq[; ijh{kk rFkk vuqxkeh ijh{kk½ iznku fd, tk,axsA 9- Mh-,M- ijh{kk esa dksbZ Hkh O;fDr Lok/;k;h mEehnokj ds :i esa ugha cSB ldsxk fdarq izFke ,oa f}rh; o"kZ ds fu;fer izf'k{k.kkFkhZ dks tks izFke volj dh ijh{kk esa vuqÙkh.kZ gks x;k gks] ;k U;wure mifLFkfr dks izfr'kr iwjk djus ds i'pkr~ Hkh fdUgha vifjgk;Z dk;ksZa ls ijh{kk esa u cSB ldk gks rks mls Lok/;k;h :i ls ijh{kk esa lfEefyr gksus gsrq mlh l= dh vuqxkeh ijh{kk esa dsoy ,d volj vkSj fn;k tk,xkA** 5. Regulations in question were amended by an order dated 28.6.2010 passed by the Board and the amendments in the Regulations read as under: ^^1- izos'k funsZ'k fcanq Ø-6 & Mh-,M- izFke o"kZ ,oa f}rh; o"kZ ds Nk=ksa dks izR;sd o"kZ dh ijh{kk mÙkh.kZ djus gsrq voljksa dh la[;k ij izfrca/k ugha jgsxkA 2- izos'k funsZ'k fcanq Ø-9 & ;fn fdlh Nk= us Mh-,M- izFke o"kZ dh ijh{kk mÙkh.kZ djus ds ckn fdlh dkj.ko'k vxys l= esa izos'k ugha fy;k gS rks mls vkxkeh o"kksZa esa f}rh; o"kZ esa izos'k fn;k tk ldsxkA** 6. Petitioners’ contention is that by virtue of the aforesaid amendments, there was no restriction in respect of number of chances for qualifying the D.Ed. first year examination and second year examination and, therefore, as there was no restriction in respect of number of chances, the question of restraining the petitioners to appear in the second year examination does not arise. 7. first year examination and second year examination and, therefore, as there was no restriction in respect of number of chances, the question of restraining the petitioners to appear in the second year examination does not arise. 7. Learned counsel has drawn attention of this Court towards subsequent notification which has been filed along with the reply as annexure R-2 and the same reads as under : ^^Øekad@687@ijh{kk leUo;@2012 Hkksiky] fnukad 17-12-2012 vkns'k ek/;fed f'k{kk eaMy dh dk;Zikfydk lfefr dh cSBd fnukad 23 tuojh 2010 esa fu.kZ;kuqlkj eaMy }kjk lapkfyr fMIyksek bu ,T;wds'ku ijh{kk fu;fer@ Lok/;k;h@i=kpkj ds iwoZ esa izpfyr ikB~;Øe esa izos'k funsZ'kksa esa fcUnq Ø-6 rFkk 9 dks izfrLFkkfir djrs gq, vkns'k Ø-4309@ijh{kk@leUo; Mh-,M-@2010 fnukad 26 Qjojh 2010 dks fuEukuqlkj tkjh fd;k x;k Fkk && v 1- izos'k funsZ'k Mh-,M- izFke o"kZ ,oa f}rh; o"kZ ds Nk=ksa dks izR;sd fcanq Ø-6 % o"kZ dh ijh{kk mÙkh.kZ djus gsrq voljksa dh la[;k dk izfrca/k ugha jgsxkA 2- izos'k funsZ'k ;fn fdlh Nk= us Mh-,M- izFke o"kZ dh ijh{kk fcanq Ø-9 % mÙkh.kZ djus ds ckn fdlh dkj.ko'k f}rh; o"kZ esa vxys l= esa izos'k ugha fy;k gS rks mls vkxkeh o"kksZa esa f}rh; o"kZ esa izos'k fn;k tk ldsxkA mijksDr tkjh vkns'k ds ifjikyu esa mDr fcanqvksa dks izpfyr ikB~;Øe esa Hkh ykxw fd;k x;k FkkA dk;Zikfydk lfefr dh cSBd fnukad 17-10-2012 ds fcanq Ø-6 rFkk 9 esa fuEukuqlkj la'kks/ku dk fu.kZ; fy;k x;k && Ck 1-fcanq Ø-6 % ßl= 2012&2013 ls Mh ,M izFke o"kZ ds Nk=ksa dks ijh{kk mÙkh.kZ djus gsrq vc dsoy fujarj nks volj ¼eq[; rFkk vuqxkeh ijh{kk½ iznku fd;s tk,aaxsÞA ;fn vH;kFkhZ nks fujarj voljksa dk ykHk ysus ds mijkar Hkh izFke o"kZ vFkok f}rh; o"kZ dh ijh{kk esa vuqÙkh.kZ jgrk gS rks vH;FkhZ dks iqu% izos'k ysdj fuèkkZfjr ikB~;Øe iw.kZ djuk gksxkA 2- fcanq Ø-9 % ßMh ,M ijh{kk esa dksbZ Hkh O;fDr Lok/;k;h mEehnokj ds :i esa ugha cSB ldsxk] fdUrq izFke ,oa f}rh; o"kZ ds fu;fer izf'k{k.kkFkhZ dks tks izFke volj dh ijh{kk esa vuqÙkh.kZ gks x;k gks] ;k U;wure mifLFkfr dk izfr'kr iwjk djus ds i'pkr~ Hkh fdUgha vifjgk;Z dkj.kksa ls ijh{kk esa u cSB ldk gks rks mls Lokè;k;h :i ls ijh{kk esa lfEefyr gksus gsrq mlh l= dh vuqxkeh ijh{kk esa dsoy ,d volj vkSj fn;k tk,xkÞA mijksDr ¼c½ vuqlkj la'kksf/kr vkns'k leLr 'kkldh;@v'kkldh; MkbV laLFkku ,oa izf'k{k.kkfFkZ;ksa ij vkxkeh o"kZ 2013 dh Mh-,M- ijh{kk ls ykxw gksaxsA ¼larks"k feJ½ lfpo ek/;fed f'k{kk eaMy]e/; izns'k] Hkksiky** 8. The aforesaid notification is coming in the way of the petitioners. The aforesaid notification provides that a student will be given only two chances to clear first year examination, meaning thereby, the main examination and supplementary examination. Similarly, in the second year examination, they will be given only two chances i.e. the main examination and the supplementary examination. 9. The petitioners are not being permitted to appear in the second year examination as they have failed in the second year main examination and supplementary examination. The aforesaid circular was brought in force in the year 2012. By the aforesaid circular, the Regulations were amended on 17.12.2012 and the petitioners, who were admitted for the session 2011-12 prior to the amendment, are not being permitted to appear in the examination in question, meaning thereby, in the case of the petitioners the circular is being made applicable with the retrospective effect. 10. In the considered opinion of this Court, until and unless it is mentioned in the circular that the same shall be applicable with retrospective effect in respect of earlier batches, same cannot be made applicable with retrospective effect as is being done by the Board. 11. Not only this, this Court has allowed a writ petition i.e. Writ Petition No.6349/2011 (Mohd. Parvej and others v. State of M.P. and others). The petition was allowed on 25.11.2011 and the petitioners therein were permitted to appear in the examination in question. 12. The Board of Secondary Education being aggrieved by the order passed by the Division Bench approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing an SLP and the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dismissed the SLP i.e. SLP (C) No.2366-2368/15 vide order dated 20.7.2015 (Board of Secondary Education and another v. Mohd. Parvej and others). Meaning thereby, the earlier order passed by the Division Bench has not been set aside by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13. In the considered opinion of this Court, the circular issued on 17.12.2012 cannot be made applicable with retrospective effect specially in respect of old batches as they were given unlimited chances by issuing order dated 26.2.2010. The respondents can certainly apply the amendment, which has been done w.e.f. 17.12.2012 in respect of such students who have taken admission after 17.12.2012. 14. The amendments made in the Regulations cannot be applied with retrospective effect. The respondents can certainly apply the amendment, which has been done w.e.f. 17.12.2012 in respect of such students who have taken admission after 17.12.2012. 14. The amendments made in the Regulations cannot be applied with retrospective effect. It is cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. (see Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 13th Edition, Page 532 (II). 15. The apex Court in the case of Zile Singh v. State of Haryana and others, reported in (2004)8 SCC 1 , has dealt with retrospective operation of a statute. Paragraphs No.13, 14, 15 and 22 of the same read as under : “13. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only ‘nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis’ -- a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past. (See : Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, Ninth Edition, 2004 at p.438). It is not necessary that an express provision be made to make a statute retrospective and the presumption against retrospectivity may be rebutted by necessary implication especially in a case where the new law is made to cure an acknowledged evil for the benefit of the community as a whole. 14. The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes.In determining, therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form. If a new Act is ‘to explain’ an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospective. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. If a new Act is ‘to explain’ an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospective. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended an amending Act may be purely declaratory to clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect. 15. Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed and rather there is presumption against retrospectivity, according to Craies (Statute Law, Seventh Edition), it is open for the legislature to enact laws having retrospective operation. This can be achieved by express enactment or by necessary implication from the language employed. If it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation, the Courts will give it such an operation. In the absence of a retrospective operation having been expressly given, the Courts may be called upon to construe the provisions and answer the question whether the legislature had sufficiently expressed that intention giving the Statute retrospectivity. Four factors are suggested as relevant : (i) general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what it was the legislature contemplated (p.388). The rule against retrospectivity does not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount to accrued right 22. The State Legislature of Haryana intended to impose a disqualification with effect from 5.4.1994 and that was done. Any person having more than two living children was disqualified on and from that day for being a member of municipality. However, while enacting a proviso by way of an exception carving out a fact situation from the operation of the newly introduced disqualification the draftsman’s folly caused the creation of trouble. A simplistic reading of the text of the proviso spelled out a consequence which the Legislature had never intended and could not have intended. It is true that the Second Amendment does not expressly give the amendment a retrospective operation. A simplistic reading of the text of the proviso spelled out a consequence which the Legislature had never intended and could not have intended. It is true that the Second Amendment does not expressly give the amendment a retrospective operation. The absence of a provision expressly giving a retrospective operation to the legislation is not determinative of its prospectivity or retrospectivity. Intrinsic evidence may be available to show that the amendment was necessarily intended to have the retrospective effect and if the Court can unhesitatingly conclude in favour of retrospectivity, the Court would not hesitate in giving the Act that operation unless prevented from doing so by any mandate contained in law or an established principle of interpretation of statutes.” 16. In light of the aforesaid judgment as the amendment does not state that it is applicable with retrospective effect, the same cannot be applied to the cases of the petitioners with retrospective effect. 17. The apex Court has take a similar view in the case of Shyam Sundar and others v. Ram Kumar and another, reported in (2001)8 SCC 24 , also. 18. The apex Court in the case of J.S. Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, reported in (2011)6 SCC 570 , has once again held that unless and until it is provided in the statute itself, it cannot be made applicable with retrospective effect. 19. In the case of C. Gupta v. Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd., reported in (2007)7 SCC 171 , has again held that every statute is prima facie prospective unless and until it is made clear in the statute itself that it will have retrospective effect. 20. In the light of the aforesaid judgments, this Court is of the considered opinion that the amendments, which have been made w.e.f. 17.12.2012 cannot be made applicable to the students, who have taken admission prior to 17.12.2012. 21. Resultantly, the respondents are directed to permit the petitioners to appear in the examination in question and the respondents shall also declare the result of the petitioners after their examination. The writ petition stands allowed and other connected writ petitions also stand allowed. 22. Let a copy of this order be placed in other connected petitions also.