Hon'ble SHARMA, J.—We have heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant. 2. The judgment of learned Single Judge, dated 21.4.2015, dismissing the writ petition in limine, on gross laches, is under challenge in this Special Appeal. 3. It is submitted by learned counsel appearing for appellant that the appellant/petitioner had applied for allotment of a plot in Thatar Awasia Yojna, advertised by the Notified Area Committee, Amer, which was merged in the Jaipur Municipal Corporation, in the year 1988, on deposit of registration fee of Rs. 500/- on 15.7.1988. A lottery system was adopted for allotment, in which the petitioner did not succeed. It is alleged that thereafter he continued to wait for allotment, but that despite several reminds and representations, no plot was allotted to him. 4. It is submitted that there were 331 plots in all in Thatar Awasia Yojna, in which 223 plots were allotted and that 64 plots are still vacant. No further allotment was made as some disputes were pending in the Court. The Designated Information Officer informed the petitioner, under the Right to Information Act, 2005, that the matter with regard to allotment was subjudice in the Court, and that at present, there is no proposal to allot any plot in the Scheme. On query No. 6, the petitioner was informed that 223 plots have been allotted, and that 64 plots are remaining. 5. It is submitted that the Jaipur Nagar Nigam, Jaipur, has advertised the residual plots for auction on several dates, at reserved price of Rs. 15,000/- per sq. mtr. It has however not considered the petitioner's representation, whereas his registration has neither been cancelled, not 64 plots were put up for allotment. 6. Learned Single Judge, considering the long and unreasonable delay and relying on the dictum of Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petrolum Co. vs. Hurd, (1874) 5 PC 221, and Moon Milla Ltd. vs. M.R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, AIR 1967 SC 1450 , held that where a person does not approach the Court for ventilating his grievances within a reasonable time, which has to be seen from the facts and circumstances of each case, the delay if not sufficiently explained, the Court will not exercise its extraordinary powers, to grant any relief. In State of Maharashtra vs. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 , twenty years delay was taken to defeat the rights of the petitioner. 7.
In State of Maharashtra vs. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 , twenty years delay was taken to defeat the rights of the petitioner. 7. In the present case, the petitioner had applied for allotment of a residential plot on 15.7.1988, and had approached the Court in the year 2014, after a delay of about 26 years, seeking allotment, when the prices of the land have escalated manifold and residual plots are put up for auction. The explanation given by the petitioner of having represented the matter several times, was not found to be sufficient. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that his registration and repeated representations without satisfactory reply, as well as pendency of disputes, have kept his right alive. He has been waiting continuously for allotment in the Scheme, in which the plots have now been advertised arbitrarily to be sold by way of auction. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment in Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Others, (2013) 1 SCC 353 , in which, in a land acquisition matter, the Supreme Court held that the delay/laches are not an absolute impediment to exercise of judicial discretion and rendering of substance justice. In that case, the petitioner was the owner of the land. His right to property was considered to be a Constitutional right, but also as a human right. The acquisition proceedings were not completed. The petitioner had filed the writ petition as no proceedings were taken after notification under Section 4, for quashing the notification and for return of the land. The petitioner's right to property was not defeated by incomplete acquisition proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the delay in such cases would not amount to defeat his right to property. 10. In H.D. Vora vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (1984) 2 SCC 337 , once again in land acquisition proceedings, the Supreme Court held that in the writ petition challenging the order of requisition filed 30 years after the order was passed, the petitioners have a strong ground of challenge. The petition could not be dismissed on preliminary point of laches. 11. In the present case, no such right to property had accrued, or has matured in favour of the appellant.
The petition could not be dismissed on preliminary point of laches. 11. In the present case, no such right to property had accrued, or has matured in favour of the appellant. He was an applicant for allotment of a plot, which did not materialise in the lottery and waited for 26 years to file the writ petition. The details of the alleged litigation and its result have not been disclosed in the pleading. The ratio of the judgments of the Supreme Court in cases relating to acquisition of land owner by the petition is, thus, not attracted in the present case. 12. In the circumstances of the case, we do not find any error or law in the finding recorded by learned Single Judge, that the explanation of delay of 26 years in approaching the Court for allotment of a plot in the Scheme, in which the petitioner was registered on 15.7.1988, is not only highly doubtful and unreasonable, but also questions the bonafides of the petitioner. If the petitioner was interested in allotment of a plot, in pursuance to the registration made in his favour, he should have approached the Court within reasonable time. The delay of almost 2-1/2 decades, within which the prices of land in Jaipur have escalated manifold, did, defeat the rights of petitioner by the law of repose. The principle of law that delay defeats equity is also attracted in this case. 13. If the appellant applies, the registration amount will be returned to him, along with admissible interest, by the Nagar Nigam, Jaipur. 14. The Special Appeal is devoid of any substance and is, accordingly, dismissed.